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This dissertation unfolds subnational political phenomena by engaging questions about 
redistributive politics and territorial power-building. How do state governors in federal systems 
strategically harness public expenditures to influence vote choice? What causes these leaders to 
emphasize the allocation of private versus semi-public goods? Are governors rewarded for their 
redistributive efforts at the ballot box? And if this is the case, why are some governors able to 
retain power during long periods of time while others are not? These issues are investigated both 
within and between Argentina and Brazil, two federations regarded as textbook examples of 
robust federalism, during the post-authoritarian period. 
The argument has two causal chains. The first chain espouses that variation in subnational 
redistributive politics is attributable to the structure of fiscal federalism and political careerism. 
Gubernatorial incentives for private allocations (patronage or public employment) are stronger 
where, such as in Argentina, fiscal institutions concentrate access to federal transfers at the state 
level and grant governors high discretion over these funds, and electoral and partisan rules foster 
party-centered political careers. By contrast, gubernatorial incentives for semi-public allocations 
(pork-barrel or infrastructure projects) are stronger where, such as in Brazil, fiscal institutions 
disperse access to federal transfers among political actors and limit governors’ discretion in 
spending, and electoral and partisan rules maximize candidate-centered political careers.  
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 v 
The second causal chain links subnational redistributive politics with incumbents’ electoral 
returns. Statistical analyses indicate that patronage tend to benefit Argentine (but not Brazilian) 
governors, while pork-barrel benefits Brazilian (but not Argentine) ones. These different returns 
are explained by stressing the role of political competition and delivering networks of support. It 
is finally argued that extensive patronage-based networks as found in Argentina contribute to 
subnational incumbent stability by shaping expectations about the future distribution of public 
jobs over a stable web of party operatives, who are able to dissuade voters from migrating to the 
opposition. In contrast, pork-barrel networks as found in Brazil are less conducive to incumbent 
stability because they are weakly enmeshed in society so as to monitor voter behavior.  
 vi 
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1.0  THE POLITICS OF SUBNATIONAL COALITION-BUILDING  
For good or ill, over the last quarter of the twentieth century a process of decentralization of 
government –that is, the downward transfer of economic resources, spending responsibilities, 
and political authority from national to subnational and local governments– has spread around 
the world.1
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, the term “subnational” refers to the intermediate levels of government between the national and 
municipal (“local”) governments. States, provinces, or departments are these intermediate jurisdictions. I employ the 
term “state” in general discussions. When discussing country-specific politics, I use the term (“state” or “province”) 
employed in that country.             
 Constitutional and political reforms adopted in countries as varied as Belgium, 
Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and South Africa, to name a few, have 
radically changed relations among levels of government, altered the political incentives, electoral 
strategies and career paths of politicians, and increased the protagonism of territorial politics. 
Due to sweeping decentralization, ordinary citizens in multi-level (or federalized) countries are 
more affected today by intergovernmental institutions and subnational/local politics than in the 
past, while state and municipal governments in a larger number of countries have now to meet 
the needs of their constituents, cultivate direct electorates, and face close scrutiny. I would argue 
that along with transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, the spread of federal institutions 
is perhaps the most salient trend in governance of our time.     
2 
 
 
 
In Latin America, there was a widespread adoption of institutional arrangements that 
granted political authority to subnational and local actors. Whereas in the early 1980s only three 
countries in the region had popularly elected governors and eight held regular elections to choose 
mayors, today state and municipal executives are elected by popular vote in ten and eighteen 
nations respectively.2 In addition to the devolution of political power, the center has transferred 
to lower levels of government the administration and delivery of major public services such as 
education, health, social welfare, housing, and transportation thus making subnational and local 
authorities more accountable to their constituencies. Moreover, although Latin America is still 
characterized by a comparatively high degree of fiscal centralization, the proportion of total 
government expenditures executed by the states and municipalities increased dramatically from 
an average of 15.6 percent in 1985 to 22.4 percent in 2005. Likewise, the share of revenues 
collected by the central governments decreased from an average of about 85 percent of the total 
tax revenue to almost 70 percent in the same period.3
Recent decentralization policies have brought the issue of territorial politics to the 
forefront of the political analysis. Much of the emerging literature on the political economy of 
federalism, however, has tended to focus on the vertical relationship between the national 
“centers” and “peripheries”. Several scholars in this tradition have studied how subnational 
jurisdictions may undermine national macroeconomic stability, good governance, and policy 
  
                                                 
2 See Appendix A, Table 8 for details on gubernatorial and mayoralty elections in the continent. 
3 These percentages refer to fourteen countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) for which comparable data are 
available (author´s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund and World Bank, various years).  
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innovation (Ames 2001; Rodden 2006; Rodden and Wibbels 2002; Rodden, Eskeland, and 
Litvack 2003; Triesman 2000; Wibbels 2005). Others have analyzed how decentralization 
processes may affect the balance of power among different levels of government (Falleti 2010; 
González 2008; Stepan 2004a). Paradoxically, despite the renewed importance of subnational 
actors in contemporary politics, little systematic research has been devoted to study political life 
and territorial power-building within the individual states from a comparative perspective.4
This dissertation unfolds within-state political dynamics and processes by engaging 
questions about redistributive (or “particularistic”) politics and subnational power-building.
 We 
know much about how political power and economic resources are distributed between center 
and periphery, and how these imbalances are institutionalized. We also know that subnational 
governments, concerned about regional rather than national needs, may constrain or free-ride on 
the central government’s preferred policies generating pernicious outcomes for the country as a 
whole. Yet, how politics is configured at the subnational level and what strategies regional 
leaders (in this dissertation, state governors) deploy for governing the countryside is still a 
mystery in the field of comparative politics.  
5
                                                 
4 Two notable exceptions are the recent literatures on subnational authoritarianism and political clientelism. The 
former has emphasized how democratization at the national level can coexist with authoritarian subnational 
practices (Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2010). The latter has highlighted that the poor are more likely to 
receive clientelistic goods, and that majoritarian parties are more likely to benefit from such linkages (Brusco, 
Nazareno and Stokes 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Desposato 2002). Most of these works, however, are single-
country studies or comparative analyses of a few states in two countries.  
 
Specifically, how do state governors in federalized systems strategically harness public 
5 I use the term redistributive instead of distributive politics to stress that the particularistic allocation of material 
goods entails redistribution of welfare –and then distributional conflicts– from some groups of individuals to others.  
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expenditures to influence vote choice and amass territorial power? What causes these political 
leaders to emphasize the allocation of private versus public goods? Are governors rewarded for 
their redistributive efforts at the ballot box? And if this is the case, why are some regional 
political elites able to build and retain power during long periods of time while others are not? 
These are important questions difficult to ignore in an era of widespread decentralization.  
The present study addresses these relevant questions by developing two themes. First, it 
treats redistributive politics at the subnational level as a dependent variable by advancing an 
argument about the interaction of fiscal institutions, and electoral and partisan rules in shaping 
state governors’ priorities towards the allocation of patronage (i.e., public employment) and 
pork-barrel (i.e., public infrastructure and capital) goods with electoral purposes. Second, it treats 
redistributive politics as an independent variable by conducting a multivariate analysis about the 
significant, but commonly overlooked, impact of these particularistic strategies on gubernatorial 
electoral performance and enduring political survival.  
Drawing from rational choice institutional accounts of politics and the theoretical insights 
of the recent literature on fiscal federalism and political careerism, I advance the argument that a 
large part of the cross-national variation we observe in the redistributive electoral strategies 
deployed by incumbent governors is attributable to the structure of fiscal institutions and the 
nature of political careers. The central argument espouses that gubernatorial incentives for 
patronage, that is, to permeate the ranks of the state bureaucracy with political loyalists, are 
stronger where intergovernmental fiscal arrangements concentrate access to federal transfers at 
the state level and grant incumbent governors high political discretion to use these funds, and the 
5 
 
 
 
electoral system and partisan nomination and selection rules maximizes party leadership control 
over political careerism.6
By contrast, incentives for subnational spending on pork-barrel allocations are stronger 
where the institutions of fiscal federalism disperse access to intergovernmental grants among 
governors, mayors, and congressional legislators and limit gubernatorial discretion over how the 
transferred funds can be spent, and electoral and partisan rules maximize candidate-centered 
political careerism. Under such conditions, citizens have more incentives to make state 
governments somehow responsible for their expenditure choices, electoral contestation increases, 
and individual politicians seek to reinforce their personal vote by claiming credit for localized 
goods delivered to the regions or constituencies they represent. Pork-barreling, other things being 
 Where incumbent governors concentrate discretionary fiscal resources 
not generated by domestic taxpayers and influence the future of politicians’ careers, 
opportunities for biasing expenditures in the direction of patronage increase because citizens lack 
incentives to make gubernatorial fiscal decisions accountable, electoral challengers are less likely 
to emerge, and the bureaucracy –especially in the absence of professionalized civil service rules– 
becomes a primary source to reward loyalty, encourage activist participation, and finance 
campaigning. Patronage, I contend, contributes to gubernatorial incumbent stability by 
disciplining an elaborate political machine and discouraging voters from exiting to the 
opposition.  
                                                 
6 Federal transfers are revenues collected by the central government and then channeled (either directly or indirectly) 
to lower levels on a regular basis according to some pre-established criteria. This definition excludes specific federal 
programs executed in the states and/or municipalities such as food, income-support, social assistance, and working-
generation programs. These programs do not constitute a permanent transfer of revenues from the center but rather 
temporary allocations of federal expenditures oriented to achieve contingent policy (and political) goals.        
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equal, is less conducive than patronage to subnational incumbent stability. The reason is that 
pork does not encourage a centralized control of party life but rather fosters the creation of 
multiple individually-led networks of support weakly enmeshed in society so as to monitor voter 
behavior and reduce exit options for political clienteles.  
These issues are investigated both within and between the cases of Argentina and Brazil –
two prominent federations that have been widely regarded as textbook examples of “robust” 
federalism– during the post-authoritarian period that begins with the return of democracy in the 
early 1980s. Without question, political support is exchanged for government jobs and public 
works in almost every society, but Argentina and Brazil are exceptional in the pervasiveness of 
these mechanisms of electoral mobilization. A recent survey conducted in twenty-six countries 
of the Americas reports that the Argentines and Brazilians are the citizens of the continent who 
declare to be more frequently exposed to vote-trading relations, only below respondents from 
Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Mexico (AmericasBarometer 2010). In a similar vein, 
several analysts drawing upon ethnographic research and aggregate level data emphasized the 
importance of particularistic exchanges in Argentina and Brazil to both inter- and intra-party 
competition, and pointed to state governors as the champions of patronage and pork-barrel ridden 
politics. Yet academic research has ironically concentrated on electoral exchanges involving 
governors with national actors (especially legislators and the president) in detriment of a focus 
on how and with what success state incumbents allocate public moneys to win votes.  
Unfortunately, systematic efforts to explore redistributive politics using geographic 
subdivisions as units of analysis are rare and almost exclusively based on the U.S. experience 
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(for exceptions on single countries, see Alston, Melo, Mueller, and Pereira 2007; Chhibber and 
Nooruddin 2003; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Remmer 2007). To my 
knowledge, no cross-national comparative study has yet examined variation in redistributive 
politics and its ultimate electoral efficiency across states of different federations. 
This lacuna in the literature is both surprising and serious. It is surprising considering that 
states in multi-level countries are important actors in themselves. In effect, they take significant 
expenditure decisions, administer an array of federal projects, implement highly contentious 
policies such as privatizations and administrative reforms, determine industrial and regulatory 
policies, control their own financial institutions, and in some federations may even issue bonds 
as payment to suppliers and public employees. Moreover, the importance of state governors is 
undeniable. In most federalized countries around the globe, subnational executives enjoy great 
power to dictate politics in their districts, and possess the ability to affect national policy-making 
through their legislative cohorts in Congress. This lacuna is serious because national politics in 
decentralized contexts is often shaped by subnational coalition building. Understanding how 
regional leaders craft political support in their own territories thus helps explain the variation we 
observe in national arenas and core-periphery relations. In addition, an intergovernmental focus 
that neglects state level politics makes the study of politics in multi-level nations incomplete 
because we lack the whole structure of interests that operates on elected politicians.  
The present work contributes to fill important theoretical lacunae in the literature on 
redistributive politics and clientelism, the political economy of federalism, and subnational 
elections. The argument proposed here informs research on redistributive politics and clientelism 
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by answering why subnational executives attempt to win votes through the supply of 
programmatic (non-excludable goods) or particularistic (excludable goods) electoral strategies, 
and what causes them to favor certain particularistic exchanges (jobs in the public sector or 
infrastructure/capital projects) over others. The first question has been addressed by a few studies 
of specific national contexts where strategic changes in the allocation of material benefits for 
electoral support have occurred over time.7
This dissertation alto talks to new research on the political economy of federalism which 
underscores variations in the working of federal polities across the world. Some prior analyses 
have distinguished between federations in which the central government distributes funds to 
states proportionally to their population, and federations in which it benefits populations living in 
overrepresented sates in the national legislatures (Gibson, Calvo, and Falleti 2004). These 
accounts identify sub-types of federal systems based on how fiscal institutions eventually shape 
the regional distribution of intergovernmental transfers. The conceptual distinction proposed 
here, in contrast, is based on how such institutions affect the spending preferences of incumbent 
 The second question has not been tackled (for a 
recent exception based on individual level data, see Calvo and Murillo 2009). This dissertation 
fills in more political context to analyze whether, why and with what electoral effects incumbent 
governors rely primarily on the goodwill of voters who receive material benefits from them, or 
rely instead on financing grassroots networks able to permeate the state bureaucracy, serve in 
party operatives, and gather fine-grained information to monitor voters’ behavior.     
                                                 
7 See, for example, Magaloni (2006) on Mexico, Levitsky (2003) on Argentina, and Hagopian, Gervasoni, and 
Moraes (2009) on Brazil. A comparative account of the decline of clientelistic practices in advanced democracies 
can be found in Kitschelt (2007).   
9 
 
 
 
governors and the consequent distribution of state budgetary resources within subnational 
jurisdictions. Thus, this dissertation not only focuses on how much federal money subnational 
constituent units receive, but fundamentally on how state governors use that money to marshal 
vote support that may increase their electoral performance and chances of political survival. In 
other words, whereas previous research has explored the implications of federal fiscal 
institutions for core-periphery relations, I propose to examine their impact on state level political 
phenomena. 
Understanding variation in gubernatorial redistributive spending patterns possesses a 
major theoretical challenge for comparative studies of federalism. The conventional wisdom in 
the field has tended to see state governors through the lenses of national politics, claiming that 
variation in gubernatorial spending powers and influence over national legislators determines the 
capacity of subnational actors to constrain presidential initiatives and reshape federal institutions 
(Lijphart 1999; Stepan 2004b; Tsebellis 1995). This interpretation, as the following chapters will 
show, has also dominated recent studies on subnational politics. But this research tells us little 
about how incumbent governors actually rule in their fiefdoms in order to preserve territorial 
power, arguably their primary concern. A cross-state two-country comparative study of the 
relationship between redistributive politics, subnational vote choice, and incumbent stability, like 
the one proposed in this dissertation, increases our understanding of the microfoundations of 
territorial power-building in federalized countries. It also constitutes a crucial first step we must 
take before evaluating the potential impact of federalism and decentralization on a number of 
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issues as critical as the delivery of public services, the political participation of local 
communities, and the management of government resources.  
1.1 THE SUBSTANTIVE PUZZLES 
A fundamental distinction among the varieties of federalized democracies in the world refers to 
whether the locus of politics is located at the center or at the state level of the political system. 
According to a commonly accepted view, we should think of Argentina and Brazil as 
archetypical examples of “robust” federations. That is, federal polities in which the states 
comprise the most salient arena of political competition for national power.8
First, in both countries politicians compete in regular elections for the votes of state 
residents making subnational jurisdictions the core of electoral politics. Second, the chief 
executive and the national party leadership exercise very little –if any– influence on candidate 
nomination and therefore on politicians’ state-based careers (Jones 1997, 2008; Jones, Saiegh, 
Spiller and Tomassi 2002; Samuels 2003, 2008; Santos and Pegurier 2004). Third, political 
parties are highly factionalized and decentralized organizations (Ames 1995a; Levitsky 2003; 
Mainwaring 1999; Murilo de Carvalho 1993; Nicolau 1996) that operate in a mosaic of 
 There are enough 
reasons to sustain this interpretation. . 
                                                 
8 The political importance of regionalism in Argentina and Brazil stands in marked contrast with the centralized 
configuration of power that has characterized the other Latin American federations: Mexico and Venezuela.  
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subnational party systems (Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2007; Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Lima 
Júnior 1983, 1997). Fourth, Argentina and Brazil are the only democracies in the world that 
combine a president with strong legislative powers, a highly malapportioned bicameralism with 
both houses having extensive veto powers, and a federal organization with some member states 
having de facto authority to block significant policy-making (Ames 2001; Shugart and Carey 
1992; Snyder and Samuels 2004; Stepan 1999). Fifth, subnational political elites (in particular, 
governors) have traditionally based their territorial dominance on the extensive use of resources 
gained from patronage and pork-ridden politics (Abrucio 1998; Benton 2003; Graham 1990; 
Hagopian 1996; Remmer 2007; Samuels 2002; Stokes 2005), shown great ability to translate 
their interests into national politics (Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Jones and Huang 2005; Kikuchi 
and Lodola 2008; Montero 2000; Samuels 2000a), and emerged as leading contenders to the 
presidency.9
On the basis of these remarkable commonalities, we would expect the logic underlying 
subnational power-building in these federations to be fundamentally and thoroughly similar. A 
 Six and finally, Argentina and Brazil are in a considerable advanced stage of fiscal, 
political, and administrative decentralization ranking in the top positions among all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (IADB 2005).  
                                                 
9 During the period covered by this dissertation, three popularly elected presidents in Argentina (Carlos Menem, 
Fernando De la Rúa, and Néstor Kirchner) and five presidential candidates (Eduardo Angeloz, José Octavio Bordón, 
Horacio Massaccessi, Eduardo Duhalde, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá) had held the governorship before occupying the 
presidency or running for it. Both Duhalde and Rodríguez Saá were named president by Congress following De la 
Rúa’s resignation. In Brazil, three elected presidents (José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Melo, and Itamar Franco) and 
eight presidential candidates (Leonel Brizola, Orestes Quércia, Espiridião Amin, Ciro Gomes, José Serra, Anthony 
Garotinho, Geraldo Alckmin, and Cristovam Buarque) had previously occupied the governorship. Originality 
elected vice-presidents, Sarney and Itamar replaced Tancredo Neves and Collor de Mello in the presidency after the 
former died in office and the latter was impeached on corruption charges.      
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closer examination, however, reveals that the notion of robust federalism masks striking 
differences between Argentina and Brazil. In effect, both countries noticeably differ in the way 
incumbent governors manipulate public outlays to influence vote choice, benefit from different 
redistributive allocations in the electoral market, and succeed in retaining territorial power. The 
rest of this section illustrates these puzzles which challenge the prevailing view about Argentina 
and Brazil as essentially analogous federations. 
1.1.1 The First Puzzle: Patronage and Pork-Barrel Systems   
The Figure 1 presents the first puzzle by displaying the evolution, as percentage of the GDP, of 
state government spending on patronage and pork-barrel goods across all twenty-four Argentine 
provinces and twenty-eight Brazilian states in the period under analysis.10 Patronage is measured 
here as state government spending on personnel allocations.11
                                                 
10 This dissertation covers the 1983-2003 and 1982-2006 periods in Argentina and Brazil respectively. These periods 
begin with the gubernatorial elections that marked the restoration of democracy in both countries, and culminate 
with the most recent gubernatorial elections held in Brazil and the 2003 contests in Argentina. The 2007 elections to 
choose governors in Argentina are excluded because the internal fractures within the PJ, and to a lesser extent the 
UCR, make it difficult to distinguish political factions and alliances in many provinces. I am generating a dataset on 
provincial factionalism at both the gubernatorial and state legislative levels based on experts’ interviews and local 
newspapers that will be used to expand the time-frame covered in this study. 
 This measurement excludes 
administrative expenditures associated with the delivery of goods and services (including social 
security services). Perhaps the most important limitation of this indicator is that it assumes that 
11 Fortunately, the ministries of finance of all provinces/states in Argentina and Brazil classify their expenditures 
following a similar protocol. Although protocols have changed through time thus affecting the identification of some 
budgetary items in the historical series, the question of comparing regional data collected in different countries is not 
a major concern in this dissertation. 
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all jobs public sector employment is patronage when, of course, it is not. There are other 
alternative ways to operationalize subnational patronage, but all of them entail trade-offs and 
limitations. For example, one could use the relative size of the state public sector. But this 
variable would not capture changes in public sector wages. One could instead rely on the public 
sector median wages, but it would not capture the actual magnitude of public employment. Or 
one could utilize the number of temporary employees and public sector wage premiums. But 
these data are only available for a limited number of years in a few states.12 Finally, one could 
consider that a major source for subnational governments to develop patronage comes from 
international loans that allow state authorities to fire outside consultants. Although these loans 
are subject to federal oversight mechanisms, particularly in Brazil as Chapter 3 will show, they 
are opened to patronage and in some states serve to finance a parallel administration. 
Unfortunately, subnational governments are highly reluctant to make these data public.13
                                                 
12 Several often-cited studies have relied on public employment spending as an indicator of patronage (Gibson and 
Calvo 2000; Remmer 2007). I also use the relative size of the state payroll in the statistical analyses developed in 
Chapter 5. 
   
13 Drawing upon aggregate data for the 1998-2005 period, my ongoing research (see Lardone and Lodola 2009) 
finds that financial assistance from the World Bank to support administrative reforms in the Argentine provinces is 
positively associated with increments in personnel spending regardless of the provincial economic conditions and 
degree of regional political competitiveness.   
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Sources: Argentina: 1983-2001, Porto (2004); 2002-2003, Secretaría de Relación Fiscal con las Provincias. Brazil: 
1982-1990, IBGE Sistema de Contas Nacionais; 1991-1994, IBGE Regionalização das Transações do Setor 
Público; 1995-2004, IBGE Novo Sistema de Contas Nacionais. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Patronage and Pork-Barrel Spending in Argentine and Brazilian States, 1982-2004 
 
 
The operationalization of pork-barrel is, arguably, less problematic. It is measured here 
by computing state government spending on both public works and capital projects. One of the 
most evident problems with this measure is that we are unable to capture subcontractors’ 
contributions to candidates, which are thought to be a main source of campaign funds (Samuels 
2001a, 2001b). Investments on public works, as the next section will make evident, are 
geographically targeted semi-public goods, while expenditures on capital projects such as credits 
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to specific economic sectors and firms are sectorally targeted benefits. In measuring pork-barrel, 
I deliberately exclude state government spending on financial investments because this category 
commonly refers to debt interest payments. 
The data presented in Figure 1 provide a clear picture. Subnational governments in 
Argentina and Brazil exhibit markedly different redistributive spending patterns. Whereas 
Argentine provinces spent considerably more public resources on patronage allocations, their 
Brazilian counterparts spent significantly more budgetary outlays on pork-barrel goods. 
Specifically, considering the post-authoritarian period as a whole, the former devoted an average 
of 5 percent and 1.4 percent of the GDP to finance employment in the public sector and to 
develop infrastructure and capital projects respectively. The latter instead targeted an average of 
3.8 percent and 2.1 percent of the GDP to such activities. In terms of the relative priority that 
incumbent governors placed to patronage and pork in their budgets, these percentages 
represented 49.8 percent and 15.7 percent of the total state government spending in Argentina, 
and 42 and 22 percent in Brazil. Therefore, descriptive evidence suggests that Argentine 
governors skew redistributive spending –both in absolute and relative terms– towards patronage, 
while Brazilian governors skew it towards pork.  
In effect, the Argentine provinces have exhibited a sustained proclivity to increase 
government spending on the public sector at the expense of investment on public works and 
capital projects. Notice that in 1983 the gap between expenditures on patronage and pork was 
1.25 percent of the GDP. Twenty years later, it reached 6.45 percent or almost five times de 
initial gap. Both the wages and size of the provincial public sector witnessed continuous 
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increments. With regards to wages, the median public wage increased around 70 percent or 610 
pesos in real terms during the period under study.14 As for size, the privatization of enterprises in 
several sectors (airlines, telephones, railways, coal, and petrochemicals) and the decentralization 
of federal services such as education and health dramatically reduced the number of civil 
servants in the national administration and contributed to increase public employment in the 
provinces. It has been estimated that between 1989 and 1995 nearly 565,000 jobs were 
eliminated from the national public sector payroll, representing a 60 percent cut in national 
public employment (Alessandro 2009; see Appendix A, Figure 33). The incumbent governors, 
however, expanded their politicized bureaucracies in about 193,000 employees. Provincial public 
employment thus passed to account for 54 percent of the total public sector workforce to 75 
percent in the same period.15
                                                 
14 Author’s  calculations based on Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias, various years. 
 Further efforts to reduce provincial payrolls run up against severe 
resistance mainly due to the heavy reliance of governors on the distribution of jobs to their party 
machines. As a result, both patronage spending and the size of provincial public employment 
continued to grow in the 1996-2003 period. They did so at average annual rates of 5.8 percent of 
the GDP and around 20,000 workers. By the end of the period, the ratio of private to provincial 
employees was above 10 in only one province (Córdoba), and below 6 in fourteen provinces 
(Guido and Lazzari 2002). In these provinces, provincial public employment accounted on 
average for almost 20 percent of the total workforce. 
15 As Gibson and Calvo (2000) have convincingly argued, during this period the central government was able to 
advance unpopular structural economic reforms at the national level by allowing provinces to postpone public sector 
employment cuts. 
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The Brazilian states, on the other hand, have shown a more proportional and stable 
pattern of redistributive allocation. Actually, the gap between spending on patronage and pork 
only increased 0.28 percent of the GDP between 1982 and 2006. In sharp contrast to the 
incessant expansion of public employment observed in the Argentine provinces, beginning in the 
mid-1990s the Brazilian states reduced spending on personnel and the size of their bureaucracies. 
Concretely, state government expenditures on patronage were cut by 0.5 percent of the GDP and 
the provincial public sector payroll was reduced from almost 44 percent of the total public 
employment in 1992 to 35.7 percent in 2006 (Pessoa, Brito, and Figuereido 2009; see Appendix 
A, Figure 34). The processes of privatization, decentralization, and fiscal restructuring have 
therefore a different impact on subnational redistributive spending in Brazil. Despite the states 
continued to be major share-holders in important regional enterprises, overall state public 
employment decreased. In part due to the decentralization of education and health services to the 
lowest tier of government, this reduction was accompanied by a rapid expansion in the level of 
municipal public employment, which increased from 37.7 percent of the total public workers to 
49 percent in the same period.16
                                                 
16 As Chapter 3 will show, the process of municipalization in Brazil contributed to the weakening of state governors 
in this country. 
 Furthermore, although fiscal adjustment affected the states’ 
investment capacity, particularized allocations to finance public works and capital projects 
increased at an annual rate of 2 percent of the GDP. If we consider the last five years for which 
systematic data are available, public expenditures allocated these expenditures by the Brazilian 
states more than double those allocated by the Argentine provinces.  
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1.1.2 The Second Puzzle: Subnational Incumbent Stability  
Having revealed a striking cross-national difference in state government redistributive spending, 
I will turn to the puzzle of variation in the capacity of subnational incumbents in Argentina and 
Brazil to build durable territorial power. The primary objective here is to illustrate the extent to 
which subnational political elites are more or less able to survive politically and advance their 
own careers. Although competition for subnational leadership varies considerably within our two 
federations, closer inspection reveals that the electoral efficiency and long-lasting survival of 
regional incumbent parties and individual governors is visibly higher in Argentina than in Brazil. 
The Figures 2 and 3 plot the position of all Argentine provinces and Brazilian states 
along two dimensions, one partisan and the other individual, of subnational incumbent stability. 
These dimensions, which I refer to as incumbent party strength and gubernatorial electoral 
efficiency, serve to illustrate whether subnational incumbency is stable or unstable across time 
and space, and whether partisan or individual –or some combination of both– components of 
support is the driven force behind incumbent stability. 
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Note: Larger markers represent more data points (provinces).  
 
Figure 2: Subnational Incumbent Stability in Argentina, 1983-2003 
 
 
Note: Larger markers represent more data points (states). 
 
Figure 3: Subnational Incumbent Stability in Brazil, 1982-2006 
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The first (partisan) dimension captures the enduring strength of political parties by 
computing the time a given party controls the governorship. Specifically, it measures the 
proportion of consecutive gubernatorial terms that party j governs in state i. The measure equals 
100 for states in which the party in power never changed, and 0 for states where it was never 
reelected. Gubernatorial terms take the value of 1 if the incumbent party is reelected or leads the 
winning electoral coalition, 0.5 if it belongs but does not lead the winning coalition, and 0 if it 
loses the gubernatorial race.17 The second (individual) dimension indicates the ability of 
incumbent governors to win elected office. I measure gubernatorial electoral efficiency as the 
proportion of elections won by the incumbent governor k (i.e., any democratically elected official 
who occupied the governorship for a minimum of six months) in state i during her/his tenure (if 
s/he decides to step down to run for other elected position) or immediately after the end of 
his/her mandate.18
                                                 
17 The 1983 and 1982 gubernatorial terms are the baselines for Argentina and Brazil respectively. As an example of 
how this indicator is computed consider the Brazilian state of Goiás, which was governed by the PMDB in 1982, 
1986, 1990 and 1994, and by the PSDB in 1998, 2002, and 2006. Thus, the incumbent party strength value for Goiás 
is 83.3, which results from dividing five consecutive gubernatorial elections won by the incumbent party over six 
contests held.  
 Governors who win an election (either the governorship or any other) receive 
a value of 1, and those who lose are coded 0. Incumbents who do not run for an elected post 
present a potential problem because their exclusion may bias measures upwards. Relying on 
qualitative data and personal interviews, I constructed an inventory of the “motives” that led 
18 I consider immediate elections any contest held up to four years (or one gubernatorial period) after an incumbent 
left the governorship. If, for example, an incumbent governor left the state executive office in 1992 and run for an 
elected position sometimes between that date and 1996, I consider that election as if it were held in 1992.  
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Argentine and Brazilian gubernatorial incumbents not to run for an elected position.19 Governors 
who could have run but decided not to do it because their chances of winning were sufficiently 
low are included in the estimations and receive a value of 0. In contrast, those who did not run 
because they died in office, were legally banned to do it (either as a result of a legislative 
impeachment or other legal procedures), were appointed to the federal or state bureaucracies, or 
simply quit politics are considered “retirees” and excluded from the estimations.20
The Figures 2 and 3 display one quickly discernable pattern. Both countries exhibit a 
reasonable level of congruence between party and gubernatorial turnover.
 Detailed 
information on the values obtained by each province/state is presented in Appendix A, Table 9. 
21
Delving deeper into these figures, the most striking difference is the enduring strength of 
incumbent parties in Argentina where ten provinces never experienced a partisan alternation in 
power. All Brazilian states, in contrast, experienced at least one alternation. Indeed, the average 
 Yet, variation is 
wider in the two dimensions across Brazilian states. Notice than no Argentine province does 
poorly in both dimensions, and only one fifth obtain values below 50 in at least one dimension. 
In marked contrast, five Brazilian states perform poorly in both dimensions and almost half of 
them get values below 50 in at least one dimension.  
                                                 
19 Since politicians’ real motives are only knowable to them, my inventory may include some miscoded cases. But it 
is, to my knowledge, the only systematic comparative treatment of this subject.  
20 For instance, the Argentine province of Chaco had five different governors during the period under scrutiny. One 
of them quit politics despite enjoying reasonable levels of public approval, three of them won elected office (one of 
these three governors was reelected once), and the remaining governor lost a federal deputy contest. Consequently, 
the gubernatorial electoral efficiency value for Chaco is 75.    
21 Correlation coefficients (excluding the outlier Argentine provinces of Jujuy and Neuquén where internal disputes 
within their respective hegemonic parties affected the stability and electoral prospects of incumbent governors) are 
.605 and .613, p < .001 for Argentina and Brazil respectively.  
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incumbent partisan strength rate is close to 78 in Argentina (representing an average of 1.2 
partisan alternations per province) but only around 50 in Brazil (or 2.9 alternations). Partisan 
differences, however, are only part of the history. In addition, Argentine governors have 
individually been more dominant as suggested by the gubernatorial electoral efficiency rate 
which averages 77 in Argentina versus 66 in Brazil.  
To get a more nuanced depiction of cross-national differences in the electoral efficiency 
of individual governors, Figures 4 and 5 present disaggregated information on the career choices 
and electoral performance of all incumbent governors as defined above in Argentina and Brazil 
in the period under analysis. This information includes gubernatorial running and winning rates, 
and gubernatorial turnover from both electoral defeats and retirements. Details on how these 
figures were computed are provided in Appendix A, Table 10. 
The most important observation is that Argentine governors have consolidated their 
electoral efficacy over time, while Brazilians show a lower and more uneven performance. The 
average running rate (i.e., incumbents seeking any elected office) is similar in both countries: 
nearly 72 and 81 percent respectively. As we would expect, running rates increased considerably 
after the introduction of electoral reforms allowing for the immediate reelection of governors.22
                                                 
22 Beginning in 1987, most Argentine provinces were gradually adopting rules allowing for gubernatorial reelection. 
Today eighteen provinces permit the incumbent governor’s reelection, and four of them limit it to two consecutive 
terms (see Chapter 4 for details). In Brazil, only one consecutive gubernatorial term is allowed since 1998. I test the 
impact of gubernatorial reelection on subnational vote choice in Chapter 5.  
 
Yet, these electoral reforms encouraged subnational incumbent stability in Argentina but not 
much in Brazil. In the Argentine provinces, gubernatorial winning rates (as percentage of 
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incumbents running for office) continued to be extremely high and turnover remained very low. 
The former averaged 92 percent in the whole period (with insignificant changes between 
electoral terms), while the latter averaged 34 percent. Of this 34 percent not winning, only 20 
percent (or 8 cases) run for an elected position and lost. The gubernatorial winning rates in Brazil 
(as percentage of incumbents running) decreased from an average of 81.4 percent before the 
1998 gubernatorial electoral reform to 67.3 percent after it. Similarly, the relations between the 
retirement and defeat components of the turnover rate turned upside down. Whereas in the 1982-
1998 period the ratio of gubernatorial retirements to defeats was of 7 to 3, it became of 4 to 6 in 
the 1998-2006 period. That is, Brazilian governors began to run more for (re)election but also 
lost more elections than in the past. 
 
 
Note: Years indicate the electoral performance and career decisions of incumbent governors whose mandates ended 
at that time. N = 135. Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 4: Career Choices and Electoral Efficiency of Incumbent Governors in Argentina, 1983-2003 
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Note: Years indicate the electoral performance and career decisions of incumbent governors whose mandates ended 
at that time. N = 205. Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 5: Career Choices and Electoral Efficiency of Incumbent Governors in Brazil, 1982-2006 
 
In sum, the data discussed in this section are puzzling because they contrast markedly 
with the conventional wisdom among scholars, who stress the similarity (“robustness”) of 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s federalisms and highlight that governors in both polities are powerful 
actors able to build enduring territorial power based on the particularistic distribution of 
patronage and pork. Yet both incumbent parties and governors are more stable in Argentina than 
in Brazil.    
Having established the puzzles of cross-national variation in gubernatorial redistributive 
politics and subnational incumbent stability in Argentina and Brazil, and having justified why 
they should be of interest, the remainder of this chapter develops more fully an explanation of 
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these outcomes. In the next section, I first develop a two-chain theoretical argument linking 
institutional arrangements with particularistic politics and associated delivering networks; and 
these networks with incumbent stability. Then, I provide a typology of subnational particularism 
in federalized countries that serves to generalize my arguments to a large number of cases. 
1.2 THE MAIN ARGUMENT 
How can the radically different patterns presented in the previous section be explained? Relying 
upon rational choice institutional accounts, this dissertation posits an incentive effect of 
institutions. That is, institutional frameworks create incentives for politicians seeking to 
maximize their personal and/or party ambitions to strategically distribute public expenditures 
with electoral goals.23
The first argument developed in this section highlights that differences in the operation of 
country-level institutional arrangements help explain –both across countries and across time in a 
 By shaping the strategic calculations and behavior of politicians, 
institutions affect the specific forms (varieties) particularistic politics takes. But what kinds of 
institutional configurations make certain varieties of particularism more likely to predominate in 
subnational politics? And why do state governors in particularistic-ridden systems benefit 
differently from the strategic allocation of public outlays?  
                                                 
23 Incentive-based approaches have been applied to study the conditions under which decentralized fiscal institutions 
foster market-enhancing policies and good governance (Careaga and Weingast 2003; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 
1995; Weingast 1995) or instead, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, encourage resistance to market 
reforms, macroeconomic distress, and corruption.       
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given country– whether incumbent governors are more likely to supply patronage or pork-barrel 
allocations in their attempts to mobilize vote support.24
The second argument developed below deals with the question of why different electoral 
strategies built around material inducements do not often provide the same electoral returns to 
incumbent governors. The argument underscores the role of organizational components of 
support or the specific ways in which state-society relations are configured. These relations 
fundamentally encompass the political networks through which voters’ interests are assembled 
by politicians. Patronage-based networks contributes to the enduring territorial dominance of 
subnational political leaders by shaping expectations about the future distribution of public jobs 
 Specifically, the argument holds that the 
structure of fiscal federalism and the nature of political careerism, which organize the way state 
governments are financed and state politics is arranged, lead to notable differences in subnational 
redistributive spending and the organizational attributes of delivering networks of support. 
Where state governors concentrate access to federal transfers, enjoy ample discretion over the 
use of such funds, and influence the future of political careers, they have strong incentives to 
overspend public expenditures on patronage allocations. By contrast, where state governors share 
access to federal transfers with other political actors located at different levels of government (in 
particular, municipal mayors and congressional legislators), enjoy limited political leverage over 
the transferred funds, and do not control the prospects of political careers, they have major 
incentives to invest public outlays on pork-barrel goods. 
                                                 
24 I center the analysis on patronage and pork. Other private allocations are of course possible and would not affect 
the basic argument. I will elaborate on the provision of clientelistic goods in further extensions of this work. 
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over a stable and elaborate network of party operatives, who are able to monitor voters and 
dissuade them from migrating to the opposition. In contrast to patronage, pork-barrel is less 
conducive to incumbent stability because it results in several individually-led networks weakly 
enmeshed in society so as to monitor voter behavior. In combination with the level of political 
competitiveness, the electorate socio-demographic makeup, voting technologies, and electoral 
fiscal agendas, different delivering networks of support largely explain different electoral returns 
from particularistic allocations of public expenditures. 
In sum, there are two steps in the causal chain: first, from fiscal and electoral/partisan 
institutions to gubernatorial redistributive politics and associated delivering networks; and 
second, from redistributive politics and political networks to subnational incumbent stability. 
This argument is summarized in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: The Main Argument 
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1.2.1 The First Causal Chain 
Incumbent governors must decide how to allocate a basket of particularistic goods to voters. 
These goods and the delivery strategies differ in their relative budgetary costs, expected electoral 
returns (expected number of votes for a unit of targeted investment), and level of electoral risk 
which varies according to the publicness of the good delivered. As mentioned in the previous 
section, patronage has one important advantage over pork, because it provides better oversight to 
assure that citizens receiving a material benefit will vote for the benefactor. Patronage, however, 
potentially yields lower electoral results precisely because it benefits a smaller group of voters. 
An additional assumption is that incumbents are risk-averse politicians (Cox and McCubbins 
1986; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estéves 2007). Considered together, these assumptions 
suggest that incumbents should use a mixed of patronage and pork.  
Higher shares of subnational spending on patronage are expected to predominate where 
federal fiscal institutions concentrate access to intergovernmental transfers in gubernatorial 
hands and grant incumbent governors high discretion to spend such funds, and the electoral 
system and partisan nomination/selection rules –especially in the absence of an institutionalized 
civil service– promote party-centered political careers. By contrast, higher shares of spending on 
pork-barrel are expected to be more prevalent where fiscal institutions disperse access to federal 
grants among multiple political actors (governors, mayors, and congressional legislators) and 
limit gubernatorial discretion in transfer spending, and electoral and partisan rules –particularly 
in the presence of stable civil service rules– foster candidate-centered political careers. 
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1.2.1.1 Fiscal Federalism 
Two analytically distinct but related causal mechanisms link the institutions of fiscal federalism 
with subnational redistributive spending and the propensity of state incumbents to supply 
patronage and pork-barrel goods to win votes. The first can be termed the rentier mechanism. 
This argument parallels the discussion on the “resource curse”, which underscores that high 
levels of government dependence on oil and minerals (Ross 2001) or revenues not generated by 
domestic taxpayers such as federal transfers (Gervasoni 2010) create opportunities for 
authoritarian politics at the national and subnational levels.25 I go further than these studies and 
assert that fiscal institutions that promote gubernatorial transfer access and discretion provide a 
key advantage to the incumbent governors in obtaining fiscal resources free of domestic taxation 
and opportunity costs (i.e., fiscal rents) to invest in expanding the state bureaucracy.26
                                                 
25 In contrast to this literature, which focuses on the volume of nontax revenues office-holders receive (or the rate of 
nontax revenues to own-source revenues), my argument also highlights the discretion institutionally assigned to state 
incumbents to arbitrarily use these funds. As Chapter 2 will make evident, failing to consider discretionality renders 
empirical findings questionable because we are unable to know the extent to which the recipients can actually utilize 
the transferred money to achieve the theorized goals.   
 The 
fundamental implication that follows from the distinction between access and discretion is that 
financially relevant transfers may be a politically useless tool in the absence of discretion, while 
relatively modest transfers with almost no strings attached may become a valuable mechanism to 
mobilize adherents (see Bonvecchi and Lodola, forthcoming). 
26 A similar argument advanced by the public finance literature links high levels of nontax revenues coming from 
central transfers with the growth of subnational government spending (Oates 1972; Bird 1986). More recently, 
several scholars have found empirical evidence supporting the claim that nontax revenues –including international 
aid– increases the size of governments (Remmer 2004; Rodden 2002, 2003; Stein 1999).  
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Theoretical and empirical studies in public economics have suggested that ordinary citizens 
and politicians view intergovernmental grants and locally-generated revenues through different 
lenses. Discretionary federal transfers increase governors’ political power vis-à-vis individuals 
and local economic groups, and create the fiscal illusion that subnational public expenditures are 
funded by non-residents. In doing so, central government transfers alter individual perceptions 
about the level of state government spending that can be sustained. If subnational polities are 
financed by fiscal rents –which can be larger than their own-resources and the size of the private 
economy– the link between taxes and benefits is broken and regional voters are less likely to 
sanction public overspending. Subsidized by a generous and sustained inflow of revenues 
coming from the center, and protected from being electorally punished for their profligate fiscal 
behavior, incumbent governors sooner or later manipulate public expenditures to construct 
territorial power based on a large state apparatus.27
Conversely, to the extent that governors receive a small portion of earmarked federal 
transfers and should rely on broad-based domestic taxation to finance the provision of services, 
there is a close link between the benefits provided by these services and the costs to the local 
taxpayers. Under such conditions, electoral constituents have stronger incentives to monitor 
 For incumbent politicians/parties that are 
uncertain about how voters will respond to targeted material benefits, supplying private goods 
(jobs) to their core friends is preferable to delivering semi-public goods (pork) to their swing 
neighbors. 
                                                 
27 A few recent works report a positive association between federal transfers and subnational public employment in 
Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Gervasoni 2010; Remmer 2007), and Russia (Gimpelson and Treisman 2002).  
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subnational authorities’ fiscal behavior closely making incumbent governors less likely to invest 
domestically-generated revenues in financing a large –and probably inefficient– bureaucracy and 
more likely to spend these resources on delivering public and semi-public goods. Arguably, these 
investments may foster economic activity, boost tax revenue, and relax budget constraints.  
The second causal mechanism can be called the barriers to entry mechanism. In fostering 
gubernatorial transfer access and discretion fiscal institutions allow state incumbents to tax their 
constituents lightly, thus reducing the incentives of individual politicians and organized groups 
to challenge the incumbent governors and consequently diminishing the potential for electoral 
competitiveness. In an environment with few –if any– electoral challengers, state governors face 
little incentives to spend additional fiscal resources in credit claiming activities (pork-barrel 
projects), and are more prone to rely on their privileged fiscal position to finance traditional 
forms of particularism such as filling bureaucratic posts with political supporters. By contrast, 
fiscal institutions that disperse access to intergovernmental grants and limit gubernatorial latitude 
over how they can be spent lead state incumbents to tax local workers and businesses, thereby 
increasing incentives to challenge governors and augmenting the potential for competitiveness. 
The likely presence of competitive challengers in the electoral market forces state executives to 
draw upon their pork-barrel credit-claiming ability (rather than on the excessive distribution of 
jobs in the government administration) in order to differentiate from their competitors and gain 
the consent of economic actors and voters.  
As it can be appreciated in Figure 6, I emphasize that five fiscal institutional variables 
determine the ability of state governors to concentrate access to federal transfers and obtain 
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discretion over their use. Some of these variables primarily affect gubernatorial access, while 
others condition gubernatorial discretion. Gubernatorial access, on the one hand, depends on the 
level of subnational vertical fiscal imbalance, the legal mechanisms that regulate the allocation of 
federal transfers to municipal governments, and the openness of budgetary rules and processes to 
congressional appropriations of grants transferred from the center. Gubernatorial discretion, on 
the other hand, depends on the spending powers assigned to governors by the transfer system, 
and the hardness of subnational budget constraints. I discuss below each of these variables and 
the corresponding propositions relating to the gubernatorial propensity towards patronage and 
pork-barrel allocations. 
The first variable affecting gubernatorial access to intergovernmental grants is also the 
most obvious one: the level of subnational vertical fiscal imbalance or the gap between the 
allocation of revenue-raising and expenditure powers to state jurisdictions. High vertical 
imbalances make subnational governments dependent on resources transferred from the center, 
as opposed to domestically-raised taxes and fees, to carry out their spending responsibilities. As 
posited by the rentier mechanism, in countries where these imbalances are particularly high, 
incumbent governors enjoy the political benefits of spending (even in bad economic times) 
without facing the political costs of taxing. Contrary to common wisdom, therefore, fiscal 
dependence from the center does not invariably undermine the capacity of state executives to 
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reign in their fiefdoms.28
The second fiscal institutional variable that contributes to concentration of gubernatorial 
access to intergovernmental grants is the set of formal mechanisms that regulate the allocation of 
federal transfers to municipalities. Gubernatorial access is higher where: (a) municipalities lack 
their own transfer agreements with the central government, which exclusively channel revenues 
to the states; and (b) the mechanisms to reallocate federal grants from state to local governments, 
if existent, are determined by subnational –not national– legislation.
 Indeed, governors can benefit politically from such dependence as they 
can give up taxing local constituents and live off fiscal rents used to hire many civil servants. 
29
An institutional framework in which municipalities only receive federal grants through 
the states according to the latter’s constitutions or specific legislation has a twofold effect on the 
incentives that incumbent governors have for deploying particularistic goods. First, it logically 
enlarges the share of total transfers at the governors’ own disposal thus promoting rentierism and 
associated patronage networks. Second, it allows state governments to politicize municipal level 
redistribution. By placing municipalities under subnational rather than federal fiscal tutelage, 
intergovernmental institutions create barriers to entry for mayors as potential competitors for the 
governorship. Moreover, presidents have fewer opportunities to strengthen mayors bypassing 
governors and to meddle into state-municipal affairs. The institutional obstacles mayors and 
  
                                                 
28 Neither does it, in itself, decrease incumbent governors’ power vis-à-vis the presidents. Actually, Falleti (2010) 
shows that the impact of different decentralization reforms on the intergovernmental balance of power between 
national and subnational executives has been insignificant in Argentina and minor in Brazil. Chapter 3, however, 
will dispute the latter assertion.  
29 Direct national-municipal transfer mechanisms are de jure more feasible when national constitutions recognize 
municipalities as autonomous federal units distinct from the states.  
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presidents face when entering into the incumbent governors’ political turfs reduces political 
competitiveness and reinforces subnational propensity for patronage because governors can 
placate regional voters with private goods (jobs). 
By contrast, if intergovernmental grants to municipalities flow directly from the center 
and national legislation determines the reallocation of funds from state to local jurisdictions, 
incumbent governors share access with mayors who gain financial autonomy from subnational 
largesse. As presidents can funnel transfers bypassing governors, moreover, weak mayors can be 
bolstered in an attempt to undermine states which are typically seen as more threatening by the 
center. This institutional framework diminishes subnational rentierism and increases potential for 
rivalry, thereby forcing governors to rely more intensively on the supply of club goods in order 
to claim credit among voters and maintain a comparatively smaller but unified coalition.  
The third institutional factor that affects gubernatorial access to federal fiscal transfers is 
the openness of budgetary rules to congressional appropriations of transfer moneys. If fiscal 
institutions discourage national legislators from capturing transfers from the federal budget with 
the goal of benefiting local political elites and their own electoral fortress, they contribute to the 
monopolization of fiscal rents on the governors’ hands. In addition, they make it harder for 
individual legislators to challenge the territorial power of established subnational leaders who 
count on a spoils system to feed collective party behavior. Conversely, if national legislators are 
allowed to introduce budget amendments to appropriate federal grants, gubernatorial access to 
such funds is logically diminished. Additionally, national legislators are politically empowered 
as they can charge governors a price for their legislative support, claim credit for whatever 
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federal largesse they attract, side-step governors by acting as intermediaries on behalf of mayors, 
and become potential aspirants to the governorship. By reducing subnational rentierism and 
removing barriers to entry, budgetary rules and processes opened to congressional appropriations 
create incentives for gubernatorial spending on pork-barrel goods.     
With regards to gubernatorial transfer discretion, I highlight two fiscal variables that 
matter: the bias within the intergovernmental system in allocating spending powers to transfer 
recipients, and the strength of subnational budget constraints. As for institutional bias, the 
literature has typically analyzed transfer discretion by indicating whether federal grants are 
earmarked or unearmarked to specific purposes. But federal earmarking is a poor indicator of 
discretionality because it may involve an array of provisions such as unilateral imposition, 
elaborated forms of cooperation and/or co-finance among levels of government, and different 
kinds of strings attached. In order to better capture these nuances, I propose to operationalize 
gubernatorial transfer discretion by assessing whether the incumbent governors control four 
dimensions of funding execution: reallocation, timing, procurement, and monitoring.  
Reallocation concerns the ability of subnational executives to spend the money on other 
projects or activities from those specified in the original agreement. Reallocation can take place 
within and across policy areas. In the first case, governors are de jure or de facto entitled to 
trade-off spending within a policy area. For example, they can determine whether to use transfer 
loans earmarked to education to construct schools or to finance teachers’ professional training. In 
the second case, governors have the authority to divert the money from the policy area to which 
it was assigned to another area. Also critical in this dimension is whether a portion of the federal 
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grants can get diverted to enlarge public employment or increase wages, and then to finance 
machine politics. Timing denotes governors’ leverage to determine when the money can be 
executed. Procurement indicates their capacity to freely decide on hiring employees and 
subcontractors to implement the transferred funds. Finally, monitoring refers to the existence of 
accounting mechanisms designed to supervise incumbent governors’ final spending choices.  On 
the bases of this operationalization, I classify an intergovernmental grant as giving a high level of 
gubernatorial discretion if the transfer system allows subnational executives to control the four 
dimensions of funding execution. A grant with low level of gubernatorial discretion, by contrast, 
is one where the governors are restricted to use the money in ways determined by federal rules. 
These rules will limit hiring power and include strict supervision of accounting mechanisms. Of 
course, many transfers fall between these poles, and I will refer to these transfers as having a 
medium level discretion. 
The second variable that conditions discretion is the set of rules regulating subnational 
finances. Ideally, the ability of subnational and local governments to manage their expenditures 
should be regulated by market discipline or “soft budget constraints” (Kornai 1980). In practice, 
this proposition means that lower levels of government should cover their budget expenditure out 
of their own revenues and the allocated transfers without outside fiscal intervention from either 
the central government or external credit. Political economists, however, have stressed that 
market-based regulations (particularly in less developed countries) are far from an ideal solution 
because a level of government would often extends fiscal help to a lower level in search of its 
political support. An alternative market discipline is a rule-based, “hard budget constraints” 
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approach that limits the capacity of subnational and local governments to receive external 
assistance forcing them to reduce or terminate an activity if the deficit persists.     
A simple cross-national measure of hard budget constraints in unavailable because 
federal restrictions and oversight often come about in various ways. In this dissertation, I refer to 
hierarchical legal systems (i.e., constitutions, fiscal responsibility laws, or other well-established 
regulations) that satisfy four conditions: (a) they limit subnational ability to borrow from private 
foreign or domestic entities (especially banks owned by the states and local public enterprises) 
and to issue bonds based on fiscal-capacity criteria; (b) institute specific targets for fiscal 
performance such as debt stocks and overall balances; (c) establish restrictions on subnational 
public sector spending; and (d) determine legal penalties for states that fail to meet their 
borrowing agreements such as interest rate penalties on existing state debt held by the federal 
government, increases in debt service ceilings, and deductions of state debt service directly out 
of the revenue sharing participations from the center.30
When budget constraints are soft, governors count on more resources to spend in a 
discretionary way. As they know that the central government will respond with bailouts (as 
opposed to ordinary transfers) if things go wrong, state incumbents have strong incentives to set 
  
                                                 
30 Notice that these conditions refer to both ex ante and ex post regulations. Relying on ex ante regulations alone 
gives irresponsible borrowers and lenders strong incentives to sidestep initial legal hurdles and do transactions that 
will be bailed out. Relying only on ex post mechanisms does not prevent borrowers and lenders to build up 
extensive debts whose consequences the national government is unable to enforce. Although I do not consider it 
here, ideally ex ante and ex post controls should also act on public and private lenders. Constraints on borrowers 
alone allow lenders to push loans and find politicians with recklessly high discount rates willing to borrow despite 
the existing rules. Ex ante regulations on lenders typically include no direct central bank financing, financial 
supervision, credit rationing to states, and increased capital requirements for lending to risky states. Ex post 
mechanisms include the strong supervision of banks, and rules requiring capital write-offs for losses from 
subnational governments’ debts (Webb 2004). 
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public employment levels or wages beyond their fiscal capacity. By diverting fiscal revenues to 
finance the state bureaucracies, governors can extract additional federal resources through 
bailouts.31
                                                 
31 Obviously, the cost of not funding public employment may erode governors’ political support. But subnational 
executives can often shift the blame for such unfortunate situation to the central government, which will feel pressed 
to bailout the delinquent state. Since, at equilibrium, the central government often provides transfers to avert blame 
from the states, it will be punished by regional voters if it decides not to bailout. As Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) 
argue, it is strategically rational for voters to punish the central government for not providing bailouts simply 
because the greater the share of the blame they attribute to it, the larger the federal transfers they will receive.  
 Such rents, especially in transfer-dependent and fiscally poor jurisdictions, boost 
public employment even further, at least more than equivalent increments in locally-generated 
revenues. Furthermore, in a context of subnational overspending municipalities can be fiscally 
captured by states through extending credit (Beck Fenwick 2010). This reduces the possibility 
that mayors of large cities will challenge incumbent governors. By contrast, when subnational 
budget constraints are hard, subnational governments rely on less discretionary resources and are 
forced to tighten public expenditures and trim patronage overstaffing. As governors should 
inevitably adjust the public workforce downturn –either through hiring fewer workers or 
reducing wages– they need to increase investment in other electorally-valuable particularized 
goods. Thus, hard budget constraints foster states to use their remaining borrowing and spending 
authority to promote localized short-term investments in infrastructure and capital projects. They 
also make it harder for states to hold municipalities fiscally hostage opening the door for mayors 
to become potential challengers of the incumbent governors. 
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1.2.1.2 Political Careerism 
A large body of literature on comparative parties and elections has analyzed the extent to which 
electoral systems and intra-party nomination and selection rules encourage party-centered or 
candidate-centered political careers (e.g., Ames 1995b; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Carey 
and Shuggart 1995; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). The key difference between these 
institutional structures lies in the relative importance that electoral and partisan institutions 
assign to party leaders in determining the future of individual politicians. Under the close-list 
proportional representation system (CLPR) such as Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela voters 
choose between closed lists of parties (coalitions). The lists are “closed” in the sense that the 
ranking of candidates on each list is decided by the party prior to the elections in a process in 
which the (national or subnational) party leadership has a very heavy hand. Under preferential-
list proportional representation systems (PLPR), voters have a role in the ranking of candidates, 
with the importance of such role varying across subtypes of PLPR systems. In open-list PLPR 
systems such as Brazil, Chile, Poland, and pre-1994 Italy within-list vote share captured by each 
individual candidate determines their positions in the list. Variations aside, these systems vary in 
two important ways. First, they differ in the capacity of party leaders to discriminate in favor of 
some particular candidates and against others. Whereas in CLPR systems such capacity can be 
nearly absolute, in PLPR (especially under open-list) it is greatly weakened. Second, the two 
systems differ in the degree of intra-party competition they produced. In CLPR systems, such 
kind of competition is nil since voter preferences do not determine the electability of particular 
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candidates on the lists. In PLPR, by contrast, candidates feel obligated to differentiate themselves 
from their co-partisans and intra-party competition may be extremely intense. 
These tendencies have a marked effect on the electoral strategies chosen by candidates, 
and the organizational forms adopted by delivering networks of support. To analyze the role of 
party and candidate centeredness on gubernatorial spending calculations, I focus on the 
incentives legislative candidates have for mobilizing support on behalf of their governors. Where 
parties control political careers and campaign finance, politicians (and politically oriented 
bureaucrats) depend on currying favor with party leadership. In return for receiving a nomination 
or a job, these individuals are expected to participate in party daily-life and electioneering 
activities. Incumbent governors in control of the state apparatus can therefore induce 
participation in the party by offering appointments and jobs in the state bureaucracy to faithful 
militants. Because such participation is an observable service, patronage exchanges are profitable 
for ordinary citizens, individual politicians, bureaucrats seeking a political future, and party 
bosses. In this way, electoral/partisan rules that promote party-centered careerism encourage 
state incumbents to reallocate public expenditures through patronage allocations in order to 
finance an elaborated machine and dense webs of territorial connections.   
By contrast, where parties do not control political careers politicians focus their efforts on 
cultivating a personal vote and building an individually-led network of support. There are 
multiple ways to cultivate a personal vote. One option is to rely on name or fame, but only a few 
candidates can resort to this strategy. Another mean, commonly used in U.S. primary campaigns, 
is to emphasize policy or factional differences within the party (Cox and Thies 2000; Samuels 
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1999). Party leaders try to discourage this option because it undermines party cohesion and 
dilutes the value of a party label. A most common alternative is to allow or encourage candidates 
to cultivate a personal support network by directing (or promising to direct) pork-barrel goods to 
their constituents even at the expense of undersupplying much-needed public goods (Ames 2001; 
Cox and McCubbins 2001; Golden 2003). It is worth noting that politicians generally cannot 
differentiate themselves based on patronage resources coming from party leaders or the state 
apparatus because their fellows (or at least some of them) have access to the same goods. Thus, 
politicians must usually generate their own campaign funds which foster them to engage in 
additional pork-barrel activities. In short, a party-centered system of political and bureaucratic 
careerism provides a superior technology for patronage linkages and state-based and politically 
rewarded networks of support. A candidate-centered system, in marked contrast, gives pork-
barreling a more prominent role in party politics and the electoral process, and promotes the 
building of individually-based and delivering networks.32
1.2.2 The Second Causal Chain  
 
What is the link between redistributive politics and subnational incumbent stability? The 
explanation of the electoral efficacy of particularistic strategies emphasizes demand-side and 
supply-side factors along with the institutional rules that condition vote-trading interactions 
                                                 
32 Despite my argument favors the conventional wisdom regarding Argentina’s and Brazil’s party systems, I do 
acknowledge that these countries are moving targets. In particular, Argentine parties became more personalized in 
recent years, while their Brazilian counterparts entered a phase of consolidation after the presidency of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso.    
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between politicians/parties and voters. On the demand-side, I highlight the role of the electorate 
makeup, fiscal agendas, and political competition. On the supply-side, I stress the organizational 
capabilities of delivering networks of support to screen voter behavior. And on the institutional-
side, I point to the effect of balloting structures and voting technologies. 
There is a large body of literature on distributive politics and clientelism that associates 
the returns of individualized allocations of goods with low levels of socioeconomic development 
and organization of the civil society.33
Along with the electorate socio-demographic characteristics that determine voters’ 
dependence on government largesse, I bring partisan politics into the analysis by contending that 
an important demand-side factor that explains cross-state variation in the electoral returns reaped 
from patronage and pork-barrel goods is the degree of regional political competitiveness. 
Drawing on research that highlights the impact of political competition on the provision of 
(semi) public versus private goods (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2003; 
 Poverty-based interpretations argue that the poor are more 
likely to effectively engage in particularistic exchanges because they have less income and 
therefore derive a larger marginal return from a material good (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 
2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Dixit and Londregan 1996), or because they are more risk averse 
and then prefer a small good for certain than a riskier redistributive policy (Desposato 2002; 
Wantchekon 2003). In any case, the underlying idea of this literature is that votes from the poor 
are cheaper and more readily available to buy.  
                                                 
33 For a complete review of the early literature, see Kistchelt (2000).  
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Chhibber and Nooruddin 2003; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Persson and 
Tabelini 1999), I argue that the electoral payoffs of particularistic strategies –either patronage or 
pork– are inversely related with the number of parties competing in elections. The intuition is 
that competitive political settings generate the image of vote trading discontinuity, thereby 
making voting more volatile. Other things being equal, therefore, a unit of patronage or pork 
investment would yield lower electoral returns in electoral markets where multiple parties 
compete for office than in non-competitive electoral turfs. In more general words, as the number 
of competitive parties increase the winning candidate’s vote share would on average decline.  
The level of political competitiveness explains the decreasing returns of patronage and 
pork, but it does not tell us which of these particularistic investment choices is more conducive 
to incumbent stability. In order to answer this question, explanations based on formal rules and 
contextual factors should be completed with considerations of the ways in which state-society 
relations are configured within subnational political units. These relations fundamentally 
encompass the networks through which voters’ interests are assembled by politicians. We 
therefore need to move from the demand to the supply-side of politics.  
The general argument is that patronage rather than pork contributes to the enduring 
stability of (subnational) incumbent elites. It does so by shaping the organizational attributes of 
delivering networks of support. Patronage contributes to incumbent durability in two primary 
ways. First, it shapes expectations about the future distribution of public jobs over a stable 
network of voters (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2001; 
Robinson and Verdier 2003). Second, it facilitates vote monitoring and then discourages voters 
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to deter to the opposition (Stokes 2005, 2007; Medina and Stokes 2007). When incumbents 
garner richer economic resources than their opponents and interactions between dense political 
networks and voters became sustained over time, patronage is likely to generate a “self-enforcing 
group equilibrium” (Kitschelt and Williamson 2007) that served the governing elite to endure its 
political monopoly. But when political parties that are not enmeshed in society attempt to buy 
votes through patronage inducements, voters greet these redistributive efforts with skepticism 
and express a higher propensity to free ride by ignoring the private rewards (or promises) they 
had received.  
In contrast to patronage, pork-barreling is less efficient in contributing to incumbent 
stability because it fosters the construction of individually-led political networks weakly 
enmeshed in society. These networks have few resources to monitor sponsored activities and 
make inferences about how individuals vote. Monitoring in such scenarios is more symmetrical 
among different competing forces and voter defection is more likely, thereby making enduring 
leadership the exception rather than the norm. Because organizational penetration is weak and 
incumbents have difficulties to repeatedly win elections, voters have little incentives to back 
exchanges based on the provision of public jobs as they anticipate that the patronage interaction 
will not continue in the long future. Even after assuming that politicians/parties are capable of 
convincing voters that they deserve merit for supplying pork, the lack of a socially proximate 
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cadre of party brokers open avenues for massive defection to the opposition.34
Finally, there is an institutional-side component that reinforces the electoral efficiency of 
patronage over pork. This factor refers to the voting technology and balloting system that affect 
the anonymity of the vote and facilitate or hinder politicians/parties to solve the commitment 
problem immersed in particularistic interactions. In manual voting systems in which paper-based 
ballots are produced and distributed by political parties, the electoral efficiency of patronage 
increases because parties are more able to keep track of turnout and voting patterns. By contrast, 
electronic voting systems reduce party brokers’ involvement in the electoral process thereby 
decreasing the potential returns of patronage investments.  
 Individual voters 
(and politician/parties themselves) are then more inclined to shift electoral allegiances over time.  
1.3 A TYPOLOGY OF SUBNATIONAL PARTICULARISM 
I propose a typology of subnational redistributive spending according to the structure of federal 
fiscal institutions and the nature of political careers, summarized in Figure 7. Using Lijphart’s 
strategy of creating a dichotomous overarching typology, I collapse the access and discretion 
                                                 
34 Identification of creditworthy is far from obvious in multi-level countries where geographically specific goods 
very often promote the participation of different tiers of government that parade about the same constituencies. This 
cross-level or “nested” parade is well summarized by the 2006 gubernatorial campaign motto of the PT, the 
Brazilian president’s party, in the state of Bahia. The slogan stated: “Lula faz a obra e Paulo Souto faz a placa” 
(president Lula finances the public work and Paulo Souto –the candidate from the state incumbent party– does the 
sign). Creditworthy is also ambiguous because public work projects often take time to be completed, thereby 
allowing different politicians to claim credit.        
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dimensions of the fiscal institutions variable into a single category which I refer to as extensive 
or restricted gubernatorial transfer power. In the former case, federal grants are primarily –if not 
exclusively– transferred to the states and incumbent governors enjoy high political discretion 
over their use. In the latter case, access to intergovernmental grants is shared among different 
political actors with multiple constituencies and gubernatorial leverage over transfer spending is 
limited.35
 
 The political careerism variable, on the other hand, distinguishes between electoral and 
partisan institutions that foster party-centered or candidate-centered political careers. That is, 
institutions that place control of candidate selection/nomination processes in the hands of party 
leadership that also control campaign finance (or other resources that politicians consider 
valuable for their future), and institutions that place such control more broadly among individual 
politicians within a party organization. Two critical implications follow from these distinctions. 
First, extensive versus restricted gubernatorial transfer power alters who has “ownership” of 
federal fiscal transfers and makes spending decisions about redistribution. Second, party-
centered versus candidate-centered rules alters who controls the delivering political networks and 
determines the principal manner in which such networks are financed.  
 
 
                                                 
35 This is therefore a broad categorization that reduces all the possible combinations between (high/low) access and 
(high/low) discretion into a simpler dichotomous framework. Despite its limitations, this strategy is especially useful 
to highlight the existence of contrasting subnational redistributive logics across federalized systems. It is also 
analytically successful to compare countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, whose differences are quite subtle. 
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Figure 7: A Typology of Subnational Particularism 
 
Combining these two variables produces a two-by-two typology with four primary types 
of subnational particularism in federalized countries. The first type, in the upper-left quadrant, is 
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characterized by extensive gubernatorial transfer power and party-centered careerism. I label this 
combination expansive patronage. The institutions of fiscal federalism bias access to federal 
fiscal revenues toward the incumbent governors, even taking into account other factors 
influencing revenue-sharing, thereby enlarging state budgets. Municipalities receive a very small 
portion of transfers directly from the central government or indirectly through the states 
according to subnational (rather than national) legislation, while congressional legislators are 
either banned or limited from making appropriations of intergovernmental grants from the 
budget. In addition, intergovernmental fiscal arrangements grant governors exclusive spending 
authority to make the most important decisions about redistribution. As for political careerism, 
the structure of partisan and electoral rules harness delivering networks to party leadership and 
the incumbent governors themselves who stand at the apex of vertically structured authority 
relations in the states. The combination of large budgets funded by nontax revenues, exclusive 
spending powers over such resources, and political career control leads incumbent governors to 
mobilize constituents primarily by deploying patronage allocations. Especially in the absence of 
stable and meritocratic civil service rules, governors centralize the construction of elaborate, 
state-based political networks that link voters to an army of professional party brokers and 
militants in the public administration to the dominant political leader. Subnational politics in 
Argentina, as Chapters 2 and 4 will show, Mexico, and the U.S. South during the heyday of the 
spoil system best approximate this ideal type.36
                                                 
36 I expand on Mexico and the other Latin American countries mentioned below in the chapter that concludes this 
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A second type of subnational particularistic politics, located in the lower-right quadrant 
of Figure 7, combines restricted gubernatorial transfer power and candidate-centered careerism. I 
label this combination locally-based pork. In this type, federal fiscal institutions introduce a 
more balanced transfer scheme in which state governors share access to intergovernmental grants 
with municipal mayors, who receive a considerable share of the nationally-collected revenues 
directly from the center without gubernatorial intermediation, and congressional legislators, who 
are able (individually and/or collectively) to appropriate federal transfers to reward local political 
elites and their own electoral cohorts. Additionally, incumbent governors’ spending power to 
dictate redistribution of nontax revenues is constrained by federal legislation and oversight 
mechanisms. State executives also lack control over delivering networks because candidate 
selection process and the electoral system reduce the capacity of party leadership to favor 
compliant militants and instead foster personalized campaigns primarily based on pork-barrel 
credit-claiming appeals. This institutional structure, which tends to coincide with more 
institutionalized civil service laws that limit political appointees in the bureaucracy, encourages 
the building of decentralized and individually-run political networks. Under such conditions, 
patronage is not a valuable electoral strategy for incumbent governors who prefer to bolster ties 
with independent local brokers and decentralized networks of support through the delivery of 
narrowly targeted policies and parochial goods. Subnational politics in Brazil, as Chapters 3 and 
4 will make evident, and Colombia fits this characterization.   
                                                                                                                                                             
dissertation. On the U.S. case, Key (1949: 335) remarked that “a considerable part of the party expenses is met by 
the public treasury, and the chief means of diverting public funds to party purposes is through the appointment of 
party workers to public office.”  
51 
 
 
 
A third type, found in the lower-left quadrant, combines extensive gubernatorial transfer 
power and party-centered political careerism. I label this type locally-based patronage, a term 
that suggests the prevalence of decentralized patronage-based networks of support commanded 
by multiple local party bosses –typically mayors of large urban cities– rather than by state 
governors. This is largely possible because the intergovernmental transfer system gives certain 
preferential access and discretion over federal fiscal grants to municipalities at the expense of the 
states (sometimes as a result of a deliberate process of municipalization led by the central 
government with the goal of weakening intermediate level jurisdictions). Political careers, on the 
other hand, do not remain under the control of party leadership. Municipal executives can 
therefore take advantage of burgeoning budgets to build local political networks run by activists 
with jobs in the local administration. Incumbent governors may still reap political dividends of 
such arrangement to the extent that they (independently from or in conjunction with mayors) 
have a say in the nomination of candidates to the party lists. The case of Bolivia appears to 
classify in this characterization.      
The final type of subnational particularistic politics exists where gubernatorial transfer is 
restrictive and political careerism is controlled by party leadership. This type, which I call 
extensive patronage in the absence of a better terminology, is found in the upper right-hand 
quadrant of Figure 7. Althpugh it represents an odd combination, the case of Costa Rica appears 
to fit in this characterization.    
This typology provides a useful heuristic framework to compare and contrast subnational 
particularistic politics and the organizational attributes of the delivering networks of support that 
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incumbent governors choose to employ. The next section defines the particularistic politics as an 
electoral strategy. It also discusses the varieties of particularism (i.e., patronage, pork-barrel, and 
clientelism) that can be found in a polity, and elaborates the implications that such electoral 
strategies have for the organizational forms adopted by the delivering networks of support 
politicians/parties choose to employ.  
1.4 CONCEPTUALIZING PARTICULARISTIC POLITICS  
This dissertation is conversant with the new institutionalism and rationalist approaches to the 
study of politics. Central to these approaches is the premise that politicians strategically allocate 
public expenditures in ways than can increase their electoral performance, advance their personal 
careers, and/or enhance their party reputations.37
                                                 
37 In this sense, I join a nascent “second generation” of positive political economy research on federalism that thinks 
of decision makers as politicians motivated by the desire of retaining power rather than as apolitical benevolent 
despots or rent-seeking Leviathans. For reviews of this literature, see Rodden (2006) and Wibbels (2005). 
 In capturing political strategy at the elite level –
where the key exchanges of public outlays for political support occur– the present study reflects 
an underlying theory of voters, who have preferences over government spending and taxation 
and are willing to vote against those who do not display similar preferences. That is, although 
explaining the demand for government redistribution is important, I take that demand as given 
and focus on electoral exchanges as strategic investments made by politicians/parties. Given 
budgetary constraints, candidates for elected office thus select an electoral strategy –or mix of 
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strategies– by determining when certain appeals will be more effective or successful than others. 
But what sort of appeals do politicians/parties can choose to make?  
Theorists of representative democracy have traditionally conceived that voters react to 
political parties’ programmatic appeals and the provision of public goods such as a stable 
currency, a professionalized bureaucracy, price stability, stronger environmental protections, and 
relatively efficient property rights that affect the fortune of all citizens. But political scientists 
know that this model of responsible partisan government is an idealization of democratic 
governance. Numerous scholars have systematically shown that politics in middle-income and 
recently democratized countries –and in part of the industrialized world as well– also revolve 
around the targeting of material benefits to individual voters, narrow groups of citizens, and 
politically reward networks or machines in exchange for their services to promote the benefactor 
most preferred candidate’s (re)election by delivering the vote and participating in election 
activities.      
I draw upon market-based theories of citizen-politician linkages that identify voters and 
parties as actors who engage in instrumental exchanges. In these theories, the logic underlying 
the electoral exchange resembles a typical market transaction in capitalist economies.38
                                                 
38 This assumption explicitly excludes non-market electoral strategies such as corruption and fraud.  
 Hence, 
given the institutional environment, voters and parties find it advantageous to engage in 
voluntary exchanges of benefits for electoral support. In the responsible partisan model observed 
in some well-established Western democracies, the instrumental exchange is primarily framed in 
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valence or programmatic terms with the aim of providing collective goods to large (all) groups of 
voters. An alternative option available for politicians/parties to instrumentally engage with voters 
is based on “particularistic” material inducements. Because scholars are not sure what to call this 
last electoral strategy or class of strategies, I propose a conceptual scheme to distinguish the 
scope of mechanisms of electoral mobilization available to politicians in electoral democracies.39
The Figure 8 provides a simple scheme mapping the set of electoral strategies motivated 
by politicians in search of support. A first basic distinction is between mechanisms that rely upon 
non-material and material inducements.
 
It is worth noting that these empirically testable mechanisms or strategies are not mutually 
exclusive. Different electoral strategies are usually found in a single polity because rationally-
minded politicians/parties seeking to obtain votes may trade-off budgetary resources, segment 
strategies to constituencies in different electoral sites, or deploy a mix of mechanisms that 
combine different appeals (Ames 1987; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; Magaloni, Diaz-
Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Kitschelt 2010). It is thus an empirical challenge to determine which 
exchange mechanisms predominate or are combined. 
40
                                                 
39 I employ the term mobilization to refer to (gubernatorial) incumbents inducing citizens to vote for their candidates 
and participate in campaign activities. I do not analyze incumbents’ attempts to induce citizens to turn out to vote, a 
strategy that bypasses the commitment problem associated with vote-trading (Nichter 2008). Of course, incumbents 
can also raise the costs for mobilizing in the political opposition through co-opting or repressing political forces, 
controlling social organizations, businesses and the media, and trough direct physical intimidation. The study of 
these non-electoral strategies, however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
 The former include expressive and affective 
attachments that motivate voters to enter a bond with candidates or parties (Kitschelt 2010). 
40 Other research, including that on machine politics in the United States, has made some similar distinctions. For 
example, Banfield and Wilson (1963) wrote about machines providing goods that are “specific and material”, as 
opposed to “non-material” payoffs. A key difference between my work and this literature is that I consider electoral 
exchanges as mutually beneficial for politicians and voters rather than as antithetical with democratic rule. 
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These mechanisms include valued personal physical or cultural traits such as gender, race, 
region, language or ethnic preexisting identities (Chandra 2004), the sentimental attachment to a 
party’s history, symbols, collective memories and social networks, and the fascination with the 
unique personal qualities and charisma of a politician that arises loyalty in his/her leadership. 
Although non-material strategies frequently include campaigns emphasizing promises of 
material benefits for voters who share the correct attribute, politicians primarily resort to 
emotional and symbolic components of support. And voters are responsive to these components 
without expecting material advantages to flow in return because they hint at the identity group 
and derive the emotional satisfaction of supporting someone unique or one of “their own”.  
The mechanisms of electoral mobilization rooted on material inducements, on the other 
hand, involve instrumental and calculated exchanges. As we can appreciate in Figure 8, they can 
be broadly divided between programmatic and particularistic electoral strategies. Extant 
literature offers many rich insights into how to conceptualize particularism, but the absence of a 
fully developed terminological map has produced a definitional morass. Rubrics such as 
clientelism, patronage and pork-barrel continued to be conflated in the literature with serious 
consequences for conducting empirical research. Yet these rubrics actually encompass a range of 
different particularistic strategies politicians/parties undertake to mobilize electoral support. As 
we will see in more detail below, not only do these strategies vary in a number of distinctive 
features (i.e., scale of disbursement, contingency, and incumbency) but also affect the 
organizational forms that politicians/parties choose to establish in order to foster linkage 
relations with voters and be electorally successful (Kitschelt 2010).  
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Figure 8: Mechanisms of Electoral Mobilization 
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My emphasis in distinguishing particularistic from programmatic mechanisms is based on 
a key analytical dimension: the degree of publicness of a given material good, or who can be 
prevented from benefiting (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez 2007).41 Programmatic 
strategies involve the delivery of extensive (i.e., collective) goods that cannot be denied to 
anyone. These goods are typically comprised in the notions of social welfare benefits, universal 
education, and health care.42
                                                 
41 Other scholars using a marked-based approach employ the term programmatic in a different way. For example, 
Stokes (2009) argues that programmatic strategies involve both material inducements and publicity. That is, these 
strategies are ones in which the objectives of the distribution are a matter of public debate, these objectives 
constitute the official criteria for distribution, and distribution is actually executed according to the objectives 
initially stated.   
 Arguably, programmatic policies often target some individuals and 
involve redistribution (and therefore distributional consequences) from some group of citizens to 
others. In this sense, of course, they are not purely public goods but rather both programmatic 
and targeted goods. Nonetheless, because the consumption of collective goods is essentially non-
exclusive, the benefactor is unable to “particularize” their distribution and then to credibly 
punish individual citizens for falling to trade their votes in return. Under programmatic 
strategies, material goods unconditionally accrue to individual voters regardless of whether they 
had supported or will support the benefactor’s most preferred candidate. And, critically, voters 
can freely support other-than-the-benefactor candidate because they will not suffer individual 
punishment from defecting.     
42 Strictly speaking, programmatic goods are usually defined as “valence” issues (e.g., national security, clean air, 
full employment) that are desired by anyone in society and from whose enjoyment no one can be excluded. I do not 
consider in my definitions these types of goods because they are not subject to political competition and rivalry. 
That is, politicians/parties do not offer different packages of pure public goods, but rather they claim being capable 
of delivering such goods if elected to government office.    
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Particularistic mechanisms or strategies, in contrast, involve the targeting of material 
goods that are excludable in the sense that only certain specific individuals or categories of 
individuals are granted the benefit. Therefore, particularistic goods are not welfare-enhancing 
collective goods. Instead, they are private or semi-public (commonly known as club) goods that 
grant benefits to some specific individuals or subset of individuals and exclude a broader set of 
citizens. I then understand particularism as an overarching category encompassing different 
electoral strategies. The common feature of these strategies is excludability in targeting material 
goods. Notice that excludability differs from “contingency”, a term that has been introduced by 
recent conceptualizations of clientelism (Kitschelt 2000, 2010; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Medina and Stokes 2007; Stokes 2007). Whereas contingency entails a quid pro quo exchange 
such that benefits should accrue to individuals only as long as they comply with the terms of the 
agreement, excludability refers to the scale of the target group/s to which a benefit is provided. 
This means that particularistic politics occurs when politicians/parties target excludable goods, 
and not only when distribution is contingent on voter behavior. Under these definitions, if the 
targeted goods are excludable they cannot be collective goods and must be either private or semi-
public goods.   
Of course, semi-public or club goods are non-excludable in the targeted subset of the 
population thus constituting a collective good for that smaller group. This feature has led some 
scholars to argue that club goods should be treated as non-excludable (Stokes 2009). Ironically, 
these authors recognize that the distribution of club goods often incorporates “bias” or that 
politicians/parties allocate them to a particular group after considering its electoral 
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responsiveness and past loyalty. In other words, their distribution is politically discriminatory. 
For example, a new bridge is technically available to all citizens, but practically delivers the 
most benefit to those who live nearby and will use it frequently (and, of course, the 
subcontractors). If, subject to budget constraints, politicians/parties discriminatorily allocate a 
basket of semi-public goods to certain narrow clienteles –and not to others– according to an 
expected electoral return, I do not see why we should consider these material goods as non-rival 
and non-excludable benefits in the electoral market (at least the subcontractors do not build the 
bridge).  
Having clarified these conceptual nuances, I will turn to the classification of different 
particularistic strategies. The first of these strategies is pork-barrel. As anticipated in the previous 
section, pork-barrel politics refers to the supply of divisible, semi-public goods that are narrowly 
–either geographically or sectorally– targeted. Obvious examples of geographically targeted 
goods include public works with a decisively local impact such as electricity, sewage, drinking 
water, bridges, paved roads, dams, housing, harbors, and the like. Sectorally pork-barreling 
fundamentally comprises government market interventions and special legislation designed to 
benefit certain firms, producer groups, or economic sectors through tax breaks, subsidies, credits, 
procurement contracts, or favorable regulatory decisions. The second particularistic strategy I 
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identify is patronage which, as we have mentioned, refers to the supply of jobs in the public 
sector to individual voters.43
I emphasize that there are three major differences between patronage and pork-barrel 
strategies as defined in this dissertation. The key difference is the criteria used for exclusion. 
Whereas patronage determines exclusion based on criteria related to voting, pork does not 
involve contingency. Under a patron-client relation, a dedicated citizen who works for a 
politician or party suffers a punishment (or reasonably fear that s/he will suffer one) if s/he 
defects from the implicit or explicit vote-trading bargain. By contrast, because pork-barrel has a 
relatively large scale of disbursement, the threat to punish individual voters in a specific district, 
particular firm or economic sector for failing to support the benefactor lacks credibility. Once a 
politician or party targets a club good, the benefactor cannot be certain that voters will comply 
with their part of the exchange. For this reason, pork is always a riskier electoral investment than 
patronage (Robinson and Verdier 2003). A second distinction is that patronage goods are far 
more fungible than pork-barrel benefits. Indeed, the latter are not always totally fungible with 
money. Take the example of public works or specific legislation, which commonly comprise “in-
kind” –as opposed to “in-cash”– payments. The third difference between patronage and pork is 
that between one-shot and continuous goods. Pork-barrel entails the delivery of single-shot 
  
                                                 
43 Some scholars utilize patronage and clientelism as interchangeable concepts, while others use the former as an 
indicator of the latter. Robinson and Verdier (2003: 2), for example, contends that “clientelism is a political 
exchange between a politician, a patron who gives patronage in exchange for the vote or support of a client…what is 
exchanged in clientelism are jobs for votes”. In sharp contrast to these accounts, I argue below that patronage and 
clientelism are different classes of particularistic strategies. 
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goods (or a series of multiple discrete goods), while patronage entails a longer and sustained row 
of transactions between the benefactor and the recipients.44
It should now be clear that my emphasis on pork-barrel and patronage is not simply 
another label of the often elusive category of political clientelism. A clientelistic strategy, the 
third particularistic mechanism I identify, shares with patronage the quid pro quo quality of 
exchanges. That is, the handout supply of cash payments, baskets of food and other material 
gifts, or the preferential access to social programs such as individualized scholarships, medical 
treatment, and disability benefits are contingent on how the recipients voted or which candidate 
they supported. But a clientelistic strategy, on the other hand, differs from patronage and pork-
barrel mechanisms of electoral mobilization in a critical aspect. In both patronage and pork 
politicians/parties possess the ability to supply particularistic goods to responsive constituents 
only for the time they retain elected office (Medina and Stokes 2007). That is, public jobs and 
club goods are material resources that depend on the incumbency.
  
45
                                                 
44 I accept that this distinction is not always clear. What initially may look as a one-off transaction may, under 
certain circumstances, become the first exchange of a longer row of such a (discrete) deals.  
 By contrast, in clientelism 
the political patron may or may not hold public office thus it can be practiced by both incumbent 
and non-incumbent politicians/parties. For example, incumbents can discretionarily shift access 
45 This, of course, does not mean that governing and opposition incumbents have access to the same resources in 
similar amounts. Typically, the former enjoy an advantage in fund allocation over the latter. In addition, federalized 
systems open the possibility of parties that are in opposition at the national level to govern at the subnational and/or 
local levels. This dissertation is concerned with how state executives (who either belong to the national incumbent 
party or to the opposition) deploy material inducements to win votes rather than with the level of resources these 
leaders enjoy because of their party affiliation or political relations with the federal government. Following a 
Rikerian approach to federalism (see Riker and Schaps 1987), a large body of literature has explored the impact of 
vertical co-partisanship on the allocation of federal funds to the states/municipalities. In further extensions of this 
study, I will examine the role of partisan links between national and state politicians on subnational redistributive 
spending.          
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to social assistance programs away from their ostensible beneficiaries to other people based on 
voter responsiveness, while non-incumbents can develop a direct vote-buying exchange of 
material goods for votes before elections.      
The combination of electoral strategies political leaders deploy has implications for the 
organizational attributes of delivering networks of support they choose. However, it is difficult to 
establish a causal link between electoral strategies and organizations because, as Kitschelt (2010: 
4) has noted, “political entrepreneurs choose linkage strategies and organizational forms 
simultaneously in an interactive process and through feedback loops governed by the external 
results their interactive efforts have generated, namely the constituency support they have won in 
democratic elections compared with those of their competitors.” This dissertation does not seek 
to answer which causes which. It may be that politicians decide to choose their delivering 
networks knowing the prior distribution of citizens’ preferences for programmatic or certain 
particularistic goods (along with affective considerations), or that these preferences themselves 
are endogenous to previous actions of politicians in past rounds of party competition. I simply 
contend that there is an affinity between the nature of electoral strategies (i.e., what politicians 
supply to voters) and specific organizational attributes of the political networks they employ to 
deliver programmatic and particularistic goods.   
The fundamental point here is straightforward. Because patronage tends to go to party 
activists thus enabling incumbent politicians to finance recruitment, there is a strong affinity 
between supplying excessive jobs in the public sector and building organizationally dense 
political networks. Politicians/parties that primarily rely on patronage inducements require strong 
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organizational capacities to requisition a maximum of resources and concentrate decision-
making power in small circles or even in a single person. They also need a substantial manpower 
to implement a modicum of monitoring (if not sanctioning) either by direct supervision or tacit 
network information. Patronage-based organizations are then elaborate, tentacle-like machines 
built around an army of party operatives and brokers who live among the people whom they are 
responsible for mobilizing. In contrast, there is an affinity between drawing upon the delivery of 
pork-barrel goods and the construction of political networks weakly enmeshed in society. 
Because pork-barrel politics is fundamentally about currying goodwill among potential 
beneficiaries, individual politicians enjoy an important strategic degree of freedom within an 
organizational structure. Indeed, elaborate networks may be irrelevant –if not counterproductive– 
for the task of building a personal linkage to constituencies. The role of dense organizational 
structures in mobilizing votes is therefore less important under pork-barrel electoral exchanges 
because such exchanges make it difficult for politicians/parties to comply voters with their part 
of the agreement. It is also less important because pork-ridden politics entail some purposive 
motives, at least in comparison with patronage (and clientelism), which foster individual 
politicians to construct their own organizational structures.  
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1.5 THE COUNTRY CASES 
This dissertation is concerned with general questions pertaining to the relation between 
redistributive politics and subnational incumbent stability, but it is focused on Argentina and 
Brazil. Both substantive and analytical concerns motivate this cross-state two-country 
comparison.46
Argentina and Brazil, however, noticeably differ in four major institutional arrangements 
that allow for controls of the main argument. With regards to fiscal institutions, Argentina is 
characterized by a high subnational vertical fiscal imbalance, an intergovernmental transfer 
system and budgetary rules that bias access and discretion to federal grants toward incumbent 
 First, these prominent federations are important countries that deserve analysis in 
their own right. They stand among the leading economies in the region accounting for almost 55 
percent of the Latin American population, and 65 percent of its GDP. Second, both Argentina 
and Brazil have been historically exposed to comparable international pressures, pursued 
analogous economic policies in the twentieth century (i.e., protected industrialization followed 
by market liberalization), and experienced similar populist experiments, authoritarian pasts, and 
recent democratic transitions. Third, as we have noticed, they constitute archetypical examples of 
robust federalism, each with three tiers of government and intermediate jurisdictions of 
comparable size that have historically maintained contentious relations with the center.  
                                                 
46 Other scholars before me have made useful comparisons between these countries thus reinforcing the notion that 
Argentina and Brazil are suitable for comparison. To my knowledge, the first comparative work in the political 
science field is Rippy’s (1949) description of French investments in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. This 
study was then followed by a number of analyses including Alexander (1962), Eaton and Dickovick (2004), 
Kaufman (1985), Melo (2005), Montero (2001), Negreto (2000), and Sikkink (1991).  
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governments relative to municipal mayors and congressional legislators, and soft subnational 
budget constraints. In contrast, Brazil has lower vertical imbalances, a more institutionally-
balanced transfer system in which governors share access and discretion over intergovernmental 
grants with mayors and national legislators, and hard subnational budget constraints. In terms of 
their electoral and partisan institutions, while Argentina has a CLPR system and centralized 
candidate nomination rules that magnify provincial leadership control of political careers and 
campaigning, Brazil has an OLPR system and highly decentralized selection procedures that 
result in political careers and campaign finance controlled by individual candidates. As for their 
bureaucratic institutions, Argentina lacks stable civil service rules thereby subscribing to a spoils 
system which allows incumbents at all levels of government to make appointments in a partisan 
manner, whereas Brazil subscribes to a more meritocratic system –particularly since the mid-
1990s– that reduces the relevance of civil service appointments made with a strong incumbent 
bias. And with respect to balloting systems and voting technologies, Argentina uses a manual 
vote system with paper-based ballots produced and distributed by parties, while Brazil uses an 
electronic voting system. Finally, Argentina and Brazil exhibit extreme intra-national variation in 
political, economic, socio-demographic, and even cultural variables. This large regional diversity 
allows for making cross-state comparisons both within and across federations. These institutional 
and organizational differences, as we have noticed, produce contrasting patterns of subnational 
particularism and electoral rewards.  
This dissertation is based on eighteen months of fieldwork research carried out in three 
Argentine provinces (Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Chaco, and Formosa) and five Brazilian states 
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(Bahia, Brasília, Paraná, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Sul). The primary data analyzed 
include fiscal and electoral data, legislation, and more than 180 in-depth interviews conducted 
with academics, journalists, politicians, and public officials from the national, subnational, and 
local levels of governments (see Appendix D for the list of interviewees).47
1.6 OVERVIEW AND ROAD MAP  
 I have also relied on 
secondary sources to analyze some of the policies of interests, and to construct original databases 
of the political careers of incumbent governors and state legislators.    
The rest of this dissertation proceeds in two stages, each peering deeper into the structure and 
dynamics of subnational politics. Chapters 2 to 4 concentrate on cross-national comparisons of 
subnational particularism from an institutional prism. Chapter 2 analyzes the institutions of fiscal 
federalism in Argentina and traces the evolution of intergovernmental relations during the period 
under analysis. It shows that, despite the country experienced a process of decentralization, 
provincial governors continued to concentrate discretionary access to federal fiscal rents which 
allowed them to strengthen territorial power based on statewide patronage linkages. Chapter 3 
examines the institutions of fiscal federalism in Brazil. It shows that, despite intergovernmental 
conditions at the onset of the democratic period fortified state governors, the intrinsic structure of 
                                                 
47 The duration of the interviews ranges from thirty minutes to more than two hours, with an average of about one 
hour. A well number of these interviews are not used in this dissertation. They will be utilized to write the case 
studies (see Chapter 6) that will be part of a future book.     
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fiscal rules generate major incentives to construct local networks of support through pork-barrel 
allocations. This tendency was reinforced in the last two decades as a result of a recentralization 
with municipalization process that invigorated local governments at the expense of the states. 
Chapter 4 explores the relation between the nature of political careerism and subnational 
particularistic strategies in both Argentina and Brazil. It investigates how the relative party-
centrism or candidate-centrism of the electoral system and intra-party nomination/selection rules 
affect gubernatorial incentives to engage in patronage and pork-barrel electoral linkages. In 
Argentina, provincial governors control careerism and are therefore likely to redirect government 
resources to finance state-based patronage machines. In Brazil, state governors do not control the 
contours of political careers and are thus more inclined to draw on pork-barrel allocations to 
mobilize the support of individually-led and localized networks of support. The chapter argues 
that these connections are undermined or reinforced by the public personal system. In Argentina, 
a system founded on unstable civil service rules increases the scope of subnational patronage, 
while in Brazil a more professionalized bureaucratic system significantly diminishes such scope. 
Drawing upon recent literature on political recruitment and novel datasets on state and municipal 
elected positions, the chapter illustrates this argument by examining the characteristics of state 
legislators’ careerism since the return of democracy. In Argentina, the centralization of political 
careers in the hands of incumbent governors results in static and discontinuous patterns of 
provincial legislative careerism. These patterns suggest that governors rotate politicians and 
bureaucrats with political aspirations among the various posts the party can offer so as to induce 
involvement into the organizational machinery. In Brazil, candidate-centrism results in dynamic 
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and continuous state legislative career paths. A legislative reelection dynamic similar to what we 
observe in the U.S. and a considerable level of extra-legislative ambition suggests that incumbent 
governors are unable to involve state politicians into their organizations and make them sensitive 
to their dictums.  
Chapter 5 moves the focus down to cross-state comparisons. Comparing geographical 
subdivisions has methodological and substantive advantages over small N and cross-national 
research designs (Locke 1995; Snyder 2001). First, a focus on comparing subnational territories 
makes it possible to overcome the problem of imputing single patterns to internally 
heterogeneous countries and, therefore, allows for a treatment of the spatially uneven nature of 
complex processes. Second, disaggregating countries along territorial lines increases the number 
of observations thus solving the quandary of “many variables, small N” and increasing the 
probability of making valid causal inferences (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).48
                                                 
48 When variables outnumber cases, the ability to control for sources of extraneous variance is reduced so as to the 
point that the evidence marshaled cannot confirm or disconfirm a stated hypothesis. In other words, having more 
inferences to assess than implications to observe usually leads to “indeterminate” research designs.  
 Third, by 
providing within-country variation of political, economic, social, and cultural conditions, intra-
national comparisons contribute to measurement validity as they reduce problems of 
comparability. The chapter utilizes state level data and electoral results from a large number of 
gubernatorial elections held in Argentina and Brazil to estimate the ultimate effect of 
gubernatorial spending choices. It provides empirical evidence supporting the claim that 
particularistic inducements render governors in these federations with different electoral payoffs. 
The statistical analysis indicates that patronage allocations provide net electoral returns to 
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Argentine but not to Brazilian state incumbent candidates, while pork-barrel benefits Brazilian 
but not Argentine ones. The chapter emphasizes that the causal link between particularistic 
spending and electoral premiums is mediated by the structure of political competition, 
organizational components of support (i.e., the degree to which partisan networks are enmeshed 
in society), voting technologies (i.e., party balloting versus electronic voting), and electoral fiscal 
agendas. This analysis provides the basis for detecting alternative causal mechanisms by which 
some regional elites succeed in constructing machine organizations that retain enduring control 
of political life while others fail. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation’s main findings regarding the effects of fiscal 
federalism and political careerism on subnational particularistic politics, and the ultimate impact 
of redistributive mechanisms of electoral mobilization on subnational vote choice. It also lists the 
main contributions of the dissertation to the literature on the political economy of federalism, 
redistributive politics, and political careers. It finally outlines research tasks to be addressed in 
further extensions of this work. 
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2.0  FISCAL FEDERALISM AND SUBNATIONAL PARTICULARISTIC SPENDING 
IN ARGENTINA 
This chapter explores how incentives embedded in the institutions of fiscal federalism make 
Argentine governors more likely to invest government resources in financing a large provincial 
bureaucracy than in supplying public and semi-public goods to mobilize voters and influence 
their electoral choices. Relying upon the theoretical argument developed in the previous chapter, 
the following examines the working of five key fiscal factors: the level of subnational vertical 
fiscal imbalance, the allocation mechanisms that regulate the distribution of federal transfers to 
the states and municipalities, the openness of budgetary rules to congressional appropriations of 
intergovernmental grants, the spending powers institutionally assigned to the incumbent 
governors to arbitrarily use moneys transferred from the central government, and the hardness of 
subnational budget constraints.  
Evidence from Argentina suggests that, despite decentralization processes and changes in 
macroeconomic conditions affected subnational budgetary resources during the period under 
analysis, the institutions of fiscal federalism contributed to maintain provincial governors as the 
“kings” of territorial politics in the country. To a large extent, they did so by preserving (and 
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even strengthening) the capacity of subnational political bosses to reallocate fiscal resources 
coming from the center to patronage-based networks of support that worked in favor of the 
incumbent party.  
A comparatively large vertical fiscal imbalance is the first institutional feature that 
promotes subnational rentierism in Argentina and allows governors in command of plentiful 
fiscal rents to use such resources for breeding elaborate political machines. Moreover, the legal 
ambiguity about the status of municipalities in the federal order and an intergovernmental 
transfer system that only conceives the direct allocation of federal grants to the provinces, make 
the municipalities highly dependent from subnational jurisdictions in both political and financial 
terms. Politically, although the Argentine municipios have the constitutional right to exist, they 
are de facto creatures of the provinces as the latter are granted exclusive authority to organize the 
lowest level of government within their territories. Financially, the vast majority of municipal 
revenues emanate from the reallocation of the tax sharing agreement between the center and the 
provinces. This reallocation, known as coparticipación municipal, is freely determined by 
subnational legislation without any federal interference or oversight. The dependent nature of 
municipalities fosters incumbent governors to condition the allocation of fiscal resources to local 
leaders who show disposition to engage in particularistic exchanges oriented to maintain a solid 
base of gubernatorial supporters. It also precludes the emergence of sustained national-municipal 
relations. These relations are mediated (if not controlled) by the governors, who cannot be easily 
bypassed by the center. The institutional ability of subnational leaders to capture and subordinate 
the local level and to constrain the power of the sitting president to meddle into provincial-
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municipal relations make it extremely difficult for mayors to challenge the territorial dominance 
of provincial incumbents. Such a framework increases barriers to entry into the electoral market 
and, consequently, reinforces gubernatorial proclivity to deploy fiscal rents to finance a large 
patronage-base apparatus. 
Of equal importance, the transfer system introduces a gubernatorial bias in the discretion 
assigned to the use of federal grants. The decentralizing administrative reforms undertaken at the 
beginning of the 1990s offloaded provincial expenditures without enough transferred resources 
(Falleti 2010), but opened up possibilities for incumbent governors to arbitrarily manage hiring 
and firing in the education and health sectors. In addition, although the 1992 and 1993 fiscal 
pacts recentralized some revenues, they did not have an overall negative effect for the provincial 
coffers. Both the provinces’ share of total and discretionary revenues actually increased while 
subnational expenditures were held almost constant. Fiscal revenues –in particular those of a 
discretionary nature– flew again after 1995 and expanded even more at the end of the decade. 
Finally, despite the central government took some measures to curtail subnational excessive 
borrowing such as the privatization of most provincial banks, the politicized “soft” nature of 
budget constraints did not affect the autonomy of provincial governors to set their own budget 
priorities (especially regarding public sector employment) and borrow from abroad using federal 
transfers as collateral.  
The rest of the chapter is organized in five sections corresponding to each of the fiscal 
factors identified as affecting the degree to which governors concentrate access to federal 
transfers and enjoy discretionary powers over their use. The chapter concludes by discussing the 
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implications of my findings for the construction of territorial power in Argentina and sets the 
stage for the next chapter, which discusses the relation between fiscal federalism and subnational 
particularism in Brazil.  
2.1 HIGH SUBNATIONAL VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE  
Federalized countries around the world noticeably differ in the fiscal institutions that allocate 
expenditure and revenue-raising powers across tiers of government. On the spending side, 
Argentina is characterized by a comparatively high degree of decentralization with most 
spending responsibilities assigned to the provinces. Although the 1983 constitution lays out some 
broad areas for which national and provincial governments can jointly supply public services, the 
tendency in the last two decades has been to decentralize the operation of services to subnational 
jurisdictions (Falleti 2010; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). This process, however, 
reinforced the ability of provincial incumbents to concentrate transfer funds in their hands and 
granted them additional expenditure attributions to utilize such moneys in a highly discretionary 
manner, bypassing soft federal oversight mechanisms and placing municipalities under their 
fiscal tutelage.  
The activities under the exclusive federal competence are those generally allocated to the 
central government in normative fiscal federalism: defense, foreign affairs, common currency, 
and national highways. The provinces, on the other hand, are in charge of most social 
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expenditure (elementary education, health care, and social security), and economic infrastructure 
(roads, ports, housing, water and sewerage services).49 In the period covered by this dissertation, 
subnational governments were responsible for almost 35 percent of total public sector 
expenditures (including pensions), nearly 38 percent of social spending, and 92 percent of urban 
economic infrastructure.50
On the revenue side, the federal government collects most taxes including personal and 
corporate income taxes and levies on consumption and wealth, while provinces have only limited 
revenue-collecting potential. Indeed, one of the most distinctive features of Argentina’s federal 
system is the minor role of the provinces (and, as we will see in the next section, municipalities 
as well) in raising their own tax revenues. The constitution originally allowed subnational 
territorial units to impose domestic indirect taxes concurrently with the federal government. But 
a drop in foreign trade taxes during the 1930s led the center to introduce national income and 
sales taxes that replaced most existing provincial revenues. As a result, the provinces only 
retained access to taxes on gross receipts, estates, motor vehicles, and stamps.  
  
Although in many countries subnational spending is to a significant extent financed by 
the central government, Argentina’s vertical fiscal imbalance is particularly high. I have 
estimated that between 1983 and 2003 it reached an average of 61.5 percent compared to 24.2 
percent in Brazil.51
                                                 
49 All powers not explicitly delegated to the national government remain with the provinces. 
 In the whole period, only 30.2 percent of total provincial expenditures were 
50 Excluding pensions, provinces accounted for approximately two-thirds of total public sector expenditures. 
51 The measure of vertical imbalance is defined as the ratio of intergovernmental transfers from the central 
government, including tax sharing, over total revenues (own plus transferred) of the subnational level. Based on 
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financed by the provinces’ self-administered taxes.52 It is also worth noting that provincial 
revenues were mainly the purview of large jurisdictions. In effect, the city and the province of 
Buenos Aires accounted for almost two-thirds of total provincial tax collection, and the five 
largest provinces collected nearly 83 percent. Strikingly, ten of the twenty-four provinces 
financed less than 10 percent (and eighteen provinces less than 20 percent) of their outlays with 
autonomous resources.53
This highly imbalanced fiscal structure has led the Argentine provinces to rely on federal 
transfers –most of them automatically allocated with few strings attached– for an average of 56.4 
percent of their expenditures. All provinces with the exception of the Ciudad de Buenos Aires 
(and Neuquén if royalties are included) have received central government grants which were 
substantially larger than their own tax resources.
  
54
 
 To better appreciate subnational disparities in 
vertical fiscal imbalance, the Figure 9 displays the weighed percentage of each province’s 
expenditures financed by autonomous revenues (with and without royalties) and total federal 
transfers in the period under study.    
                                                                                                                                                             
decentralization surveys, one of the few comparative studies on the matter estimated that the average vertical 
imbalance for fifteen Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1997 was 52 percent (IADB 1997).  
52 This sum increased to 33.8 percent if oil, gas, and mineral royalties are computed as provincial revenues. 
Arguably, these resources should be considered as such because they are collected by the federal government and 
then reallocated with no conditions attached to the provinces were such resources were extracted. 
53 The number of provinces is six and twelve respectively if royalties are considered as provincial revenues.  
54  Expectations may therefore be different in these exceptional provinces. In further elaborations of this work I will 
investigate this issue.  
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Note: Royalties refers to natural resource (oil, gas, and minerals) revenues collected by the center and 
reallocated to the provinces where such resources were extracted. Source: Ministerio de Economía, Secretaría 
de Relación Fiscal con las Provincias.  
 
Figure 9: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Argentina, 1983-2003. Percentage of Provincial Expenditures Financed 
Through Autonomous Revenues and Federal Transfers 
 
Thus, many Argentine provincial governments count on guaranteed fiscal resources much 
larger than their own tax bases. In these districts, the public sector concentrates a very high 
proportion of employment and economic activity. The ten provinces where federal transfers 
cover approximate 90 percent of their expenditures have had an average of 1.6 public employees 
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for each private employee, whereas the averaged ratio for the metropolitan provinces (i.e., the 
city and province of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza) has been 0.58.55
The financial weakness of local governments required to be compensated with transfers 
from higher levels. The bulk of Argentina’s intergovernmental transfer system is composed by a 
complex revenue-sharing regime called Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos (Federal Tax-
Sharing Agreement, CFI) and a large variety of special loans with low federal earmarking. The 
CFI, which accounted for nearly 70 percent of the total transfers in the post-authoritarian period, 
is an automatic transfer that operates as a common pool of nationally-collected revenues 
subsequently distributed in three rounds. The denominated “primary” distribution divides the 
whole co-participation pie between the central government and the provinces. Then, the 
“secondary” distribution automatically divides the provincial share among the provinces as 
established by formulaic criteria determined by Congress. 
  
The CFI regime was originally introduced by Congress in late 1934 (Law 12,139) at 
request of the central government, which due to the international economic crisis could no longer 
finance its functioning out of taxes on foreign trade as it was constitutionally stipulated. 
According to the 1853 Constitution, the federal government had exclusive rights to fix import 
and export duties, and to levy domestic direct taxes for a determined time period “whenever the 
defense, common safety or general welfare of the Nation so require” (Lopez Murphy 1995). 
Provincial governments were assigned exclusive authority over taxes on production, circulation 
                                                 
55 Author’s calculation based on data from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 population censuses. 
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of goods and territorial contributions, and patents (Jerach 1966: 36). They were forbidden to 
impose export taxes, and only Congress was authorized to establish special contributions. 
Although at that time revenue income from foreign trade accounted for more than three-fourths 
of total revenues (Pirez 1986: 12), the provinces had access to a large basket of taxes considering 
that they represented less than one-third of the total public spending. The constitution only 
recognized one federal transfer, the non-automatic National Treasury Contributions (ATNs), 
which represented a mere 2 percent of the national spending or around 5 percent of the provincial 
resources.56 Since there were almost no intergovernmental transfers the central and subnational 
governments did not have real opportunities to cheat on each other, having to adjust their 
expenditures to their own budget constraints. But starting in the 1880s many provincial 
governors began to circumvent such constraints by resorting to mounting public debt in the form 
of paper-money issues and international gold borrowing. This situation gave rise to the 1890 
Baring of London crisis, which led British investment to cease abruptly and the prices of 
Argentine goods to decline pronouncedly.57
The sharp decrease in public finances and the closeness to foreign credit forced the 
federal government to assume many provincial debts. In return, subnational governments were 
obliged to surrender their control over certain taxes. To cover an overall balance of payment 
deficit, the federal government of Carlos Pellegrini (1890-1892) sent to Congress the imposition 
of temporary consumption taxes under the guise of “internal” taxes (to distinguish them from 
  
                                                 
56 For details on the ATNs and the other special funds mentioned in this section, see Appendix B. 
57 The crisis emerged when Baring of London failed to attract subscribers for a loan it had underwritten to 
reorganize water supply in the province of Buenos Aires.  
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custom or “external” taxes). Income revenue from this measure was initially meager, accounting 
for only 4 percent of total national revenues. But due to successive increases in the number of 
items taxed and the rates imposed, revenues from internal taxes augmented to 24 percent in 
1900. The expansion of foreign trade in the 1920s weakened the importance of internal taxes, 
which dropped to 17 percent. Despite these ups and downs, the supposedly “temporary” internal 
taxes were renewed every year until 1934, when in response to a new drop in foreign trade 
revenues the national authorities unified all taxes concurrently applied by the nation and the 
provinces, placed their collection under the central government, introduced both income and 
sales taxes, and compensated provinces for lost revenue by establishing the first tax-sharing 
regime. For economic and political reasons the provinces accepted to delegate their rights over 
domestic tax sales to the center. On the political side, governors shifted the administrative and 
political costs of tax collection in hard times onto central government. On the fiscal side, 
provinces received substantial debt forgiveness from the center (Pirez 1987).58
As Figure 10 below displays, the CFI’s provincial share has grown consistently under 
democratic governments and economic stability periods when distributive pressures gain 
political clout, and decreased under authoritarian governments and economic crises (Eaton 
2001b; Gonzalez 2008). Originally, the primary distribution for the nation and the provinces was 
set at 82.5 percent and 17.5 percent respectively. The nationalist military governments that ruled 
 
                                                 
58 According to Díaz-Cayeros (2006), fiscal centralization became possible in Argentina (as well as in Mexico and 
Venezuela, but not in Brazil) because the national party leadership was able to credibly guarantee attractive career 
prospects to ambitious subnational politicians. However, as Eaton (2008) has convincingly argued, the traumatic 
rupture of the constitutional order by the “provisional” military government of José Felix Uriburu (1930-1932) 
makes an institutional, third-party-enforcement argument hard to believe in the case of Argentina.  
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the country in the 1940s introduced a number of changes that resulted detrimental to provincial 
finances. In 1943, the generals issued a decree that created a non-sharable tax on profits. Two 
years later, they altered the rules used to divvy up revenues from the income tax, virtually 
freezing the scheduled increases in provincial shares ordered by the 1934 CFI law (Eaton 
2001b). The rest of the revenue-sharing system remained unaltered until 1947 when the 
government of Juan Domingo Perón (1946-1955) enacted a new co-participation law. The Law 
12,956 expanded the number of taxes to be shared with the provincial jurisdictions, in particular 
through the introduction of eventual and extraordinary profits. This modification increased the 
provincial share to 21 percent. It also affected the secondary distribution of funds to favor the 
poor and advance provinces (at the expense of the intermediate provinces) where Perón’s 
populist coalitions were based. In effect, as illustrated in Figure 10, the advance and poor 
provinces moved up from 67.5 percent to 70.3 percent and from 7.5 percent to 10.6 percent of 
the provincial share respectively, while the intermediate provinces decreased from 25 percent 
to19.1 percent. It is also worth mentioning that for the first (and unique) time, it was mandated 
that provinces should reallocate at least 10 percent of the sharable revenues to their respective 
municipalities.  
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Source: Elaborated by the author on the basis of CFI legislation and Porto (2003). 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of Argentina’s Revenue-Sharing Regime, 1953-2003: Primary and Secondary 
Distributions 
 
 
No significant changes were introduced in the co-participation system during the military 
junta that overthrew Perón from power. Despite the CFI law expired in 1955, the successive 
military governments extended it every single year. With the return of democracy and the 
proscription of Peronism, the government of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1960) sought to build an 
independent political base to neutralize Perón by increasing the provincial share to 26 percent 
(Law 14,788). Further increments made by Congress set this share at 36 percent plus an 
additional 6 percent for the federal district. The secondary distribution also experienced 
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modifications in consonance with Fondizi’s strategy of “buying off” the support of peripheral 
elites. The portion corresponding to the advanced provinces decreased from 70.3 percent of the 
provincial share in 1946 to 65.5 percent in 1958. The fraction obtained by the intermediate 
provinces diminished from 19 percent to 15.6 percent. The provincialization of the national 
territories of Chaco, Formosa, and Misiones contributed to the major increment undertaken by 
the poor districts, which moved up from 10.6 percent to 18.7 percent of the provincial resources. 
Finally, the recently created and low populated Patagonian provinces of Chubut, Río Negro, 
Neuquén, and Santa Cruz increased their participation from 1.9 percent to 6.4 percent in the 
same period.  
When the CFI law expired in 1963, the Arturo Illia administration (1963-1966) proposed 
to increase the provincial share to 44 percent. But in reviewing the executive proposal, the 
Budget Committee raised this sum to 46 percent. The new military governments of Juan Carlos 
Onganía (1966-1970) and Alejandro Lanusse (1971-1973) introduced important changes into the 
tax system as part of an ambitious effort to reform the country’s economic model. Critically, in 
1967 Onganía unilaterally reduced the provincial share to 35.46 percent, and the federal district’s 
share to 5.32 percent and to 2.66 percent one year later. The unexpected emergence of popular 
uprisings in several capitals of the interior, the increasing inflationary process, and the financial 
effect of legislation raising the salaries of provincial and municipal workers to national levels 
forced the military regime to implement some relief to the provinces. It did so by creating the 
Regional Integration Fund (FIR) which arbitrarily financed public work projects of provincial 
and inter-regional interest. As a result of this measure, the amount of discretionary transfers at 
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the president’s disposal remarkably increased from 7.5 percent of the sharable revenues in 1970 
to 56.8 percent in 1971 and to 88.3 percent in 1972 (Saiegh and Tommassi 1999).  
To mitigate the political effects of an almost sure Peronist triumph in the 1973 elections, 
the military endowed conservative elites in the periphery and limited the resources at Perón’s 
further disposal by increasing co-participation funds to the provinces. The government thus 
enacted the CFI Law 20,221, which unified taxes into a single system and pegged provincial and 
federal shares at 48.5 percent. The remaining 3 percent was destined to the Regional 
Development Fund (FDR) designed to gave continuity to the FIR. The law also stipulated that all 
subsequent taxes would be automatically included in the revenue-sharing pool forcing any 
Peronist government to share new tax revenues with the provinces. Moreover, it created a 
permanent Federal Tax Commission composed of provincial and national representatives to 
monitor the functioning of the transfer system. Finally, the law mandated provinces to “establish 
a CFI system with the municipalities based upon objective redistributive criteria and automatic 
allocation”. But provinces were highly reluctant to loss political leverage over funding 
allocation. Most of them simply rejected automaticity in reallocation and continued to operate 
under their own co-participation mechanisms of municipal redistribution. As for the secondary 
distribution, the advanced provinces received 49 percent of the provincial share (almost 10 
percent less than in 1960), the intermediate obtained 17.3 percent, the Patagonian 9.4 percent, 
and the poorest districts captured 24.6 percent thus increasing their participation in about 6 
points. 
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During the third Perón administration (1973-1976) and the subsequent military regime 
(1976-1983), the Law 20,221 remained essentially unchanged. When this law expired in 1980, 
the government of Jorge Rafael Videla issued a decree that eliminated the federal district from 
the CFI scheme, abolished employer contributions to social security, and deducted the resources 
needed to finance the national social security system. Although this “pre-co-participation” clause 
did not directly alter the provincial share, it diminished the total amount of federal transfers to be 
distributed to the provinces by decreasing the overall size of the sharing pool. As a result, the 
portion of co-participation funds corresponding to the subnational jurisdictions was drastically 
reduced to 29 percent (Eaton 2001b: 10).  
With the restoration of democracy, the CFI regime collapsed due to the impossibility of 
finding a compromise between the center and the provinces on how to deal with the 
macroeconomic crisis (Cetrángolo and Jiménez 1998). No agreement to modify the system was 
achieved until 1988, when the current CFI Law 23,548 was approved by Congress. In the 
meantime, co-participation transfers were preserved by a transitory financial agreement signed in 
1986 by the government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) and the provinces. The agreement 
established the co-participation shares for that year on the basis of the shares prevailing in the 
1983-1985 period, and changed the allocation criteria for the secondary distribution set in the 
1973 law to 30 percent development gap, 30 percent demographic dispersion and 40 percent 
population. Consequently, the provinces with low fiscal capacity were benefited at the expense 
of the most advanced regions. In particular, the Buenos Aires province, which at that time was 
governed by the president’s party, lost 10 points in favor of the intermediate and poor 
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jurisdictions that gained 3.7 and 5.2 points respectively. The agreement was short-lived as the 
federal government rapidly replaced it by an informal and highly discretional allocation of 
ATNs. A pervasive inflationary process and a complete loss in the 1987 elections to the Peronists 
left Alfonsín little maneuvering room.59
The new law 23,548 granted provinces their historical peak of 57.05 percent, keeping 
only 41.95 percent for the center, and an additional 1 percent for the ATNs. Furthermore, it ruled 
that the provinces could not receive less than 34 percent of the total (sharable and non-sharable) 
revenues collected by the federal government. The provinces also obtained the control of the 
FDR, which became to be allocated using the coefficients established by the new legislation. In 
this way, the fund was entirely removed from presidential discretion and placed at the hands of 
provincial governors.
 In this context, the federal government sent to Congress 
a tax reform that included the creation of new levies to attain a severe fiscal adjustment. The 
Peronist governors negotiated the reform to include the funds originated in the new tax package 
into the co-participation primary distribution producing a loss of the government’s collection 
base of 0.6 percent of the GDP. Both the tax reform and a new CFI law were eventually 
approved on January 1988.   
60
                                                 
59 The UCR lost majority in both chambers. The PJ won 17 of 22 governorships and the party of the president 
retained control of only two provinces, Córdoba and Río Negro.  
 With regards to the secondary distribution, the most notable change was 
the partial recuperation of Buenos Aires –now governed by the opposite PJ– which recovered 
around 5 points at the expense of the intermediate provinces. Most provinces, however, retained 
60 Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores, January 7-8, 1988: 2378. I thank Lucas Gonzalez for calling me 
the attention on this issue.  
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their shares as the law sought to validate the portions each district obtained in the 1985-1987 
distribution.    
Although the law was conceived as a “transitory” regulation, its main features prevailed 
until the early 1990s. As part of the stabilization effort carried out by the 1991 Convertibility 
Law that pegged the peso to the dollar, the first Carlos Menem administration (1989-1995) 
sought to coordinate the reform efforts with the provinces through the negotiation of two 
successive fiscal agreements. The 1992 and 1993 Fiscal Pacts recentralized a percentage of the 
CFI funds by achieving a 15 percent deduction of the revenue-sharing pool prior to the primary 
distribution. This money was principally channeled to bailout the national social security deficit. 
Additionally, the federal government separated $43.8 million to redistribute among the provinces 
suffering financial disequilibria in different proportions from those stipulated by the 1988 CFI 
law. In this way, national authorities gained a dose of political discretion as they could 
discretionarily use a small portion of revenues originally subject to automatic sharing. Finally, in 
case the collection of sharable taxes exceeded $800 million, provincial governors agreed on 
using revenue surpluses to cancel debt and finance investment programs in their regions 
previously approved by the federal government.  
In return for their acquiescence to the fiscal pacts, the provinces obtained a fixed monthly 
sum (piso mínimo) of $725 million and reasserted their minimal guaranteed payment of 34 
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percent of all federal revenues.61
In the time when the fiscal pacts were signed, the revenue floor represented an immediate 
loss of about U.S. $13 billion for the provinces (Centrágolo and Jimenez 1997). But this loss 
would later turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the federal government and advantageous to 
subnational jurisdictions. Although the legal appropriation of sharing funds earmarked to social 
security helped Menem achieve stability at the center, the federal government was bound to 
guarantee a fixed amount to the governors regardless of the economic conditions and consequent 
revenue collection capacity. The provincial share thus dropped throughout the decade, but the 
absolute amount of tax-sharing funds automatically transferred to the provinces (i.e., immune to 
presidential manipulation) increased considerably because of improvements in federal tax 
administration and the minimum monthly payments (Eaton 2005). With no cause to worry about 
sudden decreases in co-participation transfers, the piso mínimo eventually enabled governors to 
 They also received selective incentives to get on board such as 
the federal government’s commitment to condone the $900 million debt provinces had with the 
Nation and bailout the provincial pension systems. Furthermore, the provinces attained the 
assurance of previously non-automatic and earmarked transfers for house building, urban and 
rural electricity, and road maintenance. Mainly due to political reasons, as explained below, the 
Buenos Aires province was compensated through the so-called Greater Buenos Aires Fund. In 
sum, the compensation scheme was designed in such a way that no province was specially 
harmed. 
                                                 
61 The 1993 Fiscal Pact raised the piso mínimo to $740 million and made such increment conditional on the 
privatization of provincial banks.     
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reduce tax efforts (Tommasi and Spiller 2000), resist pressures for implementing fiscal 
adjustments and tax reforms in their territories, and run up excessive debts with commercial 
banks by using the CFI guarantees as collateral. Through the general mechanism of collaterality, 
most provincial governments substituted the private loans from their recently privatized banks. 
The economic recession and worsening fiscal position accelerated by the 1995 Mexican 
Tequila crisis forced the Menem administration to seek a reduction in the minimum guarantee 
payment that was due to expire in July.62 But governors successfully blocked this attempt in the 
Senate, and colluded to extend the federal government’s obligation to honor the piso mínimo 
(Benton 2008).63
                                                 
62 The 1994 constitutional reform gave the revenue-sharing regime constitutional status and mandated that a new 
CFI law must be enacted. But the provinces’ reluctance to renegotiate their quotas led regional interests in the 
Constitutional Assembly to set stringent procedural requirements to approve tax-sharing legislation. It was 
established that a CFI law would require a previous fiscal pact between the president and the twenty-four governors, 
qualified majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and the approval by simple majority of all the 
provincial legislatures. The deadline to sanction the law was postponed several times and a new CFI regime has 
never been produced. 
 President Menem also failed to push through other proposals to reform the CFI 
regime during his second mandate (1996-2000). First, the presidential initiative of incorporating 
provincial tax efforts to the criteria used to divvy up the co-participation money was never 
considered in Congress. Second, and more important for the argument advanced here, the 
government was unable to mobilize political support to its audacious idea of introducing direct 
revenue-sharing transfers to the municipalities. As part of his strategy to run for a third 
(constitutionally prohibited) term, Menem declared the year 1998 as “the year of municipalities” 
and instructed legislators to modify the CFI regime so as to introduce a 15 percent reduction in 
63The government, however, was able to entirely appropriate a three-point VAT increase for one year with no co-
participation to the provinces. 
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the provincial share that would be directly allocated to the local governments (La Nación, 2 
March, 1998). Designed as a tool to seduce mayors, bypass governors, and disarticulate the 
presidential candidacy of Eduardo Duhalde –political boss of the Buenos Aires province and 
Menem’s main adversary within the PJ– the project was blocked twice in senatorial committees 
and never reach the floor (La Nación, 15 December, 1998). The strategy to enhance fiscal 
municipalization was backed by a considerable number of mayors, but governors showed 
remarkable strength stymieing efforts to protect their autonomy from central-municipal linkages. 
The subsequent federal governments explicitly avoided targeting CFI funds to mayors. As Carlos 
Kohan, Secretary of the Presidency from 1989 to 1999 and one of the principal architects of the 
plan put it: “the municipalization of fiscal relations in Argentina died with Menem’s failed 
reelection”.64
Four days before the Alianza government of Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) took office, 
the incoming national authorities negotiated a new fiscal pact with the recently elected 
governors. In a context of deep economic stagnation and heavy international debt obligations, the 
Federal Agreement (Compromiso Federal, Law 25,235) guaranteed an increment in monthly 
transfers to the provinces in exchange for the creation of new taxes not subject to sharing, and 
the passage of a fiscal responsibly law in Congress that would limit provincial fiscal deficits 
(Cetrángolo and Jiménez 2004; Tommasi 2002).
 
65
                                                 
64 Interview with Carlos Kohan. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 23, 2009.  
 The provincial governors signed the 
agreement but fiercely opposed to implement unpopular fiscal conservative policies. This 
65 It was stipulated that revenue monthly transfers would be $1.35 billion in 2000, $1.36 in 2001-2002, $1.4 in 2003, 
$1.44 in 2004, and $1.48 in 2005. 
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situation led the federal government to propose in November 2000 a new intergovernmental 
agreement (Law 25,400). The pact replaced the CFI fixed sums by moving averages of the 
previous three years, and increased the minimum revenue floor to $1.45 billion per month. In 
return for this concession, the government demanded provinces not to increase their primary 
spending, approve multi-year budgets, improve transparency of their fiscal accounts, harmonize 
local taxes with federal ones, and support the passage of a new CFI law in Congress (Tommasi 
2002).  
After continued declines in tax revenues, the de la Rúa administration managed to pass 
the Zero Deficit Law which included a 13 percent cut in automatic transfers and public sector 
wages. The governors extracted some important concessions in exchange for their support to the 
law including the renegotiation of provincial liabilities with private banks at low interest rates, 
and the inclusion of a new tax on financial transactions in the CFI regime. But the federal 
government failed to meet its transfer obligations. Arrears rapidly accumulated and some 
provinces decided to issue local bonds to pay public employees’ salaries. In mid-2001, the 
national authorities created an inter-provincial bond to cover these arrears, and negotiated a 
reduction of federal transfers with the PJ governors in order to forestall the national debt default 
(Eaton and Dickovick 2004: 102). Conflicts over the amount to be released, however, triggered 
the breakdown of the national-provincial dialogue, and precipitated the deep political crisis that 
forced de la Rúa to resign from office in December.  
The CFI revenue floor introduced in 1992 only ended in February 2002 when President 
Duhalde (2002-2003) signed a new fiscal pact with the provinces. The denominated Federal 
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Agreement (Acuerdo Federal, Law 25,570) rescinded the piso mínimo and returned to a 
percentage-based system whose volume depended on fluctuations in the actual amount of 
collected revenues. The national and provincial shares were set at 42.64 percent and 57.36 
percent respectively. The provinces received 30 percent of a new tax on checks, were authorized 
to issue bonds to cover their current expenditures (but not to cover their debts with the Nation), 
and saw their dollar-denominated debts refinanced in very favorable conditions to sixteen years 
with a tree-years grace period, and converted to pesos at the rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar 
(Cetrángolo and Jiménez 2004; Eaton 2005).66
To summarize, the historical evolution of the CFI regime indicates that the federal 
government has faced sharp limits to manipulate the revenue sharing system, impose centralizing 
reforms, and weaken the power of provincial governors. Tightly constrained by law and strictly 
watched over by the provinces, the CFI has been protected from presidential manipulation. Both 
the volume of funds subject to sharing and their distribution among the provinces are determined 
by Congress as either a fixed share of specific taxes or a fixed amount. In addition, tax-sharing 
legislation sets the automaticity of payment on a daily base.
    
67
                                                 
66 The national government could retain up to 15 percent of the CFI resources to cover the provincial debts (canje). 
The municipal debt was assumed by the provinces, and was not subject to the 15 percent limit. Moreover, provinces 
agreed on reducing 60 percent of their primary deficit in 2002 and eliminating it in 2003. None of these 
compromises, however, actually occurred. For details, see sections 2.3.1.3 and 2.4. 
 The more drastic change ever 
introduced, the minimum revenue guarantees, ironically constrained the flexibility of the center 
67 Weak administrative procedures have occasionally enabled the federal government to exercise some minimal 
discretion over payment and timing. But such discretion was more common upon co-participation advances than 
retentions. 
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once revenue collection declined.68
2.2 THE MECHANISMS OF TRANSFER ALLOCATION: PROVINCIAL 
STRENGHT AND MUNICIPAL WEAKNESS  
 Provincial governments, in particular those ruling small, 
financially dependent, and public-employment intensive districts, typically use these resources to 
finance current expenditures associated with the functioning of their large administrations.  
In stark contrast to the Brazilian transfer system, which automatically allocates formulaic grants 
to both the states and municipalities, the Argentine system monopolizes transfer access to the 
states. Indeed, it orders virtually all nationally-collected revenues must be exclusively allocated 
to the provinces.  Municipalities do not have their own transfer agreements with the central 
government and only receive revenues indirectly through the provinces following criteria 
specified by subnational tax legislation. By excluding municipalities from direct federal transfer 
allocation, the institutions of fiscal federalism concentrate access to fiscal resources on 
gubernatorial hands and reduce barriers to entry making local governments highly reliant on the 
dictates of powerful subnational bosses.  
To a large extent, such a centralized nature of the transfer scheme at the provincial level 
is the result of an archaic federal organization that reflects the bloody interprovincial conflicts 
                                                 
68 The central government can only obtain some leverage over the provinces by offering them new transfers as a 
quid pro quo for provincial compliance with federal initiatives.  
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that marked the origins of Argentina’s federalism (Gibson and Falleti 2004). Unlike in Brazil, 
where municípios currently enjoy federal constitutional status and have been important political 
actors since colonial times, the Argentine municipalities enjoy an ambiguous constitutional status 
and have historically been creatures of the provinces.69
Neither the 1853 Constitution nor the 1994 reforms recognize municipal autonomy. 
Although both identify a third (municipal) level as an integral part of the country’s federal order, 
they establish obligation for the provinces to “assure the municipal regime” (Article 5). 
Provinces, which as Chapter 4 will show are institutionally heterogeneous with independence to 
write their own constitutions, are then granted the exclusive right to design the municipal 
regimes and determine both the scope and content of local governments’ political and fiscal 
autonomy.
  
70
                                                 
69 Governed during the Spanish colonial period as part of the Vice-Royalty of the River Plate, the territory of 
present-day Argentina was a mostly empty area divided into three large and disconnected intendencias (Buenos 
Aires, Córdoba del Tucumán, and Salta del Tucumán). The colonial political system established that the major 
regional centers (audiencias) mediated the affairs between the towns and the viceroy. Reporting to them were the 
city councils (cabildos). Expression of the municipal oligarchic spirit and local prerogatives, the cabildos were early 
recognized by the Bourbons as an obstacle to centralized rule. Indeed, the Spanish crown created the intendencias 
regime in the eighteenth century precisely to oversee their increasing power. In the years following the start of the 
independence war in 1810, several “subordinated” cities obtained independence from their intendencias, declared 
free and sovereign states, and gradually suppressed the cabildos as they represented a rival authority to the powerful 
governor-caudillos (Chiaramonte 1993: 105-15), who concentrated power not because –like in Brazil– they were the 
big landowners but because they were the successful military bosses (Lafforgue 1999). When the cabildos were 
suppressed, the political role of municipalities was definitely disarticulated and the autonomous provinces became 
the key political actors.  
 This provision means that municipalities are highly dependent on the provinces, and 
that the federal game in indeed a two-level game played out between the federal and provincial 
governments. This game is not easily accessible to the municipalities, perhaps with the exception 
of some populated districts in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. Moreover, such provision 
70 Presently, eight provinces (Buenos Aires, Chaco, Entre Ríos, La Pampa, Mendoza, Santa Fe, Santa Cruz, and 
Tucumán) do not formally recognize municipal autonomy.  
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makes extremely difficult for the federal government to bypass incumbent governors and 
articulate politically with mayors.       
The intergovernmental transfer system reinforces the ability of governors to protect their 
territorial dominance because provinces are free to redistribute federal fiscal transfers to local 
government virtually as they wish. Financially, Argentine municipalities are weak. Regarding 
expenditures, they are responsible for the provision of basic water and sanitation (including the 
collection and treatment of solid waste), urban transport, street lighting, and a host of small 
services such as the maintenance of parks, markets and cemeteries, land use plans, building 
standards, and traffic control. As a result, during the 1983-2003 period, local governments only 
averaged 7.2 percent of the total public spending (2.2 percent of the GDP or 20 percent of the 
provincial spending). Municipalities also remained severely restricted to determine and raise 
their own taxes, which accounted for merely 2.5 percent of total municipal income. Around half 
of these meager revenues come from a composite tax on street lighting, street cleaning, and solid 
waste management (the so-called tasa de alumbrado, barrido y limpieza). Other minor levies 
include the environmental and public salubrity tax on industries and enterprises, the path 
maintenance tax on landowners, and the tax on infrastructure improvement.  
Finally, each province autonomously determines a portion of the CFI revenues that are 
reallocated to their respective municipalities. This portion, along with an autonomously 
determined percentage of royalties and provincial taxes, composed a new revenue-sharing 
regime known as Municipal Tax-Sharing Agreement (Coparticipación Municipal de Impuestos, 
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CMI). The CMI regimes vary from province to province along three lines71: the overall portion 
of resources that each province allocates to its respective municipalities, the criteria used to 
divvy up that sum among the different municipalities of a province, and the authority 
institutionally assigned to the incumbent governors to influence the municipal allocation of 
resources.72 Detailed information on the CMI regimes circa 2003 is presented in Appendix B, 
Table 11. This information allows us to visualize the fiscal relation between provincial 
governments and municipalities, and the incidence of governors upon municipal financing.73
Throughout the 1990s, provincial governments transferred to municipalities about one- 
tenth of their total (national and provincial) revenues at an annual average of 1 percent of the 
GDP. This sum represented approximately 45 percent of the municipal resources. The Argentine 
provinces exhibit notable variation in the percentage of CFI funds reallocated to their local 
governments. Indeed, this value ranges from 8 percent in the province of San Luis to 25 percent 
in Tierra del Fuego with a mean of 13.4 and a standard deviation of 3.9. There is also a large 
intra-national variation in the percentage of provincial tax resources that each subnational 
jurisdiction destined to its CMI. The level of municipal participation in the gross receipts tax 
varies from 12 percent to 45 percent, whereas the shares of local governments in the taxes on 
motor vehicles, property, and stamps vary from 5 percent to 90 percent, 10 percent to 40 percent, 
     
                                                 
71 The averaged composition of the twenty-three CMIs regimes during the 1995-2003 period was as follows: 50 
percent of the resources coming from the CFI, 5 percent from royalties, and 45 percent from provincial taxes. 
72 Once transferred to the municipalities, the CMI resources have almost no conditionalities attached thus lying at 
the mayors’ own disposal. 
73 No official information exists on the CMI regimes. I compiled data from CECE (1996) and specific provincial tax 
legislation. 
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and 12 percent to 20 percent respectively. There is even one province, Jujuy, which determines 
the overall amount of municipal transfers based upon the wage bills of the local governments. In 
addition, the parameters used to divide the CMI pie among the municipalities of a province are 
very diverse including population, territorial size, unsatisfied basic needs, municipal tax 
generation, and the number of employees in the municipal public sector. For redistribution 
purposes, most provincial governments distribute a portion of the transfers equally among all 
municipalities.  
Despite considerable subnational variation, governors enjoy substantial authority over the 
allocation of transfer funds to municipalities (at least in comparison to the little power that the 
chief executive has to arbitrarily manipulate the provincial distribution of such moneys). 
Arguably, gubernatorial latitude is higher where the provincial legislature faces constitutional 
limitations to define fund allocation, the municipal distribution of resources is non-automatic, the 
provincial government can withhold transfers, and it can reassign part of the money to the 
creation of special provincial funds administered by the governorship. An analysis conducted 
over the CMI legislation of twenty-two provinces indicates than only 17 percent of the CMI 
regimes explicitly incorporate the participation of the provincial legislatures in the process of 
fund allocation, nearly 60 percent establish non-automaticity in fund distribution, merely 27 
percent determine that it should be executed on a daily basis, 30 percent allow the provincial 
government to withhold the CMI funds, and 52 percent permit the incumbent governor to 
redirect part of these resources to the establishment of special provincial funds, which are 
distributed within the provinces according to criteria set by the sitting gubernatorial 
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administration. Thus, for most (if not all) provincial governors, the CMI regimes constitute a 
powerful instrument they can utilize to control financially dependent municipalities, spur the 
political support of mayors, and reduce their chances of becoming potential challengers to the 
governorship.     
2.3 THE CLOSENESS OF BUDGET RULES  
The third fiscal factor affecting gubernatorial access to federal transfers is the ability of national 
legislators to obtain intergovernmental grants for themselves: the less ability to appropriate such 
funds, the more gubernatorial access. Congressional appropriations of transfers from the federal 
budget are allowed in Argentina, but legislators’ prerogatives to influence the budget process in 
general and to capture line budgetary items in particular are very little compared with those of 
their Brazilian counterparts.74 I do not contend that Argentine legislators –especially those with 
subnational or local ambitions– are unlikely to invest in delivering pork to their districts by either 
biasing the content of the specific bills they draft or demanding particularistic concessions in 
exchange for their legislative support.75
                                                 
74 The budget process is regulated by the Constitution and a series of laws. It consists of four stages: the drafting of 
the budget bill, the treatment of the executive proposed budget in Congress, the execution of the budget, and the 
subsequent oversight. For details, see Abuelafia, Berensztein, Braun, and Di Gresia (2005: 17-44), and Jones (2001: 
158-168).  
 My claim is that the budget rules preclude individual 
legislators from obtaining federal transfers to fatten their own clienteles and influence the 
75 An innovative treatment of the connection between subnational/local ambitions and bill-drafting in Argentina 
appears in Micozzi (2009).    
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organization of pork distribution in their districts. Certainly, legislators can get some resources 
by working in concert with their provincial bosses. Indeed, several authors have claimed that 
governors are able to influence their legislative delegations in Congress. But these coordinated 
actions eventually bring money for the legislators’ home provinces (and governors) rather than 
for themselves. The vast majority of such interventions, moreover, are in practice oriented to 
assure the continuity of already assigned benefits. Indeed, legislative pork-barreling through 
budget amendments is mostly about “done deals” (beneficios ganados).76
The Argentine Congress is empowered to approve the budget proposal and to introduce 
expenditure modifications during its treatment in both the Budget and Finance Committee and on 
the floor. Until 1992, it had unrestricted powers to amend the budget albeit they were never 
extensively used.
 
77
                                                 
76 Interview with Alejandro Arlía, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 26, 2005. 
 The Financial Administrative Law (FAL) enacted in that year restricted the 
introduction of congressional amendments by determining that any increment in expenditures 
must identify the corresponding revenue source (i.e., new taxes, increments in resources 
earmarked for specific purposes, spending cuts in other programs, financial credits, or remnants 
of previous fiscal years). In addition to be restricted in their scope, legislative amendments to the 
annual budget are not identified with a number or the name of the legislators who proposed 
77 The constitution establishes that the budget bill must be sent to the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate typically 
treats the approved proposal in extraordinary sessions (sobre tablas) to accelerate its promulgation. Historically, the 
intervention of senators has therefore been minor, and the possibilities of disagreements between the upper and 
lower chambers have been reduced through informal mechanisms. In the words of Carlos Snopek: “The Chamber 
does not cultivate any relation with the Senate…senators just raise their hands. There is a sort of tacit agreement in 
which the Senate controls the judiciary and military nominations and we [the Chamber] deal with the budget”. 
Interview with Carlos Snopek. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 16, 2005. 
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them. Rather, they are integrated into an appendix to the budgetary law. As there is no official 
record on legislative amendments, it is impossible to follow up their implementation and 
consequently claim credit among local constituents for the eventual release of federal funds. This 
particularity, of course, decreases the incentives of legislators to introduce modifications to the 
budget and makes it harder the acquisition of discretionary resources –especially for those 
deputies who did not build up seniority– that would help them to articulate politically with 
municipal mayors bypassing subnational bosses, build their own organizational structures, and 
challenge the territorial dominance of incumbent governors.    
Congressional appropriations of federal fiscal resources in Argentina are also restricted by 
the formal and informal powers that the chief executive enjoys over the budget process. First, 
s/he informally sets the portion of the annual budget subject to pork-barrel allocations. The chief 
executive notifies legislators of this limit through the Ministry of Economy before sending the 
budget proposed project to the Chamber, and then simply vetoes the amendments that exceed 
such volume.78
                                                 
78 Interview with Jorge Baldrich, Buenos Aires, December 7, 2005. The chief executive can veto the approved 
budget bill in whole or in part (i.e., line item veto). The Congress can override a presidential veto with a two-thirds 
vote in both the Chamber and the Senate. Otherwise, the bill absent the portion vetoed becomes law. Between 1983 
and 2003, the Argentine chief executives routinely employed the line item veto, while Congress only overruled a 
presidential decision in 1998, 1999 and 2003. 
 Second, the chief executive can both increase the budget amount and divert 
expenditures during the implementation stage almost at will. These institutional prerogatives 
reached between national legislators and governmental entities (ministries, secretaries, and 
decentralized organizations) at the draft stage are not necessarily sustainable. For political 
convenience and macroeconomic incentives the federal government has systematically 
100 
 
 
 
overestimated growth and revenue forecasts thus gaining flexibility to reallocate surpluses to its 
preferred policy areas and programs. It has also expanded the prerogatives assigned to the 
president over the budget by the combination of an extensive use of emergency decrees and, 
since 1996, the delegation of legislative authority (superpoderes) to the Chief Cabinet of 
Ministers. The emergency decrees have been used consistently and for large magnitudes. For 
example, in 2004 a single decree increased the budget by $4,200 million and all decrees issued in 
that year did it by $6,150 million –nearly 10 percent of the approved budget bill.79 The 
superpoderes have also been widely utilized to trade-off budget expenditures thereby 
circumventing the restrictions imposed by the FAL.80
As a consequence of this structure of incentives, nothing of any great importance occurs 
at the budget approval stage, and relatively few congressional modifications are included in the 
final draft. Uña (2005) has estimated that budget amendments in the 1994-2001 period averaged 
less than 2 percent of the budget. Approximately 80 percent of these amendments were on issues 
previously negotiated with the chief executive in the areas of industrial and non-industrial 
promotion (which, as we will see in detail below, are strictly controlled by the governors), and 
the expansion of funds for public universities (which constitute a partisan resource demanded by 
the UCR given its control over most universities and students’ centers in the country).
  
81
                                                 
79 The 1994 constitutional reform mandated that the emergency decrees were subject to parliamentary review. 
However, the bicameral committee tasked with overseeing such decrees was only established at the end of 2006. 
 The 
80 The article 37 of the FAL established that the functions of the Chief of Cabinet Ministers are to send the executive 
budget proposal to Congress, allocate the administrative distribution of expenditures, and supervise every three 
months the expenditures assigned to each administrative jurisdiction.  
81 Interview with Nicolás Gadano, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 27, 2005. 
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remaining 20 percent comprised increments for pensions directly granted by Congress to specific 
individuals (pensiones graciables), arguably a source of legislative patronage. Only between 
1991 and 1995 were national legislators, mostly from the PJ, able to incorporate some pork-
barrel items into the budget through the so-called “happiness forms” (planillas de la felicidad). 
These forms constituted appendices added to the budget bill with no reference to any particular 
legislator detailing the execution of infrastructure projects that lacked the appropriate source of 
funding and had not been approved by federal authorities (Bonvecchi and Rodriguez 2004). 
Because citizens did not know that these public work projects cannot be implemented, legislators 
could argue for their inclusion in the budget and blame the central government for not executing 
them. The planillas de la felicidad, in other words, constituted legislative credit claiming over 
non-executable spending.   
In contrast to the minor role assigned to federal deputies (and senators) in channeling 
pork for their own constituencies, some scholars have argued that that the smooth passage of the 
executive budget proposal in the Chamber reveals the federal government’s necessity to 
incorporate the interest of its co-partisan legislators when drafting the budget (Jones 2001). The 
question, therefore, is whether the executive budget proposal sent to Congress actually reflects 
the interests of a large component of the Chamber or even the requests of the smaller president’s 
legislative bloc. Unfortunately, individual legislators’ success in attracting pork (either during 
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the treatment of the budget proposal or behind doors at the draft stage) is not measurable.82
First, as Chapter 4 will make evident, the country’s electoral and candidate selection rules 
do not produce parties with individualistic deputies. Faced with daunting rates of legislative 
turnover, Argentine legislators are unlikely to develop the skills and expertise that would allow 
them to negotiate budget resources with the chief executive (Corrales 2002: 4). Second, 
anecdotal evidence provides additional support to the “closeness” hypothesis. Asked about the 
participation of federal deputies in the draft stage, the former Chief of the Budget Committee and 
President of the Chamber of Deputies explained: “The vast majority of the national deputies do 
not know a damn about the budget until it is sent for approval. In addition, as most of what is 
incorporated into the draft is about done deals, negotiations during the draft stage are null. Only 
recently has we [the Committee] acquired some knowledge of what is sent and how the budget is 
elaborated…We are just now working to see if we can make some suggestions to incorporate our 
interests into the budget draft.”
 I 
contend, however, that several factors cast doubts on the interpretation that assigns national 
legislators play a prominent role in drafting the budget.  
83
                                                 
82 As mentioned above, there are no records of the intergovernmental transfers made to regions as a result of 
legislators’ budget amendments. Furthermore, in contrast to the information available for the Brazilian case (Ames 
2001: 150), there are no parliamentary liaisons of ministries that maintain lists of deputies meeting with ministers.  
 Similarly, in the words of the former Vice Chief of the Budget 
Committee, Rafael Gonzalez: “An individual legislator can never include a personal aspiration, 
something that s/he has decided, into the budget. I can only include something if there is a 
83 Interview with Carlos Snopek. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 16, 2005. 
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specific claim of my province…If that is the case there is a sort of correspondence between the 
aspiration of the governor and my own aspiration.”84
2.4 THE GUBERNATORIAL BIAS OF TRANSFER INSTITUTIONS  
  
As posited by the theoretical model developed in Chapter 1, two main variables affect the ability 
of governors to control the further distribution of fiscal resources transferred from the center: the 
institutional bias in the transfer rules, and the softness of subnational budget constraints. This 
section shows that provincial governors in Argentina enjoy ample transfer both because the 
intergovernmental system sets few conditionalities to how transfer funds must be spent, and the 
federal government imposes soft controls over provincial borrowing policies and expenditure 
decisions. Extant literature on Argentina’s fiscal federalism has pointed out that federal transfers 
constitute a potent instrument incumbents used to build governing coalitions, advance legislative 
agendas, and mobilize electoral support. However, prior research is inevitably exposed to one of 
two deficits: incompleteness or clustering.85
The incompleteness deficit consists of focusing on some specific types of federal 
transfers and disregarding others. This limitation leads scholars to provide a misleading account 
of how the Argentine transfer regime operates. The clustering deficit consists of grouping 
  
                                                 
84 Interview with Rafael González. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 1, 2005. 
85 This discussion is based on Bonvecchi and Lodola (forthcoming). 
104 
 
 
 
essentially different federal transfers into a common, undistinguishable pool of resources. It is 
irrelevant whether these funds are part of a revenue-sharing regime, non-automatic grants, 
unearmarked or conditioned loans. It is also irrelevant who (the national or subnational 
governments) enjoys political discretion over different dimensions attached to each individual 
transfer. Because central government resources are channeled to lower levels of government, it is 
assumed that politicians located at higher levels concentrate more discretion than those located at 
lower levels. Yet fiscal institutions distinctively assign incumbent presidents and governors 
different degrees of authority to manipulate intergovernmental grants.  
Both the incompleteness and clustering deficits affect previous studies on fiscal 
federalism in Argentina. The former deficit is evident in Wibbels’ (2005; see also Remmer and 
Wibbels 2000) original study about the effect of partisan harmony on center-periphery fiscal 
relations. The author contends that the 1990s brought about a deep process of recentralization of 
fiscal authority in which the central government restricted provincial spending autonomy through 
matching grants, and conditioned federal bailouts of indebted provinces to the subnational 
enactment of market-oriented administrative reforms. But unfortunately, the richness of Wibbels’ 
argument and the strength of his empirical findings are undermined because the author quantifies 
recentralization through the classic distinction between automatic and non-automatic, conditional 
and unconditional transfers. Although Wibbels correctly associates different types of federal 
grants with different institutional structures of incentives, he lacks a rigorous theoretical 
conceptualization of the country’s intergovernmental transfer regime.  
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Likewise, incompleteness characterizes a good-number of studies that analyze the utility 
of CFI regime to boost presidential electoral support in the provinces. Tightly constrained by law 
and closely watched over by subnational units, the co-participation funds are a sterile political 
tool for presidential coalition-building.  Despite the historical fights between national and 
subnational actors over the CFI distribution, federal governments of different stripes have been 
unable to manage these funds in a discretionary manner. By focusing on the CFI alone and 
ignoring other grants, the study of Argentine fiscal federalism is weakened in a twofold way. 
First, the analysis becomes limited to the few instances in which the revenue-sharing system was 
discussed and redefined (Eaton 2001a, 2004; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Porto and Sanguinetti 2004). 
Second, the analysis is reduced to the conclusion that the CFI regime is a perfect illustration of 
an entire intergovernmental fiscal system with unstable rules and high transaction costs that 
impede efficient outcomes (Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001).  
The clustering deficit, on the other hand, affects Gibson and Calvo’s (2001) innovative 
study on the decisive role played by low-maintenance (i.e., over-represented) subnational 
coalitions for the adoption of market-friendly reforms under the Menem administration. The 
authors argue that the central government used a portfolio of highly discretionary federal 
transfers to buy off the legislative support of low-maintenance peripheral provinces instead of 
furnishing the more expensive acquiescence of high-maintenance (i.e., under-represented) 
metropolitan districts. The collection of intergovernmental transfers analyzed by the authors 
includes some funds discretionally managed by the president, and “a series of federal grants and 
credits for housing, public works, health, and education” (Gibson and Calvo 2001: 43). Yet 
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grouping all these funds is theoretically inadequate and empirically wrong because the 
institutional rules that govern their allocation (and their consequent political utility for coalition 
building) are far from similar. In particular, as the following sections will show, the president’s 
political leverage to distribute public work projects to the provinces has varied considerably 
through time, while his/her capacity to discretionally assign health and education resources has 
been null.   
A similar problem affects Jones’ (2001) study of the potential influence exerted by the 
Argentine Congress upon the budgetary process. The author claims that provinces making the 
largest contributions to the president’s legislative bloc receive the largest shares of budgetary 
funds. To test this argument, Jones constructs a transfer variable that comprises budgetary credits 
and “the total amount of transfers allocated by the federal government” (Jones 2001: 176). 
Clustering problems are obvious as the author merges all federal transfers into a common pool of 
resources regardless of whether they are allocated through fixed formulae or in an ad hoc 
manner, and independently of whether they are conditional or unconditional (for the federal or 
provincial authorities) in nature.86
                                                 
86 Furthermore, as Jones’ variable includes federal transfers and it therefore covers more than budgetary credits, it 
does no longer serve to capture the underlying dynamics of budgetary politics in the country. At this point, 
measurement problems become conceptual problems.   
 Similarly, Gordin (2004) also falls prey to clustering when he 
investigates the potential effect of vertical (presidential-gubernatorial) co-partisanship, partisan 
turnover in the presidency, and divided government upon the share of intergovernmental 
transfers received by the provinces between 1973 and 1999. The author’s dependent variable 
combines six different federal grants: oil and gas royalties, housing funds, electricity funds, road-
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maintenance funds, national treasury contributions, and a special fund to finance public work 
projects in the provinces. But unfortunately, only the regional allocation of the last two federal 
transfers was under the absolute discretion of the president during the period under study. The 
provincial distribution of housing, electricity and road-maintenance funds was defined by 
formulaic procedures, while royalties often responded to strict devolution criteria.   
Clustering also questions the empirical validity of accounts linking intergovernmental 
transfers with subnational election results. In an often-cited article, Remmer and Gélineau (2003; 
see also Gélineau and Remmer 2006) use aggregate and individual level data to test the 
referendum voting hypothesis in subnational elections held in Argentina between 1983 and 2001. 
The authors estimate a pooled cross-sectional time-series model on the effect of several variables 
–including federal transfers- upon the vote share of candidates from the incumbent president’s 
party in gubernatorial, national deputy, and provincial legislative contests. They assume that 
rational-minded politicians will seek to influence electoral outcomes through expenditure 
allocations, and voters will respond positively to that strategic spending. It is therefore expected 
that the federal government will deploy intergovernmental grants to enhance the electoral 
fortunes of candidates affiliated with the incumbent president’s party. Remmer and Gélineau 
measure this effort as the ratio of provincial revenues to national revenues for each election year 
(weighted for the electoral calendar). This variable consistently reports a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient indicating that the lower the level of provincial revenue 
generation relative to the total flow of federal transfers, the higher the vote share of the national 
in-party candidates. The results thus seem to provide statistical grounds for confirming the 
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hypothesis that the transfer system works in favor of the incumbent president in subnational 
elections. But Remmer and Gélineau cluster quite different federal grants into a common pool. 
This serious conceptual error stems from incorrectly assuming that the Argentine president has 
exclusive control over the whole transfer pie. But, discussed below, the federal government only 
enjoys political latitude over a small share of the transferable funds to the provinces –the 
majority of which actually lies at the provincial governors’ absolute discretion.  
In order to assess the specific spending powers of governors we need to understand how 
discretionality varies across the large number of federal grants at their disposal. With that 
purpose, I apply a novel operationalization of transfer discretionality to each of the twenty-two 
transfer programs used in Argentina since 1983. Figure 11 cross-tabulates these programs 
relative to their relative degree of gubernatorial and presidential discretionality. Detailed 
examination of gubernatorial and presidential discretion over each transfer fund is presented in 
Apppendix B. 
As operationalized in Chapter 1, gubernatorial discretion identifies whether the governors 
control four dimensions of transfer execution: reallocation, timing, procurement, and monitoring. 
Presidential discretion is operationalized by assessing whether the chief executive controls five 
dimensions of spending: amount, timing, targeting, payment, and earmarking. Amount refers to 
the total volume of resources allocated to a specific transfer. It may incorporate a fixed amount, a 
variable percentage within a pre-established range, line items in the national budget, or a fully 
discretional sum. Timing indicates the temporal order in which a particular transfer is delivered. 
Targeting denotes the authority of the chief executive (or the individual ministers) to decide 
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which provinces ultimately receive the funds. Payment points to the administrative act of 
depositing the money in the recipients’ bank accounts. Finally, earmarking indicates the federal 
restrictions formally established to the use of transferred funds by the subnational governments. 
It is worth noting that these rules do not vary by province although, as we will see below, they 
have varied across time.  
In a nutshell, the Figure 11 shows that despite Argentina has experienced decentralization 
and recentralization measures throughout the years, governors –rather than presidents as it is 
commonly thought– have preserved an ample political discretion over the use of most transfer 
funds. Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, provincial bosses have retained stable co-
participation levels, increased the subsidization of their regional economies from both industrial 
and non-industrial promotion credits, gained control over infrastructure funds, and received 
sizeable federal aid to finance their deficits, pension-systems, and debts. As a result, they have 
been able to use these generous fiscal rents free of domestic accountability links to feed elaborate 
patronage networks of support.  
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Gubernatorial 
Low  Medium  High  
 
 
 
High 
Federal Tax-Sharing Regime (CFI) 
Fiscal Disequilibria Fund 
Housing Fund (FONAVI) 
Electricity Fund (FEDEI) 
Special Tobacco Fund (FET) 
Greater Buenos Aires Fund 
Basic Social Infrastructure Fund 
Oil and Gas Royalties  
Industrial Promotion 
Non-Industrial Promotion 
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Figure 11: Gubernatorial and Presidential Discretionality over Federal Transfers in Argentina 
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2.5 THE SOFTNESS OF SUBNATIONAL BUDGET CONSTRAINTS  
In setting hard budget constraints on subnational finances, Argentina has been one of the worst 
countries among middle-income nations. As a result, governors have been able to borrow 
virtually without limits and to spend budgetary resources circumventing weak federal oversight. 
Indeed, throughout the 1980s and part of the 1990s the Argentine provinces faced exceptionally 
soft budget constraints. They consequently run high fiscal deficits, which accounted for half of 
the overall public sector deficit, thus making federal bailouts almost inevitable. Provinces could 
borrow virtually without check from a variety of sources including the domestic and external 
private sector, their own commercial banks, and federal financial institutions. Subnational 
governments usually borrowed from highly politicized and insolvent provincial banks for short-
term cash management goals. These banks facilitated provincial borrowing by underwriting bond 
issues and then discounted the loans at the Central Bank, effectively giving the provinces a share 
in the seigniorage and inflation tax (Dillinger and Webb 1999). An additional source of short-
term borrowing and cash flow was the massive rediscounts granted by the Central Bank to 
provincial financial institutions experiencing liquidity problems.87
                                                 
87 Financial rediscounts are short-term loans guaranteed by the net worth of the beneficiaries’ assets. Formally 
speaking, the Argentine Central Bank is an autarchic entity from the Ministry of Economy. But in reality it has been 
dependent from national authorities most of the time. In 1992, its charter was reformed and the Central Bank gained 
independence from the central government on all matters concerning the formulation and execution of monetary 
policy. This change reduced the scope for political criteria but did not diminish discretionality upon provincial 
rediscounts. 
 By 1989, these federal 
subsidies were estimated in more than 5 percent of the GDP (Lorenzutti 1996). Provinces also 
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borrowed through a variety of informal mechanisms. Short-term deficits were frequently 
financed with arrears on payments to suppliers and public employees. After exhausting the 
tolerance for delayed payment, subnational jurisdictions resorted to forced lending paying 
suppliers and public workers with bonds authorized to float on the capital market.88 These bonds 
could be converted to cash at the provincial banks and then used to pay local taxes. Provinces 
were also able to borrow from private (either domestic or foreign) commercial banks and 
international financial organisms, mostly in the form of medium-term contractual debt, pledging 
their coparticipation funds as collateral.89
                                                 
88 Some provinces and their enterprises successfully floated Eurobonds in the mid-1990s. 
 Although provinces needed the authorization of the 
Ministry of Economy to pledge these funds, there was no legal restriction on the percentage that 
they could divert to that goal. For each loan or bond issue, the province and creditor negotiated a 
percentage limit (cupo) on the share of the daily flow of coparticipation resources which could 
be taken for service on that loan. The federal government indirectly participated in these 
arrangements as the Banco de la Nación deducted the debt service from those revenues and 
transferred the remainder to the provinces (Dillinger and Webb 1999). In case of a provincial 
default, a particular creditor got its money depending on its place in the queue and the size of its 
cupo. By the time of economic stabilization was reached in 1991, hyperinflation had greatly 
eroded the real value of provincial domestic debt although external debts remained quite 
89 The Ministry of Economy controlled the legality of borrowing operations and secured the pledged resources 
would be enough to cancel debt interests. That is, it protected the lenders’ interests (Zentner and Sanguinetti 2000). 
In this way, the colletarization discouraged financial and fiscal performance and precluded the credit market to act 
as a mechanism of fiscal discipline. 
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substantial. The provinces emerged with virtually no debt to the federal government, and most of 
their debt was owned to the private sector.   
The federal government took some measures to control provincial borrowing in the 
1990s. Because the constitution is ambiguous about the possibility of subnational borrowing 
control by the center, it was instituted a complex mechanism to oversight provinces. At first 
glance, it appears that the federal government had access to a considerable array of hierarchical 
control mechanisms. But most of these mechanisms were undermined because they emphasized 
ex ante rules without adequate enforcement, were exposed to several loopholes, and generated 
bad incentives that ultimately left compliance to provincial self-restraint.  
The most critical and effective steps were a variety of indirect measures that restricted –
not prohibited- provincial banks as sources of credit to the provinces. In line with the anti-
inflationary Convertibility Law, which required that the monetary base should not exceed the 
dollar value of international reserves, the Central Bank’s charter was reformed to prohibit the 
institution from taking any new domestic assets. This measure hardened ex post subnational 
budget constraints and limited provincial banks’ common practice of using federal rediscount 
loans to finance their expenditures. The Central Bank was also prohibited from guaranteeing 
bank deposits, which eliminated the federal government as a lender of last resort and forced 
provincial banks to rely on depositor confidence in order to maintain liquidity. Furthermore, the 
Ministry of Economy issued a resolution banning any federal agency from using its resources to 
pay creditors on behalf of a particular province, and demanded bonds issued abroad or in foreign 
currency to be cleared with the Central Bank. In the context of the 1995 Tequila crisis, which 
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produced a generalized run on deposits that shocked international reserves and threatened to 
bankrupt most provincial banks, the federal government negotiated a series of extraordinary 
loans with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to clean up the slates of 
subnational financial entities. Provinces were forced to help rescue their ruined banks first by 
trying to avert bankruptcy and then by recapitalizing them for privatization. Drawing upon these 
international loans, the national authorities created the Provincial Development Fiduciary Fund 
(Fondo Fiduciario de Desarrollo Provincial) which was utilized to privatize twenty out of 
twenty six provincial banks between 1995 and 1999 (Clarke and Cull 1999).  
The federal government also sought to control provincial borrowing by regulating the 
ability of subnational jurisdictions to collateralize their debts. This strategy, however, proved 
ineffective in the aggregate. It was mandated that provinces with a weak credit position had to be 
authorized by the Banco de la Nación to deduct their debt-service payments from the 
coparticipation funds. Provinces with a stronger credit rating were allowed to collect from such 
funds only if they faced a default in payment (Webb 2003). Although this measure initially 
discouraged the Argentine provinces from excessive borrowing, it also made private creditors 
less sensitive to risk and more willing to lend. Thus, when the growth of tax revenues resulted 
from the convertibility boom came to an end and pressures for deficit financing increased with 
the Tequila shock, the provinces responded by borrowing in excess pledging their coparticipation 
funds as guarantee. According to estimations, at the end of the decade the federal government 
took as much as one-third of these resources to pay creditors (Cetrángolo, Jiménez, Devoto, and 
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Vega 2002).90
In sharp contrast to the Brazilian experience discussed in the next chapter, the 
Argentina’s Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) approved by Congress in September 1999 failed to 
harden subnational soft budget constraints. The law established limits for the federal –not for the 
provincial- government’s growth of expenditures, instituted nominal ceilings for the non-
financial deficit, stipulated the adoption of multiannual budgeting, mandated the creation of 
transparency measures regarding public finances, and set a path to fiscal balance in 2003. 
Because the nominal ceilings were consistently broken, the FRL was rapidly replaced by a new 
regulation that relaxed those ceilings and extended the date at which the federal budget balance 
should be achieved (Braun and Tomassi 2003). Resisted by most governors, who opposed 
federal oversight and demanded the center to refinance their debts, these regulations did not 
include conditions for subnational governments and only invited the provinces to implement 
similar fiscal solvency rules on their own. Only twelve jurisdictions followed the national 
example by adopting fiscal regulations with mild restrictions on borrowing activities and fiscal 
performance. Three of them also limited personnel spending to the annual level of provincial 
GDP growth. Unclear ex ante mechanisms and ex post penalties and the absence of a strong 
central government capable of hardening constraints, however, made provincial compliance the 
 Designed on soft regulations, the market-driven credit system of colletarization 
contributed to the dramatic expansion of provincial debt, which totaled $13.9 billon in 1996 –
almost two-thirds of which provinces had been run up since 1991-, and $30 billion in 2001.  
                                                 
90 The provinces of Catamarca, Mendoza, Río Negro, Salta, and Tucumán had more than 100 percent of their 
coparticipation funds pledged as collateral.  
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exception rather than the rule. Indeed, only five provinces fulfilled their commitment with debt 
limits, three did it with regards to fiscal balance, and no province observed constraints on current 
(and then personnel) expenditures (Sanguinetti 2001).  
In 2002 the federal government was finally able to effectively curtail provincial 
autonomy over borrowing, although not over spending, by means of the Organized Financing 
Programs (Programas de Financiamiento Organizado, PFOs). These programs helped provinces 
cover their deficits and defaulted debts previously recognized by the Ministry of Economy. They 
consisted of a series of bilateral agreements by which the Duhalde administration granted 
provincial jurisdictions a monthly based loan. Subnational governments were due to repay these 
grants at below-market interest rates in the curse of 35 months. Furthermore, provinces were 
banned from contracting new debt (although they were exceptions) and increasing their floating 
debt. These conditionalities, previously assumed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
were supervised by the Under-Secretary of Provincial Fiscal Relations. By 2004, the end of the 
period covered by this dissertation, nearly 30 percent of the provincial debt borrowed from 
commercial banks had been absorbed by the PFOs. As claimed by the provinces, this transforms 
the federal government into their principal creditor concentrating almost 70 percent of the 
provincial debt stock (Cetrángolo and Jimenez 2004).91
                                                 
91 In 2005, the PFOs were replaced by the Financial Assistance Program (Programa de Asistencia Financiera) 
which only financed provincial debt services.  
  
117 
 
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has explored the role of federal fiscal institutions in facilitating incumbent 
governors’ ability to deploy resources transferred from the center to finance patronage-based 
political machines in the Argentine provinces. It underscored that a propitious institutional 
configuration (that is, a comparatively high vertical fiscal imbalance, transfer mechanisms of 
allocation that exclude municipalities and make the financially dependent from the provinces, 
budgetary rules that precludes congressional appropriations of intergovernmental grants, a 
transfer system that introduces gubernatorial discretionality in the use of such funds, a soft 
subnational budget constraints) result in extensive gubernatorial transfer power. Two related 
causal mechanisms, which I have called the “rentier” and “barriers to entry” mechanisms, in turn 
operate to connect the working of fiscal institutions with the particularistic supply of patronage 
goods to delivering networks of support. 
The next chapter analyses the connection between fiscal institutions and subnational 
particularism in the Brazilian case. It highlights that the fiscal system promotes subnational pork-
barreling (instead of patronage) because it produces a low vertical fiscal imbalance, introduces a 
more institutionally-balanced transfer system in which governors share access and spending 
powers over federal grants with municipalities and congressional legislators, and supplies hard 
subnational budget constraints.    
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3.0  FISCAL FEDERALISM AND SUBNATIONAL PARTICULARISTIC SPENDING 
IN BRAZIL 
This chapter examines how the structure of Brazil’s fiscal federalism makes incumbent 
governors more inclined to invest public outlays in supplying pork-barrel goods than in enlarging 
the state bureaucracy as a redistributive mechanism to assemble electoral support. It posits that 
contrary to their Argentine counterparts, Brazilian governors do not monopolize access to federal 
fiscal rents (but rather share them with mayors and congressional legislators) and enjoy limited 
discretion to arbitrarily manage such funds. By dispersing access to central government transfers 
among multiple political actors and regulating subnational public finance, Brazil’s rules of fiscal 
federalism diminish the resource base for state patronage and weaken gubernatorial power to 
arbitrarily determine the use of fiscal rents. 
Unlike the Argentine provinces, most Brazilian states are not financed by the central 
government. Whereas the former collect only modest tax revenues of their own and receive 
generous transfers from the center, a long-established precedent of autonomous taxation that lies 
far back in early colonial times makes the latter to rely intensively on their revenue sources. Such 
a comparatively low level of vertical fiscal imbalance precludes Brazilian governors from giving 
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up domestic taxation and living off fiscal rents. In addition, contrary to the historical pattern 
observed in Argentina where all federal transfers are directly allocated to the provinces and only 
through them to the municipalities as mandated by subnational legislation, the automatic 
distribution of federal transfers to Brazilian local units reduced state governors’ capacity to 
politicize the municipal distribution of federal transfer funds. At the same time, it guaranteed 
mayors secured resources independently from their links with state level officials and opens 
opportunities for them to articulate politically with the president bypassing governors. Given the 
allocative rationale of intergovernmental transfers in the period, municipalities that congregated 
important economic activities received a significant amount of unearmarked federal money that 
made their mayors potential challengers to the state incumbent elites. Not only did fiscal 
centralization of revenue powers affect the states more than the municipalities, but also the new 
transfer scheme protected local governments at the expense of subnational jurisdictions.  
Equally important, the broader organization of budget process in Brazil fosters 
congressional legislators to appropriate federal grants from the annual budget bill in the form of 
investment projects (pork) to bestow in their bailiwicks. This institutional feature also conspires 
against the monopolization of transfer on gubernatorial hands, and makes legislators potential 
competitors in the organization of particularistic distribution in the governors’ districts. 
Governors could get transfer funds from the annual budget bill through state bloc collective 
amendments (emendas de bancada). However, evidence discussed in this chapter indicates that 
gubernatorial influence over these collective amendments is little. This pattern sharply contrasts 
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with that in Argentina, where legislators only get budgetary resources on behalf of their 
governors. 
Since the mid-1990s the federal government launched a process of “recentralization with 
municipalization” that affected the states from both above and below. It affected the states from 
above because the recentralization of revenue powers weakened the financial autonomy of 
subnational governments vis-à-vis the center. It did it from below because the municipalization 
of expenditures (particularly in the areas of education and health) constrained the ability of 
governors to control patronage opportunities by shifting spending responsibilities. Finally, the 
Brazilian authorities successfully intensified regulation over state borrowing and expenditure 
priorities (especially regarding personnel spending), thereby limiting gubernatorial discretion 
over particularistic allocations. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in fourth sections. The first section discusses the 
comparatively low level of subnational vertical imbalance and the high degree of municipal 
political and fiscal autonomy from an historical prism. The second section deals with the 
openness of budgetary rules and the little ability of incumbent governors to obtain transfer funds 
from the annual budget bill. The third section examines the reforms implemented to regulate 
subnational finance with a focus on state debts and spending on personnel. The last section 
concludes.  
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3.1 LOW SUBNATIONAL FISCAL IMBALANCE AND MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY  
The evolution of Brazil’s fiscal federalism and its current development show a federation 
characterized by a comparatively low level of vertical fiscal imbalance for the state sector as a 
whole. Compared to Argentine provinces, Brazilian states have relied more intensively on their 
own sources of revenues than on generous federal fiscal rents which, as we have seen, encourage 
a weak tax link with constituents and therefore promote subnational rentierism and associated 
patronage-based networks. Furthermore, in contrast to Argentina’s institutional framework, a 
significant degree of municipal fiscal and political autonomy has made Brazilian governors less 
able to capture municipalities by politicizing the allocation of fiscal transfers. Both the direct 
distribution of central government grants to local units and constitutional regulations imposing 
states to reallocate a share of their revenues to their respective municipalities, have guaranteed 
mayors access to secured fiscal resources independently from political connections with state 
bosses. It also allowed the incumbent president to forge a political relation with municipal 
leaders bypassing governors. As a result, municipal mayors –especially those ruling large cities– 
became potential aspirants to the governorship. This particular configuration of politics fostered 
by the rules of fiscal federalism in turn reinforced gubernatorial proclivity to supply pork-barrel 
goods instead of overspending resources in patronage allocations. This section briefly describes 
the evolution of subnational vertical imbalance and municipal fiscal autonomy in Brazil, and 
explores how the post-1983 situation differs from that of previous eras.  
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3.1.1 Historical Evolution  
Historically, despite successive centralization and decentralization processes, the country’s fiscal 
institutions have granted a relatively high degree of revenue autonomy to the states and, to a 
lesser extent, to the municipalities. Throughout the Old Republic (1891-1930), the Brazilian 
federation was a dramatically decentralized regime in which coffee planters and governors of the 
economically powerful states, particularly Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, dominated national 
politics and the federal government machine through a pact to alternate the presidency.92
                                                 
92 The system, known as “coffee and milk,” also guaranteed stability to regional elites from the backward states by 
instituting elected governors instead of the nominated provincial presidents who had ruled the countryside during the 
highly centralized decades of the Empire (1822-1889). These presidents intervened in a large variety of matters. But 
in a patrimonial order in which regular elections (restricted to a small number of propertied males) were critical to 
legitimize territorial dominance and the Conservative and Liberal parties were subordinated to the landed elite, their 
chief function was to guarantee the electoral support of the local faction claiming to belong to the party in power 
through the skillful use of patronage and titles of nobility (Graham 1990: 82, 148-49). During the imperial period, 
the center obtained the lion’s share of revenues mostly coming from taxes on exports. It accumulated an average of 
77 percent of the total revenues, while the states and municipalities collected 18 and 5 percent respectively (Murilo 
de Carvalho 1993: 65).  
 The 
1891 Constitution allowed the states to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign governments, 
borrow money from abroad and sell bonds outside the country, control mineral rights, and levy 
taxes on exports (the most important revenue for an economy that relied heavily on international 
commodity markets), property transfers, rural/urban lands, and industrial/professional activities 
(Hagopian 1996; Love 1993: 187). Furthermore, subnational constituent units could manipulate 
tax rates and create new taxes independently from decisions adopted by the center. Primarily led 
by the cafeeiro regions and the urban expansion of the so-called “primary cities” (Sao Paulo, Rio 
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de Janeiro, Salvador, and Recife), the share of state revenues as percentage of federal revenues 
increased from 34 percent in 1907 to almost 50 percent in 1930 (Goldsmith 1986).93
Although the republican constitution proclaimed municipal autonomy, it granted states 
the authority to organize the municipal system. Incumbent governors dominated politics within 
their states –with the critical help of local landowners (coronéis) who ultimately controlled the 
supply of votes to the party in power– placing local units under their tutelage and playing 
municipal bosses off of each other (Castro 1987: 26; Leal 1949: 80-84).  
 
Subsequently, under Getulio Vargas’ Estado Nôvo (1937-1945), Brazil was officially 
declared a unitary nation and the elected governors were replaced by nominated “interventors” 
who had developed their political careers independently from traditional local machines 
(Campello de Souza 1976). Although the regime centralized fiscal resources to advance 
industrialization by granting the federal government absolute jurisdiction to regulate foreign 
trade and control the coffee and sugar sectors (Lopreato 2002), the fiscal reforms implemented 
during the Vargas’ era did not involve an abdication of subnational tax authority. Quite the 
contrary, states retained autonomy to apply their own taxes and create new ones, with the only 
limitation that 30 percent of the resources obtained through new taxation must be transferred to 
the center and 20 percent to the municipalities. The most significant fiscal changes instituted in 
the period were the gradual abolition of interstate taxes on exports, and the 10 percent rate limit 
imposed to state taxation on foreign trade (Varsano 1996). But to compensate state jurisdictions 
                                                 
93 With little capacity to tax export and consumption activities, the poor states remained financially dependent from 
the center and exposed to federal interventions typically declared to remove opposite forces from power. 
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for such revenue losses, the 1937 Constitution granted them exclusive power to regulate the 
turnover sales tax (IVC). Paradoxically enough, the modifications introduced to the tax system 
ultimately benefited the states as the international economic crisis affected export taxes (under 
federal control), and made taxes based on the domestic market (especially the IVC) the major 
source of revenues. As a result, subnational tax revenues between 1938 and 1945 increased from 
51 to 56 percent of the federal revenues (Love 1993: 218).94
Municipalities, in contrast, were negatively affected by fiscal centralization. This result 
was somewhat paradoxical considering that the municipalismo, an old and deep-rooted ideology 
developed at the turn of the nineteenth century, was an important component of the nation-
building strategy of the new governmental authorities (Melo 1993). Indeed, during the debates of 
the short-lived 1934 Constitution, several groups expressed their desire to reorganize the country 
around municipal entities. But the constitution adopted three years later was decisively anti-
municipal. Although it preserved the deliberative faculties of local councils and introduced the 
direct allocation of federal transfers out of income taxes to municipal governments, it allowed 
governors to name mayors, restricted municipalities’ revenue authority, prohibited them to 
borrow from abroad, and mandated rigid administrative controls of local expenditures through 
state and federal agencies.  
 
Pressures to liberalize the regime became irresistible at the end of World War II, and 
Vargas was removed from office in a boldness coup. Following the ouster of Vargas, there was a 
                                                 
94 The Brazilian states did not benefit equally from the IVC because it was only applied to the producer states. In 
addition, Vargas made sizeable concessions to the most prominent regions by providing a bailout of states’ debts to 
the federal government (Love 1980). 
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return of federalism and the centrality of the states. The 1946 Constitution replaced the 
nominated state interventors by popularly elected governors, who gradually gained prominence 
in national politics through their congressional delegations and ability to shape presidential 
election results. Intergovernmental fiscal institutions, however, were marked by the Vargas’ 
legacy and did not experience major chances. States from the most developed regions continued 
to benefit from the IVC, and the peripheral states strategically used their political 
overrepresentation in Congress to extract resources from the center.95
More than any previous arrangement, the new constitution reflected a tendency to 
increase municipal autonomy. This was the result of intense pressures from a vocal municipalista 
lobby in Congress organized around the Brazilian Association of Municipalities (ABM). For the 
first time, it was mandated all local officials be directly elected.
 In terms of revenue 
generation, subnational governments increased their portion from 31.4 percent of the total 
revenues in 1957 to 35.3 percent in 1964 (IBGE, various years). 
96
                                                 
95 The most developed states were able to alter tax rates and increased the IVC, while the North bloc in the Chamber 
of Deputies obtained 7 percent of the federal rent to develop infrastructure projects.  
 Since most municipalities at 
the time lacked their own revenue sources, they were allowed to organize some services and 
collect taxes on industrial and professional activities, and obtained fiscal transfers from both the 
state and the federal governments. Specifically, it was mandated that all municipalities (except 
the state capitals) would receive equal shares of the 10 percent of the federal personal income tax 
(IR) to finance rural investment projects, and one-fourth of all subnational revenues (Souza 
96 Mayors from some capital cities, however, continued to be appointed by the state governor. 
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2002: 30).97
The advent of the military regime (1964-1982) shifted the pendulum back again to 
political and fiscal centralization. In the political front, the generals extinguished all existing 
political parties, created an artificial competitive two-party system composed of a government 
party (the National Renovating Alliance, ARENA) and a docile opposition party (the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement, MDB), and decreed the presidential and gubernatorial elections indirect 
thus limiting the ability of subnational bosses to organize coup opponent forces. Moreover, the 
armed forces gained control over gubernatorial nominations. Governors became to be elected by 
 In 1961, the percentage of the IR was increased to 15 percent and it was mandated 
that a similar value of the consumption tax must also be allocated to the local governments. 
Unfortunately, despite pro-municipal written regulations, the vast majority of the Brazilian 
municípios remained financially penurious and dependent from federal and state dictums. With 
rare exceptions, the transfer regime was constantly violated by central and state authorities who 
only sporadically disbursed funds and often did it according to ad hoc political criteria. Indeed, 
municipalities’ total revenues (own taxes and transfers) only averaged 0.8 percent of the GDP in 
the 1957-1964 period (Araujo 1973). As Samuels (2000b: 81) put it, “while state governments 
regained powers lost under Vargas and the federal government continued its expansion, 
municipalities remained locked in their traditional role as passive recipients of government 
services –if their leaders had the right political connections.” 
                                                 
97 Persuaded by the possibility of capturing a larger share of the personal income tax for their home states, 
politicians from all three major parties (the virulent anti-Vargas UDN, the pro-Vargas PSD, and the labor-based 
PTB) created an impressive number of municipalities. Indeed, between 1946 and 1964, the number of municípios 
increased from 1,645 to 3,826 (Samuels 2000b: 93). 
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the state assemblies which, dominated by the arenistas, simply rubber-stamped the choice made 
by the military. This allowed the regime to replace traditional state elites for “technical” 
(técnico) governors with low political background, loose connections to subnational and local 
bosses, and tight links to the center. The military also sought to curtail the power of state 
oligarchic elites and ultimately transform patrimonial politics in the countryside –which was 
antithetical to the regime rational technocratic values– by strengthening municipalities and 
dealing directly with them in a less politicized and a more bureaucratic fashion (Sallum Júnior 
1996; Souza 1996). Thus, mayoralty and city councils elections were maintained, the budget 
system was reformed to eliminate congressional appropriations of pork from the annual budget 
bill, and the composition of the state electoral colleges in charge of designating governors and 
“bionic” senators was modified to include friendly municipal leaders.98
                                                 
98 State governors continued to appoint mayors of the state capitals and estâncias hidrominerais or cities with 
natural mineral water springs. The mayors of municipalities of national security importance were appointed by the 
president.  
 These measures fostered 
politicians to organize around local constituents, and left mayors as the only officials able to 
claim credit for the implementation of federal programs in their districts (Samuels 2002). Yet 
this strategy, as it has been widely recognized, failed to dramatically modify traditional elites’ 
organizational structures in the states because the direct election of legislative positions kept the 
military dependent from these elites to recruit candidates and organize electoral campaigns 
(Abrucio 1998; Abrucio and Samuels 2000; Hagopian 1996; Samuels 2004) In addition, the 
imposition of técnico governors affected the economic resources of conservative subnational 
elites as they could not longer rely on resources coming from the state apparatus to finance their 
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politically reward networks. In the short-run, therefore, the regional elites who had supported the 
coup began to resist técnicos, isolated them from the ARENA machines, and even campaigned 
for the MDB candidates (Martins 1975; Sarles 1982). As a result, the military suffered a 
humiliating defeat in the 1974 elections.99 Pressed by the circumstances, the regime decided to 
replace the técnicos by old political elites in order to dispute the 1978 contests (Nunes 1996). 
These changes fortified state leaders formally allied to the regime, and helped the military to 
obtain a small-margin victory in the legislative contests (Kinzo 1988: 63-65).100
In the fiscal front, the military reformed the tax system in 1965 and 1967 allowing for an 
increase in overall federal tax burden and revenue discretionality to finance infrastructure 
modernization and accelerate the pace of development, and to favor political allies at the 
municipal level (Ames 1987; Medeiros 1986). The federal government passed to control 10 out 
of the 14 taxes (Montero 2000), and was empowered to modify tax rates and create non-sharable 
taxes. In addition, it gained control over financial flows by allowing the Banco do Brasil to 
increase its portfolio of lending above legal limits (Olivera 1995), and was authorized to decide 
increments in public expenditures not contemplated in the annual budget. 
  
As in the previous centralization round, however, the Brazilian states were not deprived 
of their autonomy to tax. Although subnational jurisdictions were banned from creating new 
levies, managing tax rates, and granting tax exceptions, they were assigned authority to 
                                                 
99 Although the ARENA retained the majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the MDB obtained the 
larger number of votes since 1966 doubling its legislative representation in both chambers. 
100 The ARENA obtained a convincing 58 percent in the election for the Chamber of Deputies but was outpolled in 
the senatorial elections. Overall, it received 0.7 percent more votes than the MDB. 
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administer the tax on the exchange of real estate (ITBI) and, more importantly, to apply a broad 
basis value-added tax (the Imposto sobre Operações Relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e 
Prestação de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação, ICMS) 
in substitution for the existing turnover tax.101 With the explicit goal of freeing mayors from 
subnational tutelage and bringing them into the federal orbit, states were mandated to allocate 20 
percent of the ICMS –their highest-yielding revenue source– to their respective municipalities 
with no strings attached. At the same time, the military command counterbalanced its centralized 
movements by designing a new revenue-sharing system which set the foundations for the current 
scheme. The system, created in 1967, automatically allocated federal revenues to both the states 
and municipalities with a reasonable level of earmarking.102
                                                 
101 Yet the military retained authority to set the ICMS’ rates and earmark a significant portion of it (around 50 
percent) to the development of federal investment projects. 
 It was formed by two funds, the 
State Participation Fund (Fundo de Participação dos Estados, FPE) and the Municipal 
Participation Fund (Fundo de Participação dos Municipios, FPM), equally nurtured by 10 
percent of the taxes on personal income (IR) and industrialized products (IPI). But in 1968, the 
military soon reversed course by issuing the Complementary Law 40 which reduced to 5 percent 
the share of the IR and IPI allocated to these funds. The government also increased central 
government’s transfer discretionality by earmarking disbursement to specific programs, requiring 
the presentation of detailed investment plans to grant additional fiscal resources, and placing 
restrictions over how the transferred moneys could be spent (Oliveira 1995). In addition, states 
and municipalities were obliged to utilize their own resources to cover part of the current 
102 It was established that 50 percent of the resources must be utilized in capital spending 
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expenditures included in the approved projects (Lopreato 2002: 54). Only after the 1974 electoral 
defeat did the military increase the transferable tax share of the participation funds and removed 
earmarking (Oliveira 1995: 62).103 Moreover, to offset political opposition in the industrialized 
regions and ensure military influence over the abertura (opening) process, the generals expanded 
resources allocated to politically negotiated fiscal transfers, which increased 208 percent between 
1976 and 1982 (Affonso 1989).104
The extent of these shits in the institutions of fiscal federalism materialized in the 
division of disposable revenues, that is, gross collection of revenues by each level of government 
plus transfers received minus transfers allocated to other levels. As shown in Figure 12, the 
center increased its portion of total revenues at the expense of that of the states. Whereas the 
federal government’s share climbed steadily from 52.8 percent in 1964 to 69 percent in 1982, the 
share corresponding to the states decreased from 38.2 to 22.1 percent, and that corresponding to 
the municipalities remained stable at 8.9 percent.
 Finally, to benefit the arenista elites in the richer states, the 
federal government included fuel taxes into the ICMS.  
105
                                                 
103 The Constitutional Amendment 5/1975 mandated transfers to increase by annually augmenting 1 percent of the 
taxes subject to the FPE and FPM. However, the net effect of these formal changes on the total revenues of states 
and municipalities was nil.  
 For the purpose of my concerns in this work, 
it is important to note that even during centralized fiscal cycles Brazilian states retained access to 
an important broad-based tax that allowed most subnational governments to fund a large portion 
104 The military also increased the congressional representation of smaller states, created the poor state of Mato 
Grosso do Sul, allocated 2 percent of the IR and IPI to a special fund for backward regions, and promoted the 
creation of industrial “poles” in the underdeveloped states through the Second National Development Plan (Ames 
1987: 181-93; Sola 1994).  
105 On the spending side, the shares of the federal, state, and municipal governments during the same period moved 
from 54.8 to 68.2 percent, 35.1 to 23.3 percent, and 10.1 to 8.6 percent respectively (Rezende 1995).    
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of their spending activities. Indeed, throughout the highly centralized 1964-1982 military period 
states covered nearly 35 percent of their own expenditures through domestically raised revenues. 
This level of subnational vertical fiscal imbalance is lower than that of Argentina during its most 
recent decentralization era analyzed in the previous chapter.   
As can be seen in Figure 12, with the return of democracy in 1983 the national 
government’s share of total revenues decreased steadily and the subnational and local shares 
increased, with the largest gains concentrated at the municipal rather than the state level.106
 
 
Indeed, between 1983 and 2006, the center lost 12 percentage points of its disposable tax 
revenue, while the states and municipalities gained 3.8 and 8.2 points respectively. The next 
section explores these fiscal changes and their consequences for gubernatorial incentives to 
supply particularistic goods to mobilize electoral support and win votes. 
                                                 
106 With some ups and downs, Brazil’s overall tax burden averaged almost 25 percent of the GNP between 1983 and 
1989. In the high inflationary years of 1990 to 1993, it achieved an average of 26.2 percent. The, in the 1993-2006 
period the tax burden increased to an average of 33.5 percent. 
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Note: Disposable tax revenue includes gross collection by each level of government plus transfers received minus 
transfers allocated to other levels. Sources: 1957-1970, IBGE: Estatísticas do Século XX; 1971-2006, Afonso and 
Araújo (2006). 
 
Figure 12: Disposable Tax Revenues by Level of Government in Brazil, 1957-2006 
3.1.2 The Democratic Period  
This section shows that two factors have contributed to reduce Brazilian governors’ incentives 
toward patronage spending in the post-authoritarian period.107
                                                 
107 These factors operate in combination with the openness of budgetary rules to congressional appropriations, and 
the hardness of subnational budget constraints analyzed further below in this chapter.    
 First, the state sector as a whole 
became less dependent from federal transfers and more reliant on their own revenue sources, 
thereby constraining the ability of governors to utilize a privileged fiscal position independent 
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from domestic accountability links to finance an inefficiently large bureaucracy. Second, in 
evident contrast to previous decentralizing experiments, municipalities gained political and fiscal 
autonomy from the states. Under the aegis of the 1988 Constitution, local units concentrated 
almost all gains coming from the redistribution of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Starting in 
the mid-1990s, efforts to recentralize political power and resources strengthened even more the 
Brazilian municipalities at the expense of the states by removing expenditure responsibilities 
from the hands of subnational governments (particularly in the areas of education and health) and 
assigning them to local jurisdictions. The municipalization of social policy spending was funded 
by mandating states to reallocate a portion of their revenues to the reformed areas, and increasing 
the volume of automatic matching grants directly transferred from the center sidestepping 
governors. This process of “recentralization with municipalization” reduced state incumbents’ 
capacity to control patronage opportunities and place municipalities under their tight control. 
Moreover, it reinforced central-local linkages that contributed to free local governments from 
state tutelage. As municipal mayors gained secured fiscal resources and could claim credit for 
the implementation of federalized social policies, they became more likely to challenge state 
governors. Constrained in the access to fiscal rents, limited in the use of patronage allocations, 
and facing increasing electoral competition from local leaders, governors were somewhat forced 
to spend particularistic expenditures in delivering semi-public goods.  
Starting in the early 1980s, Brazil moved away from authoritarianism and centralization. 
Direct elections of governors and mayors were introduced in 1982 and the indirect election of the 
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president was reinstated in 1985.108
The powerful governors and the bancadas subnacionais exerted great influence in the 
1987-1988 Constituent Assembly and succeeded in locking in the fiscal institutions that 
deepened decentralization (Souza 1997). The preponderance of state and local interests in the 
national constitutional convention and the significant concessions given by President José Sarney 
(1985-1989) to conventionalists in return for an extension of his presidential mandate from four 
 This pace to democracy made governors the guarantors of 
the transition, actively negotiating new legislation with the military regime. Imbued by a 
reservoir of democratic legitimacy, regionalist interests rapidly mobilized political support to 
increase their financial autonomy. They initially codified their power in the revenue side. In 
1983, the newly elected governors and mayors supported by a multipartisan coalition in 
Congress sponsored the Passos Porto Constitutional Amendment, which expanded the 
percentage of the IR and IPI automatically allocated to the FPE and FPM from 10.5 to 14 percent 
and from 10.5 to 16 percent respectively. Moreover, the amendment enhanced subnational and 
local discretion over the use of these funds (Abrucio 1998: 96-98). Two years later, another 
fiscal reform introduced by the Airton Sandoval Constitutional Amendment increased even 
further the shares corresponding to the participation funds and delegated to state and municipal 
governments the collection of additional revenues including the roadway and transportation taxes 
(Falleti 2010: 168).  
                                                 
108 Municipalities with appointed mayors held the first direct elections of local executives in 1985.  
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to five years, resulted in an arrangement that strengthened states and municipalities vis-à-vis the 
center.   
On the expenditure side, the 1988 Constitution did little to specify spending 
responsibilities thus concentrating fiscal imbalance at the federal level. It carefully outlined some 
exclusive areas of federal competence including defense, common currency, interstate 
commerce, and national highways. But it did not itemize any exclusive responsibilities for the 
states, while only set that municipalities would provide local public services (largely 
transportation), organize zoning laws, and develop urban development plans. The constitution 
mostly established concurrent policy areas to two, and sometimes three, levels of government. In 
some of these areas, such as preschool and primary education, social welfare, and health it 
stipulated that the center must set up the standards, the federal and/or state governments provide 
technical and financial assistance, and municipalities be the “executors”. 
On the revenue-side, in contrast, the new constitution provided strict criteria for the 
allocation of taxes among levels of government, specified in detail the features of the revenue-
sharing arrangements, and stipulated that states and municipalities must spend at least 25 percent 
of all their taxes on education. In general, the constitution and the fiscal reforms introduced since 
the mid-1990s tended to consolidate the taxation authority of the states and concentrated the 
benefits of intergovernmental transfers on the municipalities.  
With regards to the states, a large amount of taxes were ceded to subnational 
governments by eliminating federal excises on fuels and lubricants, electricity, 
136 
 
 
 
telecommunications, and transport and combining them into the ICMS.109 The states also 
received other revenue powers including the authority to collect taxes on motor vehicles (IPVA), 
and inheritance and gifts (ITCD), levy supplementary rates up to 5 percent on the federal bases 
for personal and corporate incomes, and offer tax breaks and incentives which lay at the federal 
government. The constitution also guaranteed a higher level of automatic transfers to the FPE by 
increasing the shared taxes (the IR, the IPI, and the tax on corporate income) to 21.5 percent, and 
granting subnational jurisdictions 30 percent of the gold-based transactions (IOF) collected 
within their territories.110
An index developed by the Inter-American Development Bank classifies Brazil as one of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries with the lowest level of vertical fiscal imbalance 
(IADB 1997). My own analysis of official data is consistent with this source. As shown in Figure 
13, since the enactment of the 1988 Constitution the percentage of state expenditures covered by 
subnational revenues has continuously exceeded that covered by all types of federal transfers. 
Indeed, between 1988 and 2006, the Brazilian states financed an average of 45.4 percent of their 
expenditures trough autonomous revenues –which increased in the period at an annual rate of 3.8 
 Despite the increment in constitutionally-mandated taxes, the states 
have financed a larger share of their spending activities through self-collected revenues.  
                                                 
109 The ICMS legislation differs across the Brazilian states as each state can determine unique tax rates for intrastate 
trade (usually 17-18 percent). The rates for interstate trade are fixed by the Federal Senate. 
110 The regional allocation of the FPE benefits the poorer states because levies are transferred in direct proportion to 
population size and in inverse proportion to per capita income. Specifically, 85 percent of the fund is distributed to 
states of the North (25.37 percent), Northeast (52.46 percent) and Center-West (7.17 percent), while the remaining 
15 percent is allocated to states of the South (6.52 percent) and Southeast (8.48 percent). The poorer states were 
additionally benefited in 1989 with a constitutional amendment that created regional funds (nurtured with 3 percent 
of the IR and IPI) to finance development programs in the North, Northeast and Center-West regions. 
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percent of the GDP– versus and average of 33.6 percent financed trough federal transfer funds. 
During these years, the average level of subnational vertical fiscal imbalance for Brazil reached 
23.7 percent, less than two and a half times that for Argentina.  
 
 
Note: Federal transfers include constitutionally-mandate tax revenue-sharing arrangements, and non-constitutional, 
specific purpose grants. Source: Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional. 
 
Figure 13: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Brazil, 1988-2006. Percentage of State Expenditures 
Financed Through Autonomous Revenues and Federal Transfers 
 
Although the overall level of subnational vertical fiscal imbalance is low, dependence on 
federal transfers varies considerably from one Brazilian state to another. This variation is mainly 
explained by the fact that the ICMS, which constitutes the bulk of states’ revenues averaging 
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nearly 52 percent of their total income and more than 20 percent of all taxes collected in the 
country (an impressive 8 percent of GDP) in the post-authoritarian period, is taxed on origin 
thereby making it difficult for poorer states to raise it. Figure 14 displays intra-national variation 
in the level of transfer dependence from the center by weighing the percentage of each state’s 
outlays financed by autonomous revenues and total federal grants between 1982 and 2006. Over 
these years, on average Sao Paulo (the most developed state in the federation) depended upon the 
federal government for only 7.7 percent of its expenditures, while for Amapá (one of the poorest 
states) the figure was 73.6 percent.111 Nevertheless, seen in comparative perspective, subnational 
variation in vertical fiscal imbalance is still lower than in most federalized countries including 
Argentina. Note that all Argentine provinces except Buenos Aires received federal transfers that 
were larger than their self-administered revenues, while only twelve Brazilian states did. In these 
states, as the rentier mechanism suggests, the public sector has concentrated a larger proportion 
of employment. Whereas the fiscally-dependent states have averaged 0.43 public employees for 
each private employee, the averaged ratio for the rest of the Brazilian states has only been 
0.27.112
Having explained that Brazil’s fiscal federalism arrangements result in a comparatively 
low reliance of subnational governments on federal transfers, I will turn to the second 
 It is worth recalling that these values for the Argentine provinces are 1.6 and 0.58 
respectively, which provides additional evidence to my claim that subnational patronage is 
significantly more important in Argentina than in Brazil. 
                                                 
111 The level of federal transfer dependence across the Brazilian regions is as follows, from poorer to richer regions 
in terms of per capita GDP: North 53.6 percent; Northeast 43.7; Central-West 18.1; Southeast 13.4; and South 14.5. 
112 Author’s calculation based on data from RAIS, Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego.  
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institutional factor identified as affecting gubernatorial access to federal fiscal rents and, 
therefore, state incumbents’ incentives toward the particularistic allocation of patronage and 
pork-barrel goods: the autonomy of municipal units.  
 
 
Note: Federal transfers include constitutionally-mandate tax revenue-sharing arrangements, and non-constitutional, 
specific purpose grants. Source: Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional. 
 
Figure 14: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in Brazil, 1982-2006. Percentage of State Expenditures 
Financed Through Autonomous Revenues and Federal Transfers 
 
Unlike Argentina, where decentralization did not constrain the ability of powerful 
governors to monopolize access to fiscal rents transferred from the center and place 
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municipalities under their dictums, the post-1988 decentralization process in Brazil provided 
municipalities with an unprecedented formal degree of political and fiscal autonomy. In the 
political realm, for the first time in the country’s history, Brazilian municípios were recognized 
as federal entities with the same status as states (Articles 18 and 132 of the 1988 Constitution), 
which eliminates the capacity of federal and subnational governments to interfere with municipal 
laws. In the fiscal realm, they gained significant new resources in the form of autonomous taxes 
and automatic fiscal transfers from both the center and states.  
With regards to municipal autonomous taxation, the constitution increased 
municipalities’ revenue powers by granting them authority to collect excises on urban property 
(IPTU), real estate ownership (ITBI), and an array of local services exempting 
telecommunications and inter-municipal transport (ISS). In addition, local units were empowered 
to set tax rates and use a wide range of nontax instruments such as user charges and licenses. As 
a result of these changes, they continuously increased their own sources of revenues, which 
passed to account for 5.7 percent of the GDP in 1988 to 8.4 in 1995 and to 10.6 in 2006.  
As for intergovernmental transfers of revenues, and also unlike Argentina where fiscal 
rules only conceive the distribution of federal transfers to the provinces and allow them to 
reallocate funds to municipalities as they wish, the Brazilian constitution continued to mandate 
the center to directly allocate transfers to municípios and established more rigid criteria for how 
states must transfer their own resources to the local governments.  
Constitutionally-mandated federal transfers to municipalities were expanded by 
increasing the parcel of shared taxes composing the FPM. This fund, which accounted for about 
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one-fourth of local units’ total income in the 1988-2006 period, became to be nurtured with 22.5 
percent of the IR and IPI. Because the FPM is allocated proportionally to population size (with 
10 percent setting aside for the state capital cities), it benefited the larger cities whose mayors are 
the more likely potential challengers to the incumbent governors.113
The constitution also raised the ICMS base states must reallocate to municipalities from 
20 to 25 percent, thereby almost offsetting the increment of federal transfers coming from the 
FPE. It was established that 75 percent of the percentage to be reallocated (i.e., 18.25 percent of 
the ICMS) must be transferred in a derivation basis thus benefiting the larger municípios, and the 
remaining 25 percent (i.e., 6.26 percent of the ICMS) following criteria established by each 
individual state.
 Moreover, local 
governments began to receive 50 percent of the rural property tax (ITR) and 70 of the IOF. 
Considering together, constitutional federal transfers assigned to municípios averaged 4.4 percent 
of the GNP in the period, while those allocated to the states only averaged 3.3 percent (Afonso 
2004). 
114
                                                 
113 The low equalizing component of the FPM is evident when one considers that municipalities in the four most 
populated states obtain 45 percent of the funds.   
 Furthermore, the constitution mandated states to reallocate 50 percent of the 
IPVA. Due to the changes introduced by the constitution to the tax and transfer systems and 
additional reforms implemented since the 1990s, which will be examined below, municipalities 
increased their share in the disposable tax revenue from 8.9 percent in 1983 to 17.1 percent in 
114 There is no official record about the criteria used by each state to distribute this percentage. Although my 
personal interviews suggest that most states rely on derivation criteria, one may suspect that politics also plays a 
role.   
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2006 (see Figure 12). Such an increase represents a 92 percent gain versus a 17.8 percent gain 
experienced by the states in the same period. 115
Brazil’s intergovernmental fiscal relations defined in the 1988 Constitution did not 
remain unchanged during the subsequent years. Indeed, a centrally-led process of 
“recentralization with municipalization” slowly contributed to reduce states’ capacity to besiege 
the center, weaken gubernatorial ability to control patronage opportunities, and reinforce even 
more central-local political linkages. Most of the institutional changes took place during 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two administrations (1994-2002), while no significant departure 
from the new rules occurred during the first government of Ignacio “Lula” Da Silva (2002-
2006). I explore below the key institutional changes introduced in the area of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations that ultimately contributed to debilitate governors in the federal order and 
empower mayors. The following sections will examine important reforms to the budgetary 
institutions and rules of subnational finance that tended to operate in the same direction.  
   
To compensate the center for the revenue losses inflicted by the constitution, the Cardoso 
administration sought to recentralize resources by deploying a two-pronged strategy. First, it de-
earmarked federal revenues shared with the states and municipalities. Second, it increased social 
contributions, which unlike normal taxes are not shared with subnational and local units, in an 
unprecedented way.  
                                                 
115 It is worth noting that many poor and marginalized municipalities remain without capacity to generate their own 
revenues as they lack valuable property and service sector industries to tax. Indeed, approximately 90 percent of the 
municípios with less than 20,000 inhabitants (that is, 73 percent of the total local units) only generates about 10 
percent of their total income from own revenues. 
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De-earmarking of shared revenues was initially proposed by the Fernando Collor de 
Mello administration in 1991-1992 through an omnibus amendment to the constitution 
(emendão). The government set up a special committee for fiscal reform, which came up with 
proposals that were similar to those eventually implemented by Cardoso. These included the de-
linking of transfer resources, a tax on financial transaction, a federal IVA, and the elimination of 
the special employment regime for civil services. This reform package was not approved because 
of Collor’s impeachment. De-earmarking was finally achieved in 1993 when Cardoso was 
Finance Minister of the Itamar Franco administration through the enactment of a provisional 
mechanism, the Social Emergency Fund (FSE), in the wake of the Real Plan.116 The fund called 
for 20 percent retention of taxes shared with state and municipal governments to be used in 
federally-mandated specific programs.117
                                                 
116 The Real Plan consisted of a series of measures that brought inflation dramatically down, included the 
introduction of a new currency, interest rates increases, and a free-floating exchange rate. Critically, by curbing 
inflation the Real Plan removed the states’ ability to inflate away debt obligations. 
 The idea was to create a temporary source of flexibility 
that would allow the federal government to address the problem of hyperinflation until structural 
fiscal reforms could provide a definitive solution. However, when the FSE expired at the end of 
1995 it was substituted by a similar fund (the Fund for Fiscal Stabilization, FEF), which gave 
way to the DRU (De-linking of Budgetary Resources) four years later. According to Brasil-SOF 
(2003: 19), the existence of the DRU meant that in 2003 19.7 percent of total federal revenues 
were not earmarked to be shared with lower levels of government, while without the DRU the 
117 The FSE passage was enhanced by the “budget mafia” scandal involving federal deputies in the Budgetary 
Committee and construction companies, and secured through a messy amalgam of compensations to municipal 
governments and pork to individual legislators (Ames 2001; Samuels 2003). 
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figure would have been 12.9 percent. A second de-earmarking measure introduced meaningful 
changes to the ICMS. In 1996, after months of intense negotiations in Congress, the federal 
government managed to pass the Complementary Law 87, also known as the Kandir law. This 
regulation banned states from levying their value-added tax on primary and semi-manufactured 
exports. Subnational pressures rapidly mounted and the federal government designed the 
Industrialized Products Export Compensation Fund (FPEX) to compensate states for revenue 
losses. The fund, nurtured with 10 percent of the IPI, obliged states to automatically reallocate 25 
percent of the transferred moneys to municipalities without restrictions.118
Revenue recentralization continued with the steeply expansion of social contributions. 
The constitution had introduced a number of fiscal rigidities to the federal budget. Particularly, it 
had expanded entitlements in social security and social assistance, thereby creating an 
unaffordable flow of future pension commitments.
  
119
                                                 
118 The FPEX is allotted proportionally to each state’s value of manufactured exports. A single state cannot receive 
more than 20 percent of the fund. 
 In order to finance social security outlays, 
the federal government increased the rates of social contributions and created new ones. The 
contributions were instrumental to the government’s strategy because, unlike normal taxes, they 
could be collected in the same fiscal year as they were introduced. Because they were 
constitutionally earmarked to finance social security, the federal government passed several 
amendments that allowed for using part of the newly collected resources to finance other federal 
activities. Social contributions then increased dramatically from 1.2 percent of the GDP in 1990 
119 The new charter created noncontributory pensions (especially for rural workers), established a floor value for 
social security benefits equivalent to the minimum salary, and granted civil servant status to about 250,000 federal 
employees.  
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to 2.7 percent in 2000, to its historical record of 9 percent in 2006 which represented almost half 
of the central government’s total revenues. Such an increment was made in detriment of the 
participation funds. Whereas the ratio between the federal revenues that constitute the base of the 
FPE and FPM and the revenues collected through social contributions was 97 percent in 1994, it 
reached 127 percent in 2004, and 153 percent in 2006 (Afonso 2004; STN 2007). 
The recentralization of revenues took place in tandem with an extensive decentralization 
of expenditures (particularly in the area of education and health) to the muncípios sidestepping 
state bureaucracies (Falleti 2010; Fenwick 2010). Regardless of whether municipal 
decentralization was an intended second best option to discipline the fiscal behavior of states 
because full recentralization proved problematic (Eaton and Dickovick 2004; Dickovick 2007) or 
the unintended consequence of the 1988 Constitution (Fenwick 2009), it countered the power of 
states and constrained the ability of governors to control patronage opportunities by shifting 
expenditure responsibilities from subnational to local governments.  
The most important measures were the creation of the Fundamental Education Fund 
(FUNDEF), and the extension of the Single Health System (SUS). Both areas operated direct 
fund-to-fund mechanisms wherein resource flows to municipalities were predetermined by 
formulas based on services provided and population. These fund-to-fund mechanisms removed 
from state governors much political discretion over social service spending. 
The FUNDEF was created in 1996 through a constitutional amendment, which ordered 
states and municipalities to reach minimum spending levels in primary education (at least 15 
percent of the 25 percent the Constitution mandates both levels of government to dedicate to this 
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area), and encouraged local units to voluntarily assume the responsibility for providing this 
service. The fund was nurtured by a pool of state and municipal resources then redirected to local 
governments –not to the states– based on federal criteria (i.e., education investments and primary 
school enrollment).120
The municipalization of primary education was beyond expectations. By 2000, local units 
had already overtaken states as the principal providers with 51.4 percent of all matriculants 
(Oliveira 2003). This value represented an increment of 34.2 percent in the number of 
matriculants since the fund was launched. In terms of revenue transfers, the FUNDEF clearly 
reallocated resources in favor of municipalities. Between 1997 and 2000, states’ losses averaged 
10 percent while municipalities’ gains averaged 35.5 percent. 
 The FUNDEF is therefore a mechanism of redistribution between states 
and municipalities without opportunities for subnational bureaucracies (and therefore incumbent 
governors to intervene. Municipalities have incentives to increase the supply of school spots to 
receive additional transfers and to avoid the implicit penalization of having to contribute to the 
fund regardless of their matriculation levels (Arretche 2000: 140). By increasing the coverage of 
their primary education system, the municipalities became eligible for the funds that had hitherto 
been transferred to the states. 
The Cardozo administration also altered the health sector through the full implementation 
of a previous system created in 1996 to promote decentralized health care. This inherited system 
                                                 
120 Concretely, the FUNDEF is composed of 15 percent of the ICMS (excluding the compensation provided by the 
FPEX), 15 percent of the FPE and FPM, 15 percent of the IPI, plus complementary federal resources transferred on 
a monthly-base when needed to reach the minimum level of spending by student. Through the time, however, the 
federal component of the FUNDEF became irrelevant. 
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had become an easy route to state patronage given its low exposition to federal oversight. The 
new SUS combined a mechanism of centralized financing with decentralized service delivery. It 
habilitated local governments to increase the levels of health service and authorized the federal 
government to fund rising in accordance with the level attained.  This scheme generated 
incentives, especially for wealthier municipalities, to assume health care responsibilities. They 
were free to opt for different levels of service provision, but received more generous transfers 
with each additional level assumed. The SUS also developed a per capita funding mechanism to 
foster the participation of smaller municípios. By 2000, over 99 percent of Brazil's municipalities 
had adhered to the SUS’ provisions (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999). As it strengthened local 
government capacity in health provision and promoted center-local links, the SUS also allowed 
the federal government to largely bypass the State Secretary of Health for substantial portions of 
the health budget (Arretche 2000: 211). In addition, the governors became unable to influence 
congressional legislators to divert health funds into patronage networks (Dickovick 2007: 15). 
This empowering picture of increased municipal fiscal autonomy has important political 
ramifications for the relation between governors and mayors and, hence, for the particularistic 
spending priorities of state incumbents. Because municipalities receive automatic transfers 
directly from the center and states are constitutionally mandated to reallocate a part of their own 
resources with almost no strings attached, governors cannot monopolize fiscal rents and 
politicize their local distribution, while mayors –especially those ruling large urban centers and 
the states capitals– enjoy greater leeway to make expenditure and policy decisions. Moreover, 
the municipalization of expenditures implemented since the mid-1990s reduced the ability of 
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governors to utilize social expenditure to funnel into their political machines. It also opened up 
opportunities for mayors to gain additional resources without gubernatorial intermediation, 
credit-claim for the success of federalized social programs, and reinforce their linkages with the 
center. Freed from state fiscal tutelage, and counting on the potential support of the presidency, 
mayors became more likely (and powerful) contenders to the governorship.121
 
 As argued above, 
increasing political competition fosters pork-barreling rather than patronage spending.  
3.2 THE OPENNESS OF BUDGET RULES  
The central argument of this section is that the broader organization of budget process in Brazil 
fosters congressional legislators to appropriate federal grants from the annual budget bill in the 
form of investment projects to bestow in their bailiwicks. This institutional feature reduces the 
ability of state governors to monopolize access to federal fiscal rents, and allows legislators to 
influence the organization of pork distribution in their districts. As the country’s OLPR system 
fosters the personal vote and makes politicians dependent from local connections, legislators act 
as intermediaries on behalf of mayors –rather than on behalf of governors– to obtain federal 
                                                 
121 Municipalities were also liberated from the states through new administrative laws and reforms that regulated the 
competencies of subnational governments. Those included the “Law of Concessions,” the “Law of Guidelines and 
Bases for Education,” the “Reform on Public Administration,” and the “Statute of Cities”. In 2003, Lula created a 
Federal Articulation Committee in the Secretariat for Federal Affairs to involve mayors in defining a common 
program of structural reform. 
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grants and advance their own political careers. State governors can potentially get transfer funds 
from the annual budget bill through state bloc collective amendments (emendas de bancada). 
Unlike individual amendments, state bloc budgetary amendments require several congressmen 
from the same state delegation to pool together in order to elevate a statewide appropriation. 
However, I claim that gubernatorial influence over these collective amendments is little. Indeed, 
Brazilian legislators have found a way of using state bloc amendments privately by dividing up 
their content through a mechanism known as rachadinhas. This pattern sharply contrasts with 
that observed in Argentina, where legislators are discouraged (both individually and collectively) 
to obtain budgetary resources for themselves and the few resources they can appropriate are 
tightly controlled by provincial governors. 
The budget bill elaboration begins at the Planning, Budget and Management Ministry, 
which produces the executive’s Budget Law Proposal (PLO). This proposal establishes both the 
volume of funds for operational expenditures and the spending limits on each program. The PLO 
is submitted to a single committee (the Mixed Budget Committee) composed of both senators 
and deputies based on the proportion of seats held by each party in the chambers. Between 1988 
and 1992, only individual legislators could amend the budget with no restrictions on the number 
and value of their amendments. Each amendment was required to name a source of revenue 
matching the expenditure envisioned. The Mixed Committee received the amendments, then 
established subcommittees corresponding to each broad program, issued a report rejecting or 
accepting (wholly or partly) each amendment, and added its own amendments which could 
combine those or other deputies or be completely new. Over that period, individual legislators 
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used extensively their capacity to amend the budget. In 1989 they passed about 11,000 
amendments, 13,000 in 1990, more than 71,000 in 1991, and 76,000 in 1992 (Rocha 1997). In 
the Fall of 1993, a budget scandal (the escândalo dos anões do orçamento) involving a clique of 
ranking deputies led by Chair João Alves and construction companies profiting from budgetary 
amendments triggered a series of reforms to the budget process (Ames 2001: chapter 1).  
Under the new rules, the capacity of individual legislators to submit amendments was 
reduced by limiting each legislator’s number to fifty with a total value of $2 million reals. 
Priority was given to collective amendments introduced by standing committees, regional blocs, 
and state blocs. In 1995 a new budgetary reform set the number of collective amendments to five 
per standing committee, five per regional bloc, and ten per state bloc, with no rule establishing 
either a maximum or a minimum value.122
Both individual and collective amendments can only be made over items included in the 
investment category (i.e., geographically concentrated projects in the area of infrastructure) of 
the budget, which is typically a small part of the PLO. They required the support of at least two-
thirds of the Senators and Deputies of each state delegation. The budget law approved by 
Congress is not mandatory as it only authorizes the president to execute the budget based on the 
availability of resources collected during a specific fiscal year. That is, having and individual or 
collective amendment approved in the budget law does not guarantee that it will be appropriated. 
 The number of individual amendments was increased 
to twenty per legislator, with a ceiling of 1.5 million reals later augmented to 2.5 million. 
                                                 
122 For the 1994 and 1995 annual budgets amendments were accepted from political parties. Later, it was specified 
that political parties could no longer collectively amend the budget. 
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The executive possesses a line-item veto and thus can decide to leave in or strike appropriations. 
The main instrument used for this purpose has been the “impoundment decrees” (decretos de 
contingenciamento), through which approved expenditures are suspended (integrally or partially) 
and made contingent on the evolution of the fiscal situation and resources available in the 
national treasury. As the year progresses the expenditures can be “un-impounded.” However, 
they frequently remain suspended. 
Individual amendments have received considerable attention in the literature. Several 
studies show that they have been strategically used by the executive to build legislative support 
(Ames 2001; Alston et al. 2007; Alston and Mueller 2006; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Pereira and 
Renno 2003), contribute to incumbent reelection (Ames 1987; Pereira and Renno 2003), and 
primarily involved legislators’ personal connections with their local constituency network 
including voters, mayors, councilmen, and bureaucrats (Bezerra 1999). Because individual 
amendments consist of small amounts of money for legislators’ bailiwicks, governors have no 
incentives to participate in their elaboration and further “liberation.”  
Despite in the 1997-2006 period collective amendments represented twice as much as 
individual ones, they have not been extensively studied (for exemptions see Pereira and Orellana 
2009; Souza 2003). According to the data from the Joint Budget Committee of the Brazilian 
Congress, the amount of resources allocated to collective amendments has increased over time 
averaging 1,043 billion reals per year, with an average appropriation of 72.4 percent. The volume 
appropriated by legislators through state bloc amendments represents approximately 80 percent 
(at an annual average of 2.8 billion) of the total resources ranging from $ 1.5 million to $100 
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million reals. The state bloc amendments are typically oriented to the politicized areas of 
transportation, health and urban infrastructure thus indicating they are especially amenable to 
pork-barrel games.123
I argue below that, contrary to one may expect, state bloc amendments are not an 
efficient gubernatorial tool to obtain fiscal resources from the center. Indeed, legislators have 
been able to adopt consensual procedures that disfigured these collective amendments into 
individual ones. This consensual component along with the rules of collective amendments 
actually encouraged the decentralization of resources away from the governors’ (and the 
president’s) control and toward legislators’ local strongholds. Unlike individual amendments, 
which have a specific legislator as the author and a geographical identification (typically a 
municipality) for the investment, state bloc amendments have a collective authorship and do not 
indicate any geographical location besides a state. They are actually “umbrella” amendments for 
a specific federal program.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, state bloc amendments have distinctively affected the executive’s 
relationship with legislators in a way that increases the likelihood of being appropriated. In 
appropriating or rejecting an individual amendment, the executive can reward a faithful legislator 
and/or punish an unfaithful one. But the same rationality is harder to be applied with collective 
amendments because the executive is unable to trace which legislator would benefit from the 
appropriation. In rejecting a collective amendment, the executive could punish not only an 
                                                 
123In the 1996-2006 period, about 80% of the state bloc amendments were concentrated in six governmental 
agencies: Departments of Roads, Secretary of Urban Development, Ministry of National Integration, National Fund 
of Health, and Ministry of Transportation.  
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opposition legislators, but also important allies in Congress. Therefore, these amendments have a 
greater probability of being approved by the executive (Figueiredo and Limongi 2004; Pereira 
and Orellana 2009).  
On the other hand, state bloc amendments have affected governors’ relation with their 
legislative delegations in a way that diminished the likelihood of appropriating resources for the 
state. When state bloc amendments were introduced in 1993, they aimed at bringing more 
transparency to the budgetary process by limiting the number of individual amendments, which 
represented the parochial interests of legislators and, at the same time, reinforcing amendments 
with a broader profile. Congressional legislators then cared little about statewide pork because it 
appeared they would have to share credit with the rest of the state delegation. But legislators 
rapidly discovered that they could distort the original intention of state bloc amendments by 
entering into particularistic and private deals with local politicians in the municipalities to 
propose individual amendments –known as rachadinhas– disguised as collective ones. 
Although each state delegation possesses its own internal consensual characteristics, state 
bloc amendments use what can be considered a consensual decision-making rule that encourages 
cooperation among bloc members rather than with the governor. State delegation members are 
frequently organized around a coordinator of the delegation, who is in charge of demanding the 
amendments’ inclusion in the report of the Mixed Budgetary Committee and informing the 
executive how amendments will be allocated once appropriated. Another consensual peculiarity 
is tied to the decentralized process of reporting budgetary bills to the Mixed Committee. As we 
have mentioned, the distribution of amendments among committee members follows the rule of 
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proportionality according to the number of seats each political party holds in the Chamber and 
the Senate. That is, not only members of the state incumbent party coalition have the prerogative 
of reporting an amendment, but any member of the committee can do it. Therefore, it is common 
to see members of the budget committee pressing for a favorable report regarding a state bloc 
amendment simple because it incorporated several legislators’ individual demands. 
In the words of Eduardo Azeredo (PSDB), current senator and former governor of Minas 
Gerais, “when I was governor, eight state bloc amendments had a statewide orientation and 
federal deputies decided over the remaining two. But today things are different. Individual 
legislators enjoy more autonomy and the state bloc amendments work as if they were individual 
ones. Each state bloc amendment is indeed an amendment of five, six or seven deputies who pull 
together to present an amendment that benefit the municipalities where they have an important 
electoral presence.”124
                                                 
124 Interview with Eduardo Azeredo, Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
 In the same line, the current federal deputy and former governor of 
Pernambuco, Roberto Magalhães (PFL) expressed, “initially, we proposed a minimum of three 
amendments for the governor, one for the mayor of the state capital (regardless of his/her party 
affiliation), and the rest among members of the state delegation in Congress. The system 
suddenly changed, and we began to assign one state bloc amendment for every two or three 
deputies [now senators claim each of them is entitled to propose one collective amendment but 
we cannot accept that]. I have done the following: the municipalities in which I usually get more 
votes have been governed by mayors who belong to different political parties than mine, let’s say 
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the PT or PSDB. Then I have proposed a state bloc amendment with deputies from the PT to the 
municipalities governed by this party, another amendment with deputies from the PSDB to 
allocate resources to their municipalities, which after all are also mine, and so on. I have to tell 
you that this system is not good, it pulverizes [pulveriza] the collective amendments.”125
Legislators from the smallest states observed a different behavior regarding the state bloc 
amendments. Since the size of the pie (i.e., ten amendments) is about the same as the size of the 
state delegation in Congress, there is no incentive for an individual legislator to share an 
amendment. The count is simple: each legislator gets one. As the current senator and former 
governor of Roraima Romero Jucá (PSDB) explained, “in the smallest states these amendments 
make a huge difference because each individual legislator is able to allocate resources to three, 
four or five different municipalities. Moreover, the state delegations resort to rachadinhas 
because if the infrastructure project or the municipality is audited by the Tribunal de Contas you 
can still use the money in a different project or in a different municipality. As the state bloc 
 By 
resorting to this mechanism, legislators are still able to claim credit for the benefits produced by 
state bloc amendments to their local constituency network including voters, mayors, local 
legislators, and bureaucrats, who can clearly observe their efforts in bringing the bacon home and 
then mobilize votes to pay back the legislator. According to federal deputy Sergio Miranda, 
“almost 40 percent of the collective amendments have been systematically used in the form of 
rachadinhas” (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 13, 2001). 
                                                 
125 Interview with Roberto Magalhães, Brasília, June 8, 2006. 
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amendments are “generic” amendments, you can do that. If they weren’t you would have the 
money but you could not use it. Every single legislator and every single party gets something 
from the state bloc amendments because the dispute in the state delegation is a local dispute.”126 
Therefore, as the former governor of Rio Grande do Norte and current senator Garibaldi Alves 
Filho (PMDB) synthesized, “the state bloc amendments weaken the states and the power of the 
incumbent governors because they fracture the relation between the individual legislators and the 
state executives.”127
In future extensions on this topic I plan to test econometrically whether governors from 
different subnational units distinctively influence state bloc amendments, and the degree to 
which individual legislators are able to evade the governors’ grip. 
 
3.3 THE HARDNESS OF SUBNATIONAL BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
Brazil, like Argentina, has a long history of subnational fiscal misbehavior and mounting debts. 
But in contrast to Argentina, where the federal government has been unable to impose 
mechanisms to control provincial finance, the Brazilian authorities have tried with increasing 
intensity and success to regulate state borrowing and spending. With regards to borrowing, since 
the Cardoso administration renegotiated states’ debts in exchange for fiscal adjustment and 
                                                 
126 Interview with Romero Jucá Filho, Brasília, June 7, 2006. 
127 Interview with Garibaldi Alves Filho, Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
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proceeded to privatize or closure the state banks. Then, it passed a complementary law –which 
impedes executive amendments and requires absolute majorities in both chambers to be 
reformed– that effectively limited state excessive borrowing, banned federal bailouts, and set 
institutional and legal penalties for violations of the rules. As for state spending, the government 
regulated the way in which governors and mayors could spend their budgetary resources. It did 
so through the introduction of legislation that imposed limits on personal expenses, especially 
during election years. In this section I describe the evolution of federal policies oriented to 
impose hard budget constraints over subnational expenditures and borrowing policies. The 
imposition of such constraints affected the capacity of incumbent governments to arbitrarily 
manipulate personnel spending and resort to excessive indebtedness to finance the functioning of 
the state administration.  
As we have seen, the 1988 Constitution prohibited subnational governments to dismiss 
redundant civil servants and reduce salaries in nominal terms. State employees had the right to a 
pension equal to their exit salary plus any subsequent increases granted to their previous 
position. Under the Cardoso administration, a series of reforms significantly restricted state 
autonomy in the area of public sector personnel. Specifically, in 1995 the federal government 
passed the Complementary Law 87, also known as the Camata law, established that personnel 
spending could not exceed 60 percent of the states’ and municipalities’ net revenues (i.e., all 
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revenues including constitutional transfers and excluding voluntary transfers).128
State borrowing in Brazil, primarily to finance public infrastructure, began in the second 
half of the 1960s. The financing needs of subnational governments were usually fulfilled with 
loans from federal financial institutions (in particular, the BNDES), which channeled to state 
utilities funds collected through forced savings schemes based on payroll taxes. As these funds 
dwindled and the opening of international capital markets to developing countries in the late 
1960s made foreign financing a preferred option for the financing of the public sector. Indeed 
states’ recourse to external borrowing was encouraged by the federal government. The easy 
access to external credit, combined with loose controls on domestic borrowing, made the 1970s a 
decade of rapid growth of state governments’ debt. This source of finance came also to a virtual 
end in the early 1980s. These events, in combination with recession, led to widespread default by 
the states on the service of their external and internal debts. 
 Moreover, the 
law limited expenses on retirement to 12 percent of net revenues, established that any new 
permanent expenditure and the concession of fiscal benefits must be attached to a new permanent 
source of financing, and prohibited governors in election years to contract expenditures that may 
be settled in the next fiscal year. This mechanism had been typically used by subnational 
governments as short-term source of financing. Violations to these rules faced severe criminal 
charges and deposition from public office. 
                                                 
128Personnel spending capped at 50 percent of net current revenue at the federal level. Separate sub-ceilings were 
applied to federal, state and municipal expenditures on executive, legislative, and judiciary personnel.  
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Under the 1988 Constitution, any legislation on debt renegotiation or financial rescue to 
subnational governments could only be initiated by the president. After the initiative was taken, 
however, a financial rescue operation such as a debt bailout could only be implemented if it had 
been authorized by the senate.129
In the decade that followed the enactment of the constitution, Brazil experienced major 
state debt crises and consequent federal bailouts in 1989, 1993 and 1997. The deterioration in the 
primary balance of the states was especially marked after 1995, when the fiscal dividends for 
disinflation were mostly dissipated. With inflation under control, state banks lost their principal 
source of revenue (i.e., floating of financial assets). This situation was followed by an increase in 
real interest rates on non-rescheduled debt. With the service of this debt having come to a virtual 
halt, the capitalization of interest payments led to an escalation of debt. In addition to their 
funded debt, a number of states accumulated various forms of fluctuating debt, including short-
term borrowing from commercial banks secured with future revenues (the so-called revenue 
anticipation loans, AROs), arrears to suppliers or employees, and guarantees for bank borrowing 
by contractors for state infrastructure projects. In 1997, the federal government refinanced once 
 The federal government issued various regulations to restrained 
private banks from increasing their holdings of state debt, banned states from borrowing from 
their own commercial bank, and prohibited states to issue bonds. These regulations, however, 
were not strictly observed and, in some cases, they were blatantly evaded. 
                                                 
129 Starting with the 1967 Constitution, the senate has the authority to regulate all public sector borrowing. It sets 
guidelines for subnational borrowing based on the amounts of existing debt, revenues and debt service. However, it 
has the power to grant exceptions to these guidelines.  
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again of state debts conditioned to the privatization of state-owned banks in order to restrain 
states’ indebtedness capacity 
The agreements to resolve these crises tried to limit future subnational deficits and easy 
access to credit but also reinforced the perception that the center was able to provide relief if 
things were wrong. Moreover, bailouts were provided in the form of rescheduling (rather than 
forgiveness), thereby making the stock of debt kept growing and fostering defaults and new 
reschedules that left the federal government holding the states’ debt. The ex ante constraints 
written in the rescheduling agreements were usually evaded (Dillinger 1997; Rodden 2006). 
In 1997, the federal government implemented the Fiscal Adjustment and Restructuring 
Program to refinance state debts on a subsidized interest rate conditioned to the privatization of 
state-owned banks. The new legislation set conditions that included targets for declines in debt 
and deficits ratios, ceilings for personnel spending and investment, growth in own revenues, and 
privatization of state enterprises. The law also stipulated stricter ex post consequences, and a 
clause establishing withholding of federal transfers in the event of default on federally owned 
debt. Although most of these measures resembled previous ones, they set tighter limits and gave 
the government a stronger mandate to withhold transfers from states that failed to meet their 
agreements (Dillinger 2002). The federal government offered additional incentives such as 
anticipation of revenue from privatization of state utilities to encourage compliance. Between 
1997 and 2000, 24 state utilities and banks were privatized or closed.  
The debt accumulation process of the 1990s helps explain why governors accepted fiscal 
reforms that prevented them from overspending or incurring new debts. The size of the 
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subnational debt stock (about 13 percent of GDP) and the governors’ difficulty balancing their 
budget played a decisive role in the decision to renegotiate their debts and support fiscal 
responsibility legislation. Governors saw little alternative but to restrain expenditures, in 
particular personnel expenses, despite the high political costs attached to this decision. 
Moreover, fiscal restraint expanded governors’ time horizons (19 governors ran for reelection in 
1998), thus introducing an element of self-enforcement.  
In January 1999, Itamar Franco assumed the governorship of Minas Gerais and promptly 
declared a moratorium on the state’s debt payments to the federal government. In the wake of the 
East Asian and Russian financial crises, this attempt at fiscal intimidation put pressure on the 
government to devalue the real. But this attempt largely backfired. The central government 
covered Minas Gerais’ debt but withheld an equivalent amount in federal transfers (Dillinger and 
Webb 1999: 33). With this precedent, the government codified the principle of withholding 
transfers in a new Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) enacted in May 2000. The law reiterated the 
provisions of the former FSE and FEF, while adding criminal penalties for fiscal irresponsibility. 
Importantly, the LRF also became a “complementary law” (lei complementar) to the national 
constitution meaning that it cannot be modified by ordinary legislation or executive decrees. 
For the concerns of this dissertation, some provisions deserve special attention. First, the 
LRF included a golden rule provision for capital spending (i.e., annual credit disbursement 
cannot exceed capital spending. Second, limits to personnel expenditures (including pensions) 
established in the Camata law were preserved. Third, the LRF included stricter limitations for 
incumbents’ final year in office prohibiting expenditures that exceeded one budgetary period. 
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Forth, it banned public financial institutions at all levels of government from lend to their main 
shareholders. Fourth the law stipulated that the federal government has the exclusive prerogative 
of setting debt parameters and expenditures ceilings, and eliminated the possibility of bailouts. 
Finally, it included provisions to increase transparency of fiscal information under the control of 
the Treasury Secretariat (Webb 2004). 
The FRL set institutional sanctions including withholding federal transfers, denial of 
credit guarantees, and prohibition of new debt. In addition to these institutional penalties the 
Public Finance Crimes Law added a number of legal penalties ranging from fines, to 
impeachment, to ineligibility, and even imprisonment of public officials not complying with the 
deficit rules. 
The interests of governors are relevant to explain the highly successful implementation of 
the LRF. In highly polarized states in which governors face close elections, governors would 
have an interest in tying the hands of the future governor and curbing his “fiscal powers” (Melo, 
2002). But the incumbent would also benefit from the law because s/he would have an excuse to 
reject demands for pay hikes. Gama Neto (2007) and Carvalho (2006) provide extensive 
evidence that most governors were in a situation of great fiscal vulnerability and most of them 
would not be able to run for office again in the next election in 2002.  
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3.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has examined the role of Brazil’s federal fiscal rules in conditioning the ability of 
state governors to overspend resources in patronage activities. It highlighted that the country’s 
institutional configuration (that is, a comparatively low level of subnational fiscal imbalance, a 
balanced intergovernmental transfer system that mandates the direct allocation of federal funds 
to the municipalities, and establishes criteria for state-municipal reallocation, budgetary rules 
that opens up congressional appropriation of federal grants, and the imposition of hard budget 
constraints to the states) result in limited gubernatorial transfer power which, as we have seen is 
associated with pork-barreling. The next chapter moves the focus of analysis to the second 
independent variable that affects gubernatorial redistributive incentives to deploy private and 
semi-public goods: the nature of political careerism.  
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4.0  POLITICAL CAREERISM AND SUBNATIONAL PARTICULARISTIC 
SPENDING 
This chapter studies the relation between the nature of political careerism and subnational 
(gubernatorial) particularistic spending related to the finance of machine politics. Specifically, it 
investigates how the relative party-centrism or candidate-centrism of the electoral system and 
intra-party nomination/selection rules promote the strategic use of patronage and pork-barrel 
goods with electoral goals. The previous two chapters argued that the institutions of fiscal 
federalism in Argentina and Brazil distinctively affect the design of redistributive mechanisms of 
electoral mobilization at the subnational level. They do so by regulating gubernatorial access and 
discretion over intergovernmental grants. In countries like Argentina, where provincial governors 
concentrate transfer access and enjoy political leverage over how federal grants can be spent, 
there are comparatively stronger institutional incentives to build statewide patronage linkages in 
order to assemble vote support. In countries like Brazil, where the institutions of fiscal 
federalism disperse transfer access among multiple political actors located at different levels of 
government (in particular, governors, mayors, and legislators) and limit gubernatorial discretion 
over the use of transfer funds, there are major incentives to construct local networks of political 
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support through pork-barrel allocations. The present chapter completes the theoretical approach 
proposed in this dissertation by showing that the nature of political careerism also affects the 
ways in which state governors strategically manipulate their portfolios of public resources as 
instruments of electoral investment to win votes.   
The central argument of this chapter is that the degree to which subnational party leaders 
(in particular, governors) control nominations to elective office and campaign resources affects 
their incentives to engage in patronage and pork-barrel linkages. Where state leaders do exert 
that influence, they are likely to redirect government resources to finance statewide patronage-
based machines. In contrast, where subnational leaders do not control the contours of political 
careers and campaign finance, they are prone to draw on pork-barrel goods in order to cement 
alliances with established local networks. These connections are undermined or reinforced by the 
public personal system. Arguably, a system founded on stable civil service rules and 
professionalized ranks of government employees diminishes the control that party leaders have 
over bureaucratic careers, thus reducing the scope of patronage.  
The causal pathway linking careerism and redistributive electoral politics consists of the 
channel through which institutional and organizational factors determine who controls political 
and bureaucratic careers, and the implications that such a control has over the linkage strategies 
made by parties, politicians, and politically-oriented bureaucrats in the public sector. With both 
political and bureaucratic careers under control, such as in the case of Argentina, party bosses 
count on a spoils system financed with state resources to promote collective party behavior. In 
return for receiving a nomination or a job, politicians and government employees are expected to 
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participate in party mobilization efforts, engage in politicized social networks, and involve 
themselves in electoral campaigns. Performing these electioneering activities on behalf of their 
party leaders is a more profitable behavior for ambitious politicians and political loyalists who 
permeate the ranks of the bureaucracy than swimming on their own. Because participation in the 
party is an observable service, patronage exchanges are also profitable for party bosses, as 
monitoring problems that could make them inefficient from the providers’ perspective are largely 
solved. Based on their strong capacity to induce participation and colonize public institutions 
with faithful militants, subnational party leaders effectively reallocate state resources to finance 
an organized web of territorial connections and run elaborated political machines.  
By contrast, with no control over political and bureaucratic careers, such as in Brazil, 
subnational party elites lack formal mechanisms to attract participation and reward compliance. 
Both individual politicians and public employees have therefore comparatively little incentives 
to line up behind party leaders and work to strengthen party brands. Politicians find it more 
profitable to act as individual entrepreneurs promoting their personal vote, which in general is 
quite costly and often involves satisfying local constituents with parochial policies and pork-
barrel goods. Forced to differentiate themselves from their opponents and fellow competitors, 
individual politicians must impress upon ordinary voters the virtue of bringing unique benefits to 
the table. Importantly, politicians generally cannot differentiate themselves based on patronage 
resources coming from party leaders or the state apparatus because their fellows (or at least some 
of them) have access to the same goods. Moreover, the presence of a career-based personnel 
system that encourages the professionalization of the government bureaucracy discourages the 
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manipulation of public employment to run the political machine. In short, a party-centered 
system of political and bureaucratic careerism as found in Argentina provides a superior 
technology for patronage linkages. A candidate-centered system as found in Brazil, in contrast, 
gives pork-barreling a more prominent role in party politics and the electoral process. 
The chapter elaborates this argument by examining the role of institutional (electoral 
regime) and organizational (candidate selection) factors in shaping subnational political 
careerism in Argentina and Brazil since the return of democracy. It also explores the reinforcing 
mechanism generated by the countries’ different public personnel systems. The argument is 
illustrated with empirical evidence on the career ambitions of state legislators both between and 
within these prominent federations. Drawing upon recent literature on political recruitment and 
novel datasets on state and municipal positions, the chapter shows that Argentine and Brazilian 
state legislators have different static and progressive ambitions. These differences, it argued, are 
observed at both the horizontal (i.e., across positions held at a particular level of government) 
and vertical (i.e., across positions held at different levels of government) axes of federalism. In 
Argentina, the centralization of political careers in the hands of subnational party leaders results 
in static and discontinuous patterns of careerism. The extremely high rates of provincial 
legislative turnover and the absence of extra-legislative ambition suggest that governors rotate 
politicians and bureaucrats with political aspirations among the various posts the party can offer 
so as to make participation attractive and induce involvement into the organizational machinery. 
In Brazil, the fact that subnational party leaders lack control over political and bureaucratic 
careers results in dynamic and continuous career paths. A legislative reelection dynamic more 
168 
 
 
 
similar to what we observe in the U.S. and a considerable level of extra-legislative ambition 
suggests that state governors are unable to involve politicians into their organizations and make 
them sensitive to their dictums.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The second section analyses the nature of political 
careers in Argentina and Brazil from an institutional and organizational prism. The third section 
overviews the characteristics and recent evolution of the countries’ public personnel systems. In 
both sections the emphasis is placed upon unearthing the power that subnational party leaders 
have over political and bureaucratic careers. The fourth section moves into the empirical 
analysis. It reviews the scholarly literature about careerism in the countries of interest and 
elaborates a typology of career ambitions in federalized regimes. The fifth section employs this 
typology to study the structure of subnational political careers in Argentina and Brazil. It does so 
by tracing state legislators’ movements across different national, subnational, and local positions. 
This analysis helps better understand the relation between parties, politicians, and the 
redistributive electoral spending found in both polities. The last section concludes and sets the 
stage for the next chapter, which constitutes a two-country cross-state comparative study of the 
electoral returns that state governors reaped from their redistributive strategies of vote trading. 
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4.1 THE ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN SUBNATIONAL POLITICAL REGIMES 
Both Argentina and Brazil, as Chapter 1 made explicit, are typically regarded as textbook 
examples of “robust” federalism. That is, federations in which the major power base for national 
politics resides in the states. Yet upon closer examination these similar polities turn out to exhibit 
different political dynamics. One of the major differences, and the focus of this chapter, is the 
nature of political careers (i.e., whether they are party- or candidate-centered) and its effect upon 
subnational redistributive politics. Extant research on the subject in Argentina and Brazil has 
analyzed the relation between the party or candidate centrism of political careers and legislative 
behavior (Ames 1995a, 2001: chapter 5; Jones and Hwang 2005; Samuels 2003: chapter 5), level 
of multipartism (Jones 1997), committee assignments (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tomassi 2002), 
legislative party strength (Samuels 2008), candidate types (Jones 2008), and party system 
institutionalization (Mainwaring 1999). Much less attention has been paid, however, to the way 
in which the nature of political careers affects redistributive strategies with territorial power-
building goals.130
Politicians must pay attention to several rules in order to further their professional 
careers, but two are paramount: the electoral system and candidate selection. These rules affect 
the nature of parties-politicians linkages –and through them shape redistributive electoral 
strategies- by assessing the degree to which party leaders control nominations to elective office 
  
                                                 
130 Notable exceptions are the works of Ames (1995b, 2001: chapter 2) and Samuels (2002; 2003: chapter 6) on 
pork-barreling in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. To my knowledge, no comparative study has yet dealt with 
this issue at the gubernatorial level of analysis. 
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and campaign resources that politicians consider valuable for their careers.131
                                                 
131 See Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008) for a persuasive theoretical framework on political recruitment and 
candidate quality that combines electoral system and party-level variables.  
 In Argentina, the 
CLPR system and candidate selection rules provide subnational –not national- party leaders with 
extraordinary discretional powers over politicians’ career choices and prospects of electoral 
success. Powerful provincial bosses, as we will see in detail below, strategically use nominations 
to public office as an instrument to reward loyalty, foster commitment and participation in the 
organization, expand intra-party dominance, and create elaborate statewide machines financed by 
patronage (in this dissertation, public employment) resources. In Brazil, on the other hand, 
neither national nor subnational party leaders exert such a direct influence on politicians’ career 
decisions and electoral fortunes. The OLPR system along with permissive candidate selection 
norms and individual campaign finance weaken the role of party organizations and encourage 
political individualism. In order to garner the personal vote required to win office, Brazilian 
politicians cultivate their own reputations and link up with established local networks through 
pork-barrel credit-claiming activities.    
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4.1.1 The Rules of the Electoral Game 
Argentina is a federal republic composed of 23 provinces, an autonomous federal capital, and 
around 1,000 municipalities.132
Prior to 2001, representatives to the Argentine Senate were indirectly elected by 
provincial legislatures for nine-year staggered terms, with one third of the seats renewing every 
three years by plurality rule.
 The country has a presidential form of government and a 
bicameral legislature. Representatives to the Chamber of Deputies are elected for four-year terms 
in province-wide multimember districts (with district magnitudes ranging from 2 to 35 with a 
median of 3) from a CLPR system that distributes seats according to the D’Hondt method. One-
half of the Chamber is renewed every two years, with each province renewing one-half (or 
closest approximation) of its delegation. Provinces receive a number of term unlimited deputies 
(5 minimum) proportional to their population in 1980. The CLPR system, as explained in greater 
detail below, places list composition in the hands of subnational party leaders making politicians 
and politically oriented bureaucrats in the administrative sector beholden to provincial-level 
party organizations rather than to national party leaders and ordinary voters.  
133
                                                 
132 The former national territory of Tierra del Fuego obtained provincial status in 1990. Municipal executive 
elections are majoritarian and presidential midterm races. Mayors are elected for four-year terms and are not term 
limited.  
 This mechanism of election also allowed incumbent governors to 
exert great influence over senatorial nomination, and to use the upper chamber as a way station 
133 Before 1994, each provincial legislature elected two senators. In that year, the number was increased to three. 
The Senate was completely renewed in 2001 when in addition to senators’ popular election other constitutional 
amendments such as the female quota were implemented 
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in the road to recapturing the governorship or quitting politics. The Senate thus developed into an 
institution governed by provincial bosses and blood relations (Botana 1977; De Luca 2000). 
Since that date, senators have been directly elected for six-year terms, with one-third of the 
chamber renewing every two years by a fixed majority-minority formula in which two seats are 
allocated to the plurality party and one seat is allocated to the first runner-up. The fact that the 
Senate came to be popularly elected did not diminish but rather preserved the influence of 
regional interests –in particular, of powerful governors- upon senatorial nomination and 
legislative behavior (Kikuchi and Lodola 2008).  
The highly decentralized nature of Argentine federalism confers each province the power 
to determine its own constitution and electoral system thus generating one of the most diverse 
and complex institutional maps in the world (Calvo and Escolar 2005). All provinces have 
popularly elected governors. The rules regarding gubernatorial election experienced considerable 
changes across provinces and through time.134 Although since the return of democracy governors 
were typically elected according to the plurality formula for a four-year term, apparentment rules 
(Ley de Lemas) were introduced in some provinces to allow different lists of congressional 
candidates from the same political party to compete with each other while supporting the same 
runner to the governorship.135
                                                 
134 Between 1983 and 2003, there were twenty-five reforms of the electoral laws or the provincial constitutions with 
regards to gubernatorial electoral formulas.  
 No provincial constitution initially allowed for the immediate 
135 With a few minor exceptions (see Chapter 5), gubernatorial races in Argentina were held in 1983, 1987, 1991, 
1995, 1999, and 2003. Apparentment rules for the election of governors were implemented at least once in ten 
provinces (Chubut, Formosa, Jujuy, La Rioja, Misiones, Salta, San Juán, Santa Cruz, Santa Fe, and Santiago del 
Estero). The provinces of Mendoza (1983), Tucumán (1983, 1987), and Corrientes (1983, 1987, 1991) used an 
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reelection of governors and vice-governors, and their reciprocal succession.136 Starting in 1987, 
however, most provinces were gradually incorporating constitutional clauses that permit 
provincial executives to run for reelection. By the end of the period under analysis in this 
dissertation, nineteen provinces allowed the governor and vice-governor reelection with thirteen 
of them limiting executive incumbency to two consecutive terms.137
The institution of gubernatorial reelection, along with legislative electoral reforms that 
limited the emergence of local challengers (Calvo and Micozzi 2005), contributed to the 
consolidation of regional political dynasties structured around a dominant family clan or a 
personalistic leader.
 
138
                                                                                                                                                             
electoral college for the election of governors; Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2000, 2003), Corrientes (1993, 1997, 2001), 
and Tierra del Fuego (1991, 1995, 1999, 2003) employed the majority runoff formula; Chaco (1995, 1999, 2003) 
used a modified version of the double complement rule; and Chubut (1991) combined a majority runoff formula 
with Ley de Lemas to avoid the case in which the most voted candidate from the winning Lema would not receive 
less votes than any other rival candidate.  
 Classic examples of the former type include the Saadi in Catamarca, the 
Rodríguez Saá in San Luis, the Menem in La Rioja, the Sapag in Neuquén, and the Romero Feris 
in Corrientes. The same pivotal role in Argentina’s provincial politics was played by a group of 
personalistic leaders who built and maintained their territorial power based upon the extensive 
use of the governing party as an instrument of government rather than upon a family machine. 
136 The province of Neuquén required the sitting governor to “purge” two periods before running for the provincial 
executive office again. San Juán allowed the gubernatorial reelection only if the incumbent governor had been 
removed from office as a result of a federal intervention. 
137 Gubernatorial reelection was banned in Corrientes, Entre Rios, Mendoza, Santa Fe, and Tucumán. The provinces 
of Catamarca, Formosa, La Rioja, Salta, San Luis, and Santa Cruz allow for indefinite gubernatorial reelection. In a 
few instances, constitutional reforms were interpreted to allow the incumbent governor two immediate reelections 
following the amendment. These were the cases of Eduardo Angeloz (UCR-Córdoba, 1995), and Rubén Marín (PJ-
La Pampa, 1991). 
138 Personalistic leadership does not imply that the story of these subnational political regimes can be told without 
reference to partisanship. Personalistic political leaders are not personalistic in the same way. Some of them may 
favor the construction of enduring party organizations, others may strategically use the party apparatus to fulfill their 
private interests, and still others may be indifferent or even antithetical to parties.    
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Examples of this second type include the Peronists Gildo Insfrán in the Northern poor province 
of Formosa and Néstor Kirchner in Southern and oil-rich Santa Cruz.     
With regards to the formal rules governing the constitution and functioning of provincial 
legislatures, there is a notable intra-national variation. Indeed, Argentine provinces have either 
unicameral or bicameral legislatures which are renewed either partially or totally every two or 
four years.139 The median district magnitude for provincial legislatures (lower chambers) is 24, 
with some closed lists including as much as 70 candidates. In all provinces, legislators are 
elected for four-year terms and, with a few rare exceptions, they are not term limited.140
In the last two decades, Argentina’s subnational electoral systems became the subject of 
frequent reforms which showed a clear tendency towards the replacement of majoritarian by PR 
systems, the adoption of mixed-member districts, and the incorporation of some adapted version 
of the Ley de Lemas. Thirteen provinces initially employed majoritarian formulas. Today, only 
 The 
remarkable diversity of subnational electoral regimes in the country includes single member, 
multimember (with or without minimal representation for electoral departments or secciones), 
and mixed-member districts (in which a number of local legislators are elected considering the 
province as a single district, and another number considering the departments or secciones); 
Plurality, D’Hont, and Hare formulas; different combinations of majority-proportional rules, and 
several variants of the Ley de Lemas.  
                                                 
139 Today, sixteen provinces have unicameral legislatures. Between 1987 and 1999 the provinces of Córdoba and 
Tucumán eliminated their Senates while San Luis incorporated the upper chamber. 
140 The exception is Tucumán, which only allowed legislative reelection for two successive terms since 2006. Two 
other provinces, Santiago del Estero and Ciudad de Buenos Aires, limit legislative reelection to two consecutive 
periods, while Neuquén incorporated this limitation in 2006. 
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four provinces remain majoritarian, sixteen utilize PR formulas (with thresholds ranging from 2 
to 22 percent of the votes), and four employ mixed-member districts with different combinations 
of majoritarian and PR rules. A dozen provinces eventually incorporated the Ley de Lemas for 
the election of provincial legislators with requirements for the constitution of sublemas varying 
from 1 to 15 percent of the party affiliates. The electoral rules sometimes allow for the 
presentation of simultaneous candidacies across sublemas from the same party (lemitas), or the 
organization of alliances among sublemas from different parties. In any case, by allowing 
internal factions to run separately and to pool their votes in the general election, the Ley de 
Lemas reduced the negative electoral effect of intra-party factionalism and the likelihood that 
candidates would run outside the official party lists.   
It is finally worth highlighting that provincial races in Argentina can be held concurrently 
or non-concurrently with national elections as governors are legally entitled to manage the 
electoral calendar in their territories, and they usually do so in accordance with their political 
aspirations and current needs. Indeed, governors can decide the date in which gubernatorial and 
provincial legislative elections will be held141
                                                 
141 The exceptions are Tierra del Fuego and Chaco, where national and provincial races cannot be held concurrently. 
 and, between 1994 and 2005, they were also able 
to schedule national legislative contests in their districts. Elections to determine governor and 
provincial legislators have been held concurrently with presidential and national legislative races 
in nearly 50 and 80 percent of the time respectively.  
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The Brazilian federation, on the other hand, is composed of 27 states and around 5,600 
municipalities.142
All other Brazilian legislative elections at the three levels of government are ruled by an 
open list proportional representation (OLPR) system in which voters cast one vote for either an 
individual candidate or a party label (voto de legenda).
 Like Argentina, Brazil has a presidential form of government and a bicameral 
legislature with representatives elected in state-wide electoral districts. Regarding the Senate, 
each state selects three term unlimited senators in plurality contests for eight-year terms with 
one-third and two-third renewals. Political parties reserve the senatorships for their major figures 
including former governors. Indeed, around a quarter of the Senate seats during the 1982-2006 
period were occupied by politicians who had prior experience at the governorship. Compared to 
their Argentine counterparts, however, Brazilian governors have exerted less authority over 
senatorial nominations. Given that gubernatorial aspirants normally have to construct multiparty 
alliances, the power to nominate candidates to the Senate usually lies in the hands of 
gubernatorial electoral partners. This is especially the case when the leaving governor decides to 
run for other elected office or is not a viable candidate to the upper chamber.   
143
                                                 
142 The state of Rondônia was created in 1986, and the states of Amapá, Roraima, Tocantins, and the Distrito Federal 
were created in 1990. The 1988 Constitution establishes that only cities with at least 200,000 electors have mayoral 
runoff contests. The other cities employ the first-past-the-post rule. Municipal offices are elected in midterm races, 
and election norms are identical to those ruling state contests.  
 There are no reelection restrictions for 
federal and state deputies. Seats for the Chamber of Deputies and state assemblies are distributed 
143 The vast majority of citizens, however, vote for an individual candidate. See Samuels (1999) for a discussion of 
the factors affecting the level of label votes that Brazilian parties receive, and how the PT has been successful at 
cultivating a party vote. In May 1985, the first post-military government approved a constitutional amendment that 
abolished the requirement imposed in 1981 which mandated citizens to vote a straight party ticket. The amendment 
in question, as discussed below, also introduced other major changes in the electoral system.       
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among competing parties according to the following criterion.144 Votes obtained by candidates of 
the same party are first added to their party-label votes. The result is then divided by the electoral 
quotient (total valid votes divided by the number of seats) resulting in the party quota. Parties 
that do not reach the electoral quotient are eliminated, and seats are allocated among the other 
parties applying the D’Hondt divisor.145
An additional provision reduced even more party leadership control over political 
careerism in Brazil by allowing incumbent legislators at all levels of government to sidestep the 
normal process of candidate selection. In effect, until a court decision suspended it in 2002 (1986 
for Senators) the “birthright rule” (candidato nato) legally guaranteed incumbents automatic 
access to the next election ballot regardless of how many times they had switched party. 
Incumbent legislators who decided to run still needed to be members of a party, and parties could 
 Thus, in substantial contrast to Argentina’s CLPR 
system in which subnational party leaders determine the list composition before elections take 
place, the within-list vote share captured by each individual candidate in OLPR systems 
determines their positions in the list. These details mean that politicians playing out in OLPR 
systems develop a personal vote and avoid relying extensively on party leaders for nomination. 
                                                 
144 The size of state legislative delegations in the Chamber of Deputies ranges from 8 to 70 seats, which are assigned 
in accordance with the number of voters registered in each state. District magnitudes for state assemblies range from 
24 to 94. The number of seats in the state assemblies corresponds to three times the number of seats each state has in 
the Chamber of Deputies up to reach 36, and then one additional state deputy for each additional federal deputy. 
145 Therefore, a given candidate can win an election with fewer votes than a competitor from a different party. Since 
electoral quotas are achieved at the party (coalition) level, one may argue that party leaders have some leverage to 
affect backbenchers’ careers. But Brazilian parties allocate seats among candidates based solely on the number of 
individual votes each candidate receives. This means that there is no party “ordering” of the candidate lists. 
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deny an incumbent a slot in the ballot. But since it was not in the parties’ interests to reject 
renomination, this situation hardly ever happened.  
Also unlike Argentina, subnational electoral regimes do not vary across Brazilian states 
and have remained relatively stable through time. All states have popularly elected governors, 
vice-governors, and unicameral legislatures. Elections for all state positions are held 
concurrently with national executive and legislative races to serve four-year terms. Governors 
were initially elected by the first-past-the-post plurality rule. In 1989, this electoral rule was 
replaced by a two-round majoritarian formula in which voters cast single votes for candidates in 
the first round. If the top-vote getter does not exceed a plurality threshold, the top-two candidates 
go to a second round. Another important change occurred in 1998 when gubernatorial reelection 
for one consecutive term was introduced in all states. This electoral reform, as Chapter 1 showed, 
fostered incumbent governors to run for reelection but did not guarantee them to retain the 
governorship. Even prevailing regional political oligarchies such as the Sarney in Maranhão, the 
Siqueira Campos in Tocantins, and the Antônio Carlos Magalhães family in Bahia, at times 
failed to impose their preferred candidates in gubernatorial elections.   
Brazilian electoral rules, moreover, oblige executive incumbents (although not the 
president and vice-president) who run for a new mandate or for election to other office to stand 
down at least six months before the end of their mandates. At the state level, the gubernatorial 
term is completed by the vice-governor (tampão) who is in turn allowed to vie for any elected 
position including the governorship. Under these rules, the “vices” almost always have the 
chance to exercise power and control the state machine during electoral times. This leaves 
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governors in the uncomfortable position of having to find a loyal vice-governor who could “keep 
the seat warm” or be elected.146
There were also instances in which political disagreements between gubernatorial 
running mates led to deep ruptures in the governing coalition.
 Although many vice-governors loyally completed the 
gubernatorial term and some of them were reelected, others were ambitious politicians who 
sought to promote their own personal projects. In occasions, Brazilian vice-governors actively 
participated in the nomination of the governor’s successor. Other times, they negotiated sizeable 
side payments in exchange for discouraging internal fractures to emerge. And in a few cases, 
they conditioned incumbent governors’ future careers when bitter intra-governmental disputes 
led the governor to remain in office to avoid leaving the state machine at the vice-governor’s 
disposal. A good example is governor Jader Barbalho (PMDB-PA), who decided not to run for a 
Senate seat in the 1986 elections to keep control of state resources away from his vice-governor, 
Laercio Franco (PMDB), linked to Barbalho’s antecessor and personal political enemy, Alacid 
Nunes.  
147
                                                 
146 On average, the 52 vice-governors who acted as governors in the 1982-2006 period occupied the governorship 
during 13 consecutive months. The cases range from Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ) who did it during six months, and 
Alcides Rodrigues Filho (PP-GO) who did it during three entire years. Benedita run for the governorship against the 
candidate of her previous running mate and lost the election. Rodrigues Filho received the support of the outgoing 
governor, Marconi Perillo (PMDB), and was reelected at the governorship. Recall that around 54 percent of the 52 
vice-governors mentioned above run for an elected position after the end of their mandates, and 57 percent of them 
won the election.  
 In 2006, for instance, the vice-
147 In part because indefinite gubernatorial reelection is allowed in some provinces and vice-governors are weaker 
institutional players (as an illustration, Santiago del Estero, San Luis, and Río Negro only incorporated this figure at 
the end of the 1980s), succession problems have been more exceptional in Argentina. In general, departing 
governors are able to place their successors and/or to nominate political allies in the new government. Nonetheless, 
there were a few instances in which established provincial bosses passed their power to more unknown “vices” just 
to discover later than they have been deceived.  
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governor of Rio Grande do Norte, Antônio Jácome (PSB), broke up with the sitting governor and 
Lula’s candidate for reelection, Wilma Farias (PSB), to back the opposite candidate, senator and 
former governor Garibaldi Filho (PMDB). In 2002, the gaúchos Alberto Brito and his vice-
governor Vicente Bogo from the presidential PSDB run a highly divisive gubernatorial party 
primary that facilitated the triumph of the petista opposition in the state elections.148 Perhaps one 
of the most interesting cases is the daughter of former president José Sarney, Roseana Sarney 
(PFL), who failed to recapture the governorship in 2006 against Jackson Lago (PDT). This case 
is illustrative because the defeat of the Sarney clan was orchestrated by the incumbent governor, 
José Reinaldo Tavares (PSB), chosen to occupy that position primarily for his trustworthiness. 
With no prior significant career, Tavares was appointed Transportation Minister when Sarney 
was president, and then reemerged politically in the nineties to be Roseana’s vice-governor for 
two consecutive terms. When she left office to run for the 2002 presidential race, Tavares 
became the official gubernatorial candidate of the group. He was elected in a landslide victory –
precisely against Lago- but did not keep the seat warm. Two years after assuming office, Tavares 
switched to Lago from the Sarneys when he was publicly signaled by the family as responsible 
for a five billons debt borrowed during Roseana’s mandates, disaffiliated from the PFL, and 
began to form a broad political coalition to impede her return to power in 2006.149
                                                 
148 Brito won the primary by one invalid vote (voto rasurado). The dispute emerged when Brito decided to run for a 
new gubernatorial period and offered the vice-governorship to the PP. Interview with Vicente Bogo. Porto Alegre, 
September 20, 2006.  
 To 
149 In Tavares’ own words: “Roseana broke up with me. She offended me and I was forced to respond. I was really 
prejudiced because I did not show how I found Maranhão. Now, she promotes a political fracture. Each day, the 
system [the TV Mirante, affiliated to the national Rede O Globo, the Estado do Maranhão newspaper, and eighteen 
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accomplish that goal, Tavares deployed the state machine to promote vote fragmentation in the 
first gubernatorial electoral run. He primarily did so by financing the electoral campaigns of the 
most relevant opposite candidates to the governorship (Borges 2007). Once in the second round, 
Tavares promoted vote unification in favor of Lago who eventually won the election by a small 
margin. But Roseana had the last laugh. Two years after being defeated, she replaced Lago at the 
governorship after the state electoral court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, TRE) found that his 
electoral campaign had been illegally benefited from Tavares’ use of state resources. manifested  
As becomes evident from the discussion above, Argentina’s and Brazil’s electoral 
regimes affect the structure of incentives that shape political careerism in different and even 
opposite ways. The CLPR system places politicians’ careers in the hands of subnational party 
leaders –in particular, governors- and away from individual candidates and voters (Jones 1997, 
2001, 2008; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi 2002; De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002). Because 
politicians need to win a spot on the party ballot to be elected and because ballot formation is 
influenced –if not controlled by provincial party bosses- politicians must cultivate loyalty to 
regional leaders in order to survive politically and climb up their career ladders.150
                                                                                                                                                             
radios] violently accuses me to be responsible for the economic crisis” (Epoca 2004: 15-17). Actually, the conflict 
between Roseana and Tavares was not new. In 2002, Roseana wanted the state Health Secretary, João Abreu, not 
Tavares to be her successor at the governorship. Affected by the Lunus scandal, a fraudulent diversion of money 
from an Amazon development agency committed by a consulting company that Roseana owned with her husband, 
she was forced to support Tavares, José Sarney’s preferred candidate. The first sign of rupture revealed in the 2004 
mayoral election in the state capital when Roseana backed her cousin, Ricardo Murad (PTB), and Tavares supported 
Tadeu Palácio (PDT), one of the most important adversaries of the Sarney family. Palácio won in the first round 
while Murad only obtained 7 percent of the votes.  
 Even when a 
150 Candidates’ dependence is actually conditional upon their own past trajectories and electoral strength. A former 
governor is obviously less dependent from the party leadership –in many cases s/he is the leader- than a mayor, or a 
federal deputy. In the words of a congressional legislator from the Santa Fe province with a long experience in the 
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politician is not interested in running for election, s/he must stand in good relationship with 
subnational party elites as they control access to numerous positions in the organization, the 
legislatures, and the provincial/municipal (and perhaps, the national) branches of government.  
Brazilian electoral rules, by contrast, represent the extreme version of a candidate-
centered regime. The OLPR system fosters electoral personalism, encourages both inter- and 
intra-party competition, and weakens the role of party organizations (Ames 1995b, 2001; Novaes 
1994; Samuels 2000, 2002). Becoming a legislative candidate in Brazil, as discussed in the next 
section, is not that difficult. Political parties cannot refuse to nominate candidates, and parties are 
advantaged to nominate a well amount of them. In this context, candidates themselves make the 
decision to run or not for office, and voters ultimately determine candidates’ placement on the 
lists. Because the nominal votes of candidates belonging to the same party (coalition) are pooled 
and seats are allocated according to the ratio between votes and the electoral quota, politicians 
running in PR elections compete against many others without knowing the vote share needed to 
win the election. Candidates thus need to maximize their votes –even against those of their co-
partisans- to secure success. To obtain the personal vote they need, most Brazilian politicians 
rely on their pork-barrel credit-claiming ability rather than on their parties’ reward networks and 
mobilization efforts.  
                                                                                                                                                             
chamber: “It is true that someone –if you belong to the incumbent party that person is the governor- does the lists…I 
was candidate in six opportunities, and in the last four of them I was the first-runner in the list…Of course, I owe to 
the guy who built the list. But he also looked at the pools to see who were the best candidates. And my votes 
counted. Then, I’m not going to do stupid things here because someone tells me what to do [me lleva de las narices]. 
Before doing that, I’m going to sit down and discuss it with the governor, the president or whoever else.” Interview 
with Oscar Lamberto, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 8, 2005. 
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4.1.2 Candidate Selection and Campaign Finance 
In most modern democracies, including Argentina and Brazil, politicians need first to win 
candidacy in order to get elected. Thus, party recruitment and selection procedures also factor 
into politicians’ career choices and prospects of success by determining who are nominated for 
election –and under what conditions-, and to whom candidates owe political loyalty. In 
Argentina, candidate selection norms magnify the control that provincial leaders exert over 
political careers, making candidates and aspirants deferent to a small number of regional party 
bosses. Candidate recruitment processes in Brazil, on the other hand, have little influence upon 
career advancement making politicians comparatively less deferent to party leadership and more 
dependent upon their individual initiative, reputation, and personal links with voters. Cultivating 
a good relation with party leaders undoubtedly increases Brazilian politicians’ chances of gaining 
a spot on the ballot and, hopefully, winning election. But given the working of the electoral 
system individual politicians often need to develop their independent bases of support by 
bolstering ties with municipal mayors and established local networks. The most efficient way to 
increase their name recognition and obtain territorial support is to spend lavishly on pork-barrel. 
In part, this explains why powerful party leaders in Brazil typically dominate the local –but not 
the state- scene based on individually-run political machines. 
Until 2001, Argentine political parties were required to hold internal elections to 
determine intra-party positions but not to choose candidates for public office. Candidate 
nomination and the formation of party lists (i.e., who runs and in what position) is organized in 
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the provinces by district-level organizations according to their own statutes.151 The legal 
framework dictates that provincial party statutes must incorporate the requisites required to be a 
candidate (affiliation and residency) and to form electoral coalitions, the rules governing 
incumbents’ renomination, and the allocation formulae used to distribute placements among 
minority intra-party lists, and among male and female candidates. An analysis I conducted over 
forty provincial party statutes from the PJ, the UCR, and all provincial parties that occupied the 
governorship indicates that although party recruitment institutions are flexible and far from 
standardized, they decentralize decision making in the district-level party organization.152
Party affiliation requisites tend to be stricter than residency clauses. Yet in general there 
are few obstacles to nominate candidates with no previous affiliation. Provincial party leaders 
decide over this issue as well as over the positions that outsiders will occupy in the lists. There 
are, moreover, few barriers for coalition building with local party leaders negotiating and 
deciding the spots assigned to electoral partners. In the case a primary election is held, allocation 
formulae may include winner-take-all arrangements in which the list that obtains the plurality of 
the votes wins all positions, semi-proportional methods in which the runner-up list receives every 
  
                                                 
151 Prior to 2001, the Organic Law of Political Parties (Law 23,298) originally promulgated in 1985 regulated the 
candidate nomination process. This law only established that provincial party statutes should define the selection 
methods used to choose provincial level offices. There was no mention to candidacies for the presidency and 
national legislators. In 2001, Law 23,298 was modified to introduce simultaneous and open primaries for 
presidential and national legislative candidacies (Law 25,611). This decision was contested by some parties and 
factions, and modified later by various presidential decrees. In 2003, new legislation was passed ruling that the 
National Congress of each party should decide to call for primaries in order to decide national candidacies. 
Throughout the years, Argentine parties have used a variety of candidate selection methods ranging from open or 
closed primaries, to elite arrangements, to party convention votes. For details, see De Luca, Jones, and Tula (2002). 
152 Of course, both informal rules and the party “culture” often play a central role in explaining political recruitment. 
Although I mention some informal mechanisms below, a complete analysis of such a critical issue is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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third or fourth placements in the list, and D’Hondt PR formulae with thresholds ranging from 10 
to 30 percent of the votes. The national legislation sets the gender quota at 30 percent, but 
provincial organizations determine the positions eventually occupied by female candidates on the 
closed lists.153
Campaign financing in Argentina is also under the control of provincial party leaders, in 
particular governors who are frequently de jure or de facto presidents of the incumbent parties. 
Public financing does exist in Argentina. Nevertheless, it represents a modest fraction of the 
resources that relevant parties spend in electoral activities. Instead, campaign resources primarily 
come from private entities and the state machine thanks to the dual control that incumbent 
governors have over public contracts, and the future of political and bureaucratic careers. The 
aforementioned Law 23,298 created a Permanent Party Fund through which parties (not 
candidates) receive funds from the federal government to finance their operative functioning and 
electoral campaigns. Public funds allocated to finance these different types of activities are 
assigned as follows: 20/30 percent in equal parts among all political parties, and 80/70 percent in 
accordance with the number of votes each party received in the most recent federal deputy 
 Argentine parties do not allow for the automatic renomination of incumbents. The 
UCR historically required incumbents to win renomination in party primaries by two-thirds of 
the votes. This rule has been eliminated in most provinces, but some district-level organizations 
resort to informal mechanisms to limit legislative mandates to two consecutive terms.  
                                                 
153 It is usually established that no more than three consecutive placements can be occupied by either male or female 
nominees. In some cases, informal rules dictate ranking women on “winnable” positions. 
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election.154 In 1993, the amount was set to be 2.5 pesos per vote. In 1997, it was reduced to only 
1 peso. And in 2001, a presidential decree dictated that the sum must be yearly established by the 
Ministry of Interior. According to current electoral laws, parties should reallocate 80 percent of 
the public funds they receive to their provincial-level organizations.155
Along with in-cash funding, public party financing in Argentina includes a set of indirect 
additional benefits such as subsidies to print party ballots and limited free radio and television 
time, which are allocated equally among all the officially recognized parties. Only parties (not 
candidates) are allowed to purchase additional time. This regulation makes electoral campaigns 
more centered on party appeals and symbols than on candidates’ individual qualities. Parties are 
also required to report to the national electoral courts registries of their regular and campaign 
expenditures following the election date. Violations can result in fines and suspension from one 
to four years of the public funds.  
   
The way in which candidates for office are nominated, and the extent and way in which 
they access to campaign resources sharply differ in Brazil. Like Argentina’s electoral laws, 
Brazilian legislation also prohibits independent candidacies. Only political parties may present 
candidates, who (except for the president) are nominated in a decentralized process at the state 
(federal and state deputies, senator, and governor) and municipal (mayor and councilor) 
                                                 
154 The sum allocated to support parties’ institutional activities is distributed to all officially recognized parties. If a 
party did not present candidates in the previous federal deputy election, it only receives the corresponding 20 
percent of the funds. The sum allocated to finance parties’ campaigns is distributed among all parties that will run 
candidates in the incoming election, regardless of whether or not they had participated in the last federal deputy 
contest.  
155 In 2002, Argentina’s congress passed the Law 25,600 on public party financing which introduced minor reforms 
to old legislation.   
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levels.156 The electoral law 9,504, initially promulgated in 1997 and modified slightly in several 
opportunities since then, regulates the party nomination process.157 According to this law, each 
national party’s statute must indicate how candidates are selected and electoral coalitions are 
formed. But with the exception of the PT, which sets up stringent nomination rules such as 
requiring candidates to sign an agreement with the party’s ideological principles that discourages 
the entry of politicians seeking a party to rent (legenda de aluguel), making the appropriate 
financial contributions to the organization, presenting a number of committee endorsements, and 
obtaining at least 20 percent of the votes in the state party convention to make the ballot 
(Guzmán and Oliveira 2001; Meneguello 1989; Samuels 2008), Brazilian parties rely on a few 
recruitment regulations beyond residency and membership requirements.158 Because individual 
politicians often need to run on a party ticket, candidates cannot entirely dispense with parties. 
Actually, politicians’ nomination chances increase if they appease state leaders. But because of 
permissive electoral rules and permeable recruitment structures, nomination by a legally 
recognized party is not much of an obstacle to ambitious politicians and gubernatorial 
aspirants.159
                                                 
156 Since the creation of the República Nova and until 1945, independent candidacies were legally allowed in Brazil. 
  
157 The 1986, 1990, and 1994 elections were regulated by electoral Laws 7,493 and 8,713 respectively. 
158 The electoral rule 9504 dictates that candidates must be party members and had lived in the state for at least one 
year (six and ten months according to Laws 7,493 and 8,713 respectively) prior to the election. The PT also 
prohibited the extensive use of the candidato nato rule, and nominated only one candidate per seat instead of the 1.5 
candidates individual parties are allowed to nominate (Samuels 1999: 597).  
159 The PT has traditionally nominated gubernatorial candidates by consensus within the state directories. But in a 
few cases, the party’s national organization overruled subnational decisions (Power and Mochel 2008).  
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An additional feature of the electoral system makes politicians’ need to go through a 
party to secure their nomination not terribly confining. Recall that electoral rules promote a vote 
pooling within parties (coalitions), and that the total number of candidates to be nominated is a 
function of the number of seats at stake. In this institutional setting, political parties are 
advantaged by filling their electoral lists and are hesitant to exclude would-be candidates. The 
legal guideline establishes that parties running alone in states with more than twenty seats at 
stake can nominate up to 1.5 times that number. If the number of seats is twenty or fewer, they 
can nominate up to 2 times that number. Coalitions of parties, on the other hand, can run up to 2 
and 2.5 times the number of seats to be elected respectively.160 Brazilian parties, in consequence, 
seek a balance between maximizing the number of candidates and maximizing their chances of 
being elected, excluding those candidates who compete over the same geographic area. If 
candidates belong to the same region of a state, potential votes split between them resulting in 
more votes for the party list but in the election of neither candidate. For this reason, and because 
weak candidates do not to run in competitive and expensive races, parties (coalitions) rarely 
nominate the maximum number of the slots to which they have a right.161
The large number of parties and open slots available along with the fact that party 
switching has few impediments and is rampant among elected officials (Desposato 2006; 
Nicolau 1996), allow rationally minded politicians to select with relatively low political costs the 
      
                                                 
160 Before 1998, the same guidelines applied to all states. In 1986 and 1990, coalitions of three or more parties could 
run up to 3 times de number of seats at stake. In 1994, parties running alone could only nominate candidates up to 
the number of seats to be completed, while party coalitions could do it up to 1.5 times that number.     
161 In addition, small parties in alliance strategically restrict the number of candidates that place on the ballot in order 
to maximize the vote totals of their few nominees.  
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party label under which they will run for elected office.162
As for the second issue mentioned in the Brazilian parties’ statutes, there were 
traditionally almost no legal restrictions to the authority of state party conventions to form and 
compose electoral alliances. The law maintained the practice of allowing multiparty alliances in 
PR elections, with the only limitation being that the same coalition should hold for both PR and 
majoritarian contests. In 2002, however, the Supreme Court interpreted a 1996 electoral law 
stipulating that political parties must have a “national character” as meaning that in the case a 
party is running a presidential candidate, the national coalition should hold for all other national 
and state elections. This new legal principle known as “verticalization” (verticalização) changed 
the way in which parties with real chances at the presidency do electoral politics. These parties 
nationalized their intra- and inter-party negotiations thus curtailing the autonomy of state leaders 
and personalistic factions to line up and organize elections according to their local needs. But 
 In such a wide open, decentralized, 
and “self-selecting” process, neither national nor subnational leaders have the capacity to exert 
much influence over politicians’ career choices and to impose their demands to them. The 
general pattern, from which we can exclude most leftist parties, states with high partisanship 
(e.g., Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco), and states dominated by regional clans (e.g., Bahia 
and Maranhão) appears to run in the opposite direction as parties need politicians more than 
politicians need parties. 
                                                 
162 The most important limitation to party switching affects legislators who are supposed to run for reelection. These 
politicians cannot change political affiliation in their last year in office. Around 40 percent of the federal deputies 
switch party each year (Schmitt 1999; Desposato 2006). For petistas, this figure is nearly 20 percent. To my 
knowledge, there are no data on state deputies’ party switching.  
190 
 
 
 
verticalização did not modify the individualistic and decentralized nature of the party nomination 
process. Parties with no presidential chances simply stay out to maximize their chances at the 
subnational level. And alliances do not help boost the votes of any particular candidate in PR 
elections. Rather, they help individual politicians –particularly those belonging to the panoply of 
minuscule parties- to overcome the electoral quotient.163
Brazil’s legislation on public party financing reinforces the candidate-centrism of 
political careers and promotes strong incentives to marshal electoral support through pork-barrel 
rather than patronage allocations. Before the 1994 elections, campaigns contributions were 
prohibited. Since then, direct contributions from individuals, parties, and private corporations are 
allowed with few restrictions. As in Argentina, party organizations (not individual candidates) 
receive a limited amount of public finance appropriations. But, in contrast to Argentine parties, 
Brazilian ones do not finance campaigns, nor dictate how they should be run (Samuels 2001a, 
2001b).
  
164 Both PR and majoritarian candidates are then responsible for collecting their own 
funding and conducting their campaigns.165
                                                 
163 In the 1994-2006 period, 33 different political parties obtained at least one seat in the state legislatures. 
 Campaign laws permit federal deputies to finance 
candidates to the state assemblies (dobradinhas), who in turn reciprocate their benefactors by 
mobilizing local support in congressional races. In addition, the aforementioned electoral law 
164 Public funds do not finance parties’ electoral campaigns but only their institutional activities. Ninety-nine percent 
of the public funds are allocated to parties according to their votes in the last election for the Chamber of Deputies. 
To receive these funds, parties should demonstrate having national penetration (caráter nacional) by obtaining at 
least 5 percent of the votes in one-third of the states with a minimum of 1 percent in each state (Law 9,096/95). The 
remaining 1 percent of the federal funds is equally distributed among all officially recognized parties. In contrast to 
Argentina, the amount of public financing is not limited by law.  
165 Although PT candidates rely less on money and more on organizational resources, they are also responsible for 
financing their own campaigns (Samuels 1999). 
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9,504 and several additional regulations condition the campaign and spending behavior of 
incumbent executives at all levels of government. On the one hand, incumbents cannot use state 
resources for electoral purposes while those running for election cannot participate in the 
inauguration of public work projects during the election year. On the other hand, incumbents 
cannot spend in publicity more than the average spent in their first three years in office or more 
than the value spent in the year prior to election. Neither can these politicians hire, fire without 
fair cause, remove, transfer, or modified the benefits of government employees up to six months 
before/after the election date. Critically, increments in the public workers’ salaries during the 
election year (saco de bondades) are also temporarily restricted and can only cover the loss 
stemming from the inflation rate. The same legal constraints apply to the allocation of voluntary 
transfers from higher to lower levels of government. Finally, current legislation requires 
candidates –not parties- for all offices but the presidency to submit a registry of their campaigns 
contributions (prestação de contas) to the national electoral court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 
TSE) within the two months following the election date. Violations to these laws can result in 
fines, candidate revocation and, as the case of Jackson Lago discussed above illustrates, loss of a 
position after the election. 
Free television and radio time is also allocated to parties according to a formula based on 
seat representation in the Chamber of Deputies.166
                                                 
166 Campaign regulations also include some indirect benefits such as subsidies to print/mail campaign literature, and 
concessions to organize party rallies in public spaces.   
 Moreover, neither parties nor individual 
candidates are allowed to buy additional ads on radio and television. Parties distribute their free 
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time among candidates in proportion to the importance of the contest. Thus, congressional 
candidates only spend a few seconds per week presenting themselves to voters without any party 
intermediation. Candidates to executive positions, on the other hand, get large TV exposure 
making television a powerful instrument to counterbalance predominantly weak party 
organizations. All candidates to the presidency, the governorship, and the larger cities spend 
significant amounts of money to build their campaign teams, and practically everyone purchases 
newspaper space.167
The numerous campaign activities developed by candidates in Brazil, from painting walls 
to attending rallies, are often executed in conjunction with delivering public work projects to 
local leaders and mayors (Ames 2001; Becerra 1999; Mainwaring 1999). This electoral strategy, 
as Samuels (2001a) has demonstrated, is more pronounced among gubernatorial than legislative 
 But given low readership, print ads have limited electoral impact. No 
surprisingly, information on Brazilian newspapers indicates that four states (São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and Minas Gerais in this order) concentrate around 90 percent of the 
journalist market (Instituto Verificador de Circulação 2006). Absolute numbers are striking. The 
most read newspapers in the country by that time, Folha de São Paulo and O Globo, only printed 
a daily media of 310,000 and 271,000 units respectively. Other states with highly politicized 
print media show meager numbers. For instance, Bahia’s A Tarde and Pernambuco’s Journal do 
Comercio had a media publication of around 37,000 and 36,000 units respectively.  
                                                 
167 Brazilian elections are extraordinarily expensive. According to some analysts, they are the most expensive in the 
world (Ames 1995a; Mainwaring 1999). Arguably, a PR system with greater party control over nominations reduces 
incentives to campaign overspending because financial supporters are not inclined to spend money that has little 
effect on individual candidates, and because legislative candidates have fewer incentives to raise money for their 
own campaigns.  
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candidates. In exploring the sources of campaign funds, the author shows that the construction 
sector (empreiteiras) finances the bulk of gubernatorial campaigns. Indeed, state executive 
candidates receive half of their contributions from firms in this sector, while presidential and 
congressional candidates only receive an average of around 30 percent. For many candidates to 
the governorship winning the sympathy of municipal bosses is critical. Because aspirants to this 
position usually need to construct multiparty alliances, they expand their connections beyond 
their parties by making inroads among local leaders belonging to other political forces. 
To summarize, politicians in both Argentina and Brazil pay greater attention to 
subnational party leaders and discount the centrality of national leadership in assessing their 
future career options and success. Although in both countries national parties have considerable 
statutory powers, they have been reluctant to sanction their members and intervene in state-level 
party organizations.168
                                                 
168 In Argentina, federal interventions have sometimes been used as an instrument to intervene the provincial party. 
An individual who participated in several interventions manifested: “A federal intervention is both an institutional 
intervention to the constitutional powers that face a deep crisis and a party intervention that removes operatives, 
brokers, and internal factions from the provincial organization…Interventions are an ambulance that leaves many 
wounded people behind…This happened in Catamarca, where we wanted to dismantle the PJ structure involved in 
the assassination of María Soledad Morales and it also happened in Tucumán, where we created a PJ candidate and 
tried to clean up the party after the scandalous administration of José Domato.” Interview with Carlos Zelkovicz. 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, February 14, 2006.  
 Important cross-national differences in institutional and organizational 
factors, however, make subnational leaders in these robust federations matter in different ways. 
In Argentina, the preferences of provincial party bosses and the collective performance of a 
candidate’s party at the pools determine the fate of political careers. Consequently, ambitious 
politicians cultivate loyalty to regional bosses by working at different levels of the party 
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organization to promote their electoral success.169 In time, a virtuous cycle forms. As politicians 
rationally invest in and become oriented toward their parties (factions), more follow suit. This 
logic facilitates the construction of elaborated patronage-based machines. Because these political 
machines are financed by resources coming from the state apparatuses (public employment) they 
help consolidate stable bonds with voters and spread statewide. In Brazil, the preferences of 
individual candidates and ordinary voters (and the ability of the former to get more votes in 
relation to their co-partisans) shape the contours of political careerism. Party leaders exercise 
comparatively little control over professional politicians and aspirants because they have no 
formal means to pick up winners among listmates, and because they play a minor role in most 
electoral campaigns.170
                                                 
169 It is worth noting that De Luca, Jones, and Tula (2006) find no systematic relation in Argentine provinces 
between divisive gubernatorial primaries and electoral results in the general election. This finding suggests that even 
in the presence of a “bloody” primary, militants and internal factions tend to support the party’s candidate.   
 There is some informal room of influence available to state party leaders 
as they can provide targeted support through direct financial transfers to a candidate’s campaign 
fund, provide preferential allocation of party TV or radio, or stumping on behalf of a particular 
candidate. But regardless of these means, individual politicians and potential candidates need to 
cultivate the credit claiming with voters and bilaterally articulate with local networks to avoid 
campaigning in isolation. This logic tends to promote the formation of territorially-narrow and 
individually-run machines founded on the allocation of pork-barrel goods.  
170 Some authors argue that Brazilian parties cannot be completely ruled out as factors influencing political 
careerism because they mediate access to federal funds that incumbent legislators allocate to their electoral fiefdoms 
(Figuereido and Limongi 1999; Pereira and Renno 2003). Although parties do exert some control over central 
government’s resource distribution, there is far from conclusive evidence that an organized partisan dynamics 
characterizes such allocative efforts.  
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The ways in which electoral systems work and political parties are organized distinctively 
affect how politicians build their careers and search for votes. Electoral and organizational rules 
that make politicians beholden to party leaders promote the use of patronage goods to mobilize 
vote support. In contrast, rules that make politicians independent from their party organizations 
encourage the strategic use of pork-barrel goods. Among the factors than can work either to 
reinforce or undermine these links, the public personnel system plays a critical role. This is the 
issue discussed in the next section.  
4.1.3 Public Service Systems 
In both Argentina and Brazil, a non-negligible percentage of employees in the public sector 
consist of individuals with partisan connections and political aspirations for the future. The 
administrative sector in both countries is also a repository for politicians who were denied 
nomination or lost a bid for elected office. Despite these important similarities, Argentina and 
Brazil have different public service systems that distinctively affect incumbent elites’ ability to 
exploit patronage resources with coalition-building goals. The lack of stable civil service rules in 
Argentina makes the state apparatus serve at the confidence of the governing party or its internal 
factions. A comparatively long tradition of competent merit-based bureaucracy in Brazil 
diminishes incumbents’ resource base for state patronage.  
In Argentina, political criteria have traditionally colored staffing decisions at all levels of 
the national, subnational, and municipal administrative sectors as no formal division exists 
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between the appointive and career civil service. Tenure for public employees is guaranteed by 
the 1957 Constitution (article 14). Since then and until the mid-1980s, all legislation regarding 
the public sector was unilaterally determined by the federal government. With the return of 
democracy, the administration of Raúl Alfonsín failed to pass in Congress a reform oriented to 
professionalize the civil service career. Some changes were introduced during the government of 
Carlos Menem as part of a broader package of structural market-friendly reforms. These 
changes, however, did not attempt to “depoliticize” the state bureaucracy but rather to downsize 
the number of public employees and to reform the corporatist labor regulations for state workers. 
With these goals in mind, the government issued a series of decrees that reduced the number of 
secretaries, fostered voluntary retirement, and suspended collective agreements in the national 
public administration (Domeniconi, Gaudio y Guibert 1992; Orlansky 1994). Moreover, counted 
on the support of the traditionally Peronist public sector union, it implemented a centralized 
model of collective bargaining that reduced the high dispersion of public employment regimes 
inherited from the pre-democratic period (Etchmendy 2001). At the national level, as Chapter 1 
discussed, it was a considerable reduction of government employees encouraged by the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the decentralization of the education and health 
systems to the provinces. At the subnational level, however, public employment was largely 
safeguarded from draconian measures by the federal government in exchange for congressional 
support necessary to move forward the president’s neoliberal agenda (Gibson and Calvo 2001). 
A lukewarm step toward the professionalization and institutionalization of the national 
civil service was taken in 1991 with the creation of the National System of the Administrative 
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Profession (Sistema Nacional de la Profesión Administrativa, SINAPA). But the SINAPA, 
which gradually fell in disuse and is currently delegitimized, only included around a quarter of 
the government employees and did not affect the conditions of provincial and municipal workers. 
Patronage-ridden politics thus continued playing a central role as examinations for hiring and 
promotion remained largely irregular and ad hoc. Although tenure makes it difficult for 
politicians and parties to replace permanent employees hired by previous administrations, they 
can still resort to alternative mechanisms of political control. On the one hand, incumbent 
authorities can employ disciplinary measures (sumarios) to condition career advancement in the 
state bureaucracy and limit public workers’ possibility of finding a job outside the administrative 
sector. On the other hand, incumbents can easily hire supporters through temporary contracts 
which are allocated discretionally, renewed many times with the proximity of elections, and 
eventually converted into permanent positions with full tenure and pension rights. Finally, no 
legal restrictions exist regarding incumbents’ authority to increase public workers’ salaries in the 
election year.  
In Brazil, the principles of a merit-based bureaucracy were introduced early in the twenty 
century (Evans and Rauch 1999). Although these principles were never fully implemented, the 
country developed an increasingly professionalized bureaucracy with a considerable portion of 
public employees in the federal and state governments recruited on impersonal and meritocratic 
bases. A powerful patrimonialist bureaucracy dominated the state apparatus during the nineteen 
century and the First Republic (Graham 1997). Beginning in the 1930s, attempts to reduce 
bureaucratic rent-seeking by increasing effectiveness and flexibilizing rigid institutions were 
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recurrent. The first attempt to revamp patrimonialism in the public administration and build a 
rational bureaucracy came with the emergence of the Estado Novo. The government of Getulio 
Vargas needed to set up a centralized, hierarchical, and efficient administrative machinery in 
order to conduct the state-led inward-oriented development model. Along with the sanction of 
basic administrative norms and a system of classification, the government created a modernizing 
bureaucratic agency, the Administrative Department of Public Service (Departamento 
Admininstrativo do Servico Público, DASP), charged with defining and executing civil service 
policies including recruitment by competition, technical training, and budgetary elaboration 
(Geddes 1994). The DASP had administrative departments in all states, which enjoyed 
extraordinary powers to adapt the federal personnel system to the subnational territorial units. 
These collegial bodies, formally dependent on the Ministry of Justice but headed for a director 
nominated by the president, acted as a revision chamber of the decisions taken by the state 
interventor (Lima Junior 1998). In effect, with the votes of two-third of their members, the 
DASP’s administrative departments could block the interventors’ decisions and elevate the final 
verdict on the issue in conflict to the federal level. During that time, the federal government also 
used the public administration as a mechanism of political and economic control in the states 
through the pioneering creation of institutes, autarchies, and technical commissions.  
Between the democratization of the Vargas regime and the 1964 military coup, there 
were no significant changes in the country’s administrative public sector. The different 
governments of the period, fundamentally the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, expanded 
agencies in the indirect administration to facilitate the launching of the industrialist model. This 
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process was later reinforced by the military who overthrew João Goulart by means of the 
Decree-Law number 200. This legal device, issued in 1967, constituted an ambitious and 
systematic attempt to create a career system by fostering the expansion of the entrepreneurial 
public sector made of state-owned enterprises and autarchies. The administrative reform 
designed by the authoritarian regime actually gave rise to a modern techno-bureaucracy hired on 
a private fashion to occupy strategic institutions such as the Central Bank, the BNDES, and 
PETROBRAS (Gaetani and Heredia 2002: 7). Nonetheless, it did not professionalize agencies in 
the direct administration which remained patrimonialist in nature (Lustosa da Costa 2008). 
With the end of the military period, the democratic government of Jose Sarney made a 
timid effort to modernize and de-bureaucratize the public sector. It did so through the creation of 
the Secretary of Public Administration (Secretaria da Administração Pública, SEDAP) and the 
National School of Public Administration (Escola Nacional da Administração Pública, ENAP). 
These institutions served to reduce the number of organizations in the indirect administration, but 
failed to institute a merit-based system of careers. Indeed, the 1988 Constitution formally insured 
full tenure to all public employees with at least five years of service. To counterbalance, it turned 
the civil service into the only public personnel regime thus making it impossible to further 
employ public servants on private grounds. Three years later, the Single Labor Standard Law 
(Regime Jurídico Unico, RJU) granted additional privileges in pay and pensions that entitled 
federal, state and municipal civil servants regardless of their function to early retirement with full 
salary. In the medium term, this regime generated an uncontrollable vegetative increase of 
personnel spending. In an attempt to avoid these costs, the government of Collor de Mello 
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improvised a superficial administrative reform exclusively oriented to reduce the public sector. 
Several institutions in the career system were therefore extinguished, government employees not 
protected by the Constitution were fired, recently hired public workers were forced to retire, and 
permanent civil servants’ rights were extended to all other employees to promote early 
retirement. After Collor’s impeachment, the government of Itamar Franco assumed a 
conservative position regarding the administrative reform, resuscitating several ministries and 
agencies extinguished by its predecessor and timidly advancing in the privatization process.  
After decades of minor advances in the area, the government of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso implemented an unprecedented program to reform the personnel system. The 
administrative reform was packaged as an integral part of a comprehensive master plan, the 
denominated Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus (Plano da Reforma do Aparelho do 
Estado) designed by Minister of Administrative and State Reform Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, 
to restructure the entire state apparatus. Two institutions were particularly sensitive to the 
government given their potential fiscal costs: tenure retirement with full wages, and extension of 
any salary increment to retired workers and pensioners. Originally, the plan focused on 
transforming Brazil’s public administration by eliminating these institutions. In a second phase, 
priorities shifted to concentrate on reducing public personnel spending and strengthening a 
career-based system in strategic areas of the executive bureaucracy (central banking, planning, 
and budgeting).  
The Cardoso administration presented its reform plan to Congress in October 1995. After 
32 months of intense negotiations, the constitutional amendment number 173 was approved in a 
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slighted revised form. The amendment made tenure rights in the public sector –especially those 
of low and mid ranking state and municipal employees- more flexible, and established a cap for 
abusive salaries of some civil servants popularly known as marajás.171 It also eliminated the RJU 
and equalized wages in the administrative sector by prohibiting the judiciary and legislative 
powers at all levels of government from increasing salaries without a previous law or 
incorporating any temporary gratification as permanent salary. Furthermore, the amendment 
established a merit-based system of competitive recruitment (concursos públicos) that severely 
limited the capacity of incumbent authorities to nominate political allies. Although the federal 
government was defeated in the amendment on personnel temporary hiring, it eventually issued a 
provisional measure which did not require any constitutional change for setting up restrictive 
foundations on the matter.172 Having the support of the business sector, the government found a 
crucial political ally in the state governors and mayors of larger cities, who, motivated by the 
possibility of serving a new term in office, viewed the administrative reform as a tool for debt 
renegotiation and future fiscal adjustment (Bresser-Pereira 2003; Melo 1998).173
                                                 
171 Actually, the government sent two other major constitutional amendments, the tax reform and the social security 
reform, which were defeated in Congress. The term marajás comes from the Indian word maharaja employed to 
name a local and rich potentate. 
 In exchange for 
support for the amendment, the Cardoso administration agreed to refinance states’ debts and to 
incorporate a proposal made by governors and party leaders permitting redundancy dismissals of 
172 The number of temporary contracts (cargos em comissão) allowed is considerably low. For incumbents interested 
in nominating political supporters in the state bureaucracy, two alternative solutions emerged: hiring people through 
international institutions or university foundations. These methods permitted incumbents to bypass legislation 
without breaking the law. 
173 Recall that a constitutional amendment allowing for presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral reelection has been 
recently approved. 
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tenured employees only when expenditures on personnel exceeded 60 percent of the 
government’s net revenues. Subnational political leaders thought that the removal of tenure was 
decisive to allow them firing public employees and then keeping payroll under the limit imposed 
by the Camata Law discussed in the previous chapter.174
The Bresser’s reform was successful in fiscal terms and in enforcing several aspects 
related to the career system. On the one hand, it helped control public expenditures specially 
through limiting personnel spending. On the other hand, the reform produced positive results in 
key facets of the career system such as isolating strategic bureaucracies, introducing performance 
management reward schemes, incorporating entry examinations as recruitment mechanisms, 
updating personnel statistics, and training government employees (Gaetani and Heredia 2002). 
The public management reform was also effective with regards to states and municipalities, 
which adopted most of its institutions and practices. Although the lack of data about how many 
offices were filled by concursos makes it difficult to determine the exact impact of the reform 
upon governors’ ability to patronize, anecdotal evidence indicates that it does actually matter. As 
a former governor and current senator of Minas Gerais stated, “public employment in the states 
are not important since more than a decade ago. The percentage of government employees a 
governor can freely hire is marginal and salary increments in the election year are limited. The 
vast majority of the public employees are hired by concursos… and people do not pressure 
  
                                                 
174 The federal government also accepted to grant tenure to 10,800 employees from the former national territories 
probably recruited in irregular deals. According to the 1988 Constitution all civil servants in these territories who 
were active before the date of the constitution approval should be statutory federal employees paid by the central 
administration. Of course, it was extremely difficult to determine who was an active employee that date.        
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authorities to obtain a job in the administrative sector because they are convinced that public 
employment is executed though concursos. In this scheme, the president has an advantage 
because he can grant salary increments to public employees through provisional measures. The 
governor often needs the approval of the state assembly.”175
Having discussed the nature of political and bureaucratic careers, what evidence supports 
my claim of Argentina and Brazil as cases of patronage and pork-ridden politics? To assess the 
link between political careerism and redistributive electoral spending, the next section documents 
the structure of subnational career ambitions in both countries during the post-authoritarian 
period. A comparative study of state legislators’ career paths demonstrates that Argentina’s 
provincial legislatures constitute an additional ingredient of the large portfolio of jobs that 
subnational party leaders (in particular, governors) have at their disposal to distribute among 
party adherents and run their statewide patronage-based machines. In contrast, Brazil’s state 
assemblies constitute a desirable source of club goods and other particularistic benefits that 
individual politicians use to build local networks of support and climb up their career ladders. 
 
4.2 SUBNATIONAL CAREER AMBITIONS AND PARTICULARISTIC SPENDING 
After decades of being driven by a “presidential bias”, research on Latin American politics has 
increasingly turned its attention to the study of legislatures. Within this literature, a group of 
                                                 
175 Interview with Eduardo Azeredo. Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
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analysts has examined questions related to legislators’ political ambitions and career pathways. 
In exploring these issues, however, scholars have largely concentrated on national legislative 
institutions and actors of single countries such as Chile (Navia 2008), Colombia, (Carey 1996; 
Martz 1999), Costa Rica (Carey 1996), Mexico (Camp 1995; Langston 2008), Uruguay (Buquet 
2001; Morgenstern 2004), and Venezuela (Martz 1999). In contrast to this growing literature on 
national politicians’ ambitions, comparative research using subnational elected offices as unit of 
analysis is noticeably absent.176
With regards to Argentina, analysts have shown that a party-centered structure of 
incentives makes long-lasting legislative careers in the Chamber of Deputies extremely rare 
(Jones 1997). The fundamental idea is that having the upper hand in the politicians’ careers, 
provincial party bosses rotate incumbent legislators to reduce their visibility and avoid potential 
challenges from popular politicians. Using data from congressional delegations between 1983 
and 1997, Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi (2002) find that the probability of keeping a seat 
 Part of the reason for this lacuna is that any credible work on the 
matter requires a considerable amount of data, which are hard to obtain. Like prior research on 
presidentialism, legislative studies in the region are still dominated by a “nation bias” that limits 
our understanding of the whole structure of incentives shaping politicians’ office goals and their 
consequent behavioral patterns. The lack of systematic analyses on this issue is particularly 
surprising in the case of Argentina and Brazil where, as several authors have noticed, politicians’ 
future is a game played and defined at the subnational level. 
                                                 
176 There are some isolated works on gubernatorial candidate selection in Mexico (Smith 1979; Langston and Diaz-
Cayeros 2005), Argentina (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2006), and Brazil (Power and Mochel 2008).  
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in the Argentine Congress decreases with the passage of time and increases if the incumbent has 
had a leadership position in the chamber. In the same line, Jones (2001) presents evidence 
suggesting that the majority of the national deputies continued a career path linked to their 
respective parties, while an important number return home to occupy a political post in their 
provinces. The author’s analysis of the position held by PJ and UCR members of the 1991 
legislative class indicates that 85 percent of these legislators occupied a (nominated or elective) 
political post after leaving office, while 44 percent of them held a position at the provincial level.  
Scholarly understanding of the factors shaping Brazilian federal deputies’ careers initially 
highlighted the centrality of particularistic politics. It was argued that pressures coming from the 
electoral system stimulate PR candidates to build their personal reputation by concentrating or 
scattering their campaign efforts among specific localities (Ames 2001). Distributing pork-barrel 
benefits to their cohorts was a central determinant of their electoral success (Ames 1995b).  This 
view was contested by a group of analysts who argued that only a minuscule portion of the 
federal budget is spent on pork-barreling (Figueiredo and Limongi 2005; Samuels 2000), and 
that programmatic issues (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999) and the Chamber of Deputies’ internal 
rules (Pereira and Renno 2003; Leoni, Pereira and Renno 2004) also appear to play a decisive 
role in structuring politicians’ career decisions and prospects of success. In a recent piece, Botero 
and Renno (2007) move the discussion a step further by incorporating some non-institutional 
factors in comparing the career paths of national legislators in Brazil’s and Colombia’s “hybrid” 
electoral systems. The authors report that in both countries legislative fragmentation, legislative 
performance, and congressional rules increase incumbents’ likelihood of running for reelection, 
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while their chances of winning office decrease significantly in competitive electoral markets and 
increase –although with different magnitudes- for members of traditional parties.  
Yet in what constitutes the most elaborated study on political careerism in Brazil, 
Samuels (2003) demystifies the discussion a bit by arguing that Brazilian federal deputies –in 
contrast to their American counterparts- are not primarily motivated by the desire of winning 
repeated reelection. Although many deputies do run for reelection, the author claims that that 
they do not aim to build long-term careers in the chamber. Instead, congressional legislators 
conceive it as a stepping-stone to other (executive and ministerial) positions at the state and 
municipal levels. The payoff structure of elected offices and the competitive nature of legislative 
elections make extra-legislative careers more attractive to ambitious politicians. This particular 
form of progressive ambition, in which federal deputies prefer to “descend” to a state or 
municipal executive post, weakens legislative institutions by discouraging deputies’ involvement 
in the decision-making process, making standing committees unappealing as instruments of 
retention, and keeping politicians focused on local and particularistic policies. The career 
tendencies documented by Samuels for the 1945-1998 period were recently confirmed by Santos 
and Pegurier (2004) for a longer time frame. These scholars, however, convincingly reassess 
Samuels’ core argument by emphasizing that serving in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is a 
strong incentive for politicians wishing to consolidate their local bases of support. A successful 
return to their home states or municipalities, in other words, hinges on prominent activities in the 
national chamber.  
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4.2.1 A Typology of Political Careers in Federalized Systems 
Arguably, a “career” –whether in politics or anything else- entails long term trends of at least 
two decades or so. Given data availability, however, I do not analyze long-term sequences of 
movements across different positions through time but rather single, discrete movements. I then 
simplify the choice process because careers rarely involve one-shot, unidirectional movements. 
In addition, there is a lively debate in the literature as to how offices are arranged, and to whether 
they are ordered into a stable hierarchical ladder or they shift more fluidly (Canon 1990; Francis 
y Kenny 2000; Schlesinger 1966, 1991). Of course, without direct information on politicians’ 
office goals one cannot provide a definite answer to these issues.  
Based on aggregate-level data, I assume that the value associated with each position 
depends on the political opportunity structure available to rationally minded politicians (Black 
1972; Rohde 1979; Samuels 2003). That is, politicians rank positions after evaluating the relative 
benefits derived from each office (salary, appointments, budget, additional privileges such as air 
tickets, electoral vulnerability, capacity of political influence, term limits, and prospects to move 
upward in the hierarchy of positions), the relative costs of holding each office (campaign 
spending, level of public accountability and exposition), and the probability of winning each 
office (number of positions available, form of election, and electoral risk). In short, my stated 
assumption is that politicians chose to compete (or accept to be appointed) for the best job 
available, given both the benefits and constraints associated with that office. This means that I 
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infer career ambitions from the positions that politicians actually sought to win. Certainly, this is 
an impure measure because one cannot infer pure preferences from observable choices.177
The subnational structure of political careers discussed below draws upon prior academic 
contributions and observations derived from my personal interviews. Although it holds a great 
deal of factors constant, the study I proposed here constitutes a sensible –and the first that I 
know- “snapshot” of the logic underlying territorial power-building across and within states of 
different federations.  
  
There is a multiplicity of ways by which ambitious politicians can seek government 
office and build their professional careers in federalized systems. The great number of available 
(both elective and appointive) positions and the possibility of accumulation bring about career 
paths with a considerable degree of mobility. To simplify, I contend that politicians in multi-
tiered regimes can structure their careers across two territorial dimensions. They can direct their 
future towards holding positions at the same level (national, state, or municipal) of government. 
This is the horizontal dimension of political careerism. Politicians can instead build their careers 
by moving across positions held at different levels of government. This is the vertical dimension 
of political careerism. In addition, politicians can be motivated by two modalities of careerism 
each with involving a unique electoral connection: progressive and static ambition (Schlesinger 
                                                 
177 It is then impossible for me to know which position politicians actually wanted. It may be the case, for example, 
that a state legislator desired to become a governor in the next term but chose to compete for reelection knowing that 
her/his chance to win the governorship was low. 
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1966).178
 
 Politicians who are progressively ambitious seek to gain higher office, while statically 
ambitious politicians attempt to retain their current position as a long-term career. As Figure 15 
illustrates, the cross tabulation of these two distinctions produces four ideal types of political 
careers in federalized systems: horizontal-progressive (HP), horizontal-static (HS), vertical-
progressive (VP), and vertical-static (VS).  
Federalism 
Ambition 
Horizontal Vertical 
 
Static 
Subnational: GO / MY / SD / CO  
National: PR / ND / NS 
  
? 
 
 
Progressive 
Subnational: ANY  GO   
                      SD  GO 
                      SD  MY 
 National: ANY  PR 
               ND    NS 
Subnational: ANY PR   
                      MY  ND / NS 
                      PD  ND / NS 
 National: ND  MY (Samuels 
2003) 
Notes: GO (Governor), MY (Mayor), SD (State Deputy), CO (Municipal Council), PR (President), ND (National 
Deputy), NS (National Senator). Career movements in bold and italics are treated in the text.  
 
Figure 15: The Structure of Career Ambition in Federalized Systems 
 
                                                 
178 Schlesinger (1966) mentions a third form of ambition, “discrete” ambition, in which the goal is to return to 
private life after limited service. I exclude this modality from the analysis because politicians who hold discrete 
ambition lack a clear electoral motivation for behavior.  
210 
 
 
 
I define HS ambition as career choices in which incumbents harbor to stay two or more 
additional terms in their current post. HP ambition, in contrast, refers to career choices oriented 
toward higher offices held at the same level of government. Some obvious examples include 
movements from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate, from any of these two positions to the 
presidency, and from the state legislature to the governorship. More debatable is whether a state 
(or national) legislative seat has hierarchic priority over governing a municipality. According to 
Samuels’ (2003) political career ladder in Brazil, the position of mayor of a large municipality 
provides greater payoffs than does the position of federal (and state) deputy. Yet there is no rank 
order between the political value of a legislative seat and the value of ruling one of the thousands 
small and insolvent Brazilian municípios. Many politicians I interviewed suggested that the state 
assembly is more valuable than a politically and financially unexpressive mayoralty post, which 
limits politicians’ ability to expand their influence and, in doing so, threatens their future career. 
In order to evaluate whether state deputies seek to obtain a municipal executive post or mayors 
attempt to reach a state legislative seat, the analysis below considers career ambition movements 
in both directions.  
At the vertical axis of federalism, VP ambition prompts instrumentally rational politicians 
through higher posts held at different levels of government.179
                                                 
179 Note that the VS type of career ambition located at the upper-right corner of Figure 3.1 is a theoretical construct 
with no empirical reference, because “verticality” by definition implies some kind of integrated movements across 
both offices and levels of government. Thus, VS looks the same as HS if a politician wants to remain where s/he is. 
 Some examples include 
movements from mayor to governor and from governor to president. A much less obvious 
example is the movement from the state legislature to the Chamber of Deputies. Especially in the 
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small Argentine provinces, moving from the provincial to the national legislature can be a 
political punishment rather than a reward. As an experienced former legislator of Formosa who 
occupied both positions expressed: “There is an old adage here: who goes to the national-level 
losses his power in the province…becomes a political dead. We called the Chamber of Deputies 
[and the Senate] the elephants’ cemetery. If you go there, someone else occupies your space 
here, where the real businesses are done.”180 In the same token, a well-known Peronist leader 
from the same province related: “The governor asked me to go to the national Congress because 
I had too much power here…Who is in charge of the provincial party organization thinks: ‘I’ll 
send this guy to the Chamber of Deputies, to the elephants’ cemetery, to do whatever he wants 
there’. And you cannot refuse to go, you don’t have arguments; if you say ‘I don’t go’, the only 
option you have is to challenge the governor. Now you go, and if you are an active and working 
person, you have to stay in Buenos Aires. I came back to Formosa every 15 days. But that’s too 
much time to stay out of here. Your power in the province simply banished.”181
                                                 
180 Interview with Aníbal Hardy. Formosa, April 6, 2006. 
 One ex-
councilor and three-times provincial deputy from the Chaco province suggested that the 
hierarchal order between national and subnational legislative positions actually depends on who 
governs the province: “If you are in the opposition, it is preferable to be national deputy because 
you receive voters’ demands but cannot solve anything here as you lack influence and attention 
from the government. If you belong to the governor’s party, it is preferable to be provincial 
deputy. You also receive voters’ demands but you have some capacity to respond…and if you 
181 Interview with Ramón Gimenez. Formosa, April 9-10, 2006.  
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are lucky, you can make some progress in your career…If you have to leave [be a national 
deputy] it is preferable to belong to the presidential party, although that is less important because 
you can always do little there.”182
Moving up to the Chamber of Deputies can even be a reclusion punishment for important 
political figures in the province. A former mayor, current UCR senator, and rival of presidents 
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in the province of Santa Cruz, explained: “That happened twice in 
my province. When the vice-governor Eduardo Arnold began to annoy politically, the governor 
Néstor Kirchner sent him to the Chamber of Deputies. Bye, that’s it, he killed Arnold. Years 
later, when the vice-governor Sergio Acevedo began to increase a bit his political influence in 
the province, Kirchner also nominated him to head the list of national deputies.”
  
183
Brazilian federal deputies also underlie the relative political inefficacy of the Chamber of 
Deputies. In some cases, they even claim that serving in Brasília drew them away from their 
electoral basses (Samuels 2003: 18). However, politicians from all state delegations agreed that 
the position of federal deputy offers a higher attraction in terms of resources, political influence, 
and career prospects than a state assembly seat. Without attempting to solve the discussion as to 
whether national or subnational legislative positions have a higher political status, and for the 
  
                                                 
182 Interview with Rodolfo García. Resistencia, November 27, 2006. Asked about this interpretation, a national 
deputy from Chaco emphasized: “It is possible that things work in that direction. The point is that I cannot lobby for 
the province in Buenos Aires. Of course, I try to solve concrete problems… But the point is that no one pays 
attention to you here. Each day I call the ministries and secretaries to make appointments. And they never answer 
me. It’s a drama. We do not exist.” Interview with Rodolfo Fabris. Buenos Aires, November 22, 2006. 
183 Interview with Alfredo Martínez. Buenos Aires, November 22, 2005. 
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exclusive purpose of the exercise at hand, I consider a seat in the state assembly at a lower value 
relative to a seat in the Chamber.  
Drawing upon this typology, I compare the structure of state legislators’ political careers 
in Argentina and Brazil. The universe of analysis consists of all legislators (substitutes excluded) 
who were elected in the 1983-2007 and 1982-2006 periods respectively.184
 
 For Argentina, I 
compiled unpublished data from each provincial legislature, and from original party ballots as 
shown in Figure 16 archived at the National Electoral Chamber. Missing data are only a problem 
for the provinces of La Rioja (1983-1995), and Santiago del Estero (1989-1993). For Brazil, I 
used data generated by the Laboratorio de Estudos Experimentais (LEEX) and the TSE 
completed with unpublished data provided by the state legislatures to cover the period prior to 
1994. 
                                                 
184 The decision to exclude substitutes may deflate the rates of running and winning (re)election because the total 
number of deputies includes those individuals who, for whatever reason, had left the assembly and were not eligible 
to run for elected office.        
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Figure 16: Party Strip Ballot, 1995 Elections. Province of Chubut 
 
I began the descriptive analysis by exploring the HS career ambition. I then analyze the 
HP ambition by tracing state legislators’ career movements to gubernatorial and mayoralty 
offices. The former analysis is done by relying on two original datasets that cover novel 
information about all governors popularly elected in Argentina (1987-2007) and Brazil (1986-
2006). The passage from the state assembly to the local executive is conducted by using electoral 
data on six municipal contests in Argentina (1987-2007) and three in Brazil (1996-2004). I 
finally examine the VP career ambition by documenting state legislators’ mobility from the state 
legislatures to the Chamber of Deputies. As expected, the evidence reveals substantial 
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differences between both countries in the three types of career pathways analyzed. But it also 
uncovers significant subnational variation within both federations that cannot be exclusively 
attributed to the electoral system and party nomination rules. 
4.2.1.1 Horizontal-Static Subnational Ambition 
The two most important indicators of political careerism, the rates of running and winning 
reelection, indicate that Argentine provincial deputies do not build a long-term legislative career 
while their Brazilian counterparts direct a good deal of energies toward ensuring repeated 
reelection. In this sense, the patterns of static legislative careerism observed for state legislators 
in both countries are surprisingly similar to those observed by prior studies for federal deputies. 
It is enough to highlight here that the running and reelection rates of state and national deputies 
belonging to the same subnational unit may exhibit different levels of congruency. I computed a 
congruence index to determine whether national and subnational patterns of HS legislative 
careerism diverge or converge across states. The index considers the absolute difference between 
reelection rates for both positions in each state in each electoral year. A value of 0 indicates 
perfect congruence and a value of 1 denotes perfect incongruence. In Argentina, congruency for 
reelection averages .19 ranging from .08 in Buenos Aires to .37 in San Luis.185
                                                 
185 Data constraints preclude estimation of the congruency index for reelection running. 
 In Brazil, the 
running and reelection congruency indexes average .13 and .15 respectively, ranging from .05 in 
Maranhão to .24 in Sergipe, and from .06 in Pernambuco to .34 in Rôndonia. 
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Although there are practically no restrictions to immediate reelection, provincial 
legislative careers in Argentina are a rarity.186
First, we find political leaders from relatively small or even inexistent parties at the 
national level which congregate a reasonable quota of electoral support in some provinces or a 
single province. Some examples include Demetrio Alume (MID-San Luis), Carlos Favario 
(PDP-Santa Fe), and Carlos Lomónaco (ByP-Chaco). Second, we observe the presence of 
powerful regional caciques with ability to mobilize local clienteles and nominate members of 
their family nucleuses for occupying political posts. Examples include the Peronists Víctor 
Fernandez from Formosa’s Western region, Carlos Fuertes from Entre Ríos’ central area, Isidoro 
Laso from the Buenos Aires’ locality of Bolívar, and Mario Magisteri from Mendoza.
 Indeed, of the 6,645 incumbent legislators 
included in my dataset, 83.4 percent served only one consecutive term, 13.5 percent served two 
terms, 2.4 percent served three terms, and less than 1 percent served four or more consecutive 
terms. Between 1983 and 2007, there was only one provincial deputy, local boss Osvaldo 
Mercuri (PJ-Buenos Aires), who served continuously in the legislature. Different types of 
subnational legislators served during four (32 cases) and five (7 cases) consecutives terms.  
187
                                                 
186 Executive careers, in contrast, show relatively high running and reelection rates. As Chapter 1 discussed in 
greater detail, about 66 percent of the incumbent governors eligible for reelection (including the vice-governors who 
occupied the governorship for at least six consecutive months) run for a new mandate. Of those, about 83 percent 
won. The reelection rate in mayoralty contests in the 1987-2007period is nearly 62 percent.   
 Third, 
we also find professional politicians who developed a long party career such as the Peronist Julio 
Sotelo (Chaco), the radical Raúl García Goyena (Jujuy), and the socialist Alejandro Rébola 
187 Fernández’ cousin was provincial deputy; Fuertes’ son, as his father, was mayor of Villaguay and provincial 
deputy; Magisteri’s cousin was provincial senator and Secretary of Government, while his brother was instruction 
judge; Laso’s wife was Director of the Human Development Ministry. 
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(Santa Fe). The last category of provincial deputies with a prolonged legislative career includes a 
group of individuals who respond to a political godfather with personal influence upon local 
politicians and party allies. In general, these provincial deputies lack a prior political career and 
are nominated for his loyalty rather than for their blood relations. A typical example is José 
Mirabille, political cadre of former governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis). In 2001, after 
serving several periods in the provincial legislature, Mirabille was nominated federal deputy to 
coordinate Rodríguez Saá’s presidential campaign. Some years later, he came back at the 
provincial senate. According to some interviewees who preferred to remain in the anonymity, 
Mirabilles’ nomination responded to Rodríguez Saá’s necessity of counterbalancing the political 
power acquired by his personal successor –and brother, Alberto- in the governorship.  
Brevity of Argentina’s subnational legislative careers may result from the fact that 
incumbent legislators do not seek reelection but decide to quite electoral politics or to run for 
other elective posts. Unfortunately, I am unable to test this hypothesis because official records on 
voluntary retirements from politics do not exist. Alternatively, brevity may stem from voters’ 
decisions to punish incumbent deputies once they have gained their regional party renomination. 
I gathered data on renomination for about 50 percent of all provincial legislative races held 
between 1987 and 2007 and found no support for the “throwing the rascals out” hypothesis.188
                                                 
188 For some provinces and years, data on candidacies to provincial deputy were provided by Alberto Forigh. The 
information I collected only includes those sitting legislators who desired and obtained their renomination. The 
number of those who actually wanted renomination is higher but impossible to accurately measure as it requires 
identifying all incumbents who competed in, but lost, a primary election. 
 
Only an average of 20 percent of the incumbent legislators was successfully renominated by their 
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parties, but 95 percent of them achieved reelection. Thus, provincial incumbents who obtain 
renomination typically are strong candidates receiving a high placement on their party closed 
lists. This finding points to intra-party competition to obtain a spot on the ballot as a major 
impediment for the fulfillment of legislative static ambition in the Argentine provinces. In other 
words, the reason why legislative turnover is so high is precisely because provincial party bosses 
control incumbents’ future and use regional legislatures to run their party machines.   
The Figure 17 provides additional information on the nature of subnational legislative 
careers in Argentina by displaying the evolution in the percentage of incumbent provincial 
legislators who obtained reelection between 1985 and 2007. The average reelection rate is only 
20.3 percent, ranging from a low of 14.8 percent in 1987 to a high of 27.2 percent in 2007.189
                                                 
189 The average reelection rate for the Chamber of Deputies in the same period is notoriously similar: 20.6 percent. 
 
After experiencing a considerable decrease at the beginning of the period, the reelection rate 
shows a slight increment in the eighties, a minor decrease in the nineties, and an irregular upward 
trend since then with peaks in the presidential election years. Also interesting to note is the 
marginal percentage of legislators (average of 5 percent) who returned to the provincial 
legislature at some point of their careers. If the link between party renomination and high 
reelection rate mentioned in the previous paragraph is correct, such exceptionally low rates of 
legislative careerism and return suggest that provincial legislatures constitute a home base only 
for a small fraction of politicians. For provincial party bosses, in contrast, this institution 
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constitutes a component of the large portfolio of payments they use to reward second- and third-
tier politicians, payback resolute militants, and strengthen their power within the organization. 
 
 
Figure 17: State Deputies’ Reelection and Returning Rates. Argentina, 1985-2007 
 
This interpretation resembles Jones’ (2001) hypothesis of rotation in the Argentine 
Chamber of Deputies. My explanation, however, differs from that account in a central aspect. It 
is not that subnational party bosses rotate provincial legislators to reduce their visibility and 
weaken their capacity to challenge the regional party leadership. Actually, as we will see below, 
most politicians who occupy a seat in the provincial legislatures are party cadres with low 
socialization in elective positions, little personal expressiveness in the electorate, and low 
capacity to manage significant economic resources. Legislative rotation at the subnational level 
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is related to the redistributive logic of providing selective incentives to reinforce party (factional) 
loyalties, foster political activism, encourage competition among members of the organization, 
and preserve the control of political structures in the party. In the words of a two-times Peronist 
governor: “Everyone in the party has the chance of occupying a [legislative] seat here, and you, 
as a leader, have to promote that; if not, people go somewhere else to find that chance.”190 Or, as 
explained by the president of Chaco’s provincial legislature: “Party leaders rotate us to foster 
competition but also to avoid being criticized…Everybody here aspires to a political position… 
there are ten positions and one hundred and fifty aspirants..”191
For many Brazilian politicians, in contrast, the state assembly represents a decisive stage 
in their careers as suggested by the comparatively high running and reelection rates. According 
to my dataset, less than 40 percent of the incumbent legislators in the 1986-2006 period were 
“freshmen” while close to one-fourth served at least during three consecutive terms. To some 
 In many Argentine provinces, 
politics is a business. And in some provinces, it is the only business. From the perspective of 
most provincial deputies who act as loyal militants in the periphery of the party inner circle, 
obtaining a seat in the legislature grants them a relatively well-paid salary, a small cash till (caja) 
to do local politics, an opened door to receive future party rewards, and a privileged retirement 
(jubilación de privilegio) to enjoy at the end of their political careers.  
                                                 
190 Interview with Vicente Joga. Formosa, April 10, 2006. 
191 Interview with Carlos Urlich. Resistencia, November 27, 2006. In a meeting in which the provincial leadership 
was deciding on list nominations, the UCR leader, former governor, and candidate to return to the governorship, 
Angel Rozas, claimed: “This is the last time I build the lists. I’m gaining a few friends and a lot of enemies”. 
Interview with José Wajfeld. Resistencia, December 4, 2006. Unexpectedly, Rozas lost the election against the PJ 
candidate Jorge Capitanich.  
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extent, political attractiveness for this office is higher in Brazil because there are more 
institutional opportunities that legislators can use to cater particularistic benefits to their backers, 
and to discuss local policies.192 First, unlike their Argentine counterparts, Brazilian state 
legislators are legally entitled to make individual appropriations to budgetary investment 
categories establishing where and how money should be reassigned. Although the governor is 
not required to allocate these appropriations, having the authority to assign any percentage 
between 0 and 100, such a constitutional provision allows state deputies to discuss and get 
involved in public work contracts. Second, as we have seen, Brazil’s fiscal federalism and 
campaign finance laws enable state deputies to have a say regarding the geographic allocation of 
some federal transfers to the municipalities. These legal mechanisms are absent in Argentina, 
where federal grants and special loans flow directly to the provincial governments which in turn 
reallocate them across municipal units. Furthermore, the structure of regional political 
competition in Brazil impedes state governors to count on stable legislative majorities thus 
limiting their unilateral actions and fostering higher levels of legislative activity.193
                                                 
192 In Argentina, as a provincial deputy and former Minister of Production linked to the agricultural sector in the 
Chaco province explained, “…being provincial legislator does not allow you to develop as a politician nor to 
respond to the compromises you assumed with those who supported you. I prefer an executive position because it 
allows you to do things. You can do little or nothing for my sector from here [the provincial legislature].” Interview 
with Oscar Dudik. Resistencia, November 29, 2006. One of the local leaders of the PJ in the same province stated: 
“The provincial legislature functions with simple majority, unless they [the government] want a credit. In that case, 
they need two-thirds of the votes in the chamber…When do they need us? Almost never. Actually, we do not exist 
[estamos pintados] because they have the number required to session.” Interview with Rodolfo García. Resistencia, 
November 27, 2006.   
  
193 Since the return of democracy, two-thirds of the Brazilian governors have ruled a divided government while 70 
percent of the Argentine ones have had party control of the provincial legislatures. This is not to say, however, that 
Brazilian state assemblies condition regional political dynamics. Indeed, scholars have shown that in several states 
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The Figure 18 displays running, wining, and turnover (composed of both voluntary 
retirements and electoral defeats) rates for Brazilian state legislators between 1986 and 2006. It 
is first important to observe that incumbents have sought and obtained reelection at high and 
increasing rates. Indeed, these values almost triple those identified for the Argentine provinces. 
After a minor decline in 1990, partially explained by the decision of several state deputies to 
compete for municipal executive office, the running rate increased in each election. The median 
percentage of state legislators seeking a new mandate is 68.3 percent, fluctuating between 54.6 
percent in 1990 to 75.6 percent in 2006. The reelection rate has also remained considerably high: 
an average of 61.8 percent of the incumbents seeking reelection managed to keep their seats.194
                                                                                                                                                             
governors dominate the legislative agenda (Abrucio 1998, 2001; Petersem 2001) and the budgetary process 
(Schneider 2001; Desposato 2001; Pereira 2001).    
 
A second interesting aspect to mention is the fact that both reelection bids and incumbency 
advantage increased continuously since 1998. This pattern seems to indicate that the elimination 
of the candidato nato rule had little impact upon the dynamics of subnational legislative 
careerism in the country. Finally, turnover rates have also exhibited a relative stable pattern 
averaging 57.5 percent in the whole period. Although a turnover rate of that level may appear to 
contradict the motivational assumption of reelection, roughly two-thirds of the subnational 
incumbent legislators seek an immediate return to the state assembly. This number is a crude 
indicator of the importance that regional assemblies have in the structure of Brazilian political 
careerism.  
194 These numbers are notably similar to those observed for the Chamber of Deputies, where running and winning 
rates averaged 67.7 and 59.4 percent respectively.   
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Note: Reelection rate is computed as percentage of runners. Turnover includes both voluntary retirements and 
electoral defeats. 
 
Figure 18: State Deputies’ Running, Reelection, and Turnover Rates. Brazil, 1986-2007 
 
Having established that the HS legislative ambition plays a different role for Argentine 
and Brazilian politicians, the central question becomes how greatly it diverges across regions 
within each federation. The Figures 19 to 21 display the countries’ averaged running and 
reelection rates (solid lines) for subnational legislative office against each state’s averaged value. 
As we can see, there is significant intra-national variation in both countries with most cases not 
converging around the averaged national values. In Argentina, the variance ranges from 12 
percent in the impoverished and traditionally Peronist province of Santiago del Estero to 30.3 
percent in the also Peronist but richer province of San Luis. In Brazil, running rates fluctuate 
from a minimum of 51 percent in Goiás to a maximum of 85.2 percent in Amapá. Reelection 
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rates exhibit a range of 47 percent in Espírito Santo to almost 72 percent in Bahia. We have 
already mentioned that most candidates to provincial legislative reelection in Argentina are 
electorally successful. It is now worth noting that there is practically no correlation between 
seeking and winning reelection across Brazil states (Pearson’s r .293). Thus, the reasons why 
incumbent state legislators are more or less successful in some Brazilian territorial subunits than 
in others are not directly related to how many of them attempt to win repeated reelection.   
 
 
Figure 19: Averaged Reelection Rates and National Media. Argentina, 1985-2006 
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Figure 20: Averaged Running Rates and National Media. Brazil, 1986-2006 
 
 
Figure 21: Averaged Reelection Rates and National Media. Brazil, 1986-2006 
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On the basis of the descriptive evidence presented above, institutional theories seem to 
offer little insights to explain the source of intra-national variance in the patterns of HS 
subnational careerism in Argentina and Brazil. First, identical electoral institutions do not 
channel state legislators in Brazil toward a particular form of career ambition. Neither do they 
affect the chances of state legislative reelection in a distinctive fashion. Even legislative elites of 
territorial subunits with similar socio-demographic features, such as the newly created and 
impoverished Northern states of Amapá, Roraima and Rôndonia, or the rich Southern states of 
Santa Catarina and Paraná, exhibit different levels of HS ambition. Second, nearly identical 
electoral rules coexist with different HS career paths in some Argentine provinces. For example, 
Chaco and Corrientes historically used a PR D’Hondt system of single district.195
                                                 
195 The difference between both regimes is that Chaco left to use a 3 percent barer in 1995 while Corrientes 
preserved it. 
 Nonetheless, 
Chaco is among the provinces with high reelection rates while Corrientes exhibits one of the less 
stable provincial legislative elites. Third, in some other Argentine provinces, different 
subnational electoral regimes produce similar results. Take for example the cases of San Luis, La 
Rioja, La Pampa, Formosa, and Jujuy. All these provinces are located at the upper right side 
corner of Figure 19 averaging the highest reelection rates. The first three of them have used the 
Ley de Lemas from the mid-eighties and early nineties. But Formosa and Jujuy have employed 
single-member districts with low district magnitudes, while La Rioja maintains multimember 
districts that favor the representation of rural areas against the more competitive provincial 
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capital.196 La Pampa and San Luis, on the other hand, never used the Ley de Lemas. Instead, they 
utilize similar PR formulas (D’Hont with an electoral threshold of 3 percent) with similar district 
magnitudes (average of 22 and 24 respectively). Yet whereas La Pampa employs a single district, 
San Luis uses multimember districts with different magnitudes.197
4.2.1.2 Horizontal-Progressive Subnational Ambition 
 Fourth, although electoral 
systems do not vary across Brazilian states, intra-national variation is wider in Brazil than in 
Argentina: standard deviations of 6.9 and 5 respectively. Fifth, I estimated a series of models 
with the appropriate corrections to empirically test the impact of different subnational electoral 
arrangements, district magnitude, and the interaction of both upon running and reelection rates in 
Argentina. Results, which are available upon request, were often statistically insignificant.   
I provide empirical evidence of state legislators’ HP ambition by tracing their movements toward 
both gubernatorial and mayoralty positions. The data reveal profound differences in the 
horizontal career pathways of state legislators in both federations. A considerable number of 
Brazilian state deputies use the regional assembly as a springboard to reach horizontally higher 
positions. But only a small fraction of their Argentine counterparts seek to climb to provincial or 
municipal executive office.  
                                                 
196 Formosa does not establish a barrier clause. In Jujuy, the Ley de Lemas works with a 5 percent barrier for lemas 
and 10 percent of the lema vote for the sublemas. La Rioja abandoned a system that reserved two deputies for parties 
without departmental representation and a minimum of 2 percent of the electors’ vote, and incorporated the D’Hont 
formula with a barrier of 3 percent.  
197 The district magnitude of different departments varies from 2 to 10. San Luis incorporated a 3 percent barer in 
1999. 
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State governors in the countries under study scarcely reach the governorship without 
some kind of prior political experience.198 Although governors arrive from multiple posts, that of 
state deputy has been a more common launching pad in Brazil than in Argentina. The Table 1 
illustrates this tendency by displaying information on the previous political positions held by 110 
Argentine and 180 Brazilian politicians who occupied the statehouse between 1983-2007 and 
1982-2006 respectively.199
 
 Nine different positions are included thus covering the gamut of posts 
held by these regional officials prior to taking gubernatorial office. The table also distinguishes 
between political positions held immediately before an incoming governor assumes office and 
those held at some point of his/her prior political career.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 Notable exceptions are Argentine businessman Jorge Escobar (PJ-San Juán), F-1 car racer Carlos Reutemann (PJ-
Santa Fe), and popular singer Ramón Ortega (PJ-Tucumán). Brazilian amateur governors include businessmen 
Onofre Quinan (PMDB-Goiás), Blairo Maggi (PPS-Mato Grosso), Cícero Lucena (PMDB-Paraíba), and Tasso 
Jereissati (PSDB-Ceará), and popular singer Carlos Santos (PMDB-Pará). 
199 I exclude from the analysis amateur governors, and vice-governors (12 in Argentina and 6 in Brazil) who either 
occupied the governorship for less than six months or were not serious candidates for any elected office. Incumbent 
governors who were reelected (48 in Argentina and 39 in Brazil) are counted only once.  
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Table 1: Career Experience of Argentine and Brazilian Governors, 1982-2007 
  
Argentina 
 
Immediately              Some Point 
Before                          Prior 
 
Brazil 
 
Immediately                Some Point 
Before                           Prior 
 
President and Vice President 
 
        
      1.8                                 0  
  
         0                                    0  
 
Governor and Vice Governor 
 
       
      n.c                              15.4                      
       
        n.c.                               17.2                      
 
Municipal Mayor 
 
      
     10.1                             17.4 
         
       22.2                               32.2 
 
Senator 
 
     
     19.2                              4.6 
       
        3.9                                 1.1 
 
Federal Deputy 
 
    
     14.6                             16.5 
     
        6.1                                 8.6 
 
State Legislator 
 
   
     10.1                             16.5  
   
        9.4                                41.1 
 
Municipal Council 
 
  
       0                                10.1 
 
          0                                  21.1 
 
Federal Bureaucracy 
 
 
      3.7                              11.8 
 
        3.9                                  2.8 
 
State Bureaucracy 
 
 
      14.7                            21.1    
 
        3.3                                74.4 
Note: n.c. (does not correspond). Source: Elaborated by the author. 
  
 
Approximately one-fourth (26.6 percent) of the Argentine governors had some previous 
experience as provincial legislator, and nearly 10 percent occupied a seat in the regional 
legislature immediately before winning the governorship. This latter figure represents the lowest 
value among the nine political positions analyzed in this chapter, with the obvious exception of 
230 
 
 
 
the presidency and federal bureaucracy nominations (i.e., minister, secretary, under-secretary, 
and national director). It is possible to argue that the 10 percent value is underestimated because 
it only captures the career paths of those provincial deputies who eventually became governors. 
In order to eliminate this potential selection bias, I collected data on all gubernatorial candidates 
who lost the election. The sample includes all gubernatorial candidates from a either a party, 
electoral coalition or sublema who were not elected (excluding the candidates who had already 
occupied the governorship for less than six consecutive months) and obtained at least 3 percent 
of the votes. The number of candidates is 332. Again, around 26 percent of them had prior 
provincial legislative experience and only 14 percent had in the subnational legislature their last 
(or current) position. In Brazil, by contrast, exactly a half of the governors had been elected state 
deputies during their careers. Indeed, behind the position of mayor (54.4 percent) and state 
bureaucrat (77.7 percent), state deputy is the most common post occupied by governors. If we 
include the vice-governors into the analysis, the state deputy category becomes second in 
importance. 
State legislators’ passage to the municipal executive position provides additional 
evidence to the argument advanced above that subnational legislatures do not serve as a stepping 
stone to higher office in Argentina but they occupy a prominent role in the opportunity structure 
of individual politicians in Brazil. On the one hand, although there are not systematic data on the 
subject, I detected that only 124 (2.5 percent) Argentine provincial deputies from the 1983-2005 
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classes won a mayoralty election after leaving office.200
 
 As Figure 22 shows, the proportion of 
legislators who governed a municipality never exceeded 3.5 percent of the provincial 
legislatures’ members in the time of the local election. Moreover, this rate has constantly 
decreased in the last years until it attained the minimal record of 1.8 percent in 2007.  
 
Note: PD (Provincial Deputy), MY (Mayor). 
Figure 22: Argentine Provincial Deputies’ Movement to Mayor and Vice-versa, 1987-2007 
 
 
For an important number of Brazilian state legislators, the legislature is a way station on 
their road to competing for executive power. Being the mayor of a populated city affords more 
power and prestige than being state deputy. This explains why of the 697 state deputies elected 
                                                 
200 Furthermore, only 46 (1.2 percent) mayors were provincial deputies during their political life. 
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between 1994 and 2002 (22.2 percent or more than one in five) run for mayor during or 
immediately after the end of their mandates.201 The Figure 23 depicts running and winning rates 
for state legislators of the 1994-2002 classes who participated as candidates in mayoralty races. 
The first relevant thing to notice is that, although a pronounced downward trend in the number of 
state legislators who stood for mayor, it continues to be relevant: 28.3 percent in 1998, 22.7 in 
2002, and 15.6 in 2006. The second important remark is that state legislators are relatively good 
candidates for municipal executive office as their winning rate (measured as percentage of 
runners) averaged 37 percent in the whole period. Considering that almost half of the municipal 
elections in Brazil are “closed” races in which the incumbent mayor has access to very 
significant perks to offer, state legislators appear to be strong candidates.202
 
  
                                                 
201 Of these 697, 258 (37 percent) managed to win election. In addition, 62 (5.8 percent) state deputies run for mayor 
at some point of their careers, and 21 of them (33.9 percent) were successful.  
202 This number is actually higher if we include the incumbent vice-majors who run for mayor. There are not data 
available on the issue for Argentina. 
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Source: LEEX and TSE. 
 
Figure 23: Brazilian State Deputies: Running and Reelection Rates in Mayoralty Elections, 1996-2004 
 
With the purpose of evaluating the political value of state assemblies vis-à-vis the value 
of mayoralties, I codified all cases in which a state deputy competed in an executive municipal 
election before assuming a seat in the chamber. For Argentina, the proportion of provincial 
deputies coming from a municipality is 6 percent. As we can see in Figure 22, in most electoral 
years the average of municipality-legislature movements more than triple movements in the 
opposite direction. Although this fact seems to indicate the superior hierarchic order of 
municipalities, it is worth noting that the vast majority of the mayors who moved “downward” to 
the provincial legislature came from small municipios with little or no financial autonomy. The 
pattern is substantially different in Brazil. There are 546 (17.3 percent) state deputies from the 
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1998-2006 classes who run for mayor. Of these, 62.2 percent (340 cases) did it immediately 
before assuming legislative office, and around 10 percent (32 cases) won the election. As stated 
but not demonstrated by Samuels (2003), these numbers reveal the higher political value of a 
municipal position over a legislative seat in the subnational structure of Brazil’s political careers.  
Once again subnational variation is higher across Brazilian than Argentine subnational 
units, despite electoral regimes do not vary in the former country. In effect, running rates for 
mayor range from a considerable 56.5 percent of the state deputies in Pará to a marginal 4.5 
percent in Roraima, two states located in the north region of the country noted for the traditional 
power of oligarchic politics. Winning rates as percentage of runners, on the other hand, fluctuate 
from 58.8 percent in Piauí to 16.7 in Mato Grosso. It is interesting to note that seven of the ten 
states with the lowest running rates for state legislative reelection are among the ten states with 
the highest running rates for mayoralty elections. The most striking case is Goiás, which ranks in 
the last and first positions of these categories respectively. As for Argentina, mobility rates from 
the provincial legislature to mayor range from 14.3 percent in Mendoza to 0 in Corrientes, 
province in which none provincial deputy ever jumped to govern a municipality.  
To sum up this subsection, despite there is large intra-national variation, career 
movements across positions located at the subnational and municipal levels of government are 
more intense in Brazil than in Argentina. State legislatures in the former –but not in the latter- 
country seem to be a lynchpin around which political careers are built. For most Argentine 
politicians, winning provincial legislative office is a transitory payback for their party (factional 
or personal) loyalty and resoluteness which need to be continuously cultivated if one wants to 
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survive politically. For Brazilian politicians, state assemblies represent an instrument to build 
local networks of political support that are functional to career advancement. The last evidence I 
present supporting the claim that state legislatures serve to run the party machine in Argentina 
and to build personal careers in Brazil maps the passage from this institution to the Chamber of 
Deputies.  
4.2.1.3 Vertical-Progressive Subnational Ambition  
In addition to horizontal career pathways, political ambitions in multi-tiered regimes can be 
structured along national-subnational linkages. Only three elective posts (presidency, deputy, and 
senator) are available for state deputies at the federal level. It is then reasonable to assume that 
politicians aiming at nationalizing their careers will see the Chamber of Deputies rather than the 
Senate as the immediate step in that direction. As shown in detail below, the intensity of these 
linkages is much higher in Brazil than in Argentina. 
The Figures 24 and 25 below illustrate the dynamics of such movements. The first of the 
two figures shows that in the twelve federal deputy elections held in Argentina between 1985 
and 2007, only 383 provincial legislators competed for obtaining a seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies. This number represents an average of only 6.4 percent. Of these runners, 175 (45.7 
percent) eventually won a congressional seat.203
                                                 
203 The number of candidates increases to 636 (5.3 percent) and the election rate decreased to 40.6 percent if we 
compute all cases in which a state legislator run for federal deputy at some point of his/her career (but not 
immediately after leaving the state assembly). In all cases, values are computed as the proportion of provincial 
deputies who run for a seat in the Chamber in a given election (say 1995) relative to the number of those eligible for 
 The Figure 24 also reveals that the running rate 
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displays an irregular upward trend ranging from 1.3 percent of the sitting provincial legislators in 
1983 to 5.3 percent in 2003. Trend irregularity is partially explained by the fact that national 
legislative elections in Argentina take place every two years while provincial legislative elections 
in many districts are held every four years. This electoral calendar, of course, discourages 
provincial deputies who are in the middle of their mandates to run for the Chamber.204
Brazilian state legislators, on the other hand, have more systematically tried to ascend to 
the position of federal deputy and have been more successful in reaching that goal. Figure 25 
shows that in the six elections held between 1986 and 2006, 667 state legislators run for a seat in 
the federal Chamber. This number corresponds to a media of 11 percent of all sitting subnational 
deputies.
 With 
regards to the winning rate, it is enough to highlight here that only an average of 1.5 percent of 
the provincial legislators successfully moved to the Chamber of Deputies in each electoral 
contest. These values speak by themselves: provincial legislatures do not seem to catapult the 
national ambition of their members. Quite the contrary, they represent a middling office that less 
successful politicians and ordinary party members are forced to leave with hopes that they may 
get in the future an elected or appointed nomination linked to their parties’ portfolio of jobs. 
205
                                                                                                                                                             
reelection (i.e. the provincial deputies who began their mandates in 1991 and 1993). Of course, it would be better to 
use the proportion of candidates relative to the number of provincial deputies who occupied a seat and did not run 
for reelection. These data, however, only exist in a very fragmented way for some provinces.  
 Of these 667 runners, 401 (60.1 percent) successfully managed to win office. The 
Figure also indicates that running and winning rates evolved in parallel trough time. A steady 
204 In effect, running rate averages 2.5 percent versus 4 percent in concurrent election years. 
205 If we exclude the state deputies who run for reelection, the running rate for the Chamber of Deputies boosts to 
33.8 percent. 
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upward path may be observed in the first Brazilian races following the transition to democracy. 
In 1994 and 1998 the pattern of recruitment to the Chamber of Deputies decreased substantially 
due to state legislators’ decision of focusing on their reelection: the rates of reelection bids 
increased around 40 percent in those years. In the last two legislative races, running and winning 
rates increased again (although they did not reach the levels observed in the initial period) 
probably as a result of state legislators’ decision of not standing for mayor (see Figure 23). 
 
Figure 24: Argentine Provincial Deputies: Running and Reelection Rates in Elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies, 1985-2007 
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Figure 25: Brazilian State Deputies: Running and Reelection Rates in Elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies, 1986-2006 
Like in the other two types of career ambitions studied in this chapter, we find a 
significant degree of subnational variation in the VP type that cannot be attributable to 
institutional or organizational factors. This variance is, again, larger in Brazil than in Argentina. 
In Argentina, running rates from state legislators to the Chamber of Deputies range from an 
average of 1.7 percent in Santa Cruz to 9.7 percent in the metropolitan province of Santa Fe, with 
the remaining provinces located near the national mean. The most successful provincial 
legislators are those from Corrientes (who never lost an election), and the less successful ones 
are those from Neuquén. In Brazil, the running rate varies from 2.1 percent in Amapá to 13.9 
percent in Sao Paulo. The most successful legislators (considering states in which at least one 
state legislator run for federal deputy in each election year) are from Alagoas with a winning rate 
of 81.6 percent, while the less successful ones are those from Acre with 38.6 percent. Although 
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we should take with caution conclusions based on descriptive data, one of the most interesting 
findings about legislative recruitment in Brazil is the presence of a clear regional pattern. All 
states with the lowest running rates for the Chamber of Deputies, except Paraná and Rio de 
Janeiro, are from the North and Northeast regions of the country. Similarly, all states with the 
highest running rates, except Bahía and Pernambuco, are from the South, Southeast, and Center 
regions. Thus, state elites from the poorer subunits tend to be locally-oriented and those from the 
more advanced regions tend to nationalize their careers. The exceptions certainly seem to 
confirm the rule. Politics in Paraná is recognized as localistic and its political elites seldom ever 
reached national expression (Ames 2001). Bahía and Pernambuco, on the other extreme, are 
among the most politicized states even before the inception of Brazilian federalism.           
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
Students of Argentina and Brazil disagree regarding many aspects of these federal politics. But 
there is an agreement that the base of political support for politicians and parties in both 
countries is concentrated at the subnational level. There is also a surprising dearth of parallel 
research agendas on state political careerism. This shortfall is serious given that any explanation 
of how national politics works must start by identifying patterns operating within the states.  
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The issues and data discussed in this chapter provided help explain how politicians and 
parties function, and how this functioning affects patterns of government spending with 
territorial-building goals. The chapter proposed a relation between political careerism and styles 
of electoral spending based on the nature of political actors’ control over candidacies, campaign 
finance and the public sector. Concretely, it argued that institutional (electoral) and 
organizational (party nomination) factors structure the electoral finance of politics in Argentina 
and Brazil by affecting the degree to which subnational party leaders control political and 
bureaucratic careerism. In Argentina, these factors make politicians beholden to provincial party 
bosses and their statewide patronage-based machines. In Brazil, they make politicians dependent 
upon individually-run machines founded on pork-barreling activities and localized benefits. The 
chapter illustrated this argument with novel data on subnational career ambitions that make it 
possible to understand the role played by state legislatures in the construction of territorial 
power. The analysis showed that Argentine provincial legislatures do not have a fundamental 
importance for individual politicians’ careers. Instead, they represent a component of the large 
basket of resources (i.e., jobs) that regional party leaders have to selectively distribute among 
party adherents in order to build and maintain elaborated machines. Brazilian state assemblies, in 
contrast, are attractive places to ambitious politicians who use them as a platform to organize 
loose networks of local political support.  
This chapter opens up two avenues for further research. Theoretically, I will specify more 
correctly the choice model. After all, the structure of political ambitions is more complex and 
dynamic that a series of discrete movements. Empirically, I will conduct a multivariate study 
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investigating the impact of regional political competition, electorate partisanship, and different 
types of gubernatorial machines upon state legislators’ career choices and success. This analysis 
will provide insights to understand under what conditions governors, influence individual voters. 
The next chapter moves in that direction by investigating cross-state variation in the way 
subnational particularism affects vote choice in Argentina and Brazil.  
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5.0  SUBNATIONAL PARTICULARISM AND ELECTORAL RETURNS  
“Money talks in politics.” 
V. O. Key 
 
“Politics is done with the power of pen.” 
  Political adagio206
. 
 
This chapter analyzes the electoral performance of state incumbent parties in Argentine and 
Brazilian gubernatorial elections during the post-authoritarian period. It focuses on the impact of 
particularistic strategies of electoral mobilization upon aggregate incumbent vote share. There is 
a long-lasting debate among social science researchers about how, if at all, distributive politics 
affects voters’ electoral calculus and the enduring creation of power machines. Political scientists 
have devoted a great deal of attention to analyzing the link between particularized benefits and 
electoral results across national institutions and actors.207
                                                 
206 Surprisingly, this adagio exists with almost no variation in both Spanish and Portuguese. Pens, of course, serve to 
sign checks and therefore to distribute money and favors. 
 Sociological and anthropological 
207 Much effort in the field has been dedicated to explore the relation between legislative pork-barreling and the 
ability of congressional legislators to retain office. For evidence of a positive connection, see for example Ames 
(1995a, 1995b, 2001), Ferejohn (1974), Fiorina (1977), Levitt and Snyder (1997), Mayhew (1974), and Weingast, 
Shepsle, and Johnson (1981). For evidence that questions the existence of such association, see for instance Bickers 
and Stein (1996), Samuels (2002), Sellers (1997), and Stein and Bickers (1994). There is also a rich cross-national 
literature on the relation between central government spending and national executives’ electoral success. See, for 
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studies have mostly investigated the logic of particularistic exchanges in small political settings 
of single countries.208
Conventional accounts for variations in regional election outcomes and incumbent 
political survival include sociological factors such as preexisting societal cleavages and local 
identities (Chandra 2004; De Winter and Türsan 1988; Hearl 1996; Jeffrey and Hough 2003; 
Rice and Van Cott 2006; Rokkan and Urvin 1982), institutional factors such as electoral rules 
(Calvo and Micozzi 2005; De Luca, Tula, and Jones 2006; Diaz Cayeros and Magaloni 2001; 
Moraski 2003; Stolt 2004), the sequencing of elections and presidential coattails effects (Alesina 
and Rosenthal 1989; Born 1990; Mebane and Sekhorn 2002; Van der Eijk 1987), economic 
factors stemming from national and/or subnational swings (see discussion below), and formal or 
informal political linkages between federal and state-level authorities (Bernick 1979; Dometrius 
1987; Gibson 2005; Key 1953; Mueller 1985; Snyder 1999). I contend that one important –and 
typically overlooked– factor affecting subnational vote choice and the survival of regional 
 But systematic efforts to examine these issues using geographic 
subdivisions (states) as units of analysis are virtually inexistent beyond the U.S. case. Indeed, no 
temporally-broad comparative study has yet uncovered the electoral returns and ultimate 
efficiency of particularistic politics for territorial power-building across states of different 
federalized countries.  
                                                                                                                                                             
example, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), Ames (1987), Brender and Drazen (2003), Persson and Tabellini 
(2002), Schuknecht (1994), and Shi and Svensson (2000). 
208 With regards to the countries studied in this dissertation, the few often-cited essays on the topic are Auyero 
(2000), Diniz (1982), Gay (1994), and Lamounier (1978). 
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political elites is the strategic manipulation of government resources that comes from controlling 
the state apparatus. 
Chapters 2 to 4 showed that the institutions of fiscal federalism and political careerism 
shape the incentives that state governors in both Argentina and Brazil have to strategically target 
public expenditures with electoral goals. Specifically, the chapters discussed the argument that 
incentives for spending on patronage (private or public employment) allocations are stronger for 
Argentine governors because fiscal institutions concentrate access to intergovernmental transfers 
in gubernatorial hands and assign provincial executives high spending authority to discretionarily 
use such funds, while the electoral system and party nomination/selection rules maximize 
provincial party leadership control over political careers. Furthermore, permissive federal 
legislation regarding subnational spending and borrowing and the lack of stable civil service 
rules reinforce governors’ proclivity towards patronage by allowing subnational leaders to 
manage hiring and firing in the public sector without major restrictions. In stark contrast, 
Brazilian governors have stronger institutional incentives for pork-barrel (semi-public or 
infrastructure/capital projects) allocations because fiscal institutions disperse access over federal 
transfer funds among multiple political actors located at different levels of government (in 
particular, governors, mayors and congressional legislators) and limit gubernatorial discretion 
over their use, while the electoral system and candidate nomination/selection norms foster 
candidate-centered political careerism. Moreover, restrictive legislation and professionalized 
civil service rules reinforce state governors’ tendency towards pork-barreling by restricting their 
latitude to freely manipulate public sector personnel management.  
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The present chapter moves the analytical focus from the strategic design to the ultimate 
effect of gubernatorial spending choices by investigating the electoral returns associated with 
different redistributive mechanisms of mobilization. It provides systematic empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that particularistic inducements render governors in two prominent Latin 
American federations with different electoral payoffs. The statistical analysis indicates that 
patronage allocations provide net electoral returns to Argentine but not to Brazilian state 
incumbent candidates, while pork-barrel benefits Brazilian but not Argentine ones. The chapter 
also emphasizes that the causal link between particularistic spending and electoral premiums is 
mediated by the structure of political competition. Using aggregate level data, it demonstrates 
that spending electoral effects decrease significantly with the number of parties competing in 
gubernatorial elections. The argument discussed below contends that apart from political 
competition, the strategic manipulation of patronage and pork interacts with other contextual 
factors including organizational components of support (i.e., the degree to which partisan 
networks are enmeshed in society), voting technologies (i.e., party balloting versus electronic 
voting), and electoral fiscal agendas (expansive versus conservative). 
The chapter begins with a critical review of the scholarly literature on subnational 
elections. After discussing the relative merits and drawbacks of current explanations, it puts the 
issues of particularistic electoral strategies and political competitiveness at center stage. Then, it 
moves to the empirical analysis, which investigates the effect of these and other political, 
economic, and societal factors on the vote shares of Argentine and Brazilian gubernatorial 
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incumbent parties between 1983-2003 and 1982-2006 respectively. Finally, the chapter 
concludes by discussing the implications of my findings for subnational incumbent stability.  
 
5.1 EXPLAINING SUBNATIONAL ELECTORAL OUTCOMES  
Two alternative approaches have guided the discussion about subnational elections in federal 
systems. Built mostly on the U.S. experience, these perspectives share a concern about the role 
of retrospective economic voting in shaping the electoral prospects of regional incumbents. A 
first group of studies considers subnational elections as national referenda in which local voters 
evaluate the presidential performance in order to cast their ballots for state-level officials. Thus, 
gubernatorial, senatorial, and state legislative contests are simple projections of national-level 
phenomena as they are assumed to be closely tied to the public standing of the incumbent 
president. It is argued that strong presidential approval rates reward national in-party candidates 
(both incumbents and challengers) at all levels of governance. Conversely, if voters are not 
satisfied with how the federal administration is doing, candidates from the president’s party are 
penalized and those from opposite parties are rewarded. A second school, in contrast, suggests 
that state executives are held accountable for the economic health of their districts regardless of 
fluctuations in national economic conditions and approval of the sitting president. For this view, 
the level of government at which an election is held is what ultimately determines the content of 
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voter considerations and the fortunes of running candidates. Citizens are able to discriminate 
between jurisdictional responsibilities and acknowledge that incumbent governors of either 
political party have little capacity to influence national economic outcomes. Whereas the general 
shape of the economy is a national matter that falls under the responsibility of federal officials, 
subnational economic performance entails important electoral effects for regional incumbents 
and aspirants.      
By far, efforts to test the national referendum and economic voting hypotheses have 
focused on the American states. Drawing upon different samples, statistical techniques and time-
periods, extant analyses have reached somewhat inconsistent empirical results. Although it has 
been well established that national economic conditions influence presidential approval and 
elections, the relationship between assessments of the president’s job, patterns of variation in 
macroeconomic performance, and gubernatorial electoral results is still a matter of debate.209
A number of works have lent credit to the national referendum model. In effect, both 
macro and micro level analyses have documented that presidential performance and national –
but not state economic conditions affect subnational voters’ expectations and gubernatorial vote 
choice (Chubb 1988; Crew and Weiher 1996; Holbrook-Provow 1987; Kenney 1983; Kone and 
 
                                                 
209 On the positive relation between national economic expectations and presidential contests in the U.S., see Kramer 
(1971), Tufte (1978), Fair (1978), Kiewit and Rivers (1985), Erikson (1989), and Holbrook (1991). Some research 
has found empirical evidence supporting this claim in Western Europe (Lewis-Beck 1988; Powell and Witten 1993), 
and developing countries (Remmer 1991; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; and Echegaray 2005). Nonetheless, Tucker 
(2006) finds little evidence for the standard predictions of the referendum and economic voting models in national 
legislative and presidential races across regions of five post-communist countries. An impressive amount of 
literature in the American politics field also points to the connection between congressional legislators’ electoral 
fates, the approval rates of the sitting president, and the evolution of economic indicators. See, for instance, 
Abramowitz (1988), Abramowitz and Segal (1986), Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992), and Carsey and Wright (1998).  
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Winters 1993; Peltzman 1987; Piereson 1975; Simon 1989; Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991; 
Stein 1990). Several scholars, however, have emphasized that regional voters reward or punish 
gubernatorial incumbents based on the shape of the state economy rather than on considerations 
about raw national macroeconomic aggregates and the functioning of the presidential office 
(Adams and Kenny 1989; Atkeson and Partin 1995; Carsey and Wright 1998; Hansen 1999; 
Howell and Squire and Fastnow 1994; Howell and Vanderleeuw 1990; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 
1998; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Orth 2001; Partin 1995; Tompkins 1988).  
Within this second line of thought, some analysts linking gubernatorial races to 
incumbent taxing decisions and fiscal performance have indicated that American governors 
appear to suffer from electoral retribution if local taxes are raised (Kone and Winters 1993; 
Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995) and fiscal deficits increase (Peltzman 1992), whereas they seem 
to be rewarded if taxes are kept lower than in neighboring states (Besley and Case 1995a). It has 
also been argued that subnational voting reactions to tax policies, fiscal deterioration, and local 
economic swings are contingent on what political party controls the statehouse (Lowry, Alt, and 
Ferree 1998), the structure of the state economy (Ebeid and Rodden 2006), the possibility of 
incumbent reelection (Alt and Lowry 1994), and whether responsibility for government 
performance is unified or divided (Leyden and Borrelli 1995). Finally, contrary to “either-or” 
explanations, a few students have underscored that gubernatorial elections are indeed influenced 
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by both national and state economic conditions (Squire and Fastnow 1994; Svoboda 1995; King 
2001).210
In recent years, a novel literature on comparative decentralization and federalism has 
drawn heavily on these theoretical models to move the study of subnational elections beyond the 
U.S. context. As in that scholarship, students have paid special attention to the effect of national 
and state macroeconomic conditions, presidential popularity, and intergovernmental co-
partisanship upon subnational vote choice. If anything, researchers find that regional voters tend 
to cast their ballots after evaluating national macroeconomic swings and how well (or poorly) the 
federal administration is doing. Such a national-regional link appears to characterize Länd 
elections in Germany (Gaines and Combez 2004), and provincial contests in Russia (Konitzer 
2005) and Canada (Gélineau and Bélanger 2006) where state parameters also affect federal 
voting behavior (Cutler 2002). Relying upon aggregate level data for six federal countries, one of 
the few comparative pieces existing on subnational contests reports no systematic evidence 
whatsoever of state economic issues in shaping gubernatorial election outcomes, while it 
indicates that the impact of national changes is relatively small and conditional upon other 
factors (Rodden and Wibbels 2005). Political parties in control of the governorship that share the 
president’s party label usually receive lower vote shares than out-party incumbents in Australia, 
Canada, Mexico, Germany, and the U.S. (with Argentina being the only exception). The gap 
 
                                                 
210 In general, statistical analyses using individual-level data find that state rather than national economic factors 
affect gubernatorial approval and voting. Aggregate-level studies, on the other hand, commonly report that state 
economic conditions do not seem to matter, but there is inconclusive evidence regarding whether or not national 
expectations influence gubernatorial electoral results.   
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between presidential in-party and out-party candidates, however, decreases considerably with the 
strength of the national economy. Comparative accounts also suggest that the way in which 
national and state elections are linked together varies across countries and through time, being 
more tightly connected in fiscally centralized than in fiscally decentralized polities.  
With regards to the countries examined in this dissertation, research on subnational 
elections is underdeveloped. Biographical chronicles of local bosses are legion, and descriptive 
studies of specific electoral events abound. But theoretically-driven multivariate models are 
nearly absent. Actually, there is no systematic analysis that incorporates a wide range of 
Brazilian states while only a small number of recent works deal with the Argentine provinces.211
                                                 
211 For instance, Souza (2007) studies the impact of regional fiscal adjustment policies on gubernatorial elections in 
the Brazilian states of Bahia, Ceará, and Paraná between 1994 and 2002. Some research has also asked whether the 
political fortunes of federal politicians in the country are influenced by the popularity of their municipal copartisans 
in a phenomenon known as “reverse” coattails effects (Ames 1994), or by gubernatorial coattails (Samuels 2000a, 
2000c). For analyses on the later topic in Argentina, see Cabrera (1998), and Jones (1997). 
 
Remmer and Gélineau (2003) and Gélineau and Remmer (2005), for example, use aggregate and 
individual level data to test the referendum voting hypothesis in gubernatorial and provincial 
deputy elections held in Argentina between 1983 and 2001. The authors claim that the vote share 
of national in-party candidates (their dependent variable) fluctuates in accordance with the rise 
and fall of the presidential administration, the performance of the national but not the state 
economy, the midterm punishment phenomenon, and the amount of federal transfers received by 
provinces (without considering, as we have seen in Chapter 2, whether or not these grants remain 
at the president’s political discretion). According to these analysts, electoral support for the 
president’s co-religionists also varies with provincial political control as provinces governed by 
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opposite parties return a lower vote share than those ruled by the sitting president’s party. 
Scholars interested in Argentina have also applied a partisan bias model of patronage spending to 
four congressional races finding that the PJ benefits more from investment in public employment 
than does the UCR/Alianza (Calvo and Murillo 2004). Some other observers have found no 
empirical evidence of a negative impact of divisive gubernatorial primaries upon provincial 
executive elections (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2006). And still others have emphasized that the 
widespread adoption of provincial electoral reforms allowed governing elites in most Argentine 
provinces to secure control of their respective local legislatures and, at the same time, avoid the 
potentially hurtful consequences of competitive national contests (Calvo and Micozzi 2005). 
Although compelling, most of the literature discussed in this section faces a number of 
shortcomings that limit our understanding of how territorial power is built and retained within 
and across federations through time. First, both referendum and economic voting models see 
regional politics through the undifferentiated lenses of nationwide politics. The main concern of 
these approaches is to single out the degree of “nationalization” of subnational elections rather 
than to uncover the dynamics of voting behavior, party competition, and power-building in the 
states. Hence, the effect of looking at how far voters make different judgments for different 
elected offices is to characterize regional politics as significant only for what it tells us about the 
fate of national governments. Second, and related to that, prior studies are typically built upon an 
unrealistic “bottom-up” model of democratic accountability that involves an apolitical view of 
incumbency. Most extant explanations assumed that voters are sophisticated users of information 
able to obtain and connect complex data with incumbent performance. But even if we assume 
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that voters have access to these data, apportioning political responsibility in multi-tiered systems 
is a difficult task because many policy areas are shared among different levels of government, 
which claim credit for success and blame competitors for failure. What is missing in most extant 
accounts is an assessment of the role played by politicians’ strategic manipulation of the 
resources and perks of office.212
Distributive taxation theorists, as we have seen, well understood the connection between 
budgetary politics and election outcomes in the American states. But they have drawn inferences 
based almost exclusively on aggregate fiscal data (either surpluses or deficits, or the differences 
between them). Perhaps more important, studies in this tradition impute politicians operating in 
quite different institutional settings essentially the same incentives for manipulating the public 
money. In addition to these theoretical limitations, empirical analyses in the area have remained 
confined to national or regional patterns observed in single countries. We therefore are far from 
being able to assess the validity of existing claims on voter reactions to fiscal spending and to 
elaborate broad causal inferences about the importance of particularistic electoral investments 
choices and political reward networks for both short-term electoral outcomes and the durable 
construction of territorial power.   
 Subnational elections, like politics, encompass much more than 
coattails effects and cold evaluations of office-holders. Critically, they encompass the strategic 
redistributive mechanisms through which state political elites assemble voters’ interests and craft 
coalitions of support. 
                                                 
212 Several students recognize that referendum and economic voting models overlook questions involving 
incumbents’ strategies (Jacobson 1989; Gerber 1998; Marra and Ostrom 1989), and their expenditure calculations 
(Bickers and Stein 1996; Stein and Bickers 1994).  
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The redistributive approach I propose stresses that over and above intergovernmental co-
partisanship, macroeconomic swings, and ideological predispositions, subnational vote choice is 
influenced by efforts of state executives to harness government resources with the purpose of 
shaping individual perceptions, shoring up their political support, and enhancing incumbents’ 
electoral performance. Government spending is a potent instrument politicians use to preserve 
and expand their political dominance. Properly targeted, public expenditures benefit party elites, 
reward activists, finance electoral campaigns, and “buy-off” potential voters. One can argue that 
the electoral impact of particularistic politics is secondary in contexts where voters react to more 
programmatic appeals and the provision of public goods –some of the usual determinants of 
electoral results in advanced industrial democracies. But particularistic activities and political 
machines lead electoral politics in systems with non-programmatic parties and citizen-politicians 
particularistic ties like those prevailing in most underdeveloped countries.  
Several authors have underscored that territorial political control in Argentina (Auyero 
2000; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004, 2006; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Gibson 2006; Jones 
and Hwang 2005; Levitsky 2003; Powers 2001; Remmer 2007; Stokes 2005) and Brazil 
(Abrucio 1998; Ames 2001; Desposato 2002; Graham 1990; Hagopian 1996; Mainwaring 1997; 
Samuels 2002) is based on the extensive use of resources gained from patronage and pork-ridden 
politics. Nevertheless, no study has measured the relative priority and electoral returns placed on 
different particularistic mechanisms of electoral mobilization both within and between these –or 
any other– federations. In assessing spending electoral effects from a subnational comparative 
perspective, this chapter fills a significant gap in the literature on distributive politics and makes 
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a novel contribution to the study of regional voting and territorial power-building in politically 
decentralized regimes.  
5.2 WHAT AND HOW PARTICULARISTIC SPENDING MATTERS? 
The shift in placing particularistic politics at the forefront of subnational studies requires a 
discussion of the alternative goods that gubernatorial incumbents deliver with coalition-building 
ends. It is worth opening such a discussion by emphasizing what is not this chapter about. The 
arguments developed and empirically tested here do not concern the incentives influencing 
rational governors’ expenditure priorities and their ultimate investment choices, two related 
topics I addressed in previous chapters. Rather, I assess the electoral returns state incumbents 
reaped from their particularistic spending allocations. Focusing on the logic of vote-trading 
discussed in Chapter 1, the subsequent analysis is designed to explore whether and how 
gubernatorial incumbents who strategically allocate public resources to their political backers are 
rewarded for their efforts at the ballot box. Concretely, I estimate the effect of patronage and 
pork-barrel electoral strategies on subnational vote choice. The virtue of estimating the 
concurrent impact of these strategies is that we capture two pivotal instruments of territorial 
power-building in federalized polities. Almost no political individual I have interviewed failed to 
mention that political networks in subnational Argentina and Brazil dominate electoral 
interactions based on the control that gubernatorial incumbents exercise over administrative 
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appointments and the execution of public works. Filling bureaucratic jobs with political 
supporters and dispensing targeted goods to specific electoral districts and cohorts constitute the 
fundamental mechanisms of vote assembling within the states in both federations. The 
theoretical presumption is twofold: particularistic allocations are strategic decisions made by 
rational-minded politicians, and electoral results are somewhat caused by the public moneys 
spent prior to the elections.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, I measure patronage as state government spending on 
personnel, and pork-barrel as state government spending on public works and capital projects. It 
is worth noting that there is an intrinsic problem in using both categories of spending 
simultaneously. On the one hand, expenditures in public works commonly produce a second 
beneficial effect because they allow politicians to provide temporary jobs to their cohorts 
through contracts for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. They also infuse money 
into the party coffers, which in turn can be employed to create and maintain political machines. 
Thus, when engaging into pork-like spending incumbents often value the direct appeal to voters 
and the private goods that can be used for exercising patronage. Unfortunately, these indirect 
transfers to individual voters are difficult (if not impossible) to sort out. A second potential 
problem refers to the incremental and sticky nature of budgetary spending. Incrementalism and 
stickiness would condition the ability of politicians to manipulate public outlays so as to enhance 
their personal and/or party ambitions. Correlations for the spending variables of interest across 
the four years of each gubernatorial term reveal the presence of certain continuity in the level of 
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expenditures (see Appendix C, Table 12). But they also show enough variation allowing for an 
assessment of the distinctiveness of patronage and pork.   
Having defined what types of government expenditures matter, it remains the question of 
how they actually matter. A novel line of research in political science has recently moved to 
examining the impact of political parties on spending patterns and the supply of public 
expenditures (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2003; Chhibber and Nooruddin 
2003; Magaloni 2005; Magaloni, Diaz Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Persson and Tabelini 1999). 
This research program suggests that reelection-minded parties make their strategic investment 
choices in response to the actions taken by other parties competing in the electoral arena, while 
strategic voters force parties to respond to the competitive pressures of their opponents. Critical 
to this theoretical framework is the number of competing parties in the system because variations 
in the structure of political competition are likely to influence the provision of (semi) public 
versus private goods. More than the ideology of a particular party (Alesina 1987; Alesina and 
Roubini 1997; Boix 1998; Hibs 1977), it is the features of the party system what affects policy 
outcomes and the delivery of government resources. The general argument runs as follows. The 
larger the electoral coalition on which political leaders depend to remain in office, the more 
important public good provision is. In contrast, politicians who depend on a small coalition can 
reserve resources on public goods to distribute as private benefits to their supporters. This logic 
indicates that in highly fragmented electoral contexts political leaders are more likely to rely on 
club goods in order to maintain a small but unified coalition. In moderately competitive settings, 
they will provide public goods to cobble together a large coalition. While under low levels of 
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political competition, politicians have strong incentives to government spend resources without 
public regardedness because they can placate their backers with private goods.  
Drawing on this tradition, I argue that the competitive political climate in which 
subnational incumbents operate also need to be considered in examining the electoral returns –
that is, the expected number of votes from a unit of targeted transfer– of different particularistic 
strategies. Unquestionably, it is difficult to measure the electoral effects of government spending 
because voters’ behavior responds to various factors, not just to the allocation of public moneys. 
I show, however, that regional patterns of competition affect what subnational office-holders 
reap from investing public funds in patronage and pork-barrel activities. I reason that 
incumbents’ electoral payoffs are inversely related with the number of alternative choices (or 
candidates) available to voters. The intuition behind this reasoning is straightforward: 
competitive political settings expand electoral bids and generate the image of vote trading 
discontinuity thus making vote more volatile. Therefore, the same level of electoral investment –
a unit of patronage or pork-barrel transfer– would ceteris paribus yield lower electoral returns in 
districts where multiple parties compete for office than in non-competitive electoral turfs. In 
other words, as competition (i.e., the number of running parties) increases, the winning 
candidate’s vote share will on average decline.213
                                                 
213 This raises a potential problem of endogeneity as incumbent vote share and the effective number of competing 
parties may be reciprocally (and negatively) related. Although these variables are indeed correlated, correlation is 
reasonably low: -6.8 and -5.3 in Argentina and Brazil respectively. 
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5.3 DATA AND METHODS  
To assess whether redistributive politics does have an impact on subnational vote choice and the 
electoral fortunes of state incumbent parties or candidates, I collected data on each election held 
in the twenty-four Argentine provinces and the twenty-seven Brazilian states during the 1983-
2003 and 1982-2006 periods respectively. Taking as my baselines the 1983 and 1982 
gubernatorial contests, the statistical analysis investigates the determinants of gubernatorial 
incumbent party/candidate share of the vote over eleven state executive elections (five races in 
Argentina and six races in Brazil).  
It should be mentioned that the Argentine district of Ciudad de Buenos Aires held the 
first contest to determine governor in 1996, while the former national territory of Tierra del 
Fuego did it in 1991 after acquiring provincial status. In addition, the Brazilian states of Amapá, 
Roraima, Tocantins, and the Distrito Federal began to popularly elect governors after their 
creation in 1990, whereas Rôndonia began to do it in after its foundation in 1986. All this leaves 
a total of 115 gubernatorial elections in Argentina and 154 in Brazil.214
Following prior research on the topic, I estimate models on a continuous variable 
measuring the percentage of the vote received by the state incumbent party or candidate in each 
gubernatorial election. The incumbent share of the vote for Argentine provinces ranges from a 
  
                                                 
214 I exclude the 1994 gubernatorial succession in Rôndonia because the incumbent governor, Oswaldo Piana (PTR), 
and his closest political allies were forced to abandon politics after a special committee of the Chamber of Deputies 
found evidence of their involvement in the assassination of Olavo Pires (PDS), Piana’s most serious competitor to 
the governorship in the 1990 election. 
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value of 19.2 percent in San Juan (2003) to 90.1 percent in San Luis (2003), with a mean of 48.7 
and a standard deviation of 12.2. For the Brazilian states, these values range from a marginal 0.2 
percent of the vote in Espirito Santo (2002) to 81 percent in Maranhão (1986), with a mean of 
41.2 and a standard deviation of 17.1.215
Defining incumbency in the relative stable atmosphere of Argentine provincial elections 
is a fairly simple task. The incumbent party is the party of the person who holds the 
governorship.
  
216
                                                 
215 The main reason for such an insignificant vote share obtained by the gubernatorial incumbent party in Espirito 
Santo is related to the several acts of corruption that involved governor Jose Ignacio Ferreira (PSDB, 1998-2002). 
Pressed by his own party and an impeachment attempt, Ferreira abandoned the PSDB in 2001. Along with other 
politicians who had been expurgated from politics, such as senator Luiz Estevão (forced to resign by the Sao Paulo’s 
TRE) and federal deputy suplente Talvane Albuquerque (accused of orchestrating the assassination of federal deputy 
Ceci Cunha to capture her seat), Ferreira affiliated to the small PTN. In the 2002 election, Ferreira’s political support 
zigzagged between the candidates of the PSDB and the PTN, Paulo Ruy and Walter Maciel, who obtained 1.5 and 
0.2 percent of the vote respectively.  
 Without exceptions, regional incumbent parties in Argentina always presented 
and backed their own candidates to the gubernatorial house. But things work markedly different 
in Brazil. First, if the incumbent party does not run for reelection nor take part in a gubernatorial 
electoral coalition but supports an out-party runner to the governorship, I relied on the vote share 
received by the out-party candidate in question. These instances included the gubernatorial 
candidacies of Wall Ferraz (PSDB-PI, 1990), Lavoisier Maia (PDT-RN, 1994), Amazonino 
Mendes (PPB-AM, 1994), Jose Ferreira (PSDB-ES, 1998), Alvaro Dias (PP-PR, 1994), and 
Teotino Vilela (PSDB-AL, 2006). Second, if the incumbent party runs for reelection or becomes 
a member of an electoral coalition but the sitting governor her/himself sponsors an out-party 
216 The provincial incumbent party in gubernatorial elections held at the end of federal interventions (i.e., Catamarca 
1991, Corrientes 1992 and 2001, and Tucumán 1991) is that removed from office by the intervention in question. 
Models coding the provincial incumbent as the party of the sitting president reached identical results.      
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candidate in a process of political grooming known as apadrinhamento (or “godfatherism”), I 
estimated separate models using the vote share obtained by the regional in-party candidates and 
that received by the governors’ personally elected successors.217 The latter cases included the 
candidacies of Geraldo Bulhões (PSC-AL, 1990), Helio Garcia (PRS-MG, 1990), Said Xerfán 
(PTB-PA, 1990), Ronaldo da Cunha (PMDB-PB, 1990), Paulo Ruy (PSDB-ES, 2002), Aecio 
Neves (PSDB-MG, 2002), and Eduardo Dutra (PT-SE, 2002). Finally, if the party in control of 
the governorship changes during a given gubernatorial term, several coding rules may apply.218 
Recall that incumbent party changes can occur either because the sitting governor switches party 
while in office, because he/she stands down to run for other elected post leaving executive office 
to a vice-governor from a different political party, or because the sitting governor is forced to 
resign. In the first case, incumbency is coded based on the governor’s new party affiliation. In 
the second scenario, I relied on the vice-governor’s party affiliation if he/she acts as governor for 
more than one year or runs for reelection against his/her predecessor’s candidate. In the third 
case, I simply drew upon the party affiliation of the new governor.219
                                                 
217 Statistical results proved to be highly robust remaining virtually unchanged. 
  
218 Party switching is a common practice among Brazilian politicians. See Nicoloau (1996) and Desposato (2006) on 
the determinants of party switching in the Chamber of Deputies. See Appendix C, Table 13 for detailed information 
about gubernatorial party switching throughout the period under consideration. 
219 The only case of a vice-governor from a different party than that of the governor who acted as such for more than 
one year is Manuel Barros (PTB-AL, 1997-1998), whereas acting governor Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ, 2002) ran for 
reelection against his predecessor’s candidate (and wife) Rosinha Garotinho (PSB). There were three cases in which 
the incumbent governors were forced to resign. In all of them, the outcoming governor was replaced by the runner-
off candidate in the previous election. First, governor Mao Santa (PI-PMDB, 1994-2001) was separated (cassado) 
from the governorship by the TSE charged with illegal use of public resources while campaigning for his reelection. 
The governorship went to Hugo Napoleão (PFL). Second, governor Neudo Campos (PPB-RR, 1994-2001) resigned 
pressed by several cases of corruption. Later on, he was imprisoned charged with leading the mafia dos gafanhotos, 
a corruption scheme through which Campos and other state-level politicians and bureaucrats took the salaries of 
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The basic research design employed to measure the effect of particularistic spending on 
regional incumbent vote share approximates the statistical models used by aggregate level 
economic voting literature in the U.S. and other federal nations. My approach is then based on a 
pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, which allows me to compare the effect of national 
and subnational factors across geographic subunits. I rely on ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
panel corrected standard errors to address potential problems of heteroskedasticity. I also use the 
unit-fixed effects technique, which is a common approach for analyses of panel or cross-
sectionally dominant pooled data.220 Yet contrary to research that treats these unit (state) effects 
as mere control variables, I argue that they are of great analytical interest precisely because state 
dummies encompass information about how the explanatory variables work in specific historical 
cases. Considering the current state of the debate among methodologists and the lack of clear 
statistical conventions involving panel data, I have cross-checked my results using a random 
effects model. Results obtained through this alternative approach remained almost identical to 
those reported below.221
                                                                                                                                                             
“ghost” public employees. The governorship was occupied by Francisco Flamarion Portela (PSL). Reelected two 
years later, Portela was also cassado by the TSE under charges of using the state machine to promote his reelection. 
Paradoxically enough, the state executive went to former governor Ottomar Pinto (PTB), who had been accused of 
committing the same crime during his 1990-1994 mandate.  
  
220 As mentioned earlier, the mean of the incumbent party vote share variable in Argentina and Brazil is 48.7 and 
41.2 percent respectively. I exclude as baselines in the fixed effects models the states of Cordoba (48.1 percent) and 
Espirito Santo (41.7 percent). Coefficients for the fixed-effects thus indicate the effect of patronage and pork-barrel 
over a province/state compared with the effect over their respective baselines.  
221 In all the regressions, a Hausman specification test rejects the suitability of using random effects (chi2 > .05). 
Arguably, random effect models are more suitable to analyze data where the units are chosen randomly from a 
population. This assumption, however, does not apply here since my data encompass the entire universe of cases. 
See Appendix C for specification tests including Hausman results and models with random effects. All models using 
this technique are available upon request.   
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All electoral results are from the first round, even if second round elections were held to 
determine the gubernatorial winner.222 An issue of concern with comparative cross-state analysis 
stems from the fact that the size of the datasets from different countries may not be perfectly 
identical (Tucker 2006). All things being equal, countries with larger number of regions and 
elections would generate estimations with higher confidence levels simply because more data 
reduces uncertainty. From a mathematical viewpoint, however, variation in the size of the 
datasets used in this dissertation is not sufficiently great so as to affect the empirical results. 
Indeed, having smaller number of observations in Argentina does not generate less or poorer 
support for the central hypotheses explored below. From a research design stance, my analysis 
does not employ a potentially biased sample of cases but rather the entire universe. In sum, while 
there certainly is some discrepancy in the number of observations in the two datasets, by no 
means does this fact preclude the elaboration of substantive comparisons between cross-state 
dynamics and patterns observed in both federations.223
                                                 
222 Second round elections took place in Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2003*), Chaco (1995*), Chubut (1991), 
Corrientes (1997, 2001*), Tierra del Fuego (1991, 1999*, 2003*), Acre (1990, 1994), Amapá (1990, 1994, 1998, 
2002), Bahia (1994), Ceará (2002), Distrito Federal (1994*, 1998*, 2002), Espirito Santo (1990, 1994), Goiás 
(1994, 1998, 2006), Maranhão (1990*, 1994, 2006), Mato Groso do Sul (1998*, 2002), Minas Gerais (1990, 1994*, 
1998),  Pará (1990, 1994*, 1998, 2002, 2006), Paraiba (1990*, 1994, 2002), Paraná (1990*, 2002*, 2006), 
Pernambuco (2006), Piaui (1990, 1994*, 1998*), Rio de Janeiro (1994, 1998, 2006), Rio Grande do Norte (1990, 
2002, 2006), Rio Grande do Sul (1990, 1994, 1998*, 2002, 2006), Rôndonia (1990*, 1994, 1998, 2002), Roraima 
(1990, 1994, 1998, 2002*), Santa Catarina (1994*, 2002*, 2006), São Paulo (1990*, 1994, 1998*, 2002), Sergipe 
(1994, 1998, 2002), and Tocantins (1990). Elections marked with an asterisk indicate those contests in which the 
final winner had lost in the first run.  
 
223 Variation in measurement error by country can also affect our confidence in the model estimations by introducing 
inefficiency into the analysis (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Nonetheless, I do not have good reasons to expect 
more measurement error in Argentina than in Brazil or vice-versa. Although the latter country has probably a more 
efficient bureaucracy, clearer fiscal legislation, and a longer tradition in recording information on financial matters, 
official data on state macroeconomic issues is more developed in Argentina. I do think, however, that measurement 
error was decreasing in the two countries as time passed. Unfortunately, there is no remedy to solve this problem 
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The crucial independent variables measure state government particularistic spending, 
regional political competitiveness, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, state incumbency, political 
scandals, and national and state macroeconomic conditions. My models also include a battery of 
societal and demographic variables that are thought paramount in explaining patterns of electoral 
support for political parties. When data for these indicators are not available for a given year, I 
use the linear interpolation between the two most recent years for which official figures do exist. 
The operationalization of the explanatory variables included in the analyses is described below. 
Data sources are as detailed in the Appendix C, Table 14.  
All models estimate regional incumbents’ strategic efforts to harness public expenditures 
with the purpose of influencing voters’ behavior and affecting electoral results by means of two 
variables. The first variable is patronage spending, measured on the basis of state expenditures 
on public sector employment as described above. The second variable is pork-barrel spending, 
measured as state expenditures on geographically targeted infrastructure and capital projects as 
explained earlier in this chapter.224
                                                                                                                                                             
because any attempt designed to ameliorate such a difficulty (including pooling the data between countries) will still 
generate results on the basis of time-based measurement error.      
 Both variables are measured in per elector (adult 18 or older) 
constant values. I use the natural log to reduce skewness. By expressing values in per elector 
terms, my models account for patronage and pork-barrel spending relative to their potential level 
of demand. This measure has therefore an important theoretical advantage over absolute and 
224 Ideally, one would draw upon municipally allocated expenditures within states and across diverse governmental 
agencies. This information would allow me to disaggregate the major spending categories in the state budgets, select 
individual items and programs, and track budgetary trade-offs. But subnational authorities are resilient to realizing 
these data. I collected municipal-level data for a reduced number of states, though. These data will be used in further 
extensions of this dissertation to investigate municipal patterns of gubernatorial spending in several case studies.            
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share indicators since it integrates politicians’ incentives to spend (supply-side) with voters’ 
latent dependence on public largesse (demand-side). To capture differing dimensions of 
redistributive politics I estimated four different models using alternative measures of patronage 
and pork expenditures: (a) spending during the year of the gubernatorial election (Model 1); (b) 
spending averaged over the electoral and pre-election years (Model 2); (c) spending averaged 
over the four years of each gubernatorial term (Model 3); and (d) spending as percentage of 
budgetary expenditures net of interest payments of the state debt (Model 4).225 The first three 
indicators capture the timing of patronage and pork-barrel whereas the forth indicator captures 
the relative priority placed to patronage and pork within the state budget.226
The Figures 26 and 27 map the averaged percentage of government spending that 
Argentine and Brazilian states devoted to public employment and infrastructure projects 
throughout the period under study. The figures clearly reveal than Argentine provinces spend 
more on patronage while Brazilian states spend more on pork. They also exhibit large variation 
across states within both federations. On average, the metropolitan provinces in Argentina 
(Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza, and Santa Fe) spent almost 10 percent of their budgets on 
pork-barrel, while San Luis assigned close to 30 percent to similar activities. Considerable 
   
                                                 
225 I also explored the possibility that stream flows of government resources might impact gubernatorial electoral 
outcomes. To do so, I measured expenditure allocations as yearly differences. In no specification, however, did these 
coefficients approach statistical significance. For that reason, I decided not to report them.  
226 Moreover, Model 2 accounts for the potential impact of Brazilian electoral and fiscal rules that limit the 
expansion of state personnel spending in election years and ban incumbent governors from participating in the 
inauguration of infrastructure works. See Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed description of these rules. Although in the 
four models the personnel and infrastructure spending variables are correlated at the 5 percent level (r = .733, .745, 
.727, -.483; and .318, .444, .475, -.354 for Argentina and Brazil respectively) statistical results are robust to 
specifications including each of these variables separately. 
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differences are also evident with regards to public employment, with provinces such as Tierra del 
Fuego devoting an average of nearly 67 percent of its budget and La Pampa spending 41 percent 
to that area. Brazilian states also show significant variation. For instance, Tocantins dedicated an 
average of nearly 37 percent to infrastructure and capital projects, while Alagoas only devoted a 
marginal 5 percent. As for public employment, Acre dedicated approximately 55 percent of its 
budget to finance the state bureaucracy, while Roraima dedicated close to 25 percent to that 
spending category. As it can be appreciated in Figures 28 and 29, subnational variation in both 
patronage and pork-barrel expenditures is not a function of state size given that they also vary in 
per elector terms.  
 
 
Figure 26: Averaged Percentage Spending in Patronage and Pork-Barrel. Argentine Provinces, 1985-2003 
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Figure 27: Averaged Percentage Spending in Patronage and Pork-Barrel. Brazilian States, 1985-2006 
 
 
Figure 28: Averaged Per Elector Spending in Patronage and Pork-Barrel. Argentine Provinces, 1985-2003 
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Figure 29: Averaged Per Elector Spending in Patronage and Pork-Barrel. Brazilian States, 1985-2006 
 
The impact of electoral competition at the state-level is measured on the basis of the 
effective number of competing parties (or electoral coalitions) in each gubernatorial contest. I 
estimate this variable using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) index of 1 / Σ υ2(i), where υ(i) is the 
share of votes for every party i. Although this index has become the standard measure for the 
comparative analysis of party systems (Caulier and Dumont 2003), it has been argued that it does 
not apply well to some empirical situations because it over-counts the larger party (Molinar 
1991) and increases consistently with greater atomization. I tested the robustness of my findings 
employing the Molinar alternative index of 1 + ENP (Σ υ2(i) ) - υ2(1)  / Σ υ2(i), where ENP is the 
Laakso and Taagepera index, and υ2(1) is the proportion of the votes of the winning party squared. 
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In contrast to Laakso and Taagepera, the Molinar index counts the winning party as one and 
weights ENP by the contribution of the smaller parties. Conceptually, it focuses on the gap 
between the winning party and other parties. Small/large gaps mean more/less political 
competitiveness. In dominant party systems like those prevailing in many Argentine and a few 
Brazilian states, this index therefore yields fewer party numbers than Laakso and Taagepera. 
Both indexes are positively correlated in Argentina and Brazil (r = .663 and .868, p >.05 
respectively), and despite some minor differences discussed below they produce highly 
consistent results.  
In Argentina and Brazil, the effective number of parties competing in gubernatorial 
elections varies across states and within a state over time. Values for this variable in the former 
country range from 1.2 in the province of San Luis (1999 and 2003 elections) to 4.9 in Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires (2003), with a median of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 0.64. Values for Brazilian 
states range from 1.5 in Alagoas (1994), Maranhão (1986), and Paraiba (1998) to 5.1 in 
Rôndonia (2002), with a median of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 0.63. The similarity of these 
values may obscure sharp differences between the nature of political competition for state 
executive office in Argentina’s and Brazil’s subnational polities. As we have mentioned in 
Chapter 1, gubernatorial candidates in both countries lead a state based party branch and attempt 
to incorporate other politicians to their camps. But while Argentine candidates command strong 
and well-organized parties, their Brazilian colleges represent changing multiparty alliances. 
Indeed, competition for subnational leadership in Argentina has traditionally taken place between 
the PJ, the UCR, and several provincial parties with expressiveness in only one province thus 
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making most subnational party systems in the country either dominant or hegemonic (Malamud 
and De Luca 2005). Party life in this context is typically controlled by a single leader, who 
allows and sometimes fosters the possibility of intra-party competition among different factions 
and second-tier politicians, or by a small group of influential individuals. By contrast, most 
Brazilian states are plagued by varied mosaics of small and weakly organized parties with low 
capacity to win the governorship (Lima Júnior 1983, 1997). The local bosses of these parties line 
up behind favorite gubernatorial candidates to survive politically. They “sell-off” their electoral 
support in exchange for cabinet positions, administrative appointments, and slots for federal 
and/or state deputy slates (Samuels 2000a, 2000c). In short, political competition for territorial 
power is basically partisan and factional in Argentina, and coalitional and personalized in Brazil. 
We will see in the next few pages that the presence (lack) of dominant parties with dense 
organizational networks affects the electoral gains obtained from patronage and pork-barrel 
spending by either facilitating or impeding politicians to screen between true voter loyalists and 
opponents.      
For theoretical reasons explained in the previous section, I expect that the electoral effect 
of patronage and pork will be conditional upon variations in the structure of regional political 
competition at the time of election. While based on rational choice accounts several scholars 
predict that past levels of political competitiveness shape self-interested politicians’ willingness 
to target public funds, I expect a contemporaneous effect of party competition on the electoral 
returns reaped from different redistributive strategies. Furthermore, I anticipate that patronage 
and pork will provide distinctive premiums for Argentine and Brazilian incumbents in the 
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electoral market. Specifically, I hypothesize that the impact of particularistic spending in public 
sector employment will be higher across Argentine provinces. In contrast, the impact of spending 
in local infrastructure projects will be more important across Brazilian states. The positive effect 
of budgetary allocations, I argue, decreases with increasing levels of competition for subnational 
elected office. In order to test these propositions, I introduce two multiplicative interaction terms 
to each model specification. State government spending on both personnel and pork-barrel are 
therefore interacted with the effective number of parties competing in gubernatorial elections.      
Differences between subnational party systems aside, we may expect regional voters in 
both Argentina and Brazil to associate redistributive politics, economic outcomes, policy 
choices, and contingent political events not simply with the particular incumbent governor but 
with his/her party as well. Thus, when an incumbent retires from politics (i.e., when s/he does 
not run for an elected position immediately after the end of his/her state executive mandate), we 
can assume that his/her party or candidate shoulders responsibility for the governor’s 
performance over the prior office term. But when an incumbent does run for office, s/he typically 
enjoys the benefits associated with the manipulation of public resources and other well-known 
advantages to protect their turfs. These electoral assets make elections with an incumbent notably 
different from open races. To account for this fact, I include in my estimations a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of an incumbent governor running for reelection immediately after the 
end of his/her term in office: 44 and 54 observations in Argentina and Brazil respectively. 
Alternatively, I also estimate models with dummy variables indicating whether the incumbent 
governor runs for an elected (lower or higher) position other than the governorship immediately 
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after the completion of their mandates: 45 and 38 observations in Argentina and Brazil 
respectively. Although I expect state executive incumbents to fare better than open-seat 
candidates, whether and to what extent state governors running for reelection perform better than 
those running for other office is an open question.  
In order to deal with the effect of regional features that are relatively stable through time, 
I include a measure of the gubernatorial incumbent party’s “normal vote” within each state. This 
variable serves as an indicator of the partisan predisposition of the states, and the degree of 
electoral support a given candidate is expected to receive.227
                                                 
227 Arguably, the decision to include a variable accounting for previous party vote mitigates the ecological problem 
associated with the use of aggregate level data because it constitutes a proxy of voters’ partisan identification and 
policy preferences. In addition, it serves to mitigate a potential problem of endogeneity in the statistical models (see 
discussion below). 
 In addition, it partially controls for 
the endogeneity problem of electoral results being affected by government spending and that 
spending being itself dependent from the expected electoral results (see below). Prior research 
has measured the normal vote in very different ways: the lagged vote for a given office (Erikson 
1971; Remmer and Gélineau 2003; Gélineau and Remmer 2005; Gélineau and Bélanger 2006), 
the lagged vote corrected with lagged party control (Gelman and King 1990), unit and/or time 
fixed effects (Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Rodden and Wibbels 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder 
2002a, 2002b), and survey-based data of party identification (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
1993). Even in stable democracies, scholars have shown that the lagged vote for a single office is 
a poor proxy for the normal vote because it contains both the effect of incumbency advantage 
plus any idiosyncratic factor that may affect the results of an election. Presidential vote alone is 
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also biased because it reflects national rather than subnational party divisions (Gelman and 
Huang 2004). Of course, state-level surveys solve these problems but they are only available for 
a very limited group of states in a reduced number of years.  
In spite of the inherent error associated with this variable, I operationalize the normal 
vote as a running average from multiple prior elections. Concretely, I draw upon the average 
share of the vote obtained by the state incumbent party in the previous gubernatorial, 
congressional (national deputy), and presidential contests. Using presidential elections as an 
indicator of the normal vote, however, is highly problematic in the case of Brazil. First, the 
Brazilian president was not popularly elected until 1989. Second, former mitigate president 
Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) created a minuscule party with virtually no political 
expression in the states, the PRN, to run for the presidency. And third, vice-president Itamar 
Franco (1992-1994) did not formally belong to any political party when he assumed the 
presidential office after Collor’s forced resignation. Consequently, estimates for Brazilian states 
rely on a variable measuring the average vote of the previous gubernatorial and national deputy 
elections. Results were cross-checked by including the presidential vote for state executive 
elections held between 1994 and 2006, when presidents had an explicit party identification. A 
second difficulty that raises the question of how one would determine the correct normal vote in 
Brazil is the fact that parties appear and disappear between elections. When the gubernatorial 
incumbent party had not previously run for the governorship (either because it did not present 
candidates or did not exist), I rely on the vote share received by the party of the sitting governor 
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at that time.228
Along with somehow invariant political dynamics, contingency may impact electoral 
results. Mostly due to practical data constraints, extant research on subnational voting has been 
silent regarding the effect of a key contingent factor: political scandals.
 In line with dominant literature on party systems in Argentina (Cantón and Jorrat 
2002; Lupu and Stokes 2009; Torre 2003) and Brazil (Ames 1995a, 1995b, 2001; Ames and 
Power 2006; Dix 1992; Mainwaring 1991, 1997; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Renno 2000; 
Samuels 2006; Schneider 1973), I expect the normal vote variable to be a strong predictor of 
voting behavior across states of the former polity but not across territorial subunits of the latter. 
Although there is some controversy among Brazilianists about the degree to which parties are 
truly institutionalized actors, both party affiliation and organization have traditionally meant 
much more and played a higher role in Argentine than in Brazilian politics.  
229 Based on qualitative 
data collection, I coded political scandals directly or indirectly involving incumbent governors 
and vice-governors.230
                                                 
228 This rule applies to the gubernatorial contests held in Acre (1990, 1998), Amazonas (1994, 2002), Alagoas (1990, 
2006), Espirito Santo (1990, 1994, 2002) Minas Gerais (1990), and Rio Grande do Norte (1990). 
 Following Pérez-Liñán (2007: 65), who has convincingly shown that 
political scandals were a common denominator in all six cases of presidential impeachments 
occurred in Latin America, I operationalize “scandal” as an event disclosing an act of corruption 
229 Some American scholars (see Chappel and Keech 1985) have included in their time-series analysis of economic 
voting a variable to test for the effect of the Watergate. 
230 For Argentina, I used the national newspapers Clarín and La Nación, and several on-line provincial newspapers. 
For Brazil, I relied on the Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro Pós-1930, and folders archived at the Senate 
library that contain information published by the national newspapers O Globo, O Estado do Sao Paulo, Folha de 
Sao Paulo, Jornal de Brasília, Jornal do Brasil, and Correio Braziliense. Needless to say, systematic data collection 
on subnational political scandals is particularly difficult (if not impossible) for a single researcher. My inventory is 
therefore necessarily incomplete. But it has two virtues. First, it includes the most serious acts of corruption and 
misuse of power since they cannot pass unnoticed for national news stories. Second, it constitutes the only treatment 
of political scandals at the subnational level. 
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or abuse of power performed by (these) politicians. My measure is then a dummy variable coded 
1 if the governor or vice-governor were involved in a political scandal during their terms in 
office and 0 if they were not. I expect a negative and significant coefficient on the scandal 
variable suggesting that the state electorate does indeed punish incumbents for getting involved 
in political wrongdoing.  
A critical insight of this dissertation is that a focus on either national or state politics 
alone is inappropriate for explaining the nature of power-building along territorial lines. In all 
federalized political systems, subnational office-holders derive their resources and preferences 
from a pattern of influences involving the national and regional levels. In the former level, 
governors articulate with the national government, the federal bureaucracy, and congressional 
legislators. In the latter, they deal with state legislatures, mayors, and ordinary voters. Building 
territorial power thus requires subnational political leaders to play out across vertical and 
horizontal axes of intergovernmental relations. In this two-level game, national executives can 
help or undermine state incumbents’ efforts to advance their party and/or personal aspirations by 
reallocating material resources to the states. Building upon the measurement of discretionality 
elaborated in Chapter 1, I test for this possibility by including alternative measures of federal 
grant allocations that reflect gubernatorial discretion over the use of transfer funds. Accounting 
for the effect discretional gubernatorial transfers constitute a significant improvement over prior 
research (Gibson and Calvo 2001; Gordin 2004; Jones 2001; Gélineau and Remmer 2005; 
Remmer and Gélineau 2003; Remmer and Wibbels 2000), which has repeatedly failed to assess 
how national and subnational executives can actually manage the federal money with coalition-
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building goals (see Bonvecci and Lodola 2011). To the extent that higher amounts of federal 
transfers entail lower local taxes, I expect the fiscal transfer variable to carry a positive sign.  
Finally, to empirically test whether and how regional voters’ assessments of the economy 
affect gubernatorial election outcomes, I include a series of aggregate variables that accounts for 
national and state macroeconomic conditions. Adopting a familiar pattern from the referendum 
and economic voting models, I stress aggregate level hypotheses with plausible assumptions 
about individual level behavior.231
                                                 
231 Of course, this does not mean that such variables can function as a test for micro-level propositions or for the 
individual level behavior itself. 
 My assumption is that citizens who are satisfied with the 
condition of the economy are more likely to vote for incumbent parties/candidates than 
economically dissatisfied voters. I do not make any assumption about the likelihood of finding 
citizens more inclined to evaluate the performance of the national or the regional economy when 
casting their votes. Thus, if the national economic measures prove to be statistically significant, 
state executive elections are affected by national trends. If the state economic variables reach 
significance, voters factor regional performance and hold incumbents responsible for the health 
of their districts. And if variables measuring the difference between state and national indicators 
are statistically significant, electoral constituents evaluate the performance of regional officials 
by considering whether the local economy is doing better or worse than the national economy. 
Note that these simple statements are essentially different from the standard retrospective voting 
hypotheses discussed earlier in this chapter. The argument tested here is not that voters compare 
changes in the economy between the existing and previous government in order to evaluate 
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incumbents’ political competence. Rather, the prediction is that incumbents enjoy greater (lower) 
electoral strength where the economy is stronger (weaker).    
I measure national macroeconomic performance by relying on three conventional 
indicators: the monthly change in the consumer price index lagged one month with respect to the 
date in which a specific gubernatorial race occurred, the annual rate of national unemployment, 
and the annual change in national GDP both weighted for the electoral month.232 State 
macroeconomic performance is captured by means of the weighted annual rate of state 
unemployment (limited to a reduced number of years for the Brazilian states due to data 
inconsistency), and the annual change in provincial GDP.233
The Tables 2 and 3 present the correlation values for national and state economic 
indicators in Argentina and Brazil respectively. As we can appreciate, there is a considerable 
deal of correlation between national and subnational trends in the two countries. This fact of 
 In addition, I include measures of 
“relative” GDP and “relative” unemployment as measured by the national GDP/unemployment 
rate relative to the provincial GDP/unemployment rate. Because inflation, unemployment, and 
declines of GDP affect the purchasing and income power of voters, I expect that these factors 
will be hurtful for incumbents regardless of their political affiliation.  
                                                 
232 I use the following formula of the natural logarithm of the inflation rate: ln [1 + i] for any case of i ≥ 0, and – ln 
[1 + |i|] if i ≤ 0 (i.e. deflation), where i is the annual percent change in the consumer price index (see Mainwaring 
and Pérez-Liñán 2005). As in prior studies, the weighted macroeconomic indicators are calculated on the basis of the 
following formula: ρ = [ρ (t-1) * (12-σ (t)) / 12] + [ρ (t) * (σ (t) / 12)].  
233 Official data on state unemployment in Brazil is limited to six metropolitan areas. I calculated unemployment 
rates for the remaining states based on their economic active population as it is reported by the Pesquisa Nacional 
por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD-IBGE and the national periodical censuses. Unfortunately, data to compute this 
variable are not available for the 1983-1991 period. 
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course limits our ability to rely exclusively on econometric models including both types of 
indicators at the same time. To avoid multicollinearity, I estimated separate models for national 
and state-level economic variables. I introduced each national and state indicator individually so 
as to assess its separate effect, and simultaneously to capture their combined impact. 
Furthermore, in order to test the referendum voting hypothesis that the president’s management 
of the economy affects subnational electoral results, I interacted the national economic indicators 
with dummy variables denoting whether a regional incumbent candidate belongs to the 
presidential party (Argentina) or to the presidential cabinet coalition (Brazil). For Argentina, I 
coded provincial incumbency as belonging to the PJ or to the UCR/Alianza. For Brazil, I draw 
upon Amorin Neto’s (2002) data on presidential cabinet coalitions (see Appendix C, Table 15).   
 
Table 2: Correlation between National and State Macroeconomic Conditions at the Time of Argentine 
Gubernatorial Elections, 1987-2003 
 Une (N) Une (S) Une (R) CPI GDP (N) GDP (S) GDP (R) 
Unemp (N) 1.000       
Unemp (S) .718* 1.000      
Unemp (R) -.366* .385* 1.000     
CPI -.813* -.615* .254* 1.000    
GDP (N) -.613* -.524* .118 .341* 1.000   
GDP (S) -.301* -.288* .012 .118 .567* 1.000  
GDP (R) 0.109 -.054 -.079 -.121 -.085 .773* 1.000 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s R correlation coefficients with significance at p < .05 level. (N)= national; 
(S)=state; (R)=relative. 
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Table 3: Correlation between National and State Macroeconomic Conditions at the Time of Brazilian 
Gubernatorial Elections, 1986-2006 
 Une (N) Une (S) Une (R) CPI GDP (N) GDP (S) GDP (R) 
Une (N) 1.000       
Une (S) .394* 1.000      
Une (R) -.078 .885* 1.000     
CPI -.351* .047 .130 1.000    
GDP (N) -.515* -.335* .127 -.365* 1.000   
GDP (S) -.122 -.186 .020 -.383* .605* 1.000  
GDP (R) .116 -.045 -.045 -.289* .232* .915* 1.000 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s R correlation coefficients with significance at p < .05 level. (N)= national; 
(S)=state; (R)=relative 
 
 
Considering that an important explanation for variation in patterns of electoral support for 
political parties and citizens’ vulnerability to particularistic appeals emphasizes the role of 
demographic and societal factors, I include a battery of variables that tap into this question. A 
large literature on the topic that comes from studies of Western European countries points to the 
importance of labor patterns, rural-urban splits, and ethnic cleavages (see Lipset and Rokkan 
1967 and the voluminous work that followed it). The variables chosen in this study to tackle the 
effect of these factors on vote share are the state population density (log), the state median 
voter’s income (log), the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture and industry, and 
the percentage of the population living in rural areas. Along with societal voting patterns, I 
finally test for regional distinctions in the efficacy of patronage and pork. Region is crucial in the 
particularistic equation. Specifically, the absence of alternative sources of employment, social 
mobility, and infrastructure is expected to generate greater societal dependence from government 
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largesse. This dependence is likely to be stronger in underdeveloped and less industrialized 
states. Consequently, I estimated models with dummy variables for Argentine and Brazilian 
peripheral regions.234
Incumbent Vote Share = α + β1 Personnel Spending + β2 Infrastructure Spending + β3 Effective 
Number of Parties + β4 Personnel Spending * Effective Number of Parties + β5 Investment 
Spending * Effective Number of Competing Parties + β6 Federal Fiscal Transfers + β7 Political 
Scandals + β8 Incumbency + β9 Normal Vote + β10 National / State Economic Conditions + β11 
Societal and Demographic Conditions + β12 Regions + ε    
 Summary statistics for the economic and societal variables used in this 
analysis are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The generic version of the model is specified as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 In Argentina, the peripheral region comprises all provinces but the metropolitan Buenos Aires, Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe. I also estimated models coding Mendoza as metropolitan. In Brazil, it is composed of 
the poor states located in the North (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins) and 
Northeast (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraiba, Piauí, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe). 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Macroeconomic and Socio-demographic Variables. Argentina, 1986-2003 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum 
National Unemployment (%) 
 
.117 .047 .054 .190 
State Unemployment (%) 
 
.106 .048 .018 .204 
Relative Unemployment (%) 
 
-.011 .036 -.148 .063 
CPI (ln) 
 
.697 1.06 -.4 2.69 
National GDP   
 
.028 .039 -.092 .106 
State GDP  
 
.028 .062 -.24 .151 
Relative GDP 
 
-.000 .051 -.295 .131 
Median Voter’s Income (ln) 
 
6.13 .295 5.53 6.99 
Population Density (ln) 
 
2.18 1.83 -.030 9.63 
Rural Population (%) .199 .109 0 .513 
Labor Agriculture (%) 
 
.025 .028 .002 .172 
Labor Industry (%) 
 
.193 .047 .114 .329 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Macroeconomic and Socio-demographic Variables. Brazil, 1986-2006 
Variable 
 
Mean Standard  
Deviation 
 
Minimum Maximum 
National Unemployment (%) 
 
.060 .018 .032 .083 
State Unemployment (%) 
 
.075 .030 .025 .2 
Relative Unemployment (%) 
 
.003 .028 -.048 .117 
CPI (ln) 
 
.946 .823 -.02 2.54 
National GDP  
 
.029 .030 -.014 .075 
State GDP  
 
.042 .072 -.129 .247 
Relative GDP  
 
1.34 5.89 -11.47 18.12 
Median Voter’s Income (ln) 
 
6.13 .410 5.2 7.06 
Population Density (ln) 
 
2.95 1.55 -.105 5.87 
Rural Population (%) 
 
.265 .121 .04 .63 
Labor Agriculture (%) 
 
.038 .028 .003 .143 
Labor Industry (%) 
 
.210 .084 .069 .469 
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS   
The estimates of four different specifications of my basic model measuring the electoral returns 
of patronage and pork-barrel allocations in the Argentine and Brazilian provinces/states are 
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reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. Quite simply, I found strong empirical evidence 
supporting the claim that public sector employment (patronage) works in favor of Argentine –but 
not of Brazilian– provincial in-party candidates while targeted infrastructure projects (pork-
barrel) benefit Brazilian –but not Argentine– gubernatorial incumbent candidates. As expected, 
the electoral premiums reaped from these different redistributive mechanisms of mobilization are 
conditioned by the structure of regional political competition: spending effects are highest in 
monopolistic electoral turfs and gradually decrease until become null in highly competitive 
electoral markets. 
In Argentina, the point estimates for the personnel spending variable measured in the 
gubernatorial election year (Model 1) and its interaction with the effective number of competing 
parties in gubernatorial races are .302 and -.100 respectively. These coefficients are statistically 
significant, both alone and jointly, and can be interpreted as follows. For every point increase in 
the number of competing parties, the slope of personnel spending on gubernatorial incumbent 
party vote share decreases by .100. Similarly, the magnitude of the infrastructure investment 
variable in Brazil indicates that for every point increase in political competition, the slope of 
infrastructure spending on state incumbent electoral performance decreases by .052.235
 
       
 
 
 
                                                 
235 In all estimations, the effective number of competing parties has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
subnational incumbent vote share. Conditional coefficients for this variable indicate that such an effect is significant 
at all relevant values of the personal (Argentina) and infrastructure (Brazil) spending variables. Thus, a higher level 
of political competition is a sufficient condition to reduce incumbent vote share.     
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Table 6: Redistributive Spending and Electoral Returns in Gubernatorial Elections. Argentina, 1987-2003 
 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Personnel Spending or Patronage (ln)  
 
 
.302 *** 
(.115) 
 
.289 ** 
(.116) 
 
.260 ** 
(.125) 
 
.679 *** 
(.157) 
 
Investment Spending or Pork (ln)  
 
 
-.016 
(.045) 
 
.001 
(.040) 
 
.045 
(.048) 
 
.099  
(.064) 
 
Effective Number of Parties 
 
 
-.058 ** 
(.029) 
 
-.061 ** 
(.030) 
 
-.082 *** 
(.029) 
 
-.385 *** 
(.069) 
 
Patronage * Effective Number of 
Parties 
 
 
-.100 ** 
(.045) 
 
-.117 *** 
 (.045) 
 
-.091 * 
(.049) 
 
-.269 *** 
(.068) 
 
Pork * Effective Number of Parties 
 
 
.012 
(.017) 
 
.010 
(.016) 
 
.009 
(.016) 
 
-.037 * 
(.020) 
 
Party Normal Vote 
 
 
.236 ** 
(.113) 
 
.237 ** 
(.109) 
 
.189 ** 
(.106) 
 
.230 ** 
(.097) 
 
Incumbent Governor  
 
.036 *** 
(.012) 
 
.028 ** 
(.013) 
 
.034 *** 
(.011) 
 
.046 *** 
(.012) 
 
Political Scandals 
 
-.010 
(.010) 
 
-.003 
(.012) 
 
-.002 
(.012) 
 
-.011 
(.011) 
 
Federal Transfers (ln) 
 
 
.020 *** 
(.004) 
 
.024 *** 
(.003) 
 
.021 *(* 
(.005) 
 
.020 *** 
(.007) 
 
Provincial Unemployment 
 
-.441 ** 
(.181) 
 
-.428 ** 
(.183) 
 
-.420 ** 
(.177) 
 
-.607 *** 
.189 
 
Median Voter’s Income (ln) 
 
 
-.004 
(.033) 
 
-.011 
(.032) 
 
-.013  
(.038) 
 
-.015 
(.027) 
 
Population Density (ln) 
 
 
-.264 *** 
(.078) 
 
-.243 *** 
(.054) 
 
-.318 *** 
(.083) 
 
-.184 ** 
(.085) 
 
Constant 
 
 
-.102 
(.279) 
 
-.126 
(.229) 
 
-.073  
(.252) 
 
.793 ** 
(.273) 
 
R² 
Wald Test 
 
.76 
4994.61 *** 
 
.76 
1153.45 *** 
 
.77 
5518.86 *** 
 
.76 
359.86 *** 
Note: ***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .1. Dependent variable: Provincial Incumbent Party Vote Share. N=115 
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Table 7: Redistributive Spending and Electoral Returns in Gubernatorial Elections. Brazil, 1986-2006 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Personnel Spending or Patronage (ln) 
 
 
-.197 
(.153) 
 
-.201  
(.171) 
 
-.020  
(.145) 
 
-.161 
(.251) 
 
Investment Spending or Pork (ln) 
 
 
.143 ** 
(.048) 
 
.154 ** 
(.061) 
 
.080 * 
(.049) 
 
.141 *** 
(.039) 
 
Effective Number of Parties 
 
 
-.236 *** 
(.041) 
 
-.217 *** 
(.046) 
 
-.202 *** 
(.037) 
 
-.208 *** 
(.058) 
 
Patronage * Effective Number of 
Parties 
 
 
.028 
(.051) 
 
.028  
(.058) 
 
-.039  
(.049) 
 
.036 
(.091) 
 
Pork * Effective Number of Parties 
 
 
-.052 * 
(.018) 
 
-.050 ** 
(.022) 
 
-.011 
(.018) 
 
-.049 *** 
(.014) 
 
Party Normal Vote 
 
 
.019  
(.129) 
 
.062 
(.117) 
 
.035 
(.120) 
 
.042 
(.130) 
 
Incumbent Governor  
 
.101 *** 
(.028) 
 
.101 *** 
(.027) 
 
.119 *** 
(.028) 
 
.106 *** 
(.026) 
 
Political Scandals 
 
-.098 *** 
(.025) 
 
-.091 *** 
(.025) 
 
-.091 *** 
(.025) 
 
-.100 *** 
(.026) 
 
Federal Transfers (ln) 
 
 
.052 ** 
(.017) 
 
.040 ** 
(.019) 
 
.032 * 
(.018) 
 
.063 * 
(.036) 
 
National Unemployment 
 
-2.55 ** 
(1.03) 
 
-.1.95*  
(1.18) 
 
-2.05 ** 
(.894) 
 
-2.42 ** 
(.955) 
 
Median Voter’s Income (ln) 
 
 
.106 ** 
(.047) 
 
.086 ** 
(.041) 
 
.073 * 
(.042) 
 
.015 
(.031) 
 
Population Density (ln) 
 
 
-.011 ** 
(.006) 
 
-.006  
(.004) 
 
-.009   
(.004) 
 
-.012 ** 
(.004) 
 
Constant 
 
 
.423 
(.371) 
 
.473 
(.364) 
 
.619 * 
(.342) 
 
.939 ** 
(.293) 
 
R² 
Wald Test 
 
.63 
188.98 *** 
 
.64 
551.91 *** 
 
.64 
284.91 *** 
 
.61 
155.14 *** 
 Note: ***p ≤ .01, **p ≤.05, *p ≤ .1. Dependent variable: State Incumbent Party Vote Share. N=153 
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The conditional effect of patronage and pork-barrel on incumbent vote share for 
Argentina and Brazil are displayed in Figures 30 and 31.236
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Effective Number of Competing Parties
 The horizontal axis in each figure 
plots the effective number of competing parties through their sample range. The vertical axis 
plots the marginal effect on vote share of spending in patronage (Argentina) and pork (Brazil). 
The middle line in each figure is the estimated conditional effect, while lines above and below 
the middle line depict lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
Note: Personnel spending variable measured in gubernatorial electoral year. 
 
Figure 30: Conditional Effect of Personnel Spending on Gubernatorial Incumbent Party Vote Share. 
Argentina, 1986-2003 
                                                 
236 Note that these figures display government expenditures measured in the election year (Model 1) for Argentine 
provinces and averaged over election and pre-election years (Model 2) for Brazilian states. I opted for reporting 
these displays because they represent the most comprehensive models inasmuch as both fiscal and electoral rules, as 
we have discussed in previous chapters, set important limits to the way in which Brazilian executive incumbents can 
manipulate budgetary expenditures in their last year in office. All other displays are quite similar and are available 
upon request.     
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Note: Investment spending variable averaged gubernatorial electoral and pre-electoral years. 
 
Figure 31: Conditional Effect of Investment Spending on Gubernatorial Incumbent Party Vote Share. Brazil, 
1985-2006 
 
 
The Figure 30 shows that patronage spending in Argentina has a statistically 
distinguishable (at the 5 percent level) positive effect on the percentage of votes received by 
incumbent parties’ candidates whenever competition for provincial executive office is 
approximately 2.6 political parties or lower. Beyond that level of competition, like in the 
provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza during most of the period under analysis, the 
conditional coefficient cannot longer be distinguishable from zero. This finding parallels a rich 
base of prior research that has documented the centrality of support networks build around the 
distribution of public jobs in Argentine politics. With very notable exceptions, however, this 
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literature has conspicuously overlooked to explore the full electoral impact of patronage 
allocations.237
The Figure 31 tells a similar story for pork-barrel spending across Brazilian territorial 
subunits. Expenditures on public infrastructure projects provide positive electoral returns for 
gubernatorial candidates whenever political competition for controlling the governorship is equal 
or lower than 2.7 parties. Far from marginal, such a level of competitiveness characterized nearly 
65 percent of all gubernatorial races held in the country. Important exceptions to this pattern are 
contest to determine governor held in the states of Amapá, Pará, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do 
Sul, Rôndonia, and Sao Paulo.  
 My results serve to fill this critical gap by identifying the electoral markets where 
public sector employment prevails, and demonstrating its relative electoral importance vis-à-vis 
other vote trading strategies based on the provision of semi-public or club goods.  
Having established both cross- and intra-national variation in the way redistributive 
politics matters for territorial power-building, the question remains whether or not this electoral 
impact is substantively significant. To appreciate the substantive significance of my results, 
consider some hypothetical examples based on sample data. Drawing upon my sample, one can 
                                                 
237 In what constitutes the most notable exception to this trend, Calvo and Murillo (2004) argue that the rules of 
Argentine fiscal federalism introduce a partisan bias in the distribution of federal fiscal revenues that encourages 
investment in provincial public employment. Given the geographic concentration of the Peronist vote in the most 
favored provinces, such an allocative bias in turn encourages the PJ –but not the UCR/Alianza- congressional vote. 
My estimates do not reveal any consistent evidence that patronage rewards vary with partisanship. Indeed, dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the provincial incumbent party is the PJ or the UCR/Alianza regularly failed to 
achieve statistical significance. Other methodological differences aside, a possible explanation for this discrepancy 
is that my dependent variable captures gubernatorial (not congressional) electoral patterns for a longer period of 
time. A second possibility would be that Calvo and Murillo rely on a different indicator of patronage spending: the 
number of provincial public employees per 1000 inhabitants. I reestimated models using this variable and dummy 
variables indicating a Peronist and an UCR/Alianza provincial incumbent government. I found no meaningful 
effects of partisanship, while the impact of patronage and pork remained unchanged.  
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define an Argentine province with “high” patronage and “low” gubernatorial competition if its 
variables of personnel spending per elector in the election year (Model 1) and effective number 
of competing parties are .99 or higher and 1.9 or lower (i.e., one standard deviation above/below 
the mean) respectively. In that hypothetical province, as is the case in La Rioja, the overall 
impact of patronage on gubernatorial incumbent vote share is calculated as (.302*.99) + (-
.100*.99*1.9) = .110. In other words, the candidate backed by the provincial incumbent party 
can expect to obtain an additional 11 percent of the vote in this scenario. Similarly, one can 
define a Brazilian state with “high” pork-barrel spending and “low” political competition if its 
variables measuring infrastructure spending per elector and the effective number of parties are 
1.34 or higher and 1.9 or lower respectively. Under these hypothetical circumstances, like those 
present in the state of Bahia in 1998, the model specification predicts that the governing 
candidate can expect to receive an additional 8 percent of the vote.238
To test whether mobilization through patronage and pork-barrel allocations has a timing 
effect that fluctuates in accordance with the electoral cycle, I reestimated separate models for 
each of the four years of a gubernatorial term. Estimations yield a positive but statistically 
insignificant effect for spending strategies in the election year. Setting to one side the incentives 
 Such considerable 
advantages of 11 and 8 percent are high enough to swing a relatively close gubernatorial election 
in favor of the incumbent. Close races with those margins of incumbent victory occurred almost 
36 percent of the time in Argentina and 22 percent of the time in Brazil. 
                                                 
238 The calculation for this hypothetical example is (.154 * 1.34) + (-.05 * 1.34 * 1.9) = .079 
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that incumbents have to spend the most just before elections (Nordhaus 1975; Persson and 
Tabellini 2002; Rogoff and Sibert 1988) or to expand spending after them so as to reward 
supporters and build a new governing coalition (Ames 1987; Remmer 1993, 2007), my findings 
indicate that electoral cycles do not shape the reliance of Argentine and Brazilian voters upon 
patronage and pork distributions targeted in the proximity of a gubernatorial race.  
Although there are some minor differences, statistical results are highly consistent across 
the four specifications. As indicated by the R² values, each specification has a considerable 
overall fit –a fit similar to previous analyses of the subnational vote– which is an assessment of 
the models’ explanatory power. It is first relevant to note that no matter how I estimate the 
models, spending on public infrastructure projects has no real impact on incumbent party support 
across Argentine provinces (see Appendix C, Figure 35). But it clearly has a positive effect in 
Brazilian states with relatively low and moderate levels of political competition (see Appendix 
C, Figure 36). Second, patronage effects in Argentina attain statistical significance in a narrower 
range of provinces in Models 2, 3, and 4 than in Model 1 (see Appendix C, Figure 37). In the 
former specifications, incumbents can expect to gain an additional percentage of the vote 
whenever a province’s level of competitiveness is around 1.8 competing political parties (versus 
2.6 parties in Model 1) or lower.  
Also relevant to notice is that particularistic politics entail redistributive effects that under 
some conditions may bring about electoral costs –rather than benefits– or “negative 
mobilization” (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2006). Because incumbents often trade-off 
budgetary allocations to reward their cohorts, voters excluded from that benefits and those who 
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bear the costs of redistribution are likely to vote against office-holders (Ames 1987; Dixit and 
Londregan 1996). Increasing personnel spending implies cutting off expenditures in other areas 
(in particular, services and investment) as more redundant employees are hired. Pork-barreling 
benefits one or a few districts while charges the costs across all other districts (especially those 
located far away), and generates opportunity costs of investments never done or completed. If 
budgetary tradeoffs reduce support more than they reinforce it, the net electoral effect of 
redistributive spending may be negative. In Argentina, for example, Models 2 and 4 indicate that 
patronage effects become negative in provinces with extremely high –and notoriously rare- 
levels of political competition: in fact with more than 3.5 effective parties.239 But targeting 
public sector allocations does actually undermine electoral support for incumbent parties in a 
wide range of Brazilian states. As Figure 32 shows, in Models 1, 2, and 3 patronage spending has 
a statistically significant negative effect on vote share in intermediate and high ranges of political 
competition.240
 
  
 
                                                 
239 Twelve percent of the sample cases have that level of competition: Buenos Aires (2003), Ciudad de Buenos Aires 
(all its five elections), Córdoba (1999), Rio Negro (2003), San Juan (1987, 1991), Tierra del Fuego (1987, 1991, 
2003), and Tucumán (1987). The figure is only 5 percent if we exclude Ciudad de Buenos Aires and Tierra del 
Fuego, the two provinces with highest per capita income and special intergovernmental fiscal regimes. 
240 Specifically, it has a when competitiveness ranges between 1.7 and 3.4 (Models 1 and 2), or more than 2 (Model 
3) political parties. This result suggests that patronage lends Brazilian gubernatorial incumbents worst returns when 
it is used as a systematic rather than as an opportunistic strategy. 
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Note: Personnel spending variable measured in gubernatorial electoral year. 
 
 
Figure 32: Conditional Effect of Personnel Spending on Gubernatorial Party Vote Share. Brazil, 1985-2006. 
Models 1, 2, and 3 
292 
 
 
 
Why is patronage an efficient electoral strategy in Argentina and an inefficient tool in 
Brazil? And why does pork-barrel investment provide no payoffs to Argentine gubernatorial 
incumbent parties/candidates while it rewards their Brazilian counterparts? As anticipated in 
Chapter 1, my explanation of the electoral efficacy of redistributive politics emphasizes both 
supply-side and demand-side factors and the institutional rules that condition vote trading 
interactions between politicians and citizens.241
Recent models of political clientelism emphasize that the efficacy of patronage 
exchanges are primarily based on the incumbents’ access to private goods (Calvo and Murillo 
2004), and their capacity to monitor the conduct of voters in response to targeted material 
incentives (Kitschelt and Williamson 2007; Magaloni, Diaz Cayeros, and Estevez 2007; 
Magaloni 2007; Medina and Stokes 2007; Robinson and Verdier 2001; Stokes 2005). Chapters 2 
to 4 discussed in detail the differential ability of Argentine and Brazilian governors to deliver 
patronage and club goods.
 On the supply-side, the argument highlights 
incumbents’ access to economic resources and their organizational capabilities to screen voters’ 
electoral behavior. On the demand-side, it points to the role of conservative versus expansive 
fiscal agendas. And on the institutional-side, it underlines the effect of ballot systems and voting 
technologies.  
242
                                                 
241 A complete answer to this question would require micro-level information of voters’ individual predispositions. I 
acknowledge that problems of ecological inference can mar my approach. But notice that the survey approach to this 
issue faces the problem of patronage underreporting. That is, respondents may be reluctant to acknowledge having 
received a job in the public administration as a private reward. 
 But how can politicians be sure that voters will honor their part of 
242 In this discussion that follows, I assume that the more an incumbent can target private goods, the better it can 
solve the commitment problem of voters reneging on their exchange contract once in the voting booths.  
293 
 
 
 
the exchange? The problem is that they can never be sure. Dense organizational networks, 
however, facilitate screening between true loyalists and opponents allowing incumbents to 
punish opportunistic defection and enforce the implicit redistributive contract. In other words, 
patronage strategies provide higher electoral returns where incumbent party organizations with 
extended networks and resources are capable of deterring voters from exit to the opposition.243
On the supply side, I argue that patronage spending is an efficient electoral instrument in 
many Argentine provinces because relevant parties are able to effectively (although imperfectly) 
target individual transfers and condition further rewards by using their strong organizational 
networks. Previous chapters showed that the institutions of fiscal federalism, candidate selection 
rules, and permissive public sector legislation encourage the use of personnel spending to run 
state-level party machines. These machines have the tools to influence the choice of voters and 
then help provincial bosses to win office. During the period under analysis, long-standing and 
bottom-heavy party apparatuses have controlled most provincial governorships in the country. 
Built around a highly decentralized structure that relies on a territorially concentrated army of 
 
Under these conditions, patronage linkages motivate voters to support providers and reinforce a 
social network in which both of them are embedded. Where political parties that are not 
enmeshed in society attempt to buy votes through patronage inducements, voters greet these 
redistributive efforts with major skepticism and express a higher propensity to free ride by 
ignoring the private rewards (or promises) they had received. 
                                                 
243 Of course, parties do not have to actually punish voters but to make a credible threat of punishment. These threats 
can also come from intimation and political coercion. 
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grassroots militants and operatives (punteros), these subnational party machines became deeply 
inserted into the constituents’ communities. They used their social proximity to voters to gain 
knowledge about their party predispositions, and to monitor their voting behavior (Alvarez 1999; 
Auyero 2000; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005).244
Compared with Argentina’s traditional parties, Brazil’s parties are organizationally 
weaker, far less enmeshed in society, and have less resources to sponsor activities. Even though 
parties’ commitment to organization varies across states, clientele networks around the country 
have traditionally been individually dominated rather than party-oriented and controlled.
 When 
interactions between solid party structures and voters became sustained over time and when 
incumbents garnered richer economic resources than their opponents, patronage is likely to 
generate a “self-enforcing group equilibrium” (Kitschelt and Williamson 2007) that served the 
governing elite to endure its political monopoly. At the extreme, patronage-based regimes 
sustained on a territorially scattered and functionally differentiated troupe of party brokers, 
intermediaries, and militants who operate at a fine-grained level actually sidestep the voting 
booth by spying on voters.  
245
                                                 
244 Stokes (2005) reports that nearly 40 percent of the respondents in a survey conducted in 2003 (500 adults in the 
provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Misiones, and San Luis) affirmed that party operatives can find out how a 
person has voted. In marked contrast, less than 10 percent of the interviewees in a four-wave panel study conducted 
in the Brazilian cities of Juiz do Fora and Caxias do Sul manifested having had personal contact with party 
operatives (Barker, Ames, and Renno 2006). 
 
Furthermore, political machines have usually operated at the local or municipal-level facing 
245 Weak organizational commitment and a small base of partisan identifiers are not attributes of the PT and the PC 
do B. To a lesser extent and depending on the period under analysis, the PPS, the PSOL, and the PDT also cultivated 
intra-party organizational networks.  
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institutional impediments to expand their territorial influence to entire states. Besides the 
comparatively weak identification and socialization of Brazilian citizens with political parties, I 
have contended that three institutional factors are partially responsible for this pattern. First, 
Brazilian federalism grants municípios –and then local elites- significant fiscal and political 
autonomy. Second, electoral and candidate nomination rules foster individual careerism and 
campaigning. And third, restrictive legislation limits discretionality over personnel spending and 
appointments in the public sector. In the absence of tentacle-like organizational structures (with 
the notable exceptions of the PT and the PC do B) capable of developing strong and stable roots 
in society, Brazilian parties are less capable of making inferences about how individuals vote and 
whether or not they are good candidates for patronage vote buying. Monitoring in this scenario is 
more symmetrical among different competing forces and individual opportunistic defection is 
therefore more likely.246
                                                 
246 Why do Brazilian politicians resort to patronage strategies if they do not provide net electoral payoffs? The most 
obvious answer is that they miscalculate patronage effects or fail in designing their strategies. A more promising 
response points to the fact that different incumbents resort to different distributive strategies. Preliminary evidence 
subject to further investigation seems to indicate that the use of patronage and pork-barrel resources is conditional 
upon incumbents’ own political ambitions and chances of election. I estimated several models which suggest that 
subnational patronage in Brazil is primarily used by gubernatorial incumbents who do not run for reelection and, 
consequently, have little incentives to refrain opportunistic and rent-seeking behavior. When state governors decide 
not to (or cannot) run for a new mandate they are more prone to relentless spend their last time in office granting 
favors and employment to close supporters.  
 This structure of politics has constituted a fertile ground for a multitude 
of regional politicians to compete for popular votes, making enduring subnational leadership in 
contemporary Brazil the exception rather than the norm. Because organizational penetration is 
weak and incumbent parties have difficulties to repeatedly win elections, voters have little 
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incentives to back exchanges based on the provision of public jobs as they anticipate that the 
patronage interaction will not continue in the long future. 
The regression results above provides cross-state systematic evidence of the extent to 
which parties in both countries are rooted in society and, consequently, are more or less 
conducive to durable patronage linkages. Where political parties are deeply enmeshed in social 
networks, most voters regularly support the same political party in different elections. 
Conversely, where parties have weak social ties, voters (and parties themselves) are more 
inclined to shift electoral allegiances over time. Statistical results reflect the underlying 
difference in the way partisan attachments or loyalties –or even the long-term value of a party’s 
name- in Argentina and Brazil distinctively shape subnational citizens-politicians linkages. 
Estimates for the normal vote variable indicate that gubernatorial incumbent candidates in the 
former but not in the latter federation may have a good idea of how they may fare. In all 
Argentina’s model specifications, this variable produces a positive and statistically significant (at 
the 5 percent level) coefficient of at least .23 suggesting that voting patterns are relatively stable 
through time. When estimations are run without an intercept (i.e., the regression line is forced 
through the origin), coefficients are no lower than .19. Thus, a candidate from the provincial 
incumbent party in Argentina can expect to obtain around 20 percent of the party’s normal vote, 
ceteris paribus.247
                                                 
247 There is some agreement among observers of Argentine politics that the country’s 2001 crisis frayed the national 
party system by consummating the UCR’s debacle and fostering PJ’s internecine divisions. I include a dummy 
variable for the 2003 gubernatorial elections to test whether the political and financial crisis affected gubernatorial 
incumbent parties at the provincial level. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this variable has a positive sign and 
 In contrast, as anticipated by our previous discussion, coefficients for the 
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normal vote variable across Brazilian states are extremely low and never remotely close to 
achieving statistical significance.  
A second important factor to explain variation in the electoral returns reaped from 
patronage investment is located at the demand-side of public policies: the electoral fiscal 
agendas. In Argentina, as several scholars before me have noticed, the federal government of 
Raúl Alfonsín was unable to implement a fiscal reform program that punished provincial 
spending profligacy and constrained subnational borrowing, while the administration of Carlos 
Menem strategically delayed the implementation of fiscal adjustment policies –including the 
rationalization of the administrative sector- in the provinces in exchange for legislative support 
(Gibson and Calvo 2001; Wibbels 2005). During the short-lived Alianza government and the 
years following the 2001 devastating economic collapse, provincial governors continued to show 
remarkable strength and stamina stymieing efforts to reform fiscal policies, especially when it 
affected financial matters in their fiefdoms. Many provinces even assumed the right of 
seigniorage by issuing bonds to pay public sector workers. Fueled by week national constraints 
and strong institutional incentives to overspend, provinces have showed a chronic tendency to 
structural fiscal deficits. Overspending tended to concentrate in personnel categories at the 
expense of investments, while fiscal deficits were typically financed through provincial and 
commercial banks with the tacit guarantee of the Central Bank. Perhaps induced by “systemic” 
forces that implicitly combated subnational fiscal discipline, voters received no cues that 
                                                                                                                                                             
reaches significance at the 5 percent level. Substantively speaking, its coefficient indicates that incumbents obtained 
an additional 9 to 10 percent of the vote in the 2003 provincial executive contests. 
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subnational governments were held responsible for their provinces’ fiscal health. Argentine 
voters have had the perception, reinforced by some members in Congress, that provincial deficits 
and debts were not a problem in large part caused by state-level officials. But even when voters 
could have wrongly attributed responsibility for provincial fiscal outcomes to the federal 
government, the fact is that electoral agendas were never dominated by the issue of fiscal 
stabilization.  
Throughout the 1980s and most part of the 1990s, the vast majority of Brazilian states 
also ran large fiscal deficits and experienced major debt crises. But once the benefits of the 
Plano Real were stabilized, state governments began, at different paces, to incorporate the 
conservative fiscal agenda designed by the federal administration. Unlike its predecessors, the 
government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso counted on political support for fiscal reform in the 
business sector (Kingstone 1999), and among centrist and rightist parties in Congress (Power 
1998). Moreover, central monetary institutions and financial regulators gained leverage over 
states to implement restrictions on subnational spending and borrowing. Under the Program to 
Support Restructuring and Fiscal Adjustment, the federal government negotiated the terms of 
state debt workouts, which required privatizing provincially-owned banks, reducing personnel 
costs, and limiting borrowing activities. These fiscal pressures to the states, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3, were progressively enhanced with the enactment of the Camata Law, the Kandir Law, 
and the Fiscal Responsibility Law. Precisely because the central government was heavily 
involved in regulating transcendental fiscal decisions of the states, it created expectations among 
voters and the mass media that governors could not reasonably claim that states’ finances were 
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beyond their responsibility. The Brazilian electorate thus became strongly inflation averse and 
unprepared to support governments favoring unorthodox fiscal practices. Indeed, according to 
some observers, the adoption of an external (federal) conservative fiscal agenda did not affect –
and in some cases increased- gubernatorial incumbents’ territorial bases of support (Souza 2007). 
My estimates confirm the expected effect of fiscal electoral agendas on incumbent vote 
share in the two countries. In the absence of survey responses, any measure of voters’ fiscal 
concerns must rely on actual economic outcomes. This is the justification for the inclusion in the 
model of the fiscal policy management variable, the ratio of state fiscal deficit (total revenues 
minus total expenditures) relative to expenditures.248
                                                 
248 Controlling for state debt interest payments did not affect the results discussed below. Because the impact of 
fiscal performance on the real economy is not immediate, this variable is measured as the averaged value of the 
election and pre-election years, and the averaged value of the four years of each gubernatorial term. To facilitate 
discussion, results are not reported in the tables.  
 Increases in total spending should have a 
negative effect on vote share because it necessarily entails higher taxes in the future. But, if as 
suggested above, Argentine voters are not fiscal conservatives, this variable should have a 
negative sign indicating that the higher the level of deficit spending (and public employment 
expenditures), the greater the incumbent share of the vote. If, on the other hand, Brazilian voters 
are fiscal conservatives, this variable should be positively signed indicating that the higher the 
fiscal deficit the lower the incumbent vote. In all Argentina’s equations, the variable carries a 
negative and statistically significant (at the 1 or 5 percent level) coefficient suggesting that 
regional voters do reward provincial governing elites for running unhealthy finances. Although 
results are more sensitive to econometric specification, the fiscal policy management variable is 
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often positive and significant in most Brazil’s models. This results suggests that deficit financing 
does not matter politically as Brazilian voters punish spending increases regardless of whether 
they are financed by taxes or borrowing.  
In addition to dense organizational networks and expansive fiscal electoral agendas, 
certain voting technologies and balloting systems facilitate patronage vote buying by helping 
parties to monitor voters’ choices. Argentina uses a system that gives parties great control over 
individual voters. Balloting is secret and takes place in enclosed booths but, contrary to the 
Australian ballot system, ballots are paper-based, produced by political parties, and distributed 
by party workers well before the election. Each party has therefore a different paper ballot with 
all candidates for all elected categories included on it. Individual candidates for executive offices 
and party lists for legislative positions appear on separate tickets in the same party ballot.249
                                                 
249 In the Australian ballot system, all candidates or lists of candidates for a given office appear listed in the same 
single format, while government agencies produce and distribute the ballots under controlled conditions on or close 
to the election day. 
 This 
ballot structure contributes to vote inducement and monitoring. First, it enhances parties’ power 
to force straight-ticket voting. When many categories are elected on the same day, it is simply 
“expensive” for voters to split tickets (vote for different parties in different categories) because it 
requires them to actually cut the ballot by hand. Second, it allows parties to keep track of turnout 
and voting patterns (punteo) through different mechanisms. Local punteros distribute ballots in 
their territorial areas of responsibility weeks before the election day along with other private 
material goods (bags of food building materials, clothes, or mattresses) sending a clear message 
that such individualistic favors are expected to be reciprocated with a vote. Although voters can 
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obtain ballots anonymously in the voting booth, many individuals receive them directly from 
party operatives before going to vote and even in the voting line. Handing out ballots also serves 
to monitoring voters through more complex forms of vote buying such as the chain-vote (voto 
cadena). 
In Brazil, the pioneering adoption in 1996 of a user-friendly electronic voting system 
known as direct-recording electronic voting (DRE) reduced monitoring and vote trafficking by 
impeding parties and candidates to violate the secrecy of the ballot (Nicolau 2002). The 
utilization of these devises raises important questions concerning whether, and if so how, 
electronic elections can be audited meaningfully.250
                                                 
250 The mayor problem is that DREs do not allow for manual recounts of the (digital) votes because they do not emit 
any material prove that the vote was received by the system and tallied. 
 Questions of electoral fraud aside, the 
fundamental issue here is why the Brazilian voting system is less amenable to monitoring and 
then to increasing patronage returns. The DRE system is less opened to patronage because it 
reduces party activists’ involvement into the electoral process. By impeding party brokers from 
manipulating ballots before the election, it weakens the efficiency of vote inducements through 
personal gifts/threats and face-to-face interaction. Moreover, because party operatives cannot 
stuff ballots into the voters’ pockets and voters do not return ballots to party operatives (recall 
that voters never get printed slips of their choices but only saw them behind a window), the 
system also eliminates monitoring mechanisms such as the chain vote. Brazilian parties 
undoubtedly compensate these institutional constraints to monitor voting behavior by performing 
a range of other actions that enhance their ability to make informed guesses. But as several 
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features of the country’s political system are inimical to the formation of party organizational 
structures –at least in comparison with Argentina–, these activities are circumscribed to local 
territorial domains where autonomous political elites control the scene. Politicians thus need to 
carve out rather reliable electorates, and pork-barrel appears as a potent instrument to claim 
credit and fulfill that goal. 
With respect to the other independent variables, they mostly perform in conformity with 
my theoretical expectations. Unsurprisingly, Argentine and Brazilian governors enjoy the 
benefits of incumbency. An incumbent governor who runs for reelection in Argentina is expected 
to get a boost of about 2.8 to 4.6 percent of the vote (that is, coefficients for this variable across 
the four specifications range from .028 to .046), while Brazilian gubernatorial incumbents 
seeking a second executive mandate are expected to obtain a higher increment of around 10 to 12 
percent of the vote.251
                                                 
251 As we have seen in Chapter 1, however, this result does not mean that individual governors are more successful 
in Brazil than in Argentina. Actually, they are not. 
 Replacing the indicator of incumbency with a dummy variable measuring 
whether or not the sitting governor runs for other elected position but the governorship, yields 
insignificant results. At least two reasons may explain why departing governors do not enhance 
their fellow candidates’ vote. First, estimates may be biased downward because of an omitted 
variable problem: unpopular governors tend not run for reelection, which leaves them in the 
departing category. Second, some outgoing governors plan to return to state executive office 
after a term out of the governorship. In an attempt to limit the consolidation of future 
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challengers, they may decide not to mobilize significant resources and perks that would facilitate 
their successors to compete for popular votes and build independent machine structures.  
In the context of Argentine subnational politics, internal factionalism in both hegemonic 
and non-hegemonic parties is a major source of organized challengers. To a larger extent this is 
so because, as the popular adagio that opens this chapter states, political structures tend to move 
behind those leaders who currently control public jobs and government resources. This 
particularity causes many former governors to desist from any attempt to recapture the 
governorship. A relatively decent number of them, however, do run for provincial executive 
office once again although with little electoral success. Specifically, 30 percent of the 105 
individuals (reelected excluded) who occupied an Argentine governorship between 1983 and 
2003, tried to return to that office. As much as two-third of them failed in their attempts, and 
close to a half did it against a fellow candidate in a party primary or the Ley de lemas. In Brazil, 
nearly 50 percent of the 107 governors (reelected and tampão excluded) from the 1982-2006 
period sought to return, and a similar proportion of them (65 percent) failed. Consistent with 
observed party switching in Brazilian politics, 36 percent of these “returners” switched party to 
maximize their chances of electoral success. Yet there is a negative effect of party switching on 
returners’ election as only 14 percent of them eventually won the contest in question. In short, 
considering the low likelihood of regaining executive office, governors who do not run for 
reelection and plan to return in the near future have little incentives to promote their co-partisan 
candidates through budgetary allocations. 
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Interestingly enough, political scandals do not affect the electoral performance of 
provincial incumbent parties/candidates in Argentina but they do emerge as a statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent level) determinant of gubernatorial vote losses in Brazil.252 It is 
estimated that if a Brazilian governor or vice-governor incurred in irregularities during the four-
year term of office, incumbent vote share is reduced by 9/10 percent. An interaction term 
between the scandal and incumbent reelection variables generates interesting results. In line with 
scholarly literature that emphasizes the deterrence effect of reelection over incumbent rent-
seeking behavior (Besley and Case 1995b; Ferejohn 1986; Persson and Tabelini 2000), scandals 
only affect candidates backed by governors who do not run for reelection. But in contrast to 
theoretical expectations, governors seeking a second term do not refrain more than lame ducks 
from rent extraction and abuse of power. For reasons whose analysis is beyond the focus of this 
dissertation, both types of governors commit irregularities in almost the same proportion.253
                                                 
252 Why did political scandals ultimately not sink the electoral performance of Argentine subnational incumbents 
while they affect the fortunes of Brazilian state-level officials? Perhaps, the reasons have to do with a different 
development of television networks, corporate media groups, and the professionalization of newsroom that created 
greater incentives for Brazilian politicians to use scandal as a political weapon. Indeed, although these trends have 
been common to most Latin American countries, they have been dramatic in the case of Brazil (see Pérez-Liñán 
2007: Chapter 4).  
 It 
rather seems that some incumbents caught engaging in corrupt practices counted on a better 
protection against popular electoral sanctions. Protection, of course, may take many different 
253 These numbers are 31 and 26 percent respectively. For a compelling framework on the corruption-reelection link, 
see Pereira, Melo, and Figuereido (2008). In a panel of 184 municipalities in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, the 
authors do not find evidence on the governance-enhancing role of reelection incentives as first-term mayors are not 
less likely to commit irregularities than do second-term ones. The effect of corruption over electoral success, on the 
other hand, indicates that mayors who committed irregularities while in office are less likely to be reelected. Such an 
effect, however, only occurs if information about mayors’ misbehavior is released in the electoral year.  
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forms including privileges when responding to criminal charges, control of the judiciary and the 
mass media, intimidation, and cooptation. 
Also consistent with my expectations is the effect of federal fiscal transfers upon 
subnational incumbent vote. In both Argentina and Brazil, regardless of how this variable is 
operationalized, it often reaches statistically significant coefficients (at the .5 or .01 level) in all 
model specifications..254
Evidence regarding the impact of national and state macroeconomic conditions offers 
some empirical insights about how subnational incumbents are punished or rewarded by rational 
voters. In a nutshell, a variety of tests points toward the importance of provincial influences in 
Argentina and of national influences in Brazil. The estimates for the former federation suggest 
that incumbent vote share decreases with provincial unemployment and increases, although less 
consistently, with provincial economic growth. Estimations including both indicators separately 
 Note that the transfer variables included in the models do not capture 
the potential political value of other federal tools (such as central government social programs, 
and direct infrastructure investments) usually regarded as key instruments for territorial coalition 
building. Furthermore, as one expects, coefficients for federal transfers under gubernatorial 
discretionality (not reported) most of the times double or triple in size coefficients of transfers 
under exclusive presidential authority.  
                                                 
254 Note that Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 only report results of the federal transfer variable measured as total annual 
transfers per elector averaged over the four years of each gubernatorial term. Models for Argentina including this 
variable as measured by transfers discretionally managed by the governor as coded in Chapter 2 and 3 also generate 
significant coefficients. 
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produce coefficients that achieve statistical significance at the 5 percent level.255
Unlike provincial conditions, national performance as measured by unemployment, GDP 
growth, and inflation do not have any discernible effect on subnational vote choice. Models 
including these variables routinely produce insignificant coefficients, suggesting that Argentina’s 
gubernatorial elections are regional contests not driven by national swings. If we include the 
national economic indicators, a dummy variable for provincial incumbent parties sharing the 
president’s party label, and the interaction of the two terms, results remain unaltered whereas the 
conditional coefficient for the interaction does not reach statistical significance. In other words, 
presidential co-partisan candidates are not particularly affected by the overall condition of the 
 If both variables 
are included in the analysis, easier coefficients for economic growth are significant at the less 
stringent 10 percent level. Substantively, a one percent increase in the provincial unemployment 
rate undermines incumbent electoral support by about 0.4 to 0.6 percent. A similar increment in 
provincial economic growth fosters incumbent support in Argentine provinces by almost 0.2 
percent. Despite multicollinearity, coefficients for provincial unemployment remain statistically 
significant if national economic factors are included (either individually or simultaneously) in the 
estimates. Yet if we replace the indicators of provincial unemployment with those of provincial 
economic growth, results are weaker. The coefficients for GDP growth remain significant across 
the four models if national economic indicators are included individually but not if there are 
included simultaneously. 
                                                 
255 To make the presentation simpler, I only report results for specifications including the provincial (Argentina) and 
national (Brazil) unemployment rates. All other models are available upon request.  
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economy. This finding is at odds with the referendum voting hypothesis and some prior studies 
on the matter discussed in this chapter (Remmer and Gélineau 2003; Gélineau and Remmer 
2005). Contrary to this interpretation, my findings stress that although the president’s provincial 
co-partisans do better than candidates from opposition parties (the incumbent vote share variable 
has a mean of 52 and 44 percent respectively), they do not reveal strong linkages with the 
economic performance of the national administration.256
                                                 
256 Using a different dependent variable from that employed here (i.e., the vote share received by presidential –not 
provincial- in-party gubernatorial candidates), Remmer and Gélineau (2003, 2005) contend that that the fortunes of 
candidates from the presidential party are conditioned by national economic factors, especially unemployment and 
inflation, and approval rates of the sitting president. Provincial economic conditions also matters but only to credit 
or blame the presidential party. In contrast, relying on the same dependent variable used in this chapter, Rodden and 
Wibbels (2005) find that the impact of the national economy is weak across Argentine provinces and conditional 
upon intergovernmental co-partisanship. The impact of national economic conditions, however, runs in a perverse 
way since provincial incumbent candidates who do not share the party affiliation of the president actually benefit for 
good national economic performance. Among Argentine scholars, Meloni (2000), and Porto and Porto (2000) also 
argue, like me, that national economic assessments do not influence subnational electoral results. 
 Indeed, national economic factors only 
seem to be considered as referential points to reward or punish provincial office-holders. 
Estimations with the “relative” unemployment variable (not reported) show that a one percent 
increment in the national unemployment rate relative to the provincial rate leads to a boost of 
around 0.5 percent in the vote of gubernatorial incumbents regardless of their political affiliation. 
The impact of “relative” GDP, on the other hand, runs in the expected direction but estimates 
often fail to attain statistical significance. At the aggregate level of analysis, therefore, absolute 
and relative provincial unemployment constitute the most electorally salient dimensions of 
economic performance in Argentina. This finding is not surprising considering that over the past 
fifteen years unemployment rather than inflation has represented the major source of economic 
insecurity in the country. A logical implication of these results would be that Argentina’s 
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subnational governments reaping the blame or credit for their economic performance confront 
incentives to perform in accordance with the preferences of local electorates. Inferences, 
however, should be drawn with caution. Provincial performance matters but aggregate data 
cannot tell us whether it does in ways that bolster accountability of policy management. 
Actually, we have seen that voters do not punish but reward provincial governments’ reckless 
fiscal behavior.  
Do Brazilian gubernatorial elections revolve around state or national economic 
performance? First, and in contrast to what we observe across Argentina’s provinces, I find 
consistent evidence indicating that the conditions of the local economy exercise no influence on 
gubernatorial vote choice (when holding national economic performance constant). Models 
reduced in the number of cases due to missing data indicate that no significant relation exists (at 
the 10 percent level or lower) between state unemployment and incumbent vote. Estimations 
with state GDP also remain statistically insignificant as do analyses including relative 
unemployment and relative economic growth. Second, models conducted with national 
indicators speak to a pattern of moderate influences. In particular, support for gubernatorial 
incumbents in Brazil appears to fluctuate negatively with national unemployment and inflation, 
and positively with national GDP. But due to high multicollinearity, the effect of these factors is 
sensitive to model specifications. Signs of national economic voting are discernible if the 
national economic variables are included separately in the estimates attaining significance at the 
5 or 10 percent level. But if incumbent support is regressed on all tree national indicators, only 
inflation remains negatively significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Dividing the sample into time periods helps clarify this issue. If Brazilian voters punish 
and reward state incumbents for how the national economy works, we should expect the effect of 
inflation to be particularly significant in the devastating high-inflationary period prior to the 
introduction of the Real Plan. Similarly, we should expect unemployment to negatively affect 
gubernatorial races in the last decade or so, period in which it almost double from 4 to 8 percent. 
I find evidence of both patterns. The signs of inflation and unemployment rate are consistently 
negative only during the 1982-1994 and 1998-2006 periods respectively. Utilizing an interaction 
term to assess the difference between gubernatorial incumbents belonging to the presidential 
cabinet coalition and to the opposition, yields a striking result: inflation only harms presidential 
incumbents while unemployment undermines both.  
With the inclusion of societal and demographic variables, the effects of patronage and 
pork-barrel spending remain unaltered. Argentine subnational incumbent parties/candidates 
continue to benefit from public employment targeting while Brazilians reap gains from 
expenditures in infrastructure investment projects. Regarding the socio-demographic factors, 
some of them produce the expected effects, others do not. First, neither the median income of the 
economically active population nor the structure of the provincial economy (as measured by the 
percentage of the workforce formally employed in agriculture and manufacturing activities) 
affects subnational incumbent performance in Argentina. Estimates for the former variable are 
often negative while coefficients for the latter (not reported) are positive but in both cases far 
from attain statistical significance. In Brazil, state incumbents do better in jurisdictions with 
higher per capita income and worse in areas with more industry as indicated by the negative sign 
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of the manufacturing employment variable (not reported).257
Why do incumbents do better in less urbanized and less populated areas? The reason lies 
in the greater ease of vote monitoring in small communities. Actually, community size and 
geographic dispersion are proxies for observability of residents’ votes. In small towns and cities 
where social relations are multifaceted, voters are less anonymous, politicians are more present, 
and partisan predispositions are more a matter of public knowledge. Party organizations are 
therefore more able to credibly commit to helping (or excluding) individuals who vote (or don’t 
vote) for them. Moreover, sparsely populated communities –which are typically small 
constituencies-, are small markets where political monopolies and patronage-like activities are 
more likely to exist (Media and Stokes 2007). In large cities, voter heterogeneity, urban mass 
media, easy transportation to the ballot, alternative sources of employment and social mobility, 
and a greater menu of electoral choices make monitoring and patronage relations more difficult 
to develop. The inclusion of regional dummy variables appears to confirm this argument. In the 
four Argentina’s models, a variable indicating the metropolitan provinces is often negative and 
 Second, we observe that in both 
countries incumbent vote share tend to decrease in less urbanized states. Given the spatial 
distribution of Argentine and Brazilian populations, measures of urbanization tend to correlate 
with those of total population (.63 and .59 respectively). Indeed, replacing the population density 
variable by the natural log of the state population generates identical results.  
                                                 
257 A possible explanation for this result, as Ebeid and Rodden (2006) explain for the U.S. case, is that the economic 
well-being of the population in agriculture regions is driven by factors that are beyond the control of state officials 
such as the value of fixed assets and commodities in international markets. In a more diversified and modern 
economy, state governments have more influence over local welfare as it is linked to investment capital, the 
presence of propitious investment environments, and a skilled workforce. 
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significant at the .1 or .05 level, while a variable denoting the provinces located at the very poor 
Northwest and Northeast attain positive coefficients that are consistently significant at the more 
stringent .01 level. In Brazil, on other hand, regional variables where politics has long been 
dominated by conservative politicians –the Northern and Northeastern states- are positively 
signed but statistically insignificant.258
Having reported my statistical results and offered substantive explanations, it is important 
to consider whether the whole analysis is subject to question because of a potential endogeneity 
problem. The fundamental issue here is that incumbent vote share and government spending may 
be reciprocally related. Candidates spend in reaction to their anticipated electoral chances and 
other candidates’ spending priorities. In particular, candidates who appear to have a better 
chance of winning should have an easier time spending money. If incumbents face no serious 
competition, they may win by large margins without spending much. If they find in a dogfight 
against a well-qualified challenger, they spend reactively and, although they win more often than 
 Furthermore and in line with some of my findings, 
regions where the bulk of Brazilian industry and left-centrist electorates exist –the Southern 
states- are less prone to support incumbents as suggesting by the negative and significant 
coefficient (at the .05 level) routinely attained by that variable. An obvious implication of this 
analysis is that although in certain areas patronage and traditional styles of politics may still 
prevail, reforms that shrank the scope and resource base for state patronage have diminished its 
prevalence.  
                                                 
258 A triple interaction among patronage spending, competitiveness, and the North-Northeast variable also generated 
insignificant results.  
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not, their vote shares are lower than those of their unchallenged colleagues. As candidates who 
knew they were in trouble heading into an election will spend more even if the extra spending do 
not enhance their vote share, spending would appear, misleadingly, to depress the incumbent’s 
support (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1996). This creates an endogeneity problem: anticipated poor 
electoral performance might cause more spending, rather than spending cause poor electoral 
performance. 
I provide two answers, one analytical and the other methodological, to this potential 
problem. First, there are lots of factors identified as affecting anticipated electoral performance 
(such as challenger quality, and ideological proximity with the constituency) that are often 
poorly measured or not measured at all. Second, there are no conventions regarding how to deal 
with endogeneity in interactive models. The question is whether or not interaction terms should 
be instrumented as well. An additional problem is that in models with fixed effects the 
endogenous variables Xt-1 or Xt-2 cannot be used as instruments because they are related to the 
error term ε t-1 and ε t-2 of the fixed effect equation respectively.259
                                                 
259 Actually, all the values of the lagged X are related to some past value of the error term. In other words, in fixed 
and random effect models all instrumental variables must be strictly exogenous or unrelated to past, current, or 
future values of the error term. 
 In the absence of outside 
exogenous variables available to add as an instrument set, I decided to estimate an augmented 
regression or Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). I 
obtained a high p value which indicates that OLS estimates were consistent. Since I do not find 
evidence of a reverse impact of spending on incumbent vote share in my data, we can be 
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confident that patronage and pork-barrel investment play an important role in explaining 
gubernatorial elections and territorial power building in both Argentina and Brazil.  
5.5 CONCLUSION   
Building upon distributive approaches to electoral politics, this chapter has demonstrated that 
gubernatorial incumbents in Argentina and Brazil obtain different returns from different 
particularistic allocations of public outlays. Perhaps most important, it has shown that state 
incumbents in these prominent Latin American federations garner electoral rewards from 
different redistributive mechanisms of mobilization. Patronage investment benefits subnational 
incumbents in Argentina but not in Brazil, while pork-barrel spending provides net electoral 
premiums in Brazil but not in Argentina. I argued that, along with incumbents’ latitude to 
manage patronage and pork-barrel resources, three factors help explain variation in the effect of 
particularistic spending in both countries: organizational tools, electoral fiscal agendas, and 
voting technologies. Where dense party networks are enmeshed in society, electoral agendas do 
not punish fiscal profligacy, and the balloting system undermines the anonymity of the vote, 
voters are more likely to reward incumbents for private good allocations. In contrast, where party 
structures have weak social ties, electoral agendas incorporate fiscal conservative principles, and 
voting technologies make it difficult for parties/candidates to monitor individual choices, credit 
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claiming prevails and voters are then more likely to reward incumbents for semi-public (local or 
club) good allocations.  
In addition to uncovering the electoral impact of budgetary policy manipulation, this 
chapter has offered several pieces of empirical evidence for our understanding of subnational 
elections in federalized regimes. First, my statistical findings provide partial support for the 
established literature on economic voting, which suggests that the electoral fortune of the 
incumbent party revolves around its economic performance in office. Provincial economic 
performance, whether measured in absolute or relative terms to national economic performance, 
exercises a significant influence on gubernatorial election outcomes in Argentina but not in 
Brazil. My results also confronts to the traditional literature on referendum voting in showing 
that national economic swings affect the vote share of regional incumbents that belong to the 
presidential party coalition in Brazil but not in Argentina. Second, the evidence discussed here 
suggests that incumbency gives an advantage to sitting governors who run for reelection over 
new-comers. Third, consistent with scholarly work on party systems, the party’s normal vote 
gives incumbents across Argentine provinces –but not across their Brazilian counterparts– a 
good idea of how they may fare. Fourth, because of reasons that go beyond the scope of this 
chapter, political scandals only affect subnational incumbents’ electoral performance in Brazil. 
Fifth, the relative magnitude of federal transfers discretionally controlled by the sitting governor 
appears to affect electoral support for the incumbent party/candidate. Finally, when societal and 
demographic factors are considered into the analysis, it indicates that community structure and 
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size rather than voters’ income levels ultimately shape the electoral efficiency of vote buying 
strategies. 
Having discussed the institutional foundations of subnational redistributive politics in 
Argentina and Brazil and identified cross-state variation in the strategic use and returns reaped 
from patronage and pork-barrel spending, the next step in my research agenda would be to 
increase analytical resolution by carrying out a case-study approach of two states in each country 
that match on socioeconomic and demographic conditions –at least for the whole range of 
subnational cases– but exhibit quite distinct internal politics, especially regarding the structure of 
political competition and the nature of territorial political machines.  
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6.0  OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS  
I began this dissertation with the general idea that much of the emerging literature on fiscal 
federalism and decentralization has overlooked an analysis of within-state political phenomena. 
Specifically, I emphasized that what is still missing in the field of comparative politics is an 
understanding of the strategies that subnational incumbents (i.e., state governors) deploy for 
governing the countryside. I focused on state governors’ relative preferences for two types of 
redistributive or particularistic strategies: patronage (public employment) and pork-barrel (public 
infrastructure and capital projects).  
I proposed a comparative theoretical framework tying different types of fiscal institutions 
and electoral/partisan rules to different spending incentives for state governors to strategically 
allocate public outlays with electoral goals. The model predicts that state governors will prefer to 
spend on patronage allocations when fiscal institutions concentrate access to federal transfers at 
the state level and grant subnational executives high political latitude over such funds, and the 
electoral system and intra-party nomination rules maximize gubernatorial control of political 
careers. By contrast, governors will prefer to spend on pork-barrel goods when the institutions of 
fiscal federalism disperse access to federal grants among multiple political actors located at 
317 
 
 
 
different levels of government (in particular, governors, mayors, and congressional legislators) 
and limit gubernatorial discretion over funds transferred from the center, and the electoral and 
partisan rules place control of political careers on the hands of individual politicians.       
The paramount causal mechanisms through which fiscal institutions shape gubernatorial 
incentives toward patronage and pork are the “rentier” and “barriers to entry” effects. Where 
states rely intensively on discretionary federal transfers (i.e., fiscal rents) rather than on their own 
revenue sources, governors can overspend such resources on financing a large state apparatus. 
The reason is that subnational rentierism breaks the fiscal accountability link between citizens 
and state officials, and leads economically dependent individuals and groups to withdraw from 
challenging subnational incumbents in the electoral market. Under such conditions, governors 
who are uncertain about how citizens will respond to targeted material benefits will prefer to 
supply private goods (patronage) to their electoral cohorts instead of semi-public goods (pork) to 
swing voters. By contrast, where states rely on broad-based domestic taxation to finance their 
expenditure responsibilities and governors enjoy little discretion over federal transfer funds, 
gubernatorial spending choices are more likely to be monitored by local taxpayers and 
opposition forces are more likely to challenge incumbents. To differentiate themselves from their 
potential competitors and assemble the electoral acquiescence of economic groups and voters, 
governors will prefer to draw upon their pork-barrel credit-claiming ability rather than upon the 
oversupply of jobs in the state administration.  
With regards to the effect of party and candidate centeredness on gubernatorial spending 
priorities, the key causal mechanism posited that where governors control political careerism and 
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campaign finance individual politicians and politically-oriented bureaucrats in the public sector 
became dependent from subnational bosses to fulfill their personal ambitions. Thus, governors 
can resort to a spoils system financed with state resources to induce participation in their political 
machineries. Because such participation is an observable service, patronage exchanges are 
profitable for both state bosses and ambitious politicians. Where state incumbents do not control 
political careerism, in contrast, governors lack formal mechanisms to attract participation and 
reward compliance. Individual politicians and ambitious bureaucrats find it more profitable to 
cultivate a personal vote than to line up behind state leaders. This decision typically involves 
satisfying local constituents with parochial policies and pork-barrel goods. A party-centered 
system therefore provides a superior technology for patronage linkages while a candidate-
centered system gives pork-barreling a more prominent role in party politics and the electoral 
process. These connections, I contended, are reinforced or undermined by the public personal 
system. A system founded on stable civil service rules and professionalized ranks of government 
employees diminishes the control that party leaders have over bureaucratic careers, thus reducing 
the scope of patronage. 
I examined the impact of fiscal and electoral/partisan institutional rules on subnational 
particularism in two prominent Latin American federations, Argentina and Brazil, widely 
regarded as textbook examples of “robust” federalism. I developed several empirical tests to 
examine my arguments. First, I compared the institutions of fiscal federalism in both countries. 
My theory highlighted that three fiscal institutional factors (i.e., the level of subnational vertical 
fiscal imbalance, the allocation mechanisms that regulate the distribution of federal transfers to 
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both states and municipalities, and the relative openness of budgetary rules to congressional 
appropriations of intergovernmental grants) affect the ability of governors to monopolize access 
to fiscal rents, while two additional factors (i.e., the spending powers assigned to governors by 
the transfer system, and the hardness of subnational budget constraints) affect gubernatorial 
discretion to arbitrarily use moneys transferred from the center. I underscored significant 
differences in the working of fiscal institutions in both federations.  
In Argentina, fiscal federalism monopolizes gubernatorial access to fiscal rents and grants 
provincial bosses ample discretion to reallocate transfer funds to their patronage-based networks. 
A large vertical fiscal imbalance, a transfer system that exclusively allocates federal grants to the 
provinces and only through them to the municipalities in accordance with subnational legislation, 
and a set of budget rules that preclude legislators from obtaining resources to feed their own 
clienteles, contribute to gubernatorial monopolization. Moreover, a gubernatorial bias introduced 
by the transfer system and the soft nature of subnational budget constraints allow governors to 
control most intergovernmental funds and determine their spending priorities (especially with 
regards to public sector employment and borrowing) virtually without check.  
In marked contrast, Brazilian governors do not monopolize access to fiscal rents but share 
them with both municipal mayors and congressional legislators. Along with a comparatively low 
level of vertical fiscal imbalance, the federal government automatically distributes unearmarked 
revenues to municipalities bypassing governors while budget rules encourage congressional 
legislators to appropriate federal grants in the form of investment projects to bestow in their 
electoral fortresses. Furthermore, governors enjoy less political leverage over federal transfer 
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moneys. First, the intergovernmental transfer system mandates states to reallocate a portion of 
the revenue-sharing funds and their own resources to local units with almost no strings attached. 
Second, federal legislation orders Brazilian states to spend a fixed sum of their most important 
revenue source in education and health. Third, starting in the mid-1990s, the federal government 
has successfully imposed hard budget constraints to state jurisdictions thereby intensifying 
regulation over their borrowing and spending activities. Fourth and finally, the recent process of 
“recentralization with municipalization” reduced states’ capacity to fiscally besiege the center, 
weakened gubernatorial ability to control patronage opportunities, and reinforced municipalities 
as well as central-local political linkages. 
My second empirical test involved a comparative examination of the structure of political 
careerism through an analysis of state legislators’ career paths. Relying on literature on political 
recruitment and novel datasets on subnational and local positions, I showed that Argentine and 
Brazilian subnational legislators have different static and progressive ambitions observed at both 
the horizontal and vertical axes of federalism. In Argentina, the centralization of political careers 
in the governors’ hands resulted in static and discontinuous patterns of careerism. I argued that 
extremely high rates of legislative turnover and lack of progressive ambition suggest that 
provincial bosses rotate politicians and bureaucrats with political aspirations among the various 
positions they can offer thus making participation attractive and inducing active involvement into 
their organizational machinery. In Brazil, high levels of legislative reelection and dynamic extra-
legislative career paths suggest that state governors are unable to involve individual politicians 
into their organizational political networks and make them sensitive to their political dictums. 
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For the final empirical test of the dissertation, I explored the electoral returns of different 
particularistic strategies of mobilization through a cross-state two-country statistical analysis. My 
theory predicted that Argentine and Brazilian governors should benefit differently from the 
strategic allocation of patronage and pork. Concretely, the former should benefit from spending 
on public employment while the latter should do it from spending in infrastructure and capital 
projects. These electoral payoffs, I theorized, are expected to be conditional upon the degree of 
regional political competitiveness. That is, incumbents’ net electoral returns are expected to be 
inversely related with the number of alternative choices (i.e., the number of competitive political 
parties) available to voters. Other things being equal, the same level of electoral investment –a 
unit of patronage or pork investment– would yield lower electoral returns in competitive than in 
non-competitive markets. As competition increases, therefore, the winning candidate’s share of 
the vote should on average decline. 
I found strong empirical evidence supporting my main hypotheses. I emphasized that 
both supply-side (access to economic resources and organizational capabilities to screen voters’ 
behavior) and demand-side (conservative versus expansive fiscal agendas) factors, and the 
institutional rules that condition vote trading interactions between politicians and citizens (ballot 
systems and voting technologies) largely explain these results.  
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6.1 BEYOND ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL   
The arguments developed in this dissertation were examined through the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil. However, the mechanisms and predictions of my theory of subnational particularism built 
on the interaction between fiscal institutions and electoral/partisan rules are not country-specific. 
As an example of how the central arguments of this dissertation can be exported to other 
federalized (multi-level) countries, this section briefly examines the cases of Mexico and 
Colombia.  
Mexico constitutes a case of “extensive patronage”. With regards to the structure of fiscal 
federalism, the states are highly dependent from central government transfers. Their main direct 
sources of revenues (taxes on property, payroll, and fees) represent less than 6 percent of total 
tax revenues. This high vertical imbalance is bridged through a combination of unconditional 
fiscal transfers (participaciones) allocated via the revenue-sharing agreement, and earmarked 
resources (aportaciones) to finance education and health. In 1997, PRI president Ernesto Zedillo 
(1994-2000) set up a series of formulae that strengthened the allocation of transfers to 
subnational jurisdictions rather than to municipalities. During the first PAN presidency (2000-
2004), new funds such as the Programa de apoyo de entidades federativas were generated by the 
federal government to distribute fiscal resources to the states. It has been estimated that close to 
40 percent of the total transfers received by the Mexican states are under governors’ exclusive 
discretion. As for the nature of political careerism, candidate nomination and selection processes 
were initially centralized in the hands of national party leadership and the president himself. 
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However, in the last three decades many nominations became to be controlled by state bosses. 
Indeed, governors from all major parties have exerted great influence over nominations for state 
and municipal elected positions (with the exception of the Senate). Moreover, with the recent 
introduction of Single Member Districts state incumbents increased their leverage over ballot 
access for federal deputies.  
Colombia, in contrast, constitutes an example of “locally-based patronage”. On the one 
hand, subnational governments collectively execute expenditures worth roughly 8 percent of 
GDP (about a third of total public expenditures) and raise roughly 3 percent of GDP in tax 
revenue (about a fifth of total tax revenue). However, it is important to bear in mind that 
departments have an own-revenue base that is higher than most other regional governments in 
unitary countries in Latin America. Almost 80 percent of the revenues of subnational 
governments are fiscal transfers from the central government. The bulk of these resources come 
from the Sistema General de Participaciones, direct royalties and so-called rentas cedidas (that 
is, previously central government taxes which were earmarked and managed locally). Most of 
these transfers benefit the municipalities rather than the states. As the pressure for adjustment 
increased, the central government responded with a package of fiscal reforms that de-linked 
transfers to the states. Furthermore, measures for fiscal responsibility were established through 
fiscal responsibility legislation that closely monitored the fiscal behavior of subnational 
governments was closely monitored. On the other hand, the Colombian multiple closed list PR 
system encourages candidate-centered political careers as voters choose among closed party list, 
but each party can propose multiple lists at the district level. The electoral and partisan rules 
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reduce gubernatorial influence because there is no limit to the number of lists parties can present 
and candidates do not need a party’s approval to run under its name. Incentives to cultivate the 
personal vote tie candidates to the clientele networks of local rather than state bosses.  
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 1 
Table 8: Popularly Elected State Governors and Mayors in Latin America 
 
Country 
 
State Governor 
 
Mechanism                  Since* 
 
 
Mayor 
 
Mechanism              Since* 
Argentina Elected                         1983   Elected                   1983 
Bolivia Elected                         2005   Elected                   1986 
Brazil Elected                         1982   Elected                   1985 
Chile Appointed                    1989   Elected                   1993 
Colombia Elected                         1992   Elected                   1989 
Costa Rica Appointed                    1949   Elected                   2002 
Dominican Republic Appointed                    1966   Elected                   1966 
Ecuador Elected                         1998   Elected                   1983 
El Salvador1 Not Applicable               --   Elected                   1984 
Guatemala Appointed                    1986    Elected                   1986 
Honduras Appointed                    1983   Elected                   1983 
Mexico Elected                         1917   Elected                   1917 
Panama Appointed                    1990   Elected                   1995 
Nicaragua1 Not applicable                --   Elected                   1992 
Paraguay Elected                         1994   Elected                   1994 
Peru2 Elected                         2003   Elected                   1981 
Uruguay Elected                         2000   Elected                   1984 
Venezuela Elected                         1989   Elected                   1992 
Notes: (*) Following military rule, where applicable. (1) State governors do not exist in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua (except for two autonomous regions which held gubernatorial elections for the first time in 
1993). (2) Peru also featured popularly elected governors between 1990 and 1992. Source: National 
Constitutions. 
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Note: Excluding personnel in public universities, financial systems and social security system. Source: Alessandro 
(2009). 
 
Figure 33: Evolution of Federal and Provincial Public Employment Sector in Argentina, 1987-2003 
 
 
Source: Pessoa, Brito and Figuereido (2009). 
Figure 34: Evolution of Federal, State, and Municipal Public Employment Sector in Brazil, 1973-2006 
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Table 9: State Incumbent Party Strength and Gubernatorial Electoral Efficiency in Argentina (1983-2003) 
and Brazil (1982-2006) 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brazilian 
States 
 
 
Incumbent 
Party Strength 
 
 
 
Gubernatorial 
Electoral Efficiency 
 
 
Argentine 
States 
 
 
Incumbent 
Party Strength 
 
 
Gubernatorial Electoral 
Efficiency 
 
 
TO 87.5 100 CBA 100 75 
GO 83.3 100 FO 100 100 
PA 83.3 100 LP 100 100 
SP 83.3 100 RN 100 100 
MA 83.3 83.3 SL 100 100 
CE 83.3 66.7 SC 100 75 
AM 75 28.6 SF 100 75 
AC 66.7 87.5 LR 100 83.3 
PR 66.7 80 JU 100 33.3 
PB 66.7 66.7 NE 100 33.3 
BA 60 75 CT 83.3 100 
MG 58.3 66.7 BA 80 100 
ES 58.3 40 MI 80 100 
AP 50 80 SG 80 66.7 
PI 50 77.8 CO 80 80 
SE 50 66.7 CR 60 83.3 
AL 41.7 42.8 ME 60 100 
RN 33.3 87.5 SA 60 80 
RR 33.3 80 TU 60 75 
MT 33.3 62.5 CH 60 75 
MS 33.3 40 CU 60 50 
DF 25 50 ER 40 63.3 
RO 20 20 SJ 40 50 
SC 16.7 71.5 TF 33.3 50 
PE 16.7 57.1    
RJ 16.7 28.6    
RS 0 28.6    
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Table 10: Gubernatorial Careerism in Argentina and Brazil, 1982-2006 
  
         ARGENTINA 
 
 
   N                        Percentage       
 
                 BRAZIL 
 
 
        N                  Percentage 
 
Overall 
 
 131                            
 
      205                    
 
   Run for Office 
 
  96                            73.3 
 
      137                     66.8 
 
   Win  
 
  86                            89.6 
 
       99                      72.3 
 
 
Reelection Not Allowed 
 
   
  73                             
 
      
      125                     
 
   Run for Office  
 
  43                            58.9 
  
       71                       56.8 
 
   Win  
 
  42                            97.7 
 
       56                       78.9 
 
       
Reelection Allowed  
 
 
  58 
 
 
       80 
 
   Run for Reelection  
 
  45                            77.6 
 
       60                        75 
 
   Win  
 
  37                            82.2 
 
       39                        65 
 
   Run for Other Office 
 
   8                             13.8 
 
        6                        7.5 
 
   Win  
 
   7                             87.5 
 
        3                         50 
 
 
Turnover Rate   
 
 
   
  45                            34.4 
 
       
      106                     51.7 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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APPENDIX B 
GUBERNATORIAL TRANSFER ACCESS AND DISCRETION IN ARGENTINA 
This Appendix discusses all Argentina’s intergovernmental transfers according to their level of 
gubernatorial and presidential discretionality, and provides detailed information on the provincial 
CMI transfer agreements discussed in Chapter 2.  
B.1 TRANSFERS WITH HIGH LEVEL OF GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION  
The Provincial Fiscal Disequilibrium Fund (FDFP): Since democratization, the Argentine 
Congress created two funds earmarked for provinces experiencing fiscal imbalances. The first 
fund was introduced in 1988 and operated only until 1991. Nurtured by revenues from duties on 
cigarettes and taxes on the transfer of public debt bonds, it was exclusively allocated to the 
provinces of La Rioja, Salta, and Tucumán with no strings attached. The second fund was 
proposed by Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo to entice governors into accepting the 1992 
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Fiscal Pact. The pact stipulated a nominal monthly sum that each province would receive to 
cover its fiscal disequilibrium (Law 24,130) thus constraining the federal government’s 
discretion over its amount and earmarking. However, congressional legislation did not make any 
provision regarding the payment and timing of the fund, which were left under presidential 
discretion. Because no conditions were attached to the use of this fund and no formal 
mechanisms of supervision were established, the ultimate implementation to cover provincial 
fiscal disequilibria lied under the exclusive discretionality of subnational authorities.  
The National Housing Fund (FONAVI): This fund was originally created by the military 
government in 1970 to finance house building for low-income families. Two years later, Law 
21,581 mandated that it could also be utilized to execute urbanization, infrastructure, and 
communal projects associated with housing plans. The FONAVI was initially financed by taxes 
on employer contributions to the social security system, and it was regionally allocated by the 
Secretary for Urban Development according to pre-established provincial housing deficits. The 
Menem administration then replaced the employer contributions by a fixed percentage of taxes 
on oil production, and guaranteed a minimum annual sum of $900 million to finance the fund. 
During the period under study, the FONAVI constituted the largest intergovernmental grant 
(excluding the CFI) accounting for roughly 18 percent of all federal transfer resources. The 1992 
Fiscal Pact decentralized the administration of the FONAVI to Provincial Housing Institutes 
(IPVs), and entitled governors to nominate and remove their directors without prior legislative 
approval. Since then, the IPVs have been in charge of administering the housing resources, 
deciding on credit operations, determining the costs and localization of the new buildings, 
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selecting beneficiaries, hiring subcontractors, and controlling the constructions. In 2000, Law 
25,540 expanded the IPVs’ capacity to manage the housing funds by establishing that 50 percent 
of the resources could be used to finance “other activities”. This legislation of course allowed 
governors to divert a considerably sum of the FONAVI from housing projects to other politically 
profitable policy areas. As for the federal government, it only retained authority to set up the 
coefficients for the regional distribution of the fund. But these coefficients have remained 
virtually unchanged throughout the years. In addition, because the FONAVI is transferred daily 
according to formulaic criteria, national authorities exercise no leverage over its amount and 
timing. Finally, although monitoring is legally assigned to the National Housing System, several 
interviewees affirmed that this federal agency cannot effectively detect the way in which the 
transferred resources are ultimately spent. Two indicators clearly illustrate difficulties in 
monitoring implementation. First, according to legislation, the resources transferred by the 
FONAVI must be paid back. However, less than 10 percent of the outstanding loans have been 
actually recovered (Secretaría de la Vivienda 1999). Second, the FONAVI was designed to 
finance poor families but it has gradually evolved into a mechanism for subsidizing middle-class 
housing (Schwartz and Liuskilla 1997).  
The Interior Electric Development Fund (FEDEI): This fund was created by Law 15,336 
in 1960 to support electrification programs conducted by provincial/municipal governments, and 
public utility companies. The FEDEI was initially nurtured by National Treasury contributions, 
surpluses from utilities paid by the Federal District, and 30 percent (later increased to 40 percent) 
of the National Electric Energy Fund created by the same legislation. Historically, the FEDEI has 
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been managed by the Federal Council of Electric Energy (CFEE). Formed by representatives of 
the Secretary of Energy and the provincial governments, the CFEE is in charge of approving 
regional loans for electrification programs proposed by the provinces. The approved loans are 
distributed according to previously established coefficients (87 percent are allocated to the 
provincial governments, and 12 percent to local cooperatives), and must be paid back by setting 
utility rates at an “adequate level”.260
                                                 
260 The remaining 1 percent is divided between the CFEE and the provinces. By Resolution 306/97, the CFEE 
decided to grant half of its financing (0.5 percent) to the provinces.  
 In practice, however, the provincial majority within the 
CFEE has prevented the central government from exercising control over the amount, targeting, 
and earmarking of the FEDEI. National authorities only have a say over its timing and payment, 
but this influence is based on administrative procedures that do not allow for a presidential 
manipulation of the fund. The system has not seemed to be effective in preventing provincial 
governments from diverting the FEDEI resources to other policy areas. It has neither established 
the timing of spending. As stated by legislation, the provinces have a maximum of three years 
since the loans were approved to initiate the electrification works. After that time, the programs 
are supposedly closed off and the assigned funds cannot be used. Nonetheless, violations are 
common. For example, the province of Formosa received the CFEE’s approval to invest 
electricity funds in 1983, 1984, 1986, 1997 and 1998 but did not initiate the electrification works 
until 2000. Similarly, La Rioja began to receive federal approvals in 1981. Yet by 1999 it had 
only used around 20 percent of the assigned money (Secretaría de Energía 2000). Given that the 
CFEE does not monitor investment from its approval to termination, provincial governments can 
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circumvent legal clauses and have the last word on implementation. Several interviewees 
indicated that within-province distribution of the FEDEI is highly informal, while contracts are 
usually awarded to the governors’ “friends”. Despite some regional and time variation, 
subnational executives are indeed able to influence the reallocation, timing, procurement, and 
monitoring of the electrification transfer funds.      
The Special Tobacco Fund (FET): This is a subsidization grant designed to guarantee a 
“fair” price to tobacco producers and finance improvements in tobacco production processes. 
Created by Law 19,800 in 1972, it has always been nurtured by taxes on cigarettes. The FET, 
which in the 1990s accounted for around U.S. $180 million per year, is targeted according to the 
following criteria: 80 percent among the tobacco-producing provinces of Catamarca, Chaco, 
Corrientes, Misiones, Jujuy, Salta, and Tucumán in accordance to the type of tobacco produced, 
and 20 percent according to investment projects proposed by a committee composed of 
representatives of the provincial government and local producers. These projects are approved by 
the national Agricultural, Livestock, and Fishing Secretary (SAGyP), which until 1991 also 
determined the tobacco price of reference. Thus, the payment and timing of the FET have been 
under the discretion of the central government. In an attempt to limit the scope of the fund, the de 
la Rúa administration unsuccessfully sought to pass a bill that excluded the FET from the federal 
budget. This decision produced the immediate reaction of legislators from the benefited 
provinces, who forcefully argued that the tobacco fund was a “provincial right, not a federal 
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subsidy”.261 In practice, both the administration and implementation of the FET is carried out by 
the provinces in line with the rules that regulate tobacco commercialization. The resources are 
used to pay for a surplus price to local private producers and to finance projects developed by 
provincial cooperatives. Between 1975 and 2002, nearly two-thirds of the FET was allocated to 
private producers and the rest to local cooperatives (SAGPyA 2002). With regards to monitoring, 
the provincial institutions that control the fund report subsidy and investment decisions to their 
respective General Auditor Offices and the SAGyP annually conducts technical and account 
controls. Principal-agent and moral-hazard problems, however, make it extremely difficult for 
the central government to monitor provincial tobacco institutions. As a result, the SAGyP 
typically approves investment plans without previously identifying who are the actual receivers. 
This limitation precludes national authorities to collect repayments for the credits granted.262
The Greater Buenos Aires Fund and the Basic Social Infrastructure Fund: These funds 
were instituted in the 1992 Income Tax Reform with the purpose of compensating provinces by 
the revenue loss inflicted by the first Fiscal Pact. The former fund appropriated 10 percent of the 
income tax and was exclusively transferred to the Buenos Aires province.
   
263
                                                 
261 Interview with Nicolás Gadano. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 27, 2005. 
 The legislation 
abstractly mandated that resources should finance “social policy projects” decided by the 
province itself. Governor Duhalde ultimately centralized the administration of the fund in the 
262 Personal communication with Senior Advisor, SAGPyA. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 15, 2008.   
263 This appropriation was limited to AR$ 650 million in 1995 (Law 24,621), and the surplus distributed among the 
remaining provinces. Anecdotal and journalistic evidence suggest that the Greater Buenos Aires Fund was 
negotiated by president Menem and governor Duhalde. In exchange for receiving the fund, Duhalde accepted not to 
run for the presidency in the 1995 contest thus paving the way for Menem’s reelection. 
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Women Provincial Council presided by his wife. As Auyero (2000) has documented, this council 
became the headquarters for implementing a number of patronage-based programs. The monies 
allocated to Buenos Aires represented 4.4 percent of the provincial GDP in 1992, 7.8 percent in 
1993, 9.5 percent in 1994, and 10.6 percent in 1995 (Danani, Chiara, and Filc 1997). Several 
governors from the peripheral provinces repetitively demanded the derogation of the fund. But 
Duhalde was often able to impede legislative movements against it by using his federal deputies 
to push through the derogation of gas subsidies and the FET, which benefited the Southern and 
Northern provinces respectively. The Basic Social Infrastructure Fund, on the other hand, is fed 
by 4 percent of the income tax and then distributed among all other provinces according to 
poverty measures to finance social infrastructure projects. Provincial governments must submit 
to the center proof of adequate allocation of resources. The federal government, however, has 
been unable to check out the authenticity of provincial certifications, exercising discretion only 
over timing and payment. In consequence, provincial governments have great political ability to 
trade-off social infrastructure funding across different investment projects, control the timing of 
execution, and manage the procurement of resources. 
Hydroelectric and Hydrocarbon Royalties: The federal government acknowledged the 
right of provinces to collect hydroelectric and hydrocarbon royalties from private companies in 
1967 (Law 17,319). According to this legislation, companies must pay the corresponding 
royalties to the federal government, which in turn shares an unspecified part of them with the 
provinces where energy, oil and gas were extracted and produced (Articles 12, 59, 61, 62, and 
93). Throughout the years, several controversies arouse over the procedures used to calculate the 
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primary and secondary distribution of royalties. These controversies were finally settled in 1992 
when the oil-producing provinces of Chubut, Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, Mendoza, Neuquén, 
Rio Negro, Salta, and Santa Cruz bilaterally signed agreements with the national government to 
secure their royalty transfers. Then, representatives at the 1994 Constituent Assembly introduced 
an amendment stating that provinces had “original dominion of the natural resources existing 
within their territory” (Article 124). In terms of fiscal transfer discretionality, the federal 
government can only exercise control over the payment and timing of royalties. Their amount, 
targeting, and earmarking are established by the constitution and related fiscal legislation. 
Provinces that receive royalties are only mandated by provincial legislation to distribute a 
portion of them to the municipal governments. The range of royalties received by municipalities 
is quite broad varying from 50 percent in the province of Entre Rios to 7 percent in Santa Cruz. 
The Industrial Promotion Regime: The first industrial promotion program was established 
in the late 1950s to set a duty-free zone in the Patagonia (Eaton 2001a). Certainly, the generals’ 
motivation had less to do with equity and efficiency and more with defending the territorial 
integrity against potential invasions by neighboring countries (Sawers and Mazzacane 2001: 
107). Since then, different promotional schemes were promulgated. These schemes offered a 
broad array of tax breaks to firms with no coherent rationale, but the most important was the 
exemption from the VAT.264
                                                 
264 Some of the subsidies offered include exemptions from the profits and capital taxes, benefits of deferring tax 
payments, credit subsidies, and waivers of tariffs. Nowhere, with the possible exception of the San Luis province has 
industrial promotion stimulated economic activity 
 In economic terms, industrial promotion has led to an inefficient 
pattern of industrial location, diversification of production, and transportation costs (Aspiazu 
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1988; Schvarzer 1990). The distribution of tax subsidies has also cost several percent of GDP 
annually. It is therefore not surprising that the regime was considered a threat to the stability of 
Argentina’s fiscal system (World Bank 1990). Politically, industrial promotion became pure 
pork-barrel spending from the center to satisfy provincial demands and buy off regional support 
by opening up possibilities for governors to make private businesses. Because goods produced at 
any stage in the production process are tax-exempted, the promoted provinces have simply 
conceded exemptions to firms that undertake only token activities in their territories. Most plants 
located in the promoted regions are part of preexisting factories elsewhere (typically, Buenos 
Aires) set up to collect the subsidy rather than to generate an increase in industrial activity. The 
system has then encouraged rent-seeking, corruption, and widespread tax evasion.  
Four provinces, Catamarca, San Luis, La Rioja, and San Juan, have their own industrial 
promotion programs. The first three jurisdictions were included in the Historical Reparation Act, 
a decreed issued in 1973 by the Perón administration. The military regime that followed 
extended essentially the same benefits to San Juan.265
                                                 
265 It is not clear why the military regime only chose San Juan for special treatment. 
 In 1985, president Alfonsín was obliged to 
expand industrial promotion benefits previously negotiated by the generals to a number of 
additional provinces. Although the federal government simply lacked the political power to 
eliminate these benefits, several projects were never approved (Eaton 2001a). By the time 
Menem assumed office there were dozens of industrial promotion schemes in the country. The 
government resumed the practice of granting tax breaks to different industries (including iron, 
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steel, reforestation, sugar, yerba mate, fishery, ethanol distilling, cement, and paper) when the 
president decided to bid for his reelection.  
Financial credits for the promoted provinces have been distributed applying a mechanism 
that assigns provincial quotas with a ceiling established in the annual budget. The Secretary of 
Industry and the Tax General Direction (Dirección General Impositva, DGI) are in charge of 
approving credit allocations to firms after estimating their potential fiscal costs.266
Provincial governments, on the other hand, enjoy exclusive authority to determine the 
projects that are subject to federal approval and to control the implementation of the tax-
exempted projects. Therefore, the industrial promotion regime generates strong incentives for 
collusion among governors, potential private beneficiaries, and congressional legislators to 
exploit the tax-incentive scheme. A common strategy employed by provinces to maximize their 
quotas and increase the number of beneficiary firms is to underestimate the expected fiscal cost 
of the tax discounts. Another strategy is to encourage the fragmentation of projects whose costs 
approximate the quota and entice legislators to introduce more budgetary credits to favor a larger 
number of private initiatives. In addition, the complexity of legislation and the absence of 
accurate information on the projects make monitoring a nearly impossible task for the center. 
Federal officials indeed lacked the ability to recognize and impose penalties to subsidized firms 
 Thus, the 
federal government controls the amount, timing, and payment of the industrial promotion but 
does not exert any influence over targeting and earmarking.  
                                                 
266 The Secretary of Industry has been more inclined to approve promoted projects, while the DGI has typically 
attempted to reject them. 
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that failed to meet employment, production, or investment targets. No one inside the federal 
government can specify who received the subsidies –and by how much- or even identify sham 
projects established only to collect the subsidy. These deficiencies allow provincial authorities to 
easily overturn federal decisions, and permit governors to retain the ultimate control over the use 
of tax breaks. In the words of a former Under-Secretary of Tax and Revenue: “The industrial 
promotion is a key political weapon for the governors simply because provinces are the 
authorities of application…and because benefits are granted in an ad hoc, non-automatic manner 
through contracts that open avenues for bribing and private businesses. Provinces decide who 
they want to promote and how to do it…at the end of the day, they decide everything...The 
regional chief of the DGI responds to the province not to the national government because s/he is 
easily co-opted by the governor…Industrial promotion is pure cash till (caja) for the 
provinces.”267
The Non-Industrial Promotion Regime: Motivated by Menem’s desire to sum adherents 
for his candidacy to a third mandate, the federal government introduced fiscal credits for the 
promotion of “non-industrial” (i.e., agricultural and tourist) projects in thirteen provinces. The 
functioning of this regime mostly paralleled that governing industrial promotion. The budget 
proposal sets a list of provinces to be benefited from a tax-incentive quota, and national 
legislators systematically attempt to increase the amount and territorial scope of the fiscal credits. 
A former President of the Budget Committee in the Chamber explained: “Tensions between the 
 
                                                 
267 Interview with Juan Carlos Gómez Sabaíni. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 17, 2005. 
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central government and the provinces for promotional regimes always have an effect on the 
budget…With the exception of the provinces of Buenos Aires and Mendoza, which always vote 
against these schemes, the other provinces collude, obtain the majority [in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate], and vote to include additional money in the budget for industrial and 
non-industrial promotion. If the president wants to veto these articles, the provinces are able to 
get the two-thirds necessary to insist…because there is a lot of political solidarity among 
them…and because the already promoted provinces distribute quotas to the other province. 
Sometimes these quotas cover fifteen or sixteen provinces.”268
Although the federal government eventually vetoed some of these initiatives, Menem 
issued a decree that transferred the authority to reassign tax-exemptions for non-industrial 
promotion (Rodriguez and Bonvecchi 2004). Governors rapidly adapted to the new legal 
conditions by reallocating subsidies from bankrupted to new projects, and preserving the 
incentives of private beneficiaries who had changed their economic activities. Although the non-
industrial promotion system officially expired in 1999, several provinces continued to use their 
political authority to grant fiscal credits and allow modifications in the nature of investments. 
Under the short de la Rúa administration, the Federal Administration of Public Incomes (AFIP) 
denied granting tax benefits to projects directly approved by the provinces. But in 2004 president 
Néstor Kirchner issued a new decree by which the federal government accepted to concede these 
benefits.  
  
                                                 
268 Interview with Oscar Lamberto. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 8, 2005. 
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The National Treasury Contributions (ATNs): These non-automatic grants were 
introduced in the 1853 Constitution (Article 67), which entitles Congress to “grant subsidies 
from the National Treasury to the provinces whose income does not suffice, according to their 
budgets, to cover their ordinary expenses”. It was on this legal basis that the chief executive 
designed the ATNs. Until the creation of the first CFI regime, these funds constituted the single 
federal transfer to the provinces (Porto 1990). Then, the ATNs coexisted with the CFI accounting 
for almost 40 percent of the revenue-sharing pool (Cetrángolo and Jiménez 1997b). Between 
1985 and 1988, in the absence of a federal fiscal agreement, these funds replaced the co-
participation regime as the exclusive transfer scheme that ruled intergovernmental fiscal relations 
in the country. With the enactment of the current CFI law, the ATNs were reduced to a fixed 
total amount of 1 percent of all sharing taxes and their control was granted to the Ministry of 
Interior. This change transformed their regional distribution but it did not affect the absolute 
discretionality enjoyed by the president. Although s/he does not manage the ATNs total amount, 
which varies with revenue collection, the president has complete discretion to determine the sum 
allocated to each jurisdiction. The institutional framework sets some limits on the ATNs’ 
earmarking by establishing that they could only be used to “attend emergency situations and 
financial disequilibria of provincial governments” (Article 5). Yet in practice the president has 
used these grants for a variety of purposes ranging from supporting Catholic dioceses to funding 
sports competitions. Although funds are granted to governors, federal officials seek to influence 
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their municipal reallocation.269
The Regional Development Fund (FDR): It was created in the 1973 CFI law to finance 
public infrastructure works of provincial or regional interest. It was financed by 3 percent of the 
total sharing revenues, federal government’s contributions, and the product of its own financial 
management. Historically, the fund has lied under the absolute discretion of the national 
executive. The list of executable projects has often been defined by the Ministry of Economy on 
the National Development Plan. When the FDR fell into desuetude during the last military 
government, it began to be discretionally allocated by the Ministry of Interior. In 1985, the 
Ministry of Economy regained certain control but it was short-lived. During the arduous 
negotiations for the approval of the 1988 CFI law, as we have seen, the fund was transformed 
into a de facto automatic transfer controlled by the provinces. 
 In the hands of subnational executives, the ATNs are also a 
highly discretionary transfer. Reallocation and authority over procurement are common as no 
formal restrictions exist on how and where the funds should be spent. Actually, they are legally 
defined as funds of “free availability”. In some provinces, for instance Santa Fe and Mendoza, 
the Auditor General Office sets a flexible time limit for provincial and municipal governments to 
acknowledge the reception of an ATN. Although this procedure may affect when the fund is 
eventually spent (timing), it merely responds to administrative rather than to accounting 
purposes.  
                                                 
269 The Chaco province under the opposite government of Angel Rosas (UCR, 1994-2002) is illustrative of this 
dynamics. In the context of a dispute between Radical and Peronist municipalities regarding the reallocation of 
ATNs, the Minister of Interior personally intervened in the conflict urging the provincial government not to 
exclusively benefit its co-partisan mayors. Interview with Eduardo Gabardini. Resistencia, November 28, 2006. 
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B.2 TRANSFERS WITH MEDIUM LEVEL OF GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION  
Education Transference Funds: These funds are a by-product of the decentralization process that 
transferred education services to provincial jurisdictions without appropriate additional financing 
(Falleti 2010). In 1991, the Federal Education Law 24,049 dictated that the costs associated with 
the decentralization of education must be deducted from the CFI pie insofar as revenues 
exceeded their annualized average for the April-December period.270 The federal government 
committed to transfer grants for the entire cost of the services in case the CFI revenues fall short 
of that average. The education transference funds, hence, constitute a politically sterile tool for 
the center since the legal framework determines their amount, targeting, and earmarking leaving 
only to the Ministry of Education the authority to establish their payment and timing. The 
decentralization of education services undoubtedly affected the provinces’ budgets and financial 
autonomy by forcing governors to spend unearmarked transfers on an item that was formerly 
funded by the federal government. But, at the same time, the education funds have opened the 
space for the politics of patronage as the provincial devolution of fiscal responsibilities in the 
area was naturally accompanied by a corresponding decentralization of control over hiring. In 
addition, provincial governors have been able to determine how to utilize these funds because the 
federal government never attached conditions to their use and implemented monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms.271
                                                 
270 Revenue reductions began at the outset of the 1992 fiscal year. 
 
271 Critically, because these transfers are not tied to teachers’ salaries they are harder to monitor. 
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Utility Rates Subsidies and Compensation Funds: The legislation on electricity and gas 
utilities mandates to compensate provincial jurisdictions for the difference between the flat rates 
for electricity/gas services and the coverage and quality of the services received. It concretely 
rules to subsidize consumer rates where the cost of provision vastly exceeds the financial return 
from consumer payments through funds nurtured by charges on wholesale buyers and/or high-
income consumers. The Laws 15,336 and 24,065 created this fund to be administered by the 
Federal Council of Electric Energy, and successive legislation expanded these subsidies. Because 
the amount of subsidies depends on provincial utility rates and consumption levels and because 
regional distribution and earmarking are set by law, the federal government only enjoys 
discretion over payment and timing. By contrast, provincial governments have a considerable 
(though not absolute) degree of discretion. Some federal officers interviewed pointed out that the 
CFEE has not created an adequate mechanism to assess how provinces utilize the transferred 
money. Certainly, provincial governments cannot divert these subsidies to other policy areas. But 
they can determine whether to apply them to residential districts, specific economic sectors, or 
the so-called “social tariffs” –i.e., subsidies for low-consumers, retirees, shanty towns, remote 
localities, or poor families. There is also a considerable administrative vagueness in the 
procedures used by the provinces to select the potential beneficiaries, which helps governors to 
gain political discretion over timing and monitoring. 
Budget for Public Works: The fiscal resources incorporated into the national budget to 
finance public work projects in the provinces have always been under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Economy and the amendment powers delegated to the president. The Public 
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Investment Law mandates that infrastructure projects can only be included in the budget 
proposal if they had been previously approved by the Secretary of Economic Policy. The FAL 
law reinforced the authority of the central government over these funds by granting the Treasury 
Secretary extensive powers to determine their amount, timing, and payment. Although the 
geographic distribution of public infrastructure projects is established in the budget, it can be 
easily amended by the president through budgetary under-execution or expenditure reallocations 
that are hard to monitor. The level of earmarking attached to these transfers is also unclear. 
Official publications acknowledge that there has been a scarcity of public work projects 
developed on the basis of well-elaborated analysis of costs, while a system of supervision and 
oversight has never been implemented (Plan de Inversiones Públicas, several years). Once in the 
provincial coffers, it is very hard to ascertain the degree to which public works are properly 
executed within a given policy area.272
The Highway Fund (CV): Introduced in 1958 by a presidential decree, the CV consists of 
federal funds for road maintenance and construction transferred by the National Road Directorate 
(DNV) to provincial entities. The resources, composed of 35 percent of all sharing revenues 
earmarked for the DNV, are distributed according to formulaic criteria: 30 percent in equal 
amounts, 20 percent proportional to provincial population, 20 percent proportional to the amount 
 Deficiencies in planning and weak federal monitoring 
allow for gubernatorial discretionality as provinces control transfer procurement by signing 
contracts with private firms and conditioning the hiring of politically loyal workers. 
                                                 
272 As stated by a federal official from the Secretary of Public Investment: “How can we know, for instance, if a 
governor built 300 houses of poor quality instead of 100 houses of good quality?” Personal communication. Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, November 1, 2005.  
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of provincial resources invested on roads, and 30 percent proportional to the consumption of fuel 
in each province. Because the DNV has the exclusive authority to set the last two coefficients, it 
can influence the regional allocation of the road transfer funds. The central government does not 
control the amount of money to be transferred, but it enjoys certain level of discretion over 
payment because provinces must submit road programs, procurement documents, and 
disbursement requests to be evaluated by the National Road Council.273 As anticipated above, in 
exchange for the signing of the 1992 Fiscal Pact the federal government decided to automatically 
allocate road funds to the provinces thus losing control over both timing and payment. However, 
it still negotiates with the provinces the opportunity cost of initiating each project. Using the CV 
funds as an example, Carlos Snopek pointed out: “The relation between the central government 
and the provinces changed in 1992 and governors do not have to travel to Buenos Aires to get the 
funds anymore. Perhaps, the opportunity of execution, that is, when the project is launched, 
whether it is initiated this month or the next month, has to do with their peregrination to the 
center. But the institutional design guarantees governors that they get the money.”274
                                                 
273 All provinces are granted representation at this deliberative body. 
 Once 
received, provinces themselves control the CV’s implementation stage. This means that 
governors have exclusive leverage over procurement and policy reallocation. Gabriel Hernández, 
former UCR mayor of the Formosa city put it in these terms: “The important tender bids are 
influenced by provincial officials. Then, you see here that a bid from CV is directly consulted 
with the governor who indicates the private firms that can and cannot participate. There is 
274 Interview with Carlos Snopek. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 16, 2005. 
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nothing discretionally managed from Buenos Aires. Those who think that the president controls 
these funds are wrong. Provincial officials and the governor himself have the power over most 
transferred money in the province.”275
The Fund for Provincial Public Sector Reform: This fund was incepted by decree in 1993 
to assist public sector reforms in the provinces. Its financial architecture included 50 percent of 
the proceedings coming from the privatization of the National Savings and Insurance Board, the 
National Currency House, and the National Development Bank, loans from multilateral financial 
institutions, and contributions from the central government through special bonds designed to 
stimulate job creation at the local level. Managed by the SAREP, the fund has been allocated 
according to the cost of the public sector reform proposed by the provinces to the SAREP, and 
the CFI secondary distribution. The loans received by the provinces should be paid back as 
indicated by the agreement signed with the Ministry of Interior using each province’s co-
participation resources as collateral. Therefore, the central government has been able to 
determine the amount, timing, payment, earmarking and, to a lesser extent, regional targeting of 
the funds insofar as provincial sectors subject to reform are ultimately bargained between 
national and subnational authorities. Provincial governments, on the other hand, have exerted 
some discretion over these moneys by being able to control procurement and timing but falling 
short to manage reallocation and monitoring.     
 
                                                 
275 Interview with Gabriel Hernández. Formosa, April 10, 2006. 
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B.3 TRANSFERS WITH LOW LEVEL OF GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION  
Debt Consolidation Schemes: In 1992, the Argentine Congress approved the Nation-Provinces 
Financial Reorganization Regime (Law 24,133) to sort out the complex web of debts and credits 
that both levels of government had with each other. Provincial governments were in default on 
long-standing loans from the center, which was in default on payments owed to the provinces. 
The reorganization scheme was implemented through bilateral agreements in which all standing 
bills were consolidated, while remnants in favor of the provinces were paid through federal 
government’s outstanding bonds called BOCONS. The consolidated bills ranged from unpaid 
provincial taxes owed by privatized enterprises to provinces’ non-performing loans with the 
Central Bank. The Ministry of Economy produced standing bills that entitled subnational 
jurisdictions to receive BOCONS and granted the federal government authority to determine the 
timing and payment of transfers (Bonvecchi 2003). The Secretary of Assistance to Provincial 
Economic Reform affirmed: “Negotiators made titanic efforts so that all provinces got something 
out of the compensation schemes. Many political rather than technical decisions were made 
concerning the recognition of provincial debts”.276
                                                 
276 Interview with Oscar Souto. Quoted in Bonvecchi (2003). 
 These bilateral agreements lasted until 1995, 
when the reticent province of Córdoba decided to accept its debt reorganization (Dillinger and 
Webb 1999). The federal government gained control over the restructuring plans, while 
governors’ discretion was null. 
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Loan Approvals: In parallel with the reorganization of nation-provincial debts, the federal 
government sought to curb provinces’ tendency towards increasing indebtedness in two 
additional ways. First, it contracted a loan with the World Bank to finance the reform of the 
provincial public sector. To access these funds provincial governments must submit a financial 
plan to the SAREP, which allowed technocrats at the Ministry of Economy to supervise 
provinces’ indebtedness strategies with multilateral financial agencies (Bonvecchi 2003). 
Second, the federal government enacted the resolutions 1075/93 and 262/93 which mandated that 
new provincial debt operations must be approved by the Treasury Secretary and the Central 
Bank. By using its credit rating and position as guarantor, and by deciding upon the timing and 
granting of the loan approvals, the center actually restricted provincial indebtedness operations. 
Again, governors lacked discretionality over loan approvals. 
Pension System Bailouts: Between 1995 and 1998, the federal government bailed out the 
pension systems of eleven provinces (Nicolini 2002). Designed in 1992 as an enticement for the 
provinces to support the federal social security reform, these bailouts were legally introduced in 
the 1993 Fiscal Pact. Initially, they were rejected by most provinces on the grounds that the 
central government would clean up the provincial systems from dubious pensions. But in the 
aftermath of the Tequila crisis, which prompted a run on deposits and a notable fall in revenues, 
all provinces with the exception of Santa Cruz and Santa Fe claimed the center to bailout their 
pension systems. Armed with a powerful bargaining instrument, the federal government 
conditioned bailouts to its decision of taking over provincial accounts at face value. To 
implement this decision, the bailouts incorporated a “transfer act” which set strong 
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conditionalities to be ratified by the provincial legislatures. First, it was established that 
provinces could not legislate over issues related to the creation of provincial pension systems. 
Second, provincial governments allowed the National Treasury to retain CFI funds in order to 
finance personal and employer contributions to the nationalized pension system. Finally, the 
provinces assumed the judicial responsibility for any action promoted by the beneficiaries of the 
new regime. In consequence, the timing, payment, and earmarking of federal bailouts –but 
obviously not their amount and targeting– were entirely at the central government’s discretion. 
Like with the renegotiation of provincial debts, governors were unable to control any dimension 
of transfer discretionality.   
Treasury Bonds Bailouts (BOTESO): Between 1992 and 1994, the federal government 
issued a series of Treasury Bonds for U$ 800 million to rescue seven poor provinces 
experiencing severe fiscal deficits and mounting debt. These provinces were unable to obtain 
capital in the private financial markets because they had a high proportion of their CFI income 
compromised in the execution of loan’s guarantees (Nicolini 2002).277
                                                 
277 In 1994, for example, the BOTESO covered close to 90 percent of the provinces’ financial needs (Tommasi, 
Saiegh and Sanguinetti 2001). 
 The federal bailouts were 
extended through formal agreements reached between the Ministry of Economy and provincial 
governments, which agreed to fulfill conditionality clauses such as reducing fiscal deficits, 
freezing the number of public employees, and prohibiting new indebtedness. Although no legal 
enforcement drove provinces into compliance, all five dimensions of presidential discretionality 
were under the chief executive’s tight control. Because the BOTESO constituted federal 
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government debt, their amount, targeting, timing, and payment were at the center’s own 
discretion. Earmarking was also determined by federal authorities as they decided the financial 
markets where the bonds could be traded. Like most financial transfers managed by the federal 
government, the BOTESO were only slightly vulnerable to gubernatorial discretionality. Once 
the agreement between the federal and provincial governments had been signed, the provinces 
deposited the bonds with a private sector financial agent, who had to gradually place the titles in 
the market to guarantee their normal absorption. The agreements also included a clause which 
explicitly stated that the loans should be canceled through automatic withdrawals from the 
provinces’ CFI transfers. This clause guaranteed that loans would be paid back (as they 
ultimately were) on the scheduled dates. When the loans were due, the national government 
withdrew the amortization and interest payments from the CFI funds that had been use as 
collateral. The BOTESO rescue, however, was not a simple technical loan operation. Provincial 
repayment was eventually executed at a much lower financial cost than other alternatives 
available at the market, which set higher interest rates to the provinces.  
B.4 THE PROVINCIAL CMI AGREEMENTS  
This subsection provides detailed information on the CMI agreements by distinguishing its 
composition, primary and secondary distribution, and the authority of provincial governors to 
bias municipal distribution.    
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Table 11: Provincial CMI Agreements 
 
Province 
 
Primary Distribution 
 
Secondary Distribution 
 
Special Funds 
 
Authority 
 
Allocation 
 
Buenos Aires 
16.14% CFI 
16.14% Provincial Taxes 
58% (62% population, 23% p/c tax 
generation;  15% Size); 37%  hospitals; 5% 
transferred services. 
 
No 
 
Governor 
 
Daily 
Non-automatic  
No Retention 
 
Catamarca 
8.5% CFI 
10% Property & Gross Receipts, 
70% Motor Vehicle. 
95%: 42% Capital, 58% Interior. 
Interior:  33% equal portions; 33% population; 
34% tax generation. 
 
Yes 
 
Governor 
 
Within 30 days 
Non-automatic  
No Retention 
 
Chaco 
15.5% CFI  
15.5% Gross Receipts & Stamps 
15% Equal portion; 25% Tax generation; 60% 
Number of employees. 
 
Yes 
Governor 
Legislature approves 
 
Every 10 days  
Non-automatic  
Retention (up to 33%) 
 
Chubut 
 
10% CFI 
14 - 16% Royalties 
 
80% population; 20% equal portion 
Royalties: variable and earmarked. 
 
 
No 
 
Governor 
 
 
CMI: Monthly  
Royalties: Fifteen days  
Automatic 
No Retention 
 
Córdoba 
20% CFI  
20% Gross-Receipts & Property 
80.5%: 21% equal portion; 79% population. 
3%: 50% equal portion; 50% population. 
Yes 
 
Governor 
Legislature Controls 
Fifteen days, Automatic 
No Retention 
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Corrientes 
12% CFI  
12% Property, Stamps, Lottery 
 
98% Population; 2% reversed population.  
Yes 
 
 
Governor 
 
 
CMI: Every 3 days 
Provincial Resources: daily 
Non-Automatic 
No Retention 
 
 
Entre Ríos 
 
12% CFI 
24% Property, Fix Sum Gross 
Receipts, 60% Motor Vehicle, 
50% Royalties 
33% Equal portion; 20% population; 
30% tax generation; 17% basic unsatisfied 
needs. 
 
No 
 
Governor 
 
 
Every ten days 
Non-Automatic 
Retention 
 
Formosa 
12% CFI  
12% Property, Stamps & Lottery 
40% Population; 30% tax generation; 30% 
equal portions. 
Yes Governor 
 
 
Fifteen days 
Non-Automatic 
Retention 
 
Jujuy 
 
Municipal Wage Bills  
 
100% Public workers. No Governor 
 
 
Daily  
Non-Automatic 
No Retention  
 
La Pampa 
 
10.71% CFI (ATN) 
21% Provincial Resources 
15% Royalties 
 
5% equal portion; 20% Population;   
tax generation ; 20% motor vehicle; 15% 
property. 
Yes Governor  
 
 
Daily  
Automatic 
No Retention  
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La Rioja 
 
10% CFI 
20% Property 
50% Motor Vehicle 
Provincial: Fixed coefficients 
CMI: 80% Population, 10% inversed 
population; 5% tax generation. 
Yes N/D N/D 
 
 
Mendoza 
 
14% CFI 
14% Property, Gross Receipts, 
Stamps, 70% Motor Vehicle 
12% Royalties 
25% Equal portion, 65% population; 
10% fixed coefficients. 
 Royalties: 100% production. 
Yes Governor 
Legislature approves 
 
 
Fifteen days 
Automatic 
No Retention  
 
Misiones 
 
12% CFI  
12% Property, Gross Receipts, 
Motor Vehicle 
Fixed coefficients.  No  Governor 
 
Daily  
Automatic 
Retention  
 
 
Neuquén 
 
15% CFI  
15% Provincial Revenues 
15% Royalties 
 
60% Population; 15% inversed municipal 
personnel spending; 10% population without 
provincial capital; 10% tax generation; 5% 
equal portion. Royalties: 100% production  
No Governor 
Commission Controls 
 
 
Monthly 
Non-Automatic 
No Retention 
 
Río Negro 
 
10% CFI 
40% Property, Gross Receipts, 
Stamps 
10% Royalties 
40% Population; 20% equal portions;  
40% tax generation. 
Royalties: 26% population; 13% equal 
portions; 35% fixed coefficients. 
Yes Governor 
Legislature approves 
 
CMI: Daily 
Royalties: Monthly 
Non-Automatic 
No Retention 
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Salta 
 
 
15% CFI 
15% Gross Receipts, Property, 
Stamps 
10% Royalties 
24% Population; 20% inversed population; 
28% municipal spending;  
28% per capita personnel spending. 
Royalties 55.6% population; 44.44 
production. 
No Governor 
 
Monthly 
Non-Automatic 
No Retention  
 
San Juan 
 
Fix Sum  Fixed Coefficients. No Governor 
 
Weekly  
Automatic 
No Retention  
 
San Luis 
 
8% CFI 
20% Provincial Revenues 
 
80% Population; 15% equal portions; 
2.5% distance from provincial capital;  
2.5% unsatisfied basic needs. 
Yes. 
 
Governor 
Commission Controls 
 
Daily  
Automatic 
No Retention  
 
 
Santa Cruz 
 
11% CFI 
40% Gross Receipts, Games 
7% Royalties 
 
83.15% Population; 11% equal portions;  
5.85% difference population from provincial 
capital. 
Royalties: production 
 
No N/D N/D 
 
Santa Fe 
13.44% CFI 
13.44 Gross Receipts  
40% Population; 30% equal portions; 30% tax 
generation. 
No Governor 
 
Every fifteen days 
Automatic 
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Santa Fe 
(cont.) 
50% Property 
90% Motor Vehicles 
20% Others 
 Retention 
 
Santiago del 
Estero 
15% CFI (without ATNs) 
25% Provincial Resources  
40% Motor Vehicles 
44% population; 1% inversed population; 
50% tax generation; 1% unsatisfied basic 
needs; 2% rural population; 1% municipal 
employees/population; 1% equal portions. 
Yes 
 
Governor 
 
 
Monthly  
Automatic 
Retention  
 
Tierra del 
Fuego 
 
25% CFI 
45% Gross Recepits, Stamps 
20% Royalties 
Provincial: 100% tax generation. 
CMI: 100% equal portions.  
Royalties: 100% population. 
No Governor 
 
 
CMI: Weekly 
Royalties: Monthly 
Non-Automatic 
No Retention 
 
Tucumán 
 
16.5% CFI 
85% Motor Vehicles 
12% Property 
Fixed coefficients. Yes Governor 
 
 
Daily  
Non-Automatic 
No Retention  
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APPENDIX C 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR CHAPTER 5 
Table 12: Correlations between Patronage and Pork-barrel Spending by Gubernatorial Year, Argentina 
(1983-2003) and Brazil (1982-2006) 
 Year 1 
(Patron) 
Year 2 
(Patron) 
Year 3 
(Patron) 
Year 4 
(Patron) 
Year 1  
(Pork) 
Year 2 
(Pork) 
Year 3 
(Pork) 
Year 4 
(Pork) 
Argentina         
Year 1 1.000 --- --- --- 1.000 --- --- --- 
Year 2 .841 1.000 --- --- .896 1.000 --- --- 
Year 3 -.153 -.283 1.000 --- .795 .887 1.000 --- 
Year 4 -.243 -.372 .965 1.000 .810 .873 .928 1.000 
Brazil         
Year 1 1.000 --- --- --- 1.000 --- --- --- 
Year 2 .958 1.000 --- --- .797 1.000 --- --- 
Year 3 .696 .735 1.000 --- .658 .805 1.000 --- 
Year 4 .876 .897 .709 1.000 .540 .631 .582 1.000 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s R correlation coefficients with significance at p < .05 level.  
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C.1 GUBERNATORIAL PARTY SWITCHING 
Table 13 provides detailed information on Brazilian state governors who switched party 
affiliation during their executive terms in the 1982-2006 period. The Table indicates the name of 
the gubernatorial incumbent, the name of the state he belonged to, the specific year in which he 
switched party, the partisan switch, and its effect upon the governor’s electoral coalition. There 
were several party mergers and splits since the return of democracy that I do not count as party 
switches: (a) In 1985, a split from the military’s PDS formed the PFL; (b) In 1988, a group of 
defectors from the PMDB (the so-called “historic” PMDB) created the PSDB; (c) In 1992, the 
PCB became the PPS; (d) In 1993, the PDC and the PDS became the PPR; (e) Two years later, 
the PPR merged with the newly created PP to form the PPB, which in 2003 abandoned the “B” 
from its acronym to become the PP.  
 
Table 13: Gubernatorial Party Switching in Brazil, 1982-2006 
 
NAME 
 
 
YEAR 
 
FROM 
 
TO 
 
EFFECT OVER COALITION PARTNERS 
 
Romildo Magalhaes 1993 
 
PDS PPB PDS followed the governor. 
Orleir Cameli 1997 
 
PPB PFL Fracture with PPB. 
Augusto Lessa Santos 2005 PSB PDT Most PSB followed the governor. 
 
Amazonino Mendes 
 
1994 PPB PFL Most coalition partners followed the governor. 
Carlos Souza Braga 
 
2005 PPS PMDB Fracture with PFL; PPS followed the governor. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration. 
C.2 DATA SOURCES 
The Table below provides information on the data sources used for the estimations discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Joao Capiberibe 
 
2002 PSB PT PSB followed the governor. 
Joaquim Roriz 
 
1993 PTR PP Most coalition partners followed the governor. 
Max Mauro  
 
1989 PMDB PDT Fracture with PMDB. 
Vitor Buaiz 
 
1997 PT PV Fracture with PT. 
Paulo Hartung 2005 PSB PMDB Fracture with PT; other allies followed 
governor. 
Reynaldo Tavares 2004-05 PFL PTB-
PSB 
Fracture with most coalition partners. 
Dante Martins 
 
1997 PDT PSDB PDT forced governor’s resignation. 
Tarciso Buriti 
 
1989 PMDB PRN Fracture with PMDB. 
Alberto Silva 
 
1989 PMDB PRN Fracture with both PMDB and PDS. 
Jaime Lerner 
 
1998 PDT PFL Most PDT followed the governor. 
Anthony Garotinho 
 
2003 PDT PSB Fracture with PDT. 
Ivo Cassol 
 
2005 PSDB PPS PSDB forced governor’s resignation. 
Neudo Campos 
 
1998 PTB PPB Fracture with PTB. 
Jose Siqueira Campos 
 
1998 PPR PFL PPR followed the governor. 
Marcelo Miranda 2004 PFL PMDB Fracture with sector PFL led by Siqueira 
Campos. 
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Table 14: Data Sources 
Argentina 
 
Electoral Results 
 
 
 
Ministerio del Interior, Dirección Nacional Electoral, Elecciones Nacionales, 
Escrutinio Definitivo (http://www.mininterior.gov.ar); and Atlas Electoral de 
Andy Tow (http://www.towsa.com/andy/index. html). 
State Expenditures Ministerio de Economía, Dirección Nacional de Relación Fiscal con las 
Provincias, Ejecuciones Presupuestarias por Objeto del Gasto 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda). 
Federal Transfers Ministerio de Economía, Dirección Nacional de Relación Fiscal con las 
Provincias, Ejecuciones Presupuestarias por Objeto del Gasto 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda), and unpublished data. 
CPI Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), Dirección de Indices de 
Precios de Consumo, Serie 1983-2003 (http://indec.gov.ar). 
Unemployment 
Median Income 
Employment Sector 
 
INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (http://indec.gov.ar). 
National GDP INDEC, Dirección Nacional de Cuentas Nacionales (http://indec.gov.ar). 
Provincial GDP Mirabella de Sant and Nanni (2003). 
 
Brazil 
 
Electoral Results 
 
 
Tribunal Superior Electoral (http://www.tse.gov.br); and Jairo Nicolao’s 
electoral dataset (http://www.iuperj.br). 
State Expenditures 
 
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN-COREM), Ministerio da Fazenda, 
(http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br); and Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica 
Aplicada (IPEA) (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). 
Federal Transfers 
 
Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN-COREM), Ministerio da Fazenda, 
(http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br). 
CPI Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Conjuntura Econômica 
(http://www.fgvdados.com.br). 
Unemployment 
Median Income 
Employment Sector 
National GDP 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Sistema de Contas 
Nacionais Consolidadas (www.ibge.gov.br); Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicílios (PNAD-IBGE), Serie 1991-2006. 
Provincial GDP IPEA (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br). 
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C.3 METTHODOLOGICAL SPECIFICATION TESTS 
I include below examples of the Hausman specification tests performed on Models 1, and their 
respective specifications with random (instead of fixed) effects for Argentina and Brazil 
respectively. In both cases, the Hausman tests indicate that using random or fixed effects leads to 
the same coefficient estimators since chi 2 > .05. This result can be confirmed visually by 
comparing the figures included below with figures reported in the text. 
 
Argentina 
Hausman test 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed          .          Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln_person_~w |    .3019683     .1700535        .1319148          .08431 
       encpg |   -.0578134    -.0814036        .0235902        .0213131 
ln_p~wxencpg |   -.1004826    -.0565433       -.0439394        .0298248 
ln_invest_~w |    -.016378    -.0050381       -.0113399        .0312947 
ln_i~wxencpg |    .0124218     .0038291        .0085927        .0113046 
      run_re |    .0357736     .0572015       -.0214279        .0103738 
  trf_raw_av |   -.0200598    -.0122829       -.0077769        .0249905 
     scandal |   -.0105479      -.01208        .0015321        .0066853 
lag_vot_aver |    .2357234     .2893015       -.0535781        .0736815 
   unp_pv_ip |   -.4515977    -.1673785       -.2842192        .1712673 
   ln_inc_pv |   -.0036764      .024508       -.0281844        .0486721 
 ln_dens_pop |    .2646113     .0088826        .2557287        .1028715 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        9.65 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.6464 
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Random Effect Model 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       115 
Group variable: state_c                         Number of groups   =        24 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5133                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.8673                                        avg =       4.8 
       overall = 0.6855                                        max =         5 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    152.94 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on state_c) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    spy_sh_g |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln_person_~w |   .2272168    .117627     1.93   0.053    -.0033278    .4577615 
       encpg |  -.0698179   .0347951    -2.01   0.045     -.138015   -.0016208 
ln_p~wxencpg |  -.0743294   .0420323    -1.77   0.077    -.1567112    .0080525 
ln_invest_~w |   -.005766   .0483872    -0.12   0.905    -.1006032    .0890712 
ln_i~wxencpg |   .0074343   .0187215     0.40   0.691    -.0292592    .0441278 
      run_re |    .048842   .0148401     3.29   0.001     .0197559    .0779282 
  ln_trf_raw |  -.0180614    .012909    -1.40   0.162    -.0433625    .0072397 
     scandal |  -.0104988   .0185502    -0.57   0.571    -.0468564    .0258589 
lag_vot_aver |   .2760835   .0968128     2.85   0.004     .0863338    .4658331 
   unp_pv_ip |    -.00493   .0020988    -2.35   0.019    -.0090435   -.0008165 
   ln_inc_pv |  -.0128923    .030544    -0.42   0.673    -.0727575    .0469729 
 ln_dens_pop |   .0102785   .0064141     1.60   0.109    -.0022929    .0228499 
       _cons |   .6077448   .2167397     2.80   0.005     .1829428    1.032547 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .02499446 
     sigma_e |   .0710156 
         rho |   .1102205   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Brazil 
 
Hausman test       
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed          .          Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln_invest_~w |    .1053801     .1064093       -.0010292        .0263867 
       encpg |   -.1449804    -.1641157        .0191353        .0509843 
ln_i~wxencpg |   -.0361191    -.0336679       -.0024511        .0100397 
ln_person_~w |   -.2242506    -.1866777       -.0375729        .0723887 
ln_p~wxencpg |    .0597902     .0380622         .021728        .0259936 
      run_re |    .1149294     .0963835        .0185459        .0144503 
ln_trf_raw~v |    .0748553     .0503935        .0244618        .0391885 
     scandal |   -.0984606    -.0963645        -.002096        .0121196 
lag_vote_g~d |    .0579789     .0191009         .038878        .0727318 
   unp_nc_ip |   -1.159384    -.4046849       -.7546987        .4641493 
   ln_inc_pv |    .0394788     .0698732       -.0303944        .0679658 
 ln_dens_pop |    .0716252    -.0074282        .0790534         .093335 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       16.08 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1874 
 
Random Effects Model 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       153 
Group variable: state_c                         Number of groups   =        27 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4650                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.6220                                        avg =       5.7 
       overall = 0.4950                                        max =         6 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(12)      =    201.28 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on state_c) 
             |               Robust 
    spy_sh_g |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ln_invest_~w |   .1064093    .049661     2.14   0.032     .0090756     .203743 
       encpg |  -.1641157   .0488675    -3.36   0.001    -.2598942   -.0683372 
ln_i~wxencpg |  -.0336679   .0187116    -1.80   0.072     -.070342    .0030061 
ln_person_~w |  -.1866777   .0919978    -2.03   0.042    -.3669901   -.0063653 
ln_p~wxencpg |   .0380622   .0311406     1.22   0.222    -.0229721    .0990966 
      run_re |   .0963835   .0334081     2.89   0.004     .0309048    .1618623 
ln_trf_raw~v |   .0503935   .0209472     2.41   0.016     .0093378    .0914492 
     scandal |  -.0963645   .0244657    -3.94   0.000    -.1443164   -.0484126 
lag_vote_g~d |   .0191009   .0931694     0.21   0.838    -.1635077    .2017094 
   unp_nc_ip |  -.4046849   .8352603    -0.48   0.628    -2.041765    1.232395 
   ln_inc_pv |   .0698732   .0327926     2.13   0.033     .0056008    .1341455 
 ln_dens_pop |  -.0074282   .0079384    -0.94   0.349    -.0229872    .0081308 
       _cons |   .4617134     .29054     1.59   0.112    -.1077346    1.031161 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |   .1257501 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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The Figures 35 to 37 included below illustrate the conditional effect of patronage and 
pork for Argentina and Brazil in different models discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 35: Conditional Effect of Investment Spending on Gubernatorial Party Vote, Argentina (1983-2003). 
Models 1 to 4 
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Figure 36: Conditional Effect of Investment Spending on Gubernatorial Party Vote, Brazil (1982-2006). 
Models 1 to 4 
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Figure 37: Conditional Effect of Personnel Spending on Gubernatorial Party Vote, Argentina 1983-2003. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 
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C.4 PRESIDENTIAL COALITIONS, BRAZIL 1983-2006 
The table below summarizes presidential coalition in Brazil during the period under study. 
 
Table 15: Presidential Coalitions, Brazil 1982-2006 
 
 
PARTY 
 
 
ELECTORAL COALITION 
 
CABINET  COALITION 
 
FIGUEREIDO (1983-1985) 
 
 
PDS 
 
PDS 
 
PDS 
 
SARNEY I (1985) 
SARNEY II (1986-1989) 
 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
PMDB-PFL 
PMDB-PFL 
 
PMDB-PFL-PTB-PDS 
PMDB-PFL 
 
COLLOR I (1990)  
COLLOR II (1991) 
COLLOR III (1992) 
 
 
 
PRN 
PRN 
PRN 
 
 
PST-PSL 
PST-PSL 
PST-PSL 
 
 
PFL-PMDB-PDS 
PFL-PDS 
PFL-PDS-PSDB-PTB-PL 
 
 
ITAMAR I (1993)1 
ITAMAR II (1994) 
 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PTB-PSB 
PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PTB-PP 
 
FHC I (1995-1998) 
 
 
PSDB 
 
PFL-PTB 
 
PMDB 
 
FHC II (1999-2002)  
 
 
PSDB 
 
PFL-PTB-PPB-PPS 
 
PMDB 
 
LULA (2003-2006) 
 
 
PT 
 
PCB-PL-PMN-PCdoB 
 
PCB-PL-PMN-PCdoB 
Notes: (1) I do not consider the PDT and the PT as members of President Itamar Franco’s coalition because these parties only 
have cabinet representation during six and four months respectively. Sources: Amorin Neto (2002), and Borzani (n.d.).  
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APPENDIX D 
POLITICAL ELITES INTERVIEWS 
This appendix lists the names, positions held, partisan affiliation (if applicable), and state of 
origin (if applicable) of the 185 individuals I interviewed in Argentina and Brazil between May 
2005 and December 2006. Information regarding each of the interviewees is followed by the date 
and city where the meeting took place. Most of these individuals are former or current first and 
second-level officials, national and state legislators, governors, vice-governors, mayors, and 
journalists. I list the interviews by country/state and in alphabetical order by the interviewees’ 
last name.  
 
Argentina 
[1] Arlía, Alejandro. Under-Secretary of Fiscal Relations with the Provinces and President of the 
Provincial Development Fiduciary Fund, Ministry of Economy (2001-2003). Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires, October 26, 2005. 
 
[2] Arroyo, Daniel. Secretary of Social Policies and Human Development, Ministry of Social 
Development (2003-2007). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 12, 2005. 
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[3] Baldrich, Jorge (Acción por la República, Mendoza). Secretary of Treasury, Ministry of 
Economy (2001); Secretary of Budget Committee in Chamber of Deputies (1999-2000); 
Federal Under-Secretary of Economy, Ministry of Economy (1994-1996). Buenos Aires, 
December 7, 2005. 
 
[4] Bericua, Jorge (UCR, Tierra del Fuego). Federal Deputy (1996-2000); Provincial Deputy 
(2001-2005). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 14, 2005.  
[5] Berra, Claudia. General Coordinator of Federal Employment Programs (1997-present), 
Ministry of Labor. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, February 2, 2006. 
 
[6] Bonari, Damián. Director of Social Public Spending, Ministry of Economy. September 18, 
2005. 
 
[7] Camaño, Graciela (PJ, Buenos Aires). Minister of Labor (2002-2003); Federal Deputy (1989-
1993, 1997-2001, 2003-2007). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, February 22, 2006. 
 
[8] Carcioffi, Ricardo. Federal Secretary of National Budget, Ministry of Economy (1985-1989). 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 2, 2005. 
 
[9] Castillo Marín, Luis. Director of Employment Promotion (1997-2002), and Director of the 
Federal Employment System (2002-present), Ministry of Labor. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
February 1, 2006.  
 
[10] Centurión, Adrián. Under Secretary of Fiscal Relations with the Provinces, Ministry of 
Economy. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 15, 2005. 
 
[11] Cetrángolo, Oscar. Under-Secretary of Fiscal Relations with the Provinces (1999-2001), 
Ministry of Economy. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 21, 2005. 
 
[12] Doga, Nélida (PJ, Buenos Aires). Minister of Social Development (2002-2003); Federal 
Deputy (2003-2007). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 20, 2005. 
 
[13] Estabillo, José (MOPOF, Tierra del Fuego). Governor Tierra del Fuego (1991-1999); 
President of the Regional Infrastructure Federal Fiduciary Fund (2002-present). Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires, December 12, 2005. 
 
[14] Fadel, Mario (PJ and FCyS, Catamarca). Minister of Economy, Catamarca (1989-1990); 
Federal Deputy (1993-1995); Senator (1995-1999). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 
20, 2005. 
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[15] Fernandez Meijide, Graciela (FG/Alianza, Buenos Aires). Minister of Social Development 
(2001); Buenos Aires Governor Candidate (1999); Senator (1993-1995; 1997-2001); 
Federal Deputy (1995-1997). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 10, 2005.  
 
[16] Freytes, Guido (PJ, Chubut). Federal Deputy (1987-1991); Administrative Secretary of the 
Peronist Party in the Chamber of Deputies (1995-2003). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, February 
2, 2006. 
 
[17] Frigerio, Rogelio. Secretary of Economic Planning, Ministry of Economy (1991-1995); 
Under-Secretary of Public Work and Services, Ministry of Economy (1999); President of 
the FFDP, Ministry of Economy (1997-1999). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 25, 2005. 
 
[18] Gadano, Nicolás. Secretary of National Budget, Ministry of Economy (1999-2001). Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, September 27, 2005. 
 
[19] Gascón, Silvia. Under-Director of Social Policy, Ministry of Social Development (2002-
2003). December 19. 
 
[20] Gómez Sabaini, Juán Carlos. Under-Secretary of Tax and Revenue, Ministry of Economy 
(1999-2001). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 17, 2005.  
 
[21] Jones, Polly. General Coordinator of Employment Programs, World Bank. Ciudad de 
Buenos Aires, January 30, 2006. 
 
[22] Kohan, Alberto. General Secretary of Government (1989-1999). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
December 17, 2009. 
 
[23] Lamberto, Oscar (PJ, Santa Fe). Secretary of Economy, Ministry of Economy (2001-2002); 
Federal Deputy (1992-2001; 2003-2007), President Budget Committee in Chamber of 
Deputies (1992-1999). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 8, 2005.  
 
[24] Lebedinsky, Santiago. Under-Director of Public and External Investment, Ministry of 
Economy. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, January 10, 2006. 
 
[25] Lousteau, Martín. Minister of Production, Buenos Aires (2005); President Buenos Aires 
Provincial Bank (2006-2007). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 31, 2005.  
 
[26] Massacesi, Horacio (UCR, Río Negro). Minister of Government (1984); Governor (1987-
1991, 1991-1995); Senator (1995-2001). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 18, 2005. 
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[27] Makón, Marcos. Secretary of National Budget, Ministry of Economy (1991-1995). Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires, November 2, 2005. 
 
[28] Martinez, Alfredo (UCR, Santa Cruz). Mayor Rio Gallegos (1991-1999); Governor 
Candidate (1995); Federal Deputy (2001-2005); Senator (2005-present). Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, November 22, 2005. 
 
[29] Molinari Romero, Luis (UCR, Cordoba). Vice-Governor (1995-1998); Minister of 
Coordination, Cordoba (1991-1993); Federal Deputy (2001-2005). Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, December 13, 2005. 
 
[30] Mediza, Humberto (PJ, La Pampa). Vice-Governor (1999-2003); Federal Deputy (2003-
present); Provincial Deputy (1983-1991). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 10, 2005. 
 
[31] Negri, Sergio (PJ, Santa Fe). Secretary of Education, Santa Fe (1991-1995); Secretary of 
Health, Santa Fe (1995-1999). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, October 23, 2005. 
 
[32] Pisoni, Jimena. Governmental Official of the Federal Intervention to Santiago del Estero 
(2003-2005). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, January 9, 2006.  
 
[33] Salvatori, Pedro (MPN, Neuquén). Governor (1983-1987); Minister of Economy, Neuquén 
(1983-1987); Senator (2001-present). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 16, 2005.  
 
[34] Snopek, Carlos (PJ, Jujuy). General Secretary of the Governorship, Jujuy (1983-1987); 
Minister of Social Welfare, Jujuy (1996-1997); Chief of Budget Committee in Chamber of 
Deputies (2001-present); Chief Campaign for 1983 and 1995 Jujuy’s gubernatorial 
elections. Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 16, 2005. 
 
[35] Tangelson, Oscar. Secretary of Employment, Ministry of Labor (2002-2003); Secretary of 
Economic Policy, Ministry of Economy (2003-present). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
December 19, 2005. 
 
[36] Vacchinao, Rodolfo (PJ, Santa Fe). Secretary of Financial Relations with the Provinces, 
Ministry of Economy (1997-1999); Minister of Government of the Federal Intervention to 
Corrientes (1997-1998); Minister of Agriculture, Santa Fe (1986-1989). Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires, March 8, 2006. 
 
[37] Vernet, José María (PJ, Santa Fe). Governor (1983-1987); Ministry of Interior, Minister of 
Interior (2001). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, December 14, 2006. 
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[38] Zelkovicz, Carlos. Under-Secretary of Government of the Federal Interventions to Tierra 
del Fuego (1990), Tucumán (1991), Catamarca (1991), and Corrientes (1997-1998). 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, February 14, 2006. 
 
Argentina: Province of Formosa 
[39] Aguero, Carlos. Journalist, Formosa, April 5, 2006. 
 
[40] Aranda, Benito (UCR). Provincial Deputy (1995-1999; 2001-2005). Formosa, April 11, 
2006.  
 
[41] Barberis, Alfredo (UCR). Provincial Deputy (1983-1991); Director Journal Opinión 
Ciudadana. Formosa, April 6, 2006. 
 
[42] Bigatti, Angel Luis. President Empresas del Estado (1974-1976); Director of Planning and 
Finance, Chaco (1978-1980); President CENEA, Formosa (1980-1982); President Formosa 
Economic Federation (1983). Formosa, April 4, 2006. 
 
[43] Joga, Vicente (PJ). Governor (1990-1994); Federal Deputy (1995-1999); Governor 
Candidate (1998, and 2002). Formosa, April 10, 2006. 
 
[44] Hardy, Aníbal (MID). Federal Deputy (1991-1995); Provincial Deputy (1983-1991). 
Formosa, April 6, 2006. 
 
[45] Díaz Roig, Juan Carlos (PJ). Federal Deputy (2001-2005); Council Formosa City (1983-
1987); Secretary of Planning and Development, Formosa (1995-2001); Minister Social 
Assistance, Formosa (1991-1994). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, March 14, 2006. 
 
[46] Encina, Nicasio. General Secretary of the Argentine Rural Workers Union. Formosa, April 
12, 2006. 
 
[47] Gimenez, Ramón (PJ). Federal Deputy (1985-1989; 1993-1997); Provincial Deputy (1989-
1993); Ministry of Education, Formosa (1997-2001). Formosa, April 10, 2006. 
 
[48] Hernández, Gabriel (UCR). Mayor Formosa City (1999-2003); Provincial Deputy (1997-
1999). Formosa, April 10, 2006. 
 
[49] Hernández, Martín (UCR). Provincial Deputy (2005-persent). Formosa, April 4, 2006. 
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[50] Montoya, Carlos. President Formosa’s Rural Society (2000-present). Formosa, April 13, 
2006. 
 
[51] Ojer, Carlos. Secretary of Economy, Formosa (1982-1986). Formosa, April 3, 2006. 
 
[52] Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR). Senator (2005-present); Provincial Deputy (1993-1997); Council 
Formosa City (1999-2003). Formosa, March 15, 2006. 
 
[53] Rhiner, Rodolfo (MID). Governor (1982-1983); Secretary of Economy, Formosa (1980-
1982). Formosa, April 5, 2006. 
 
[54] Sebriano, Luis (PJ). Federal Deputy (1999-2003); Provincial Deputy (1987-1995). 
Formosa, April 4, 2006. 
 
[55] Viscaíno Braida, Roberto (PJ). Provincial Deputy (2003-present). Formosa, April 7, 2006. 
 
[56] Zerbato, Orlando. Journalist. Formosa, April 3, 2006. 
 
 
Argentina: Province of Chaco 
 
[57] Bergia, Juan José (UCR). Provincial Deputy (2003-present); Council Castelli (1991-1993). 
Resistencia, November 27, 2006. 
 
[58] Capitanich, Jorge (PJ). Governor Candidate (2001; 2005); Chief of Federal Cabinet (2002); 
Senate, Chair of Budget Committee (2003-present). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, September 
26, 2005.  
 
[59] Dellamea, Néstor (UCR). Secretary of Public Works, Chaco (2003-present); Under 
Secretary of Social Development, Chaco (1999-2003). Resistencia, November 28, 2006.  
 
[60] Dell’ Orto, Roberto. Minister of Economy, Chaco (2003-present). Resistencia, November 
30, 2006. 
 
[61] Dudik, Oscar (ACHA, UCR). Provincial Deputy (2003-present); Minister of Production, 
Chaco (1998-2003). Resistencia, November 29, 2006.   
 
[62] Fabris, Rodolfo (UCR). Federal Deputy (2005-present); Secretary of Commerce, Chaco 
(1997-2003). Resistencia, November 22, 2006. 
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[63] Gabardini, Eduardo (UCR). Minister of Government, Chaco (1996-2000); Director 
National Central Bank (1993-1995). Resistencia, November 28, 2006.  
 
[64] García, Rodolfo (PJ). Provincial Deputy (1995-present); Council San Martin (1991-1994). 
Resistencia, November 27, 2006. 
 
[65] García Solá, Manuel (PJ). Minister of Government, Education and Justice, Chaco (1993-
1995); Under-Secretary of Education (1996-1998) and Ministry of Education (1998-1999). 
Resistencia, December 5, 2006. 
 
[66] González, Rafael (PJ). Minister of Economy, Chaco (1983-1986); Minister of Economy, 
Tierra del Fuego (1991); Minister of Economy, Corrientes (1992); Mayor Resistencia 
(1995-1999); Chaco Vice Governor Candidate (2003); Federal Deputy, Vice President of 
Budget Committee (2001-2005). Ciudad de Buenos Aires, November 1, 2005. 
 
[67] Gigli, Carlos (PJ). Minster of Economy, Chaco (1992-1995). Resistencia, December 2, 
2006.  
 
[68] Lomónaco, Carlos (ACHA, Bases y Principios). President SECHEEP, Chaco’s Energy 
Provincial Company (2003-present); Provincial Deputy (1989-2003). Resistencia, 
December 5, 2006.  
 
[69] López, Eduardo. Journalist Diario Norte. Resistencia, November 30, 2006. 
 
[70] Maldonado, Hugo (UCR). Provincial Deputy (1997-2003). Resistencia, December 7, 2006. 
 
[71] Marinelli, Daniel (UCR). Under Secretary Public Works, Chaco (2000-present). 
Resistencia, November 28, 2006. 
 
[72] Matkovich, Hugo (UCR). Minister of Government, Chaco (2000-present); Mayor Saenz 
Peña (1991-1999). Resistencia, November 29, 2006. 
 
[73] Moro, Eduardo (UCR). Vice Governor (2003-present); Senator (2001-2003); Secretary of 
Government, Chaco (1995-1997); Provincial Deputy (1991-1995; 1997-2001). Resistencia, 
November 30, 2006. 
 
[74] Ordenavia, Edmundo (PJ). Minister of Economy, Chaco (1987-1991). Resistencia, 
December 8, 2006.  
 
[75] Salomón, Marcos. Journalist El Diario de la Región. Resistencia, November 28, 2006. 
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[76] Sanchez, Ricardo (PJ). Provincial Deputy (1989-present); Council Saenz Peña (1987-
1989). Resistencia, November 27, 2006. 
 
[77] Sotelo, Julio (PJ). Vice Governor Candidate (1991); Provincial Deputy (1985-1991; 1995-
2003). Resistencia, November 30, 2006. 
 
[78] Soporsky, Carlos. Minister of Economy, Chaco (1995-2003). Resistencia, December 11, 
2006.  
 
[79] Tauguinas, Rolando (ACHA). Governor (1991-1995); Ministry of Health, Chaco (1981-
1983). Resistencia, December 5, 2006. 
 
[80] Urlich, Carlos (UCR). Provincial Deputy (1995-present); Council Quitilipi (1983-1985; 
1993-1995); Mayor Quitilipi (1985-1989). November 27, 2006. 
 
[81] Verdún, Luis (UCR). Provincial Deputy (2003-present); Minister of Education, Chaco 
(1999-2003). Resistencia, November 29, 2006. 
 
[82] Wajfeld, José (UCR). Provincial Deputy (1983-1989). Resistencia, December 4, 2006. 
 
[83] Zerco, Darío. Journalist Primera Línea. Resistemcia November 28, 2006. 
 
 
Brazil 
[84] Alves Filho, Garibaldi (RN-PMDB). Governor (1995-1999; 1999-2003); Governor 
Candidate (2006); Senator (1991-1994; 2003-present); Mayor Natal (1986-1988); State 
Deputy (1971-1987). Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
 
[85] Azeredo, Eduardo (MG-PSDB). Governor (1994-1998); Mayor Belo Horizonte (1990-
1992), Senator (2003-present). Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
 
[86] Buarque, Cristovam (DF-PDT). Governor (1990-1994); President Candidate (2006); 
Senator (2003-present); Ministry of Education, Minister of Education (2003-2004). 
Brasília, June 6, 2006. 
 
[87] Gondim, Fabio. Director Senate Budgetary Consulting. Brasília, June 2, 2006. 
 
[88] Gonzaga Mota, Luiz (CE-PSDB). Governor (PDS, 1982-1986), Federal Deputy (1991-
1999; 2003-present); Secretary of Planning, CE (1979-1982). Brasília, June 6, 2006. 
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[89] Graça, Eliana Magalhães. Assessor in Budgetary Policy, INESC. Brasília, May 22, 2006. 
 
[90] Kunder, Marcia. Director Caixa Economica Federal (CEF). Brasília, June 1, 2006. 
 
[91] Mestrinho, Gilberto (AM-PMDB). Governor (1959-1963; 1982-1986; 1990-1994), Senator 
(1998-present); Council Manaus (1956-1958); Secretary of Economy, AM (1959). Brasília, 
May 29, 2006. 
 
[92] Piancastelli, Marcelo. Director Urban and Regional Studies, IPEA. Brasília, May 17, 2006. 
 
[93] Romero Jucá Filho (RR-PSDB). Governor (1988-1992); Governor Candidate (2006); 
Senator (1998-present); Federal Secretary of Housing (1992); Secretary of Social 
Assistance, RR (2005). Brasília, June 7, 2006. 
 
[94] Stranz, Eduardo. Director Confederação Nacional de Municípios (CNM). Porto Alegre, 
October 9, 2006. 
 
 
Brazil: State of Bahia 
[95] Alban, Marcus. General Director Secretariat Industry, Commerce and Tourism, BA (1991-
1993). Salvador, July 4, 2006. 
 
[96] Aleluia, José Carlos (PFL). Federal Deputy (1991-present); Directory Member of the 
Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE), and Director of the Banco 
do Nordeste (1987-1991). Salvador, July 5, 2006. 
 
[97] Borges, Cesar (PFL). Senator (2003-present); Vice-Governor (1998-1999); Governor 
(1999-2003); Secretary of Water Resources, BA (1992-1994). Brasília, May 24, 2006. 
 
[98] Câmara, Paulo (PFL). State Deputy (1995-present), President Budgetary Committee (2001-
2006). Salvador, June 26, 2006. 
 
[99] Castro, Manoel (PFL). Council Tribunal de Contas, BA (2003-present); Federal Deputy 
(1986-2002); Mayor Salvador (1981-1985); Secretary of Industry and Commerce, BA 
(1979); Directory Member of the Banco do Desenvolvimento do Estado da Bahia 
(DESENBAHIA), and the Banco da Bahia. Salvador, July 7, 2006. 
 
[100]  Celestino, Samuel. Journalist, A Tarde. Salvador, June 28, 2006. 
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[101]  Da Matta, Lídice (PSB). State Deputy (1999-present); Mayor Salvador (PSDB, 1993-
1996); Governor Candidate (PCdoB, 1990); Federal Deputy (PCdoB, 1987-1991); Council 
Salvador (PMDB, 1982). Salvador, July 6, 2006. 
 
[102]  Dantas Neto, Paulo Fabio (PMDB). Council Salvador (1982-1990); Academician. 
Salvador, June 30, 2006. 
 
[103]  José, Emiliano (PT). State Deputy (1988-1990; 2003-present); Council Salvador (1999-
2003). Salvador, July 13, 2006. 
 
[104]  Gomes, Alvaro (PCdoB). State Deputy (2003-present), Vice-President CUT-BA (1997-
2000). Salvador, June 29, 2006. 
 
[105]  Leite, Murilo (PSDB). Federal Deputy (1989-1991); State Deputy (1982-1986, 1992-
1995); Secretary of Governorship, BA (1989); Secretary of Public Resources, BA (1988); 
President DESENBAHIA (1987); Council Salvador (MDB, 1977-1980). Salvador, July 11, 
2006. 
 
[106]  Leonelli, Domingos (PDT). Secretary of Economy, Employment and Rent, Salvador 
(2004-present); Candidate Mayor Salvador (PSDB, 1996); Federal Deputy (PSB, 1983-
1991; PSDB, 1995-1999); Secretary of Communication, Development, and Strategic 
Actions, Salvador (1993-1994); State Deputy (MDB, 1979-1982). Salvador, July 10, 2006. 
 
[107]  Menezes, Vladson. President DESENBAHIA (2004-present). Salvador, July 12, 2006. 
 
[108]  Penino, Cristiano. Coordinator of Industry, Secretariat of Industry, Commerce, and 
Mining, BA. Salvador, July 10, 2006. 
 
[109]  Santos, Roberto (ARENA, PSDB). Governor (1975-1979); Governor Candidate (1982); 
Minister of Health, Ministry of Health (1986-1987); Federal Deputy (PSDB, 1995-1999). 
Salvador, July 17, 2006. 
 
[110]  Soares, Dennis (PT). President CUT-BA (1997-2000), Assessor of Federal Deputy Zezeu 
Ribeiro. Salvador, June 21, 2006. 
 
[111]  Princhak, Rogério. Director of Credit Operations and State Public Debt, Secretariat of 
Economy, BA. Salvador, June 22, 2006. 
 
[112]  Uderman, Simone. Assessor Technical Operations, DESENBAHIA. Salvador, July 12, 
2006. 
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[113]  Vaz, Cesar. Director Superintendência de Estudos Econômicos e Sociais (SEI), BA. 
Salvador, July 17, 2006. 
 
 
Brazil: State of Pernambuco 
 
[114]  Araújo, Bruno (PSDB). State Deputy (1998-present). Recife, July 26, 2006. 
 
[115]  Anonym: Assessor former Governor and Federal Deputy Joaquim Francisco (PFL). 
Recife, August 9, 2006. 
 
[116]  Anonym: Assessor former Mayor of Lajedo and State Deputy Adelmo Duarte (PFL). 
Recife, August 10, 2006. 
 
[117]  Briano, Maria José. Secretary of Economy, PE (2005-present). Recife, August 4, 2006. 
 
[118]  Cavalcanti, Luis Otavio. Secretary of Planning, PE (1975-1979, 1991-1992); Secretary of 
Economy, PE (1983-1986, 1992-1993); Director Diario de Pernambuco (1997-2002). 
Recife, July 25, 2006.  
 
[119]  Chaves, Felipe. Director AD/Diper (Economic Development Agency, PE). Recife, August 
3, 2006. 
 
[120]  Coelho, Geraldo (PFL). State Deputy (1982-present); Mayor Petrolina (1973-1977); 
Council Petrolina (1966-1973). Recife, July 31, 2006.  
 
[121]  Costa, Silvio (PMN). State Deputy (2002-present); Council Recife (1992-2002). Recife, 
July 21, 2006. 
 
[122]  De Paula, André (PFL). Federal Deputy (1999-present); Secretary of Rural Production and 
Agrarian Reform, PE (1999-2002); State Deputy (1995-1999). Recife, August 4, 2006. 
 
[123]  Freire, Roberto (PPS). Federal Deputy (2004-present, 1979-1995); Senator (1995-2003); 
President and Vice-President Candidate (1989, 1988). Brasília, August 16, 2006. 
 
[124]  Guerra, Sergio (PSDB). Senator (2003-present); Federal Deputy (1990-2002); Secretary of 
Industry and Commerce, PE (1988-1989); Secretary of Science and Technology, PE 
(1989); Secretary of Economy, PE (1993-1994); State Deputy (1982-1988). Brasília, 
August 22, 2006. 
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[125]  Jatobá, José. Secretary of Employment (1996) and Minister of Labor (1998), Ministry of 
Labor; Secretary of Economy, PE (1999-2004). Recife, August 8, 2006. 
 
[126]  Jucá Maciel, Suely. Director of Planning and Local Development, PE. Recife, July 26, 
2006. 
 
[127]  Krause, Gustavo (PFL). Secretary of Economy, PE (1975-1979 and 1991); Mayor Recife 
(1979-1982); Vice-Governor (1982-1986); Governor (1986-1987); Federal Deputy (1991-
1995); Minister of Economy, Ministry of economy (1992); Governor Candidate (1994). 
Recife, August 1, 2006. 
 
[128]  Magalhães, Roberto (PFL). Governor (1990-1994); Mayor Recife (1994-1998); Federal 
Deputy (1998-present). June 8. 
 
[129]  Maciel, Marco (PFL). Governor (1978-1982); Vice-President (1994-2002) Senator (2002-
present). Recife, August 5, 2006. 
 
[130]  Nascimento, Isaltino (PT). State Deputy (2004-present); Council Recife (2000-2004); 
President CUT-PE. Recife, August 1, 2006.  
 
[131]  Negromonte, João (PMDB). State Deputy (1998-present); Council Nazaré da Mata (1992-
1996); Council Recife (1996-1998); Secretary of Government and Social Action, Recife 
(1990-1992). Recife, August 6, 2006.  
 
[132]  Pais, Djalma (PSB). Secretary of Planning, Recife (2002-2004); Federal Deputy (1998-
2002); State Deputy (1990-1998). Recife, July 27, 2006. 
 
[133]  Queiroz, José (PDT). Mayor  Caruarú (1992-1996); State Deputy (1978-1982, 1996-
present). Recife, August 8, 2006. 
 
[134]  Ribeiro, Ceça (PSB). State Deputy (2002-present). Recife, August 12, 2006. 
 
[135]  Sampaio, Ivanildo. Journalist, Journal do Comercio. Recife, July 27, 2006. 
 
[136]  Soriano, Aymar. Director of Fiscal Benefits and Relations with Municipalities, Secretariat 
of Economy, PE. Recife, August 1, 2006. 
 
[137]  Suarez, José Arnildo. Secretary of Planning and Social Development, PE (2001-2004). 
Recife, August 11, 2006. 
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Brazil: State of Paraná 
[138]  Beraldin, Neivo (PDT). State Deputy (1986-present), President Budgetary Committee; Council 
Curitiba (1982-1986). Curitiba, September 4, 2006. 
 
[139] Bueno, Nestor. Secretary of Planning, PR (2006-present); General Director, Secretariat of 
Economy, PR (1991-2006). Curitiba, August 30, 2006. 
 
[140]  Castor, Belmiro. Secretary of Planning, PR (1983-1987, 1989-1990); Secretary of 
Education, PR (1988-1989). Curitiba, August 31, 2006. 
 
[141]  Campana, Fabio. Secretary of Communication, PR. Curitiba, September 6, 2006. 
 
[142]  Canto Neto, Augusto. Secretary of Public Works, PR (1997-2002); Secretary of Public 
Works, Curitiba (1986-1996). Curitiba, September 13, 2006. 
 
[143]  Correia, Elza (PMDB). State Deputy (2002-present); Council Londrina (PCdoB, 1996-
2002). Curitiba, August 29, 2006. 
 
[144]  De Lala, Rafael. Assessor State Deputy Anibal Khury; Journalist. Curitiba, September 12, 
2006. 
 
[145]  Dias, Alvaro (PMDB). Senator (1998-present); Governor (1987-1991); Governor 
Candidate (1998); State Deputy (1982-1986); Council Londrina (1978-1982). Brasília, June 
12, 2006. 
 
[146]  Dr. Rosinha (PT). Federal Deputy (1998-present); State Deputy (1990-1998); Council 
Curitiba (1988-1990). Curitiba, September 13, 2006.  
 
[147]  Ferreira, José Maria (PMDB). State Deputy (1994-present); General Director, Secretariat 
of Urban Development, PR (1993-1994); Mayor Ibiporã (1989-1993); Council Ibiporã 
(1976-1989). Curitiba, September 4, 2006.  
 
[148]  Gomes, Paulo. Chief Cabinet State Deputy Geraldo Cartário (PMDB). Brasília, August 28, 
2006. 
 
[149]  Guerra, Jorge. General Director of Industrial and Commercial Promotion, Secretariat of 
Industry and Commerce, PR. Curitiba, September 11, 2006.  
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[150]  Justus, Nelson (PFL). State Deputy (1998-present); Secretary of Transport, PR (2001-
2003); Secretary of Industry and Commerce, PR (1996-1998); President of COHAPAR and 
SANEPAR, PR. Curitiba, September 4, 2006. 
 
[151]  Isfer, Marcos (PFL-PPS). State Deputy (1994-present); Secretary of Government, Curitiba 
(1997; 1998-2000); Mayor Curitiba (1990-1992); Director DETRAN and ABDETRAN; 
Council Curitiba (1984-1988). Curitiba, September 1, 2006. 
 
[152]  Mazza, Luiz Geraldo. Journalist. Curitiba, September 13, 2006. 
 
[153]  Pastor Edson Praczyk. State Deputy (2002-present). Curitiba, September 5, 2006. 
 
[154]  Rossoni, Valdir (PSDB). State Deputy (1990-present); Mayor Bituruna (1982-1986). 
Curitiba, August 29, 2006.  
 
[155]  Sebastiani, Sylvio. Assessor former Governors Jose Richa and Roberto Requiao; Founder 
MDB/PR. Curitiba, September 13, 2006. 
 
[156]  Troncha, Ronaldo (PMDB). Chief Cabinet Federal Deputy Maocir Micheletto. Brasília, 
August 17, 2006. 
 
[157]  Veneri, Tadeu (PT). State Deputy (2002-present). Curitiba, September 6, 2006. 
 
 
Brazil: State of Rio Grande do Sul 
[158]  Arno, Agustin (PT). Secretary of Economy, Ministry of Economy (2003-2005); Secretary 
of Economy, RS (1999-2002). Porto Alegre, October 6, 2006. 
[159]  Bona Garcia, João Carlos. Chief Civil House, RS (1998-1999); Director Banco do Estado 
do Rio Grande do Sul, BANRISUL (1997-1998); Vice-Chief Civil House, RS (1986-1990). 
Porto Alegre, October 9, 2006. 
 
[160]  Bogo, Vicente (PMDB). Vice-Governor (1994-1998); Federal Deputy (1987-1991); 
Council Santa Rosa (1983-1987). Porto Alegre, September 20, 2006. 
 
[161]  Braga, Polibio (PMDB). Chief Civil House, RS (1988); Secretary of Economy, Porto 
Alegre; Secretary of Industry and Commerce, Porto Alegre; Secretary of International 
Relations, RS; Journalist. Porto Alegre, September 27, 2006. 
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[162]  Braz, Luiz (PSDB). Council Porto Alegre (1988-present). Porto Alegre, September 21, 
2006.  
 
[163]  Brunet, Julio. Chief Cabinet Secretariat of Planning, RS. Porto Alegre, September 27, 
2006. 
 
[164]  Busatto, Cezar (PMDB, PPS). Secretary of Economy, RS (1995-1998); Secretary of 
Political Coordination, Porto Alegre (2003-present); Candidate Mayor Porto Alegre (2000); 
State Deputy (1999-2002). Porto Alegre, September 25, 2006. 
 
[165]  Calazans, Roberto. General Director Department Special Programs, Secretariat of 
Planning, RS (2004-present). Porto Alegre, September 25, 2006. 
 
[166]  Cunha, Guaracy (PT). Secretary of Communication, RS (1999-2002); Secretary of 
Communication, Porto Alegre (2003-present). Porto Alegre, October 9, 2006. 
 
[167]  Dib, Joao (PP). Candidate Vice-Governor RS (2006); Mayor Porto Alegre (1983-1985); 
Council Porto Alegre (1988-present). Porto Alegre, September 21, 2006. 
 
[168]  Ferrari, Antenor (PMDB). State Deputy (1978-1990); Secretary of Health, RS (1987-
1990). Porto Alegre, October 5, 2006. 
 
[169]  Ilgenfritz, Clovis (PT). Federal Deputy (2001-2002); Governor Candidate (1986); Council 
Porto Alegre (1989-2000). Porto Alegre, October 6, 2006. 
 
[170]  Koutzii, Flavio (PT). State Deputy (1990-1998; 2003-present); Chief Civil House RS 
(1999-2002). Porto Alegre, October 2, 2006. 
 
[171]  Leal, Sauro. Chief Cabinet Federal Deputy Cezar Schirmer (PMDB). Brasília, August 17, 
2006. 
 
[172]  Majewski, Cora. Director Investment, Secretariat of Development and International 
Affairs, RS. Porto Alegre, October 3, 2006.   
 
[173]  Mosmann, Gilberto (PMDB). Vice President Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do 
Extremo Sul (BRDE); Secretary of Development, RS (1996-1997). Porto Alegre, October 
9, 2006. 
 
[174]  Pietroski, Iradir (PDT). State Deputy (1990-present); Secretary of Work and Social 
Assistance, RS (1997); Mayor Ervar Grande (1982-1988); Council Ervar Garnde (1976-
1982). Porto Alegre, October 3, 2006.  
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[175]  Pinheiro, Ezidio (PSDB). Federal Deputy (1995-2003); President Federation of 
Agricultural Workers, FETAG (1983-1986; 1989-1994; 2003-present). Porto Alegre, 
September 25, 2006. 
 
[176]  Polidoro, Rui. President Federação das Cooperativas de Produção Rural, RS 
(FECOAGRO). Porto Alegre, October 6, 2006. 
 
[177]  Pont, Raul (PT). Mayor Porto Alegre (1990-1994); Federal Deputy (1990-1992); State 
Deputy (1986-1990; 2002-present). Porto Alegre, October 4, 2006. 
 
[178]  Postal, Alexandre (PMDB). State Deputy (1994-present); Secretary of Transport, RS 
(2000-2002); Mayor Guapore (1988-1992). Porto Alegre, September 19, 2006.  
 
[179]  Righi, Fernando. Chief Cabinet Secretariat of Economic Developing, RS. Porto Alegre, 
September 28, 2006. 
 
[180]  Riter, Cinara. Federação das Associações de Municípios do Rio Grande do Sul 
(FAMURS). Porto Alegre, September 28, 2006. 
 
[181]  Ruas, Pedro (PDT). Secretary of Public Works, RS (1999-2000); Council Porto Alegre 
(1988-1999). Porto Alegre, October 3, 2006. 
 
[182]  Saldanha, Alcides (PMDB). Secretary of Mines, Energy and Communication, RS (1987-
1990); Ministry of Transport, Minister of Transport (1995-1997); Mayor Caçapava; 
Council Caçapava. Porto Alegre, September 26, 2006. 
 
[183]  Schmidt, Matheus (PDT). Federal Deputy (1963-1971; 1983-1987; 1995-1999); Secretary 
of Transport, RS (1990-1994). Porto Alegre, October 4, 2006. 
 
[184]  Streck, Adroaldo (PDT, PSDB). Federal Deputy (1987-2000); Secretary of Federal Affairs 
(2000-2002); President CGEE/RS (2002-2003); Journalist. Porto Alegre, September 26, 
2006. 
 
[185]  Villela, Guilherme (PP). Secretary of Transport RS (1995-1997); Secretary of Planning, 
RS; Secretary of Government, RS; Mayor Porto Alegre (1975-1985); State Deputy. Porto 
Alegre, September 27, 2006. 
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